Voice and Voices in Antiquity

Mnemosyne Supplements

MONOGRAPHS ON GREEK AND LATIN LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE

Executive Editor

G.J. Boter (*VU University Amsterdam*)

Editorial Board

A. Chaniotis (*Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton*)
K.M. Coleman (*Harvard University*)
I.J.F. de Jong (*University of Amsterdam*)
T. Reinhardt (*Oxford University*)

VOLUME 396

The titles published in this series are listed at *brill.com/mns*

Voice and Voices in Antiquity

Orality and Literacy in the Ancient World, vol. 11

Edited by

Niall W. Slater

BRILL

LEIDEN | BOSTON

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Slater, Niall W., 1954- editor.
Title: Voice and voices in antiquity / edited by Niall W. Slater.
Other titles: Mnemosyne, bibliotheca classica Batava. Supplementum ; 396. | Orality and literacy in the ancient world ; v. 11.
Description: Leiden ; Boston : Brill, 2016. | Series: Mnemosyne supplements ; volume 396 | Series: Orality and literacy in the ancient world ; vol. 11
Identifiers: LCCN 2016034426 (print) | LCCN 2016035431 (ebook) | ISBN 9789004327306 (hardback : alk. paper) | ISBN 9789004329737 (e-book)
Subjects: LCSH: Classical literature–History and criticism. | Oral communication in literature.
Classification: LCC PA3003.V65 2016 (print) | LCC PA3003 (ebook) | DDC 880.9–dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016034426

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: "Brill". See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface.

ISSN 0169-8958
ISBN 978-90-04-32730-6 (hardback)
ISBN 978-90-04-32973-7 (e-book)

Copyright 2017 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.
Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi and Hotei Publishing.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher.
Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change.

This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

Contents

Acknowledgements IX
Notes on Contributors X

1 Introduction 1
Niall W. Slater

PART 1
Epic Voices

2 Voice and Voices: Homer and the Stewardship of Memory 11
Elizabeth Minchin

3 Which Limits for Speech Reporting? Messenger Scenes and Control of Repetition in the *Iliad* 31
Ombretta Cesca

4 The Voice of the Seer in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* 54
Deborah Beck

5 The Individual Voice in *Works and Days* 74
Ruth Scodel

6 Nestor's Cup and Its Reception 92
Jasper Gaunt

PART 2
Lyric and Dramatic Voices

7 Pindar's Voice(s): The Epinician *Persona* Reconsidered 123
Claas Lattmann

8 *Poeta Loquens*: Poetic Voices in Pindar's *Paean* 6 and Horace's *Odes* 4.6 149
Margaret Foster

9 *Melizein Pathe* or the Tonal Dimension in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*: Voice, Song, and *Choreia* as Leitmotifs and Metatragic Signals for Expressing Suffering 166
Anton Bierl

10 Daphnis' Folksong: The Euphonist's Effect on the Creation of a Textual Performance 208
Naomi Kaloudis

PART 3
From Singing to Narrative Voice

11 Towards a Grammar of Narrative Voice: From Homeric Pragmatics to Hellenistic Stylistics 233
Andreas Willi

12 The Voice of Aeschylus in Plato's *Republic* 260
Geoffrey W. Bakewell

13 Character in Narrative Depictions of Composing Oral Epics and Reading Historiographies 277
Raymond F. Person, Jr.

PART 4
Voices of Prose

14 Written Record and Membership in Persian Period Judah and Classical Athens 297
Aubrey E. Buster

15 Voiced Mathematics: Orality and Numeracy 321
Tazuko Angela van Berkel

16 Cicero's Representation of an Oral Community in *De Oratore* 351
Joanna Kenty

17 Becoming Gallic: Orality, Voice and Identity in Roman Gaul 377
Jay Fisher

18 **λόγος and φωνή in *Odyssey* 10 and Plutarch's *Gryllus*** 397
Athena Kirk

19 **The Fragrance of the Rose: An Image of the Voice in Achilles Tatius** 416
Amy Koenig

Index 433

Acknowledgements

The conference from which this volume of *Orality and Literacy in the Ancient World* derives took place at Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia, in September 2014. I thank the Department of Classics, the Program in Ancient Mediterranean Studies, and the Emory Conference Center Subvention Fund for their generous financial support. My particular gratitude goes to the colleagues, staff, and students at Emory who generously volunteered their time and talents both in the preparations for the conference and its smooth running, and above all to John Black, our nonpareil departmental administrator, whose personal and financial acumen supported every step.

Authors have used either British or American conventions of spelling and punctuation, and bibliographies show minor differences in citation practices, but I trust these will in no way inconvenience readers. For help with preparation of computer files for the press and proofreading I am indebted to my very gifted student assistant Jamie Dawes and our outstanding departmental assistant Kim Oliphant.

Notes on Contributors

Geoffrey W. Bakewell
Professor of Greek and Roman Studies at Rhodes College, Memphis, Tennessee

Deborah Beck
Associate Professor of Classics, University of Texas at Austin

Anton Bierl
Professor of Classics, especially Greek Literature, University of Basel, Switzerland

Aubrey E. Buster
PhD Candidate in Hebrew Bible, Emory University, Atlanta

Ombretta Cesca
PhD Candidate in Ancient Greek, University of Lausanne

Jay Fisher
Visiting Assistant Professor of Classics, Rutgers University

Margaret Foster
Assistant Professor, Classical Studies, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana

Jasper Gaunt
Curator of Greek and Roman Art, Michael C. Carlos Museum, Emory University, Atlanta

Naomi Kaloudis
Visiting Assistant Professor of Classics, Valparaiso University

Joanna Kenty
Post-doctoral Research and Teaching Associate in Classics for the Responsible Governance and Sustainable Citizenship Program, University of New Hampshire

Athena Kirk
Assistant Professor of Classics, Cornell University

Amy Koenig
PhD candidate in Classical Philology, Harvard University

Claas Lattmann
Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter, Institut für Klassische Altertumskunde, Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel

Elizabeth Minchin
Emeritus Professor, Centre for Classical Studies, The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia

Raymond F. Person, Jr.
Professor of Religion, Ohio Northern University

Ruth Scodel
D.R. Shackleton Bailey Collegiate Professor of Greek and Latin, University of Michigan

Tazuko Angela van Berkel
Postdoctoral Researcher and Lecturer, Leiden University

Andreas Willi
Diebold Professor of Comparative Philology, University of Oxford

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Niall W. Slater

The biennial series of conferences from which these volumes have emerged began at the University of Tasmania in Hobart, Australia, in July 1994. The conference on "Voice into Text: Orality and Literacy in Ancient Greece," convened by Ian Worthington, was not originally planned as the beginning of a series, but the great enthusiasm of participants at that event and the spontaneous invitation from Anne Mackay at the conference banquet to convene again in Durban, South Africa, two years later made the series a reality. Sustained by no international organization but only the vision and enthusiasm of successive volunteers, the series reached its 20th anniversary with the gathering at Emory University in Atlanta in September 2014.

The theme of that first conference focused on the interactions of oral and literate cultures in Greece but already welcomed comparative studies reaching into modern Greek oral poetry and oral traditions in southern Africa.[1] While successive conferences have usually been organized around a theme, sometimes more broadly, sometimes more narrowly articulated, they have also welcomed a wide range of approaches and themes in the papers, including in more recent years studies reaching into the Near East and biblical traditions and texts as well as later into Rome and indeed into peoples and languages the Romans took over.

The theme of the 2014 conference, "Voice and Voices," was chosen both with an eye to the theme of the first conference in 1994 and with a view toward the multiplication and pluralization of notions of "voice" in many approaches to the ancient world over recent years. The papers selected for this volume (and independently refereed) speak in various ways to the changing and, though not all would agree, evolving notions of voice and voices as they descend to us in textual form. Nearly all of us who read or otherwise experience works from antiquity both in poetry and prose hear distinctive voices in those texts, but what is implicit in that recognition of separate voices? As at the conference, so now in their literate reincarnation, the papers of this volume speak to each other in some closer conversations and some that arch over time. The

1 Gauntlett 1996, Whitaker 1996.

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2017 | DOI: 10.1163/9789004329737_002

four groupings of papers have an underlying chronological organization, but I hope they also facilitate conversations that reach across time, genre, and even medium.

The first group, "Epic Voices," listens for the voices of both poet and characters within the world of epic verse, but also looks forward to how one of those voices re-inscribed itself in another medium. It begins with Elizabeth Minchin's study of "Voice and Voices: Homer and the Stewardship of Memory," in origin the keynote address of the 2014 conference, which carries us at once into the question of how the oral poet retrieves traditional stories from his memory and integrates them as distinctive voices as well as narratives within the tale told in his own voice. Building on her earlier studies of the workings of the bard's memory, Minchin examines how different tales may be stored under a range of labels in the poet's memory, ready for retrieval and redeployment in new and potentially varied contexts. Visual and spatial memory combine as the poet resurrects these voices, not just for thematic enrichment of the main narrative but also as a distinctive expression of the character, telling a story as he or she is wont to do, so that "each story is true to its teller." The rich results of her study interweave themselves through many of the contributions that here follow.

In raising the question "Which Limits for Speech Reporting?" Ombretta Cesca examines how a speaker hands over his voice to a messenger for ultimate delivery to a recipient. Within the world of the Homeric poems, no character ever doubts the reliability of a particular messenger, nor does any messenger ever falsify his message. Nonetheless, we never see more than one messenger at work in the process of transmission, which might indicate implicit doubt about the reliability of a more extended chain of messengers. Cesca's nuanced study traces similarities in the embedding of speeches in both the main narrative and the discourse of characters themselves and suggests that the limit is rather a narratological one. One voice can successfully reproduce the character and focalization of another voice, but two degrees of embedding might overtax the resources of oral technique for poet and hearers like.

While a divine messenger may pass along the voice of a god in so many words, the seer operates differently in the Homeric poems, formulating in his own words what he sees beyond the present circumstances. Deborah Beck's study of "The Voice of the Seer in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*" demonstrates how two different systems of words for prophets and prophecies illuminate not so much an individual's view of the authority of divinely inspired utterance but rather the ways in which the appearance of a marked set of terms illuminates the pre-existing or co-existing conflicts of power and authority on the poem's human level. The voice of the seer is normally respected, but when struggles

arise, the appearance of terms built on the root θεοπρόπ- help to signal to the poem's hearers the spread of conflict. The result is not a simple choosing up of sides, with competing voices speaking only through one set of terms or the other; rather, divisions of language help map social dysfunction in ways that reinforce the larger themes of both poems.

Turning to Hesiod, Ruth Scodel seeks "The Individual Voice in *Works and Days*." Leaving aside questions of autobiography, whether fact or fiction, Scodel examines both features of language (in Hesiod's novelties or variations in formulaic language) and characteristics of the nature and focus of the poet's advice to his hearers (exceptional in the degree of their caution and risk aversion) against the background of subsistence farming in archaic Greece. Taken together, these features suggest an individuality of voice and indeed a coherent character uniting these elements of voice within the poem. A quick survey of the poem's reception in antiquity confirms that what seems exceptional and individual in the poem is also what is least likely to be quoted again from a text that nonetheless becomes canonical.

The final paper of this section shows how an epic conversation carries on to a much later age and in a different medium. With the advent of literacy came the power to endow objects with voice—and some of those objects then engage in dialogue with earlier voices. Jasper Gaunt's "Nestor's Cup and its Reception" begins with the relationship that a ceramic skyphos found on Pithekoussai claims with the famous cup of Nestor known to us through the *Iliad* but perhaps memorialized even more famously in versions now lost to us from the Cyclic epics. Ancient artists and writers alike demonstrate a fascination with this cup all out of proportion to the *Iliad*'s six-line version. Gaunt's study richly illustrates how Nestor's cup spoke to later generations (from west Greek colonists to Alexander the Great marching east and others beyond), encouraging them in turn to join in a dialogue both visual and verbal through their own versions.

Since lyric forms undoubtedly coexisted with the height of the epic oral tradition, it is still a lively and interesting question as to whether lyric voices, when we first can hear them, represent a new and more individual voice than that of epic. Certainly the voices of drama, staged as they are without the possibility of a single voice comprehending or controlling all the others, do open out new dimensions of voice. The group of papers on "Lyric and Dramatic Voices" examines both lyric and dramatic practices in their original performance contexts as well as ways in which they are remembered or reimagined for later periods.

Listening *for* a voice makes assumptions about what voice we will find. In "Pindar's Voice(s): The Epinician *Persona* Reconsidered" Claas Lattmann offers

a bold reconsideration of what voice we have been listening for in Pindar since the days of the scholars working at the library of Alexandria. Beginning from the performance implied within the world of epinician ode, Lattmann listens for and finds a voice that is neither Pindar's nor a timeless poet's but rather that of a performer engaged in the imagined victory celebration. We may lose the voice of "Pindar" in the process, but we (re-)gain the voice of the fictionalized performance.

The aesthetics as well as the ethics of borrowing a voice reemerge at the heart of Margaret Foster's "*Poeta Loquens*: Poetic Voices in Pindar's *Paean* 6 and Horace's *Odes* 4.6." While the Roman poet's debt to Pindar has been acknowledged before, Foster shows how each poet's voice speaks exceptionally in each of these poems within the larger scope of their work, thereby offering insight into how Horace's borrowing of this particular Pindaric voice empowers his own role in directing a Roman chorus singing his own work and inviting Apollo into its performance. The result is a distinctly commanding voice for the poet at this moment within the larger world of the *Odes*.

Tragedy necessarily consists of voices in both concord and discord, played out before an audience, but no tragedy so thematizes the voice as does the *Oresteia* of Aeschylus. Beginning with the centrality of choral song, Anton Bierl's "*Melizein Pathe* or the Tonal Dimension in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*: Voice, Song, and *Choreia* as Leitmotifs and Metatragic Signals for Expressing Suffering" opens out the ways in which voices of both characters and chorus struggle to express hope for order and renewal at Argos even as so many forces threaten to tear the society apart. Attempts to sing the ritually correct produce perverted forms, and songs of suffering and lament enact rather than manage the violence they address. Repeated references to the chorus and song of the Furies culminate in the powerful scene of the prisoner prophetess Cassandra, at first silent in the face of Clytemnestra's taunts but eventually bursting forth in almost inarticulate cries that weave themselves into a lament, discordant to the ears of the chorus but prophetic of both her own fate and that of the house she enters. Bierl finds in these self-referential performances in the *Agamemnon* vocal threads that lead on to the laments of *Choephoroi* and the terrifying chorus of Erinyes that nonetheless can bring the *Eumenides* to a successful conclusion.

The collection of the Greek poetic heritage at Alexandria in written form regularly entailed a fission within the voice, a separation of the inherited texts from the music to which they had once been bound, provoking in turn a new interest in the sonic and musical effects of the language itself. It became possible, perhaps even necessary to re-imagine the lyric voice for this new age. Naomi Kaloudis's "Daphnis' Folksong: The Euphonist's Effect on the Creation of a Textual Performance" explores the interest of both scholars and poets in

euphony and cacophony, in repetition and the emotional effect of sound, and then focuses on the first *Idyll* of Theocritus as an attempt to rewrite the voice of folksong for the literate Alexandrian age.

It is not just later poetry that appropriates and restages both genres and linguistic forms once characteristic of oral performance alone. As an age of prose begins, those working in new forms of *historia* seek to quote or reproduce in their story-telling effects once native to the oral poetic tradition. The section "From Singing to Narrative Voice" offers three studies of this time of transition.

The textures of language within the voices form the subject of Andreas Willi's "Towards a Grammar of Narrative Voice: From Homeric Pragmatics to Hellenistic Stylistics." Beginning from the familiar but still puzzling observation that the historical present is essentially absent from Homeric Greek, yet when it appears in archaic and early classical prose seems to be a feature or reminisce of oral storytelling, Willi offers a more compelling account of the functions of the historical present in prose narrative, using the cognitive linguistic framework derived from the work of Wallace Chafe, as a prelude to discerning the same narrative functions of "immediate discourse" in Homer, but carried out by another and older system of making meaning. The result allows us to hear far more clearly how both the Homeric narrator and his characters lift certain moments and statements out of the flow of narrative. While the structurally different mode of the historical present may have been arising even before the Homeric poems took their final shape, it carries forward the same varieties of immediacy into the classical age and indeed in popular narrative beyond. The results are both a call for, and an important step toward, a grammar of narrative voice.

An implicit paradox of the borrowed voice lies within perhaps the most famous work of Plato. In "The Voice of Aeschylus in Plato's *Republic*" Geoffrey Bakewell asks why Socrates, the avowed enemy of mimetic poetry generally and tragedy in particular, chooses to quote with some regularity and indeed some approval from the great tragedian of the previous century. If the alluring voice of tragedy is toxic to the education of young, Socrates ought not to risk any citation of it before his young hearers. Bakewell traces within the *Republic*'s own imitation of voices as they never were an arc of development that hints how a redeemed tragedy might nonetheless be allowed to speak within the ideal city state of Kallipolis.

The authority of the voice, whether resident in the performer or in the shared community, is the focus of Raymond Person's comparative study of "Character in Narrative Depictions of Composing Oral Epics and Reading Historiographies." Drawing on records of oral performances in both the Greek tradition and

that of the Hebrew scriptures, Person asks how both bardic figures and narrators of history or law not only give voice to tradition but are imbued with the authority to interpret that tradition. Most notably in the figure of Moses, the roles of both bard and lawgiver are united in one and mutually reinforce each other.

While what we now think of as an age of prose may have coincided with a small rise in literacy, a still lively and complex oral culture makes itself very much felt in new literate expressions, some increasingly entangled with the state. Democratic Athens had a strong ideological commitment to oral deliberation in both its determinations of citizenship and the operations of both assembly and law courts. The Roman oratorical tradition likewise prided itself on oral tradition as well as praxis, while other state interests had to interact with new populations living partly in other linguistic environments. Philosophical interest in the relationship between voice and thought emerges, even in very playful forms. These interests and more come to the fore in a final section on "Voices of Prose."

The authority of text *as* a voice and the ability of other voices to contest it is the centerpiece of Aubrey Buster's comparative study, "Written Record and Membership in Persian Period Judah and Classical Athens." Though differently motivated, two communities of the eastern Mediterranean, the postexilic society of Judah and the rising city state of Athens, both had powerful needs to define their own membership, and both possessed written records that spoke to those questions of membership. The very different approaches to the authority claims of a written text in competition with the living voices of the contemporary community are mutually illuminating for the modes of cultural memory in each society.

The persuasive voice at work with numbers lies at the heart of Tazuko Angela van Berkel's highly innovative study of "Voiced Mathematics: Orality and Numeracy." While "oral arithmetic" sounds on the face of it a challenging enterprise in any circumstance, orators in both the assembly and the law courts needed to be able to deploy numerical arguments and reasoning. Van Berkel employs two law court speeches, one by Lysias in the late fifth-century and another by Demosthenes from the fourth, to demonstrate the ways in which skilled orators adapted their numerical arguments both to the material of their cases and their hearers' abilities to follow such arguments. Lysias cites and qualifies numbers in ways that build the moral authority of his case (and delineate the depravity of his opponents), while Demosthenes creates a persona for himself as a master of accuracy who simply subjects his facts to external mathematical reasoning. In doing so he simultaneously

enlists his audience in calculations leading to inescapable conclusions in his favor and creates an impression of immediacy and transparency essential to maintaining oratory as a fundamentally oral and therefore democratic practice.

In his first attempt at writing dialogue for a reading audience, Cicero undertakes the task of reanimating multiple voices from the previous generation of great Roman orators. As Joanna Kenty shows in "Cicero's Representation of an Oral Community in *De Oratore*," he negotiates the transition between a world in which aspiring orators learn by listening, an oral apprenticeship, to one in which textual representations play an increasing role even as he himself creates a work that is a hybrid, at once both oral and literate. In contrast to handbooks or treatises on rhetoric already known at Rome, Cicero's re-created community honors the Roman tradition in oratory while inviting the next generation into its numbers.

A collision rather than fission of voices informs a remarkable document from Roman Gaul in the second century A.D. In "Becoming Gallic: Orality, Voice and Identity in Roman Gaul" Jay Fisher explores the voice and identity of the Coligny calendar, a now fragmentary bronze inscription partially preserving a five-year cycle of months. While it is a precious document for the Gaulish language, Fisher discerns in this calendar not only some peculiarities of linguistic form but also curiosities of larger structure that prevent any easy categorization of the inscription as either an unadulterated record of both Gaulish language and thought about time or a Roman imperial scheme of time simply translated into the province's native language. Roman and Gaulish voices both struggle to find expression in this calendar, and the result is an uncannily familiar hybridity of voice in how both the engraver of the calendar and its intended viewers and readers negotiated the world of time on the edge of empire.

The encounter of Odysseus's men with Circe embodies one of the earliest thought experiments in separating voice from mind: transformed into swine, they lose the power of speech while retaining perception of their suffering. Athena Kirk's "λόγος and φωνή in *Odyssey* 10 and Plutarch's *Gryllus*" illuminates the assumptions about voice and species that underlie this and other early Greek stories about how animals can and cannot communicate before analyzing Plutarch's very different thought experiment with the Homeric characters and story in his essay *Gryllus*. When Circe returns the power of speech (but not human form) to one of Odysseus's transformed men, Gryllus, the resultant dialogue challenges deeply embedded notions about whether speech is necessary for reason and ethical behavior. Perhaps humans need a voice precisely because of their inferiority, rather than their superiority, to animals.

The issues of the borrowed and transformed voice (already examined in more than one preceding paper) are intriguingly thematized in one of the most visually spectacular of the ancient novels, *Leucippe and Clitophon*, as Amy Koenig demonstrates in "The Fragrance of the Rose: An Image of the Voice in Achilles Tatius." A first-person narrator (though here one who hijacks the story from an original frame narrator) of necessity restages the voices of others, but Clitophon's synaesthetic approach to Leucippe's voice transforms her mouth into a rose even as the effect of her speech becomes the rose's fragrance. The novelist's earlier play with rose imagery leads to a much richer interpretation of the ecphrasis of the Indian elephant who cures headaches by its breath, an image startling even by Achilles Tatius's standards. The novel's novel views of voice showcase both its appeal as a recovery of oral storytelling in the age of the Second Sophistic and its sophistic play with textual representations of voice.

Bibliography

Gauntlett, Stathis. 1996. "*Aptera Epe*: The Canon of Modern Greek Oral Poetry," pp. 195–204 in Ian Worthington, ed. *Voice into Text: Orality and Literacy in Ancient Greece*. Mnemosyne Supplementum 157. Leiden and New York: E.J. Brill.

Whitaker, Richard. 1996. "Orality and Literacy in the Poetic Traditions of Archaic Greece and Southern Africa," pp. 205–220 in Ian Worthington, ed. *Voice into Text: Orality and Literacy in Ancient Greece*. Mnemosyne Supplementum 157. Leiden and New York: E.J. Brill.

PART 1

Epic Voices

CHAPTER 2

Voice and Voices: Homer and the Stewardship of Memory

Elizabeth Minchin

The primary narratives of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, which we associate with the voice of the poet, are elaborated and enhanced by a number of other tales, secondary narratives that are in almost every case spoken by one or another of the storyteller's characters. Some of these embedded narratives, like the story that Achilles recounts to his mother, at *Il.* 1.365–392, about his quarrel with Agamemnon, the story that Odysseus tells Arete and Alcinous, at *Od.* 7.243–297, about his arrival on Scheria, or the story that runs through Eurycleia's mind, at *Od.* 19.392–466, about how Odysseus came by his scar, are primarily explanatory by nature and have a direct *causal* relationship with the events of the main narrative. Others, which have been variously described as digressions,[1] mythological paradigms,[2] or para-narratives,[3] exhibit a *thematic* relationship, and offer a contrast with or draw an analogy to the events of the primary narrative. Tales of this kind are the Meleager-story that Phoenix tells Achilles (*Il.* 9.524–599); the Niobe-tale that Achilles tells Priam (24.602–617); and, in the *Odyssey*, the insistent re-telling of Agamemnon's return to his homeland and its consequences and the series of elaborate lying tales that Odysseus-as-beggar presents to various audiences to support his presence on Ithaca.[4]

There has been abundant discussion of the *content* of secondary tales of this thematic kind, especially those of the *Iliad*, and their relationship to the story proper.[5] But I am concerned, as I often am, with the practicalities of storytelling, and particularly with the relationship any storyteller enjoys with his memory. I shall therefore use this wealth of secondary narrative as a resource

1 Cf. Austin (1966).
2 Cf. Willcock (1964).
3 Cf. Alden (2000: 1).
4 For stories about Agamemnon's return, see *Od.* 1.32–43; 3.193–198, 232–235, 255–303; 4.514–537; 11.405–434; Odysseus' lying tales: *Od.* 13.256–286 (to Athene); 14.192–359 (to Eumaeus); 19.165–202, 221–248, 262–307, 336–342 (to Penelope).
5 On tales in the *Iliad*, see, for example, Austin (1966); Willcock (1964); (1977); Braswell (1971); Alden (2000). On tales in the *Odyssey*: Trahman (1952); Haft (1984); Schein (2001).

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2017 | DOI: 10.1163/9789004329737_003

as I probe the mechanisms of memory that underpin a successful oral poet's stewardship—his management—of his repertoire of stories. In the first long section of this paper I shall explore the form in which an oral poet such as Homer stores story material in memory, how he locates it when he needs it, and how, when necessary, he adapts it to render it thematically relevant.[6] Because it is less of a challenge for a poet to access stories that have a *causal* relationship with the narrative, since they either emerge directly from it or feed directly into it, and because it is more of a challenge to retrieve the second category of stories I identified above, *thematic* tales, I shall focus on stories of this thematic kind that are told in both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*.[7]

The second part of this paper builds on the first. It concerns the *Odyssey* exclusively. Here much of the secondary narrative has a close temporal relationship with the story proper. My concern at this point will be to observe how the poet controls the release of information. I have noted already that he assigns secondary narrative to different characters, speaking in their voices. I shall take this up again in my discussion of the *nostos*-tales of Agamemnon and Menelaus, Nestor, and Odysseus; and I shall discuss the poet's ability to interleave these accounts, his management of out-of-sequence narration, and, finally, some of the strategies he uses to minimize confusion.

Part 1: What Do We Remember When We Remember a Story?

Every story we tell has been distilled and stored in memory as a causal chain, a chain of logical causes and effects. It is this chain that represents the *fabula* or *gist* of the tale; as Roger Schank and Robert Abelson have observed, its linked series of causes and effects is what will give the resulting *story* its coherence.[8] The causal chain of any one tale, its sequence of motivation and event, may vary slightly from one telling to another, but it never varies significantly. This is particularly so in oral traditions; as David Rubin observes, stories that find their way into an oral tradition display considerable stability in form.[9]

---

6 Throughout this paper I use the terms 'Homer' and 'poet' to refer to the creator, as tradition has it, of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. The term 'oral poet' is used to refer to oral poets in general.

7 A similar challenge faces poets who compose in writing; but they are not composing under pressure, in performance.

8 Schank (1995: 170–176). On the causal chain as the backbone of a story: Schank and Abelson (1977: 22–35). For discussion of these cognitive principles in the context of Classics: Minchin (2001: 15–16, 35–36).

9 Rubin (1995: 37).

The Homeric poems are evidence that the oral poet can access not only the gist of the primary narrative of each epic, but also the gist of a wide variety of stories from the mythological past that he will weave into each tale. Because he assumes that his audiences too are more or less familiar with these tales, he may simply *refer to* the *fabula*, or *elaborate on* a single episode; he feels no need to re-tell the whole.[10]

Early in the *Iliad*, as Achilles and Agamemnon are engaged in their fierce quarrel, Nestor intervenes, presenting a plea for calm through first-person reminiscence. This first-person tale, like others he will tell in the course of the *Iliad*-story, points up the urgency of Nestor's efforts to bring persuasion to bear on his strong-minded colleagues. And, as we shall see, as a first-person story it will serve the poet in another, practical, way. The story that the old man tells here is the story of the fight that broke out amongst the guests at the wedding of the Lapith king Pirithous and Hippodamia/Laodamia, although he does not name their names (1.262–273).[11] According to Nestor, the Lapiths summoned him and sought his advice (καὶ μέν μευ βουλέων ξύνιεν πείθοντό τε μύθῳ, and they listened to the advice I gave and heeded my bidding, 273); and this advice enabled them to destroy the unruly Centaurs. The old man recommends therefore that Achilles and Agamemnon too, on this present occasion, should accept his counsel (274).

Because he is so old and because he has led so active a life, Nestor can tell many stories of engagement with the great men of the past. We may even discern in the *Iliad* a typical Nestorian story-pattern, which runs along the lines of 'though *young* I responded to the call to arms and I *performed well, on the field and in counsel*'.[12] In *Iliad* 1 he had been summoned from Pylos to fight alongside the Lapiths and to *advise* them; at 4.319 and, more extensively, at 7.132–158, he tells how, despite his *youth, he had the courage* to stand up to the hero Ereuthalion;[13] at 11.670–762, *his youth* and *his courage* are again dominant themes as he engages with the Eleans; at 23.629–645 he takes pleasure in recalling *his fine performance* in the funeral games for Amaryngkeus, while *in his prime* (τότε δ' αὖτε μετέπρεπον ἡρώεσσιν, but at that time I shone amongst the fighting men, 645).[14]

10 Schank (1995: 38). As he refers to one *fabula* or another, the poet affirms the long tradition (a 'shared body of knowledge') that underpins his performance: Foley (1991: 45).

11 Alden (2000: 78–82).

12 For discussion of these tales as a form of self-definition: Minchin (2005).

13 Kirk (1990: 254) comments: '[e]xtreme youth is a typical element of this kind of David-and-Goliath encounter'.

14 Alden (2000: 102–110).

Nestor is not the only hero who is identified by stories that illustrate a particular theme. Diomedes is obliged to listen to stories about his forebears and their deeds—another thematic story-pattern ('your father was much braver/stronger/wiser than you').[15] He is challenged by both Agamemnon (4.370–400) and Athene (5.800–813) to live up to the reputation of his father, Tydeus, who fought as one of the Seven against Thebes.[16] Agamemnon and Athene both refer to the prelude to that assault, when Tydeus went alone to Thebes with a message. Tydeus was attacked twice by the Cadmeans and fearlessly resisted their onslaught. His valour in these skirmishes is what Agamemnon and Athene hold up before his son (Τυδεὺς μὲν καὶ τοῖσιν ἀεικέα πότμον ἐφῆκε· πάντας ἔπεφν', … [4.396–397]. On these men Tydeus let loose a fate that was shameful. He killed them all …). The account of the fight that ensued against Thebes, however, and the fate of the seven heroes, is not offered. What the poet needs at this stage of the Troy-story is a narrative of exemplary behaviour, and *this* Tydeus-tale can supply it. And yet we know that the whole story is filed away in the poet's memory. Sthenelus, in a defiant response to Agamemnon's rebuke, alludes (4.404–410) to a later episode in this same story. He compares the recklessness of those like Tydeus, who died at Thebes, σφετέρῃσιν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν, by their own headlong stupidity (409), with the bravery, and the success, of the Epigoni, their sons who came later.

Probing Memory for the Right Story: Indexing, Storage, and Retrieval

So how does a storyteller locate an appropriate story when he needs it? Just as the poet can locate an appropriate simile, when the action of the tale brings to mind a vivid image of comparable action,[17] it is by a similar process that he is able to locate an appropriate story. This ability to retrieve analogies, whether as similes or stories, is not of itself a specialized technique found in only a

15 Such genealogically-based stories are not unusual in the *Iliad*, where fathers and sons are regularly compared. For other examples: Alden (2000: 156–161), who cites Achilles (16.33–35) and Sarpedon (5.633–646). On Agamemnon: Martin (1989: 113–119).

16 For an excellent summary of the elements of Tydeus' story as the poet of the *Iliad* chooses to tell it: Ebbott (2010: 247).

17 Ready (2012: 55–87, at 74): 'the poet learned not that there are certain entities to which one can compare a warrior, for example, but that there are certain entities *doing certain things* to which one can compare a warrior' (my italics).

few individuals; psychology tells us that it is an ability we all share.[18] Gentner and Smith propose a search-process that enables us to locate a second domain that matches the target domain in key respects.[19] Retrieval of an appropriate analogy may occur instantly, as a flashbulb memory (because the cue is so powerful), or as the result of a slower process of narrowing down possibilities.[20] To help us comprehend this search-process, Gentner offers a tempting but ultimately unsatisfying analogy: 'gaining access to long-term memory is a bit like fishing: the learner can bait the hook—that is, set up the working memory probe—as he or she chooses, but once the line is thrown into the water it is impossible to predict exactly which fish will bite.'[21]

This analogy is deficient, in my view, because it lacks any analysis of retrieval, of how mental processes respond to the baited hook. But other exploratory work may complete the metaphor. Roger Schank has long proposed that the key to an effective memory system is effective storage; and this in turn depends, he claims, on careful labelling or indexing. If, on encountering an interesting story, we wish to remember it, we must label it in ways that will allow us to retrieve it later. If we do not do so, the story will be lost forever.[22] Schank proposes that an effective labelling system includes both the goal of the actors in the story and the result of their actions; one could also encode a story in terms of the lesson learned.[23] His proposals about storage and labelling are supported by the work of Lawrence Barsalou who speaks not of labels but of 'exemplars'; Barsalou observes that 'any exemplar from a current event may retrieve a similar exemplar from a past event and thereby retrieve the past event'.[24] Barsalou's exemplars are less abstract than Schank's labels: he proposes as cues such as objects, people, actions, location, time, thoughts.[25] An important criterion, especially in connection with oral epic, is that the labels,

18 Roediger (1999: 52–75); also Gentner and Smith (2012: 130): 'the ability to perceive and use relational similarity between two situations or events … is a *fundamental aspect of human cognition*' (my italics).

19 For discussion of the processes of retrieval, mapping, and evaluation in analogical reasoning: Gentner and Smith (2012: 130–131).

20 Reed Hunt and Ellis (2004: 165–169 (esp. 167), 172–173).

21 Gentner (1989: 231–233).

22 Schank (1990: 84–113). Roediger (1999) argues that storage is only one of a number of keys to effective memory. One could argue, however, that without effective storage there can be no retrieval.

23 Schank (1990: 86–94).

24 Barsalou (1988: 227–232).

25 Barsalou (1998: 227): 'almost any characteristic of an event can serve to remind a person of another event having that characteristic'.

or exemplars, that are used should generate vivid images of objects or actions: visual memory, as we know, plays a crucial role in the retrieval process.[26] There is, I should add, no limit to the number of labels or exemplars that may be assigned to the individual episodes that make up any single tale. A 'massively indexed memory', to use Schank's phrase, will enable any storyteller to locate appropriate analogies when he or she needs them.[27]

When Homer seeks a relevant story for Antinous to tell at *Od.* 21.295–304 by way of a threat to Odysseus, at that point disguised as a beggar, he returns to long-term memory to locate a tale that is comparable with the current situation in certain key respects. Antinous seeks to dissuade the beggar, whose rash offer to try to string the bow, he fears, will debase the competition and lead to social disruption. Wanting to warn the beggar off, Antinous appears to probe memory for a similar scenario, in which an individual's lack of self-control at a social gathering causes turmoil—for which he is severely punished. The story that Antinous 'retrieves' emerges from the same corpus of story-material that I referred to above: now, however, we focus on Eurytion the Centaur, who behaved badly at that wedding feast when overcome by drink (297–298)—and who was punished for it (299–302).[28] Thus the suitor can foreshadow unpleasant outcomes for the beggar should he persist in his inappropriate behaviour.

So two elements from the one body of story-material, the account of the wedding of Pirithous and Hippodamia, are used by the poet to produce distinctly different secondary narratives (a tale of persuasion in the *Iliad* and a tale of dissuasion in the *Odyssey*).[29] But it is not the case, as Mabel Lang suggests, that the poet required two *paradeigmata* to tell *one* story;[30] nor is it the case that the poet consciously sought to retrieve that particular story *as a whole* at each of these points. He did not conduct a mental search under 'wedding', or 'Lapiths and Centaurs' or 'Pirithous and Hippodamia', or even 'fight amongst wedding

26 Rubin (1995: 39–64, at 62–63); Bakker (2005: 62–66).

27 Schank (1990: 112). For observations of plural prompts: Gentner (1997: 53).

28 ὁ δ' ἐπεὶ φρένας ἄασεν οἴνῳ| μαινόμενος κάκ' ἔρεξε δόμον κάτα Πειριθόοιο (When his brain went wild with drinking, in his fury he did much harm in the house of Peirithoös), 21.297–298. Eurytion was mutilated and banished from the feast because of this (διὲκ προθύρου δὲ θύραζε| ἕλκον ἀναΐξαντες, ἀπ' οὔατα νηλέϊ χαλκῷ| ῥῖνάς τ' ἀμήσαντες·. Springing up [the Lapiths] dragged him through the forecourt and outside, severing his ears and nose with the pitiless bronze) 21.299–301. On the poet's use of this story: Alden (2000: 79); de Jong (2001: 517).

29 We find a third reference at *Il.* 2.738–746, in the Catalogue of Ships.

30 Lang (1983: 147–151).

guests'—although these are all potential labels for the tale. Rather, when Nestor was about to deliver his 'good advice' tale in *Iliad* 1, the poet may have searched under the label 'a difficult situation demands good strategic advice'; and, in order to retrieve a story of dissuasion for Antinous to tell, he may have searched for the label 'lack of self-control leads to social disruption and punishment'.[31] On the basis of this evidence, I propose that the story of this turbulent wedding celebration was indexed in the poet's memory under several useful labels.[32]

Equally versatile is the series of stories about Heracles: his birth, the hostility of Hera, his labours for Eurystheus, and his sack of Troy. To console Aphrodite Dione at *Il.* 5.392–394 tells the story of how Heracles wounded Hera (a story that the poet might access through the label: gods suffer injury at the hands of mortals). Athene refers to a Heracles-tale (at *Il.* 8.360–369) to show how, as a favour to Zeus, she supported the hero when he was broken by Eurystheus' demands, with special reference to his visit to the Underworld for the hound of Hades (label: willing assistance deserves reward). And Agamemnon uses another Heracles-tale (at *Il.* 19.90–133) to show how he, like Zeus, could be blinded by Ate: just as Zeus, as father-to-be of Heracles, was deceived by Ate when he took an oath dictated by Hera, Agamemnon argues that he was similarly blinded by Ate when he stripped Achilles of Briseis, his prize (label: delusion leads even the mighty into unfortunate errors).[33] Heracles appears in the *Odyssey* also: the story of his conception is alluded to by Odysseus in his catalogue of heroines at 11.266–270; and Odysseus reports a meeting with him in the Underworld, at 11.601–626, when Heracles himself tells the story of his

31 Alden (2000: 22), in discussing Agamemnon's and Sthenelus' references to the Tydeus-story (see above), claims that the poet *uses the same piece of information* (my italics) to 'support two completely different arguments'. This is not the case. The poet has retrieved two separate elements (albeit of the same story) independently of each other. One of these shows Tydeus' courage (label: the father is more courageous than his son); the other tells of his stupidity (label: even a great warrior can be undone by recklessness).

32 Cf. Ebbott (2010: 255), who demonstrates that one episode of the Theban story (Tydeus and the attacks on Thebes) is appropriate for the *Iliad* while another (the betrayal of Amphiaraus by Eriphyle, at 11.326–327 and 15.244–247) is appropriate for the *Odyssey*. I assume that the poet has retrieved the latter story using the tag: betrayal of a husband by his wife.

33 For the story told in the *Iliad* of Zeus' anger over Hera's obstruction of Heracles after his capture of Troy (15.18–30: label: deceit brings punishment) and Zeus' punishment of the other gods (14.249–261), see Alden (2000: 40–42); Janko (1992: 191–192, 229). Heracles is referred to in passing in the *Iliad* also at 2.676–680 (offspring of Heracles); 5.628–669 (death of Tlepolemus at the hands of Sarpedon); 11.685–695 (Heracles amongst the Pylians); 15.636–643 (Copreus, messenger of Eurystheus); 18.117–119 (Heracles is mortal).

journey there to capture Cerberus.[34] Odysseus' encounter with Heracles at this point is not accidental: this dangerous expedition into the world of the dead is something that the two heroes have in common (label: shared experience and sympathy).

The Storyteller and His 'Voices'

When we consider the mechanisms of story-retrieval we should take into account the character of the speaker whom the poet is impersonating. I have discussed elsewhere, following Schank and Abelson, the way in which we store in memory information about individuals, their goals and plans, and the scripts they follow.[35] Schank and Abelson propose that we assemble and store in memory for each individual we get to know a package of 'themes' that describe that person's role in society, his or her relations with others, and his or her general moral and ethical outlook. These proposals concerning the organization and storage of information about individuals and their behavioural choices had been neatly foreshadowed in a paper by Malcolm Willcock, who, only a little earlier, had remarked on the consistency of characterization across the *Iliad*, with a special focus on the Achaean heroes appearing in the funeral games of *Iliad* 23.[36] Working from this Homeric evidence Willcock intuited that an oral poet held in memory for each hero individualized 'mental moulds', as he called them, in many respects similar to the packages of themes identified by Schank and Abelson. If we understand the character of an epic hero in this way, as a package of themes or a mental mould, we begin to see how a poet might retain in memory for each character a consistent range of goals along with the plans of action by which they might be fulfilled. This information in turn leads the poet to the *kinds of stories* that such a person might tell, about himself or herself, or about others. I propose, therefore, that the mental mould of a character, or the package of themes that describe him or her, is another constraint, alongside contextual relevance, that operates when the poet searches for the stories his characters will tell: the story-gists he retrieves for any one character must be consistent with his or her character and outlook. Limitations like this, as

34 Cf. *Il.* 8.362–369.

35 Minchin (2011). Schank and Abelson's 'themes' should not be confused with Albert Lord's 'recurrent groupings of ideas' in episodic form, for which he had adopted the term 'theme': Lord (2000: 68–69).

36 Willcock (1973); (1983).

Wanda Wallace and David Rubin propose, not only refine but also facilitate the search process.[37]

So, when the poet casts about for the kind of story that Nestor might tell, he is looking for stories that are consistent with the package of Nestor-themes that he holds in memory. He is looking for 'labels' that will take him to the stories that portray Nestor *as he sees himself*: as a courageous fighter from his early youth, and as a trusted adviser. Thus we hear the hero's accounts of his performance against the Centaurs, against Ereuthalion, against the Eleans, and against a double opponent in the funeral games for Amaryngkeus. These stories are consistent with Nestor's character and they validate it; they become part of the package. Through their consistency we recognize a man with a healthy self-image (who alone among the heroes of the *Iliad* tells stories about his own triumphs), a man past his physical prime but with a reputation for courage under pressure, who now wants to see 'his' side win and who will use arguments drawn from his own life-experience to help achieve that goal.

On the other hand, when the poet seeks the kinds of stories that Agamemnon might tell he 'fishes', to use Gentner's metaphor, for a different kind of story. Agamemnon's character is abrasive: he uses stories not simply to encourage and rally his men but to provoke them, as he does when he tells Diomedes and Sthenelus in *Iliad* 4 that they are no match for their fathers—in the passage I referred to above—or when he accuses Odysseus and Menestheus of lacking a fighting spirit (4.338–348).[38] Despite his occasionally provocative words, Agamemnon is generally weak and defensive by nature. He tells elaborate stories in order to exculpate himself, as he does at *Il.* 19.90–133, when he tells the long tale of Ate, Delusion, to explain away his appropriation of Briseis.[39] Both kinds of stories are consistent with Agamemnon's character; and they develop it, reflecting his prickliness, his inability to acknowledge his own weaknesses, and his unattractive readiness to pass the blame for his actions onto someone else.

When Achilles reminds Thetis, at *Il.* 1.396–406, of the time when she rescued Zeus from the three gods Hera, Athene and Poseidon, who had threatened to bind him (and thus disempower him—the ultimate penalty), he tells her how she saved Zeus by her prompt action and her clever use of her network of contacts (label: willing assistance deserves reward)—a consistent feature of Thetis' character that Laura Slatkin has so usefully revealed to us.[40] Here

37 Wallace and Rubin (1988).

38 On the character of Agamemnon: Scodel (2008: 58–62).

39 Cf. Agamemnon's rambling accounts at *Il.* 2.110–141; *Od.* 11.405–434.

40 Slatkin (1991: 64–77).

Achilles has used a story typical of the Iliadic Thetis (although not otherwise attested) so that he might give his mother the confidence to ask a favour of Zeus.[41] One of Achilles' conspicuous character traits is his empathy: thus the poet tries to locate the kinds of stories to which Achilles' addressees (in this case Thetis or, at *Il.* 24.602–617, Priam) will respond positively.

Adapting the Story

We have observed already that when Homer's characters use a secondary narrative to support their argument (whether they are persuading their listener to a new course of action or offering comfort) they refer to mythological narratives apparently familiar to the internal (and often also the external) audience: the wedding of Pirithous and Hippodamia, the labours of Heracles, or the story of the Seven against Thebes, for example. Listeners both internal and external therefore experience the reassuring comfort of recognition; they are prepared to accept the validity of what is to come. But, as has been pointed out by Willcock, Braswell, and Alden, it is often the case that the particular stories the speakers couch within this paradigmatic framework are *in some respects* unfamiliar: in these cases the story itself appears to have been modified (and in some instances developed) to suit the storyteller's immediate purposes, to provide a closer parallel for the situation under discussion.[42] This process of modification must be linked to an oral poet's working habits. I propose that he may well have prepared for performance by thinking through his song in advance, by locating tales or parts of tales analogous to the situation in the primary narrative and by testing them out in rehearsal—perhaps several times—in order to speed that retrieval process when he is in front of an audience (I draw here particularly on the research of Bjork and Roediger).[43] As he rehearses, matching the source domain of his secondary tale with the target of his primary narrative, the poet may be obliged to adjust his secondary narrative. It is desirable that he has thought these changes through and practised them in advance of

41 Kirk (1985: 93). And cf. 18.394–405: Thetis' (and Eurynome's) protection of Hephaestus when he was cast out of heaven by Hera. This may be another Homeric invention, 'to provide Thetis with a claim on his gratitude' (Edwards [1991: 193]); and see Braswell [1971: 19–21]). Neither story is told by Thetis herself; she does not know, or boast of, her own power.

42 Willcock (1964: 152); Braswell (1971); Willcock (1977); Alden (2000: 237).

43 On the cognitive benefits to the learner of repeated retrieval, see Bjork (1988); Roediger (2000: 70–71): '[r]epeated retrieval is the key to long-lasting memories'.

performance. Thus, to return to Homeric epic, *Nestor's* involvement as special adviser to the Lapiths was probably an outcome of Homeric adaptation; as was *Thetis*' rescue of Zeus; as too those elements in the Niobe-tale that included Niobe's ability *to eat* a good dinner despite her great grief and the petrification of her people.[44]

In connection with tales such as these Willcock refers to a compositional process that he describes as a 'pervasive technique of instant invention'.[45] In light of the discussion above, I cannot endorse Willcock's epithet 'instant'. And, rejecting the term 'invention', I propose that we refer to 'adaptation'. As I have observed already, locating possible analogies and recognizing patterns of correspondence is a normal part of intelligent behaviour. We can easily find parallel stories for a story we have just heard in conversation; this exchange is one of the fundamental principles of everyday talk. Most of us are also able to undertake *partial matching*: that is, to adapt existing data, a story already stored in memory, for use in a new situation.[46] For an oral poet, therefore, as he prepares for performance, once a partial match has been retrieved, adaptation begins: the process whereby the gist of an existing story is modified to conform to the new situation. Adaptation is not only a readily observable practice in everyday talk; it is also a hallmark of a competent oral poet.[47]

To summarize to this point, then. As any oral poet prepares for performance he assembles and rehearses the material he needs for his song. In order to assist him in accessing the secondary narratives he needs at each point, he uses a nuanced system of story labels and, where appropriate, the mental mould or thematic package that he has developed for each character. The story he tells may be only a partial match to the situation of the primary narrative.

44 For a suggestion as to how this process might operate, cf. Willcock (1964: 141–142), who discusses the submerged tension that causes one theme to elicit another: 'petrification is associated with Niobe and therefore comes in as a motif, although in an abnormal part of the story' (142). That is certainly a possibility. We could argue in this case that the poet has retrieved a story that corresponded to Priam's situation (label: lamentation on the loss of a beloved child) and has adapted it to satisfy his goal (to persuade Priam to eat with him). He also tried to accommodate the story (thanks to 'submerged tension') to Hector's unburied state; but the story of Niobe's being turned to stone is here transferred to the people who could not bury her children. This is possibly an example of the suggestibility of memory, as described by Schacter (2001: ch. 5). Or it may be a deliberate adaptation on the part of the poet, who has used a label that we associate with the Niobe-tale (label: Niobe turned to stone) to resolve this difficulty.

45 Willcock (1977: 53).

46 Schank (1990: 226–227).

47 It is also, naturally, a feature of written composition.

But the poet will assimilate his story to the primary narrative using otherwise predictable (or necessary) details. In performance, therefore, the transitions he makes between the secondary narratives voiced by others and his own primary narrative will be smooth, plausible, and sure. The kind of adaptation that we observe in the Homeric epics, therefore, might be located towards the creative end of a *universal* compositional spectrum.[48]

There is, I should add, no evidence that the poets in this tradition were conscious of the processes I have described above. They were simply putting into practice the *ad hoc* practical solutions familiar to us all as everyday storytellers, but which had been further refined by their training in traditional epic song.

Part II: Secondary Narrative in the *Odyssey*

Although some of the secondary narratives of the *Odyssey*, like the para-narratives of the *Iliad*, have been drawn from a more distant mythological past, the majority of the secondary stories the poet uses here have a much tighter temporal relationship with the main narrative. These secondary tales for the most part are cast as reminiscences, but, unlike those of the *Iliad*, they are the reminiscences of the present generation; they derive from the very recent past. An important sub-set of these, the tales of the returns of the heroes have not been told with persuasion or dissuasion in mind, as is so often the case in the *Iliad*.[49] Rather, these stories have been included to heighten our suspense about the fate of Odysseus and to encourage us to follow his tale with greater commitment and greater understanding, especially in our interpretation of its 'narrative and ethical complexities'.[50]

Backtracking and Interleaving

In everyday storytelling it is not unknown for a storyteller to move back and forward in time; he or she may include long 'backstories' to explain or supple-

48 I adapt to a new context a phrase coined by Jonathan Ready: a 'spectrum of distribution' (that he applies to the composition of similes): Ready (2012: 56–57).

49 Other categories of stories are, first, those Odysseus hears in the Underworld: these are reported as direct exchanges of information between Odysseus and his mother, 11.181–203; Agamemnon, 405–434, 441–461; and Achilles, 488–503, but not Telamonian Ajax. A second category comprises Odysseus' lying tales, listed above.

50 Schein (2001: 406).

ment the action of the narrative present. Oral poets too, if we are to judge from the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, were not constrained to tell their stories in a uniformly linear fashion. The poet of the *Iliad*, whose story was set in the tenth year of the Trojan War, attempted to convey an impression of the war as a whole, using reminiscence and retrospection to take the audience back to its beginning, and prolepsis to let us see into the future, beyond its conclusion. The poet of the *Odyssey* adopted the strategies of the *Iliad*-poet and used them even more intensively. Thus, although he took up his tale at a temporal point only weeks before Odysseus' return to his homeland, he opened out the poem to include key events from the later stages of the Trojan War and the Sack of Troy ten years before, as well as the homeward journeys of the other leading heroes. In devising a framework within which Odysseus could tell the tale of his fantastic Wanderings the poet has taken a bold and distinctive step, whereby he inserts into the latter stages of Odysseus' *nostos* his hero's lengthy account (9.2–12.450) of his survival (in a 'monde imaginaire'), after he had been blown off course as he rounded Cape Malea (9.79–81).[51] What is remarkable about this 'interlude' is not only the sharp temporal disjunction that it introduces into the *Odyssey*-tale but also the competent way in which the poet handles this lengthy analepsis.[52]

The poet's capacity to accommodate narrative disjunction is illustrated even more powerfully in his control of the flow of information in connection with not one story but many stories—all of which he must hold in mind simultaneously. I refer here to his careful management of the *nostoi*-stories of a number of other Iliadic heroes even as he keeps at the back of his mind the parallel stories of Odysseus and his son Telemachus. In this final section of the paper I consider how the poet has organized these story-strands in memory, so that they remain distinct and at the same time easy of access.

The *nostoi*, the stories of the returns of the heroes, may have been known in the oral tradition as separate songs. Several of these, however, have been integrated into the *Odyssey*.[53] Here the poet has assigned to each of his principal heroes—Nestor, Menelaus, Agamemnon, and Odysseus—the story of his own *nostos*, yet each hero also adds something to the others' tales. At 3.103–200 Nestor begins the story of departure for all the surviving heroes, except

51 I borrow Germain's term: Heubeck and Hoekstra (1989: 4). On retrospectivity: Heubeck and Hoekstra (1989: 3).

52 On this interlude: Bergren (1983: 42–45).

53 The *nostoi*-tales may have been gathered together in a single work by Agias of Troezen, perhaps, suggests West, at the same time as the composition of the *Odyssey*: West (2013: 20, 38, 244–250).

Agamemnon, who had remained at Troy, and Odysseus, who returned to join him (3.155–164). In conversation with Telemachus he reports Diomedes' safe arrival in his homeland (180–182) and his own (182–185). At this point he has no further first-hand experience to draw on. But he has heard, through others (186–187), of Idomeneus' safe return (191–192) and of Agamemnon's death and that of his slayer Aegisthus (193–198). A second invitation from Telemachus, this time asking Nestor to give more details about Agamemnon's death, elicits a narrative (254–312) that outlines Aegisthus and Clytemnestra's relationship (262–275) and explains why Menelaus was not in a position to assist his brother, having been blown off course in a storm (286–290) at Cape Malea, and driven on to Egypt (291–300). Orestes' vengeance on Aegisthus, seven years later, coincides, according to Nestor, with the very day of Menelaus' return (306–312).

One of the special challenges for the poet is the management of time relationships as he brings these stories together: which hero saw which other hero and when; who knew what when. We should note an instance of the poet's care in this respect in *Od.* 4. Here Nestor sends Telemachus to Sparta, to speak to Menelaus, who, in his seven years of wandering, may have acquired further news of Odysseus. Menelaus picks up his own story (4.81–112, 333–586) *at the very point* where Nestor's knowledge had failed (3.286–300), and shares what he knows with Telemachus. He thereupon fills in details of his own travels and relays the information passed on by Proteus, the shape-shifter. Menelaus has asked Proteus about the fates of the heroes whom he and Nestor left behind when they left Troy: notably Agamemnon, Ajax, and Odysseus. Again we hear the tale of Agamemnon: like Menelaus he had been blown off-course at Cape Malea (4.514–518), but, although he had reached his homeland safely, he was trapped in Aegisthus' ambush.[54] A narrative oversight here draws our attention to the real complexity of the poet's task: in recounting the story of Aegisthus' killing of Agamemnon (521–537), Proteus apparently fails to tell Menelaus what motivated it—Aegisthus' sexual relationship with Clytemnestra.[55]

From Menelaus we hear the story of Ajax son of Oïleus (499–511); and we hear a tantalisingly brief report of Odysseus, at that point on Calypso's island,

54 The Agamemnon-tale has more mileage in it yet: at 11.405–434 the hero himself, in the Underworld, tells the story of his homecoming to Odysseus, who until then has been entirely ignorant of how his leader had died. Agamemnon will also quite pointedly reflect on his wife, who assisted her lover Aegisthus in bringing him down (409–411, 424–426, 430–434), and the capacity of women in general to perform such acts (427–430).

55 This version of the tale must have been puzzling to *Menelaus*, when he first heard it, although it would later make sense to his addressee, Telemachus, who, by this time, was aware of the reason for Aegisthus' actions: de Jong (2001: 110).

longing for home (498, 555–560). In the stories of these heroes we note, first, the poet's insistent repetition of the Agamemnon-tale, second, his ability to move between stories, laying aside one story-thread and later taking it up again where he left off, and, third, his ability to weave the tales together—as he *interleaves* the *nostoi* of his principal heroes.[56] One of the important functions of the reminiscences of Nestor and Menelaus, as they speak of the homeward journeys of their peers as well as their own, is thematic. When they tell of Diomedes' safe return, or Nestor's, or Menelaus' more adventurous journey, or the unhappy welcome that Agamemnon received, the poet is not only providing both his internal audience (Telemachus) and his external audience (ourselves) with a full account of the homecomings of the great heroes of the *Iliad*; he is presenting both audiences with a rich array of possibilities for the outcome of Odysseus' own homeward journey.

Homer and the 'Distinctiveness Heuristic'

So how does the poet manage this cluster of stories, all quite similar in content, interweaving and interleaving them as he does? His primary strategy is to speak in the voice of each of his heroes: thus he spreads the responsibility for storytelling amongst his characters, allocating to each distinctive character the telling of his own distinctive story. And because each character tells *his own* story the poet is able to counter as far as possible the problems of interference and misattribution.[57] This 'distinctiveness heuristic', as Schacter calls it, which relies in part on visual memory (as the poet envisages the hero whom he impersonates in a particular setting), reminds us of the ancient method of *loci* and *imagines*.[58] Helpful too at this point are Schank and Abelson's 'thematic packages', which I described earlier, that hold information about individual characters. These serve as effective prompts to the *nostos*-tale of each hero and as monitors of internal consistency: Nestor the survivor, good in counsel, has an easy journey home; Agamemnon, prickly and abrasive, has a hostile reception; Menelaus the vulnerable, struggles to achieve his return; and Odysseus will achieve his homecoming only through the exercise of his cunning intelligence.

56 It is possible for the poet to tell the Odysseus-story *without* the interleaved tales: *Od.* 23.310–341.

57 On interference (when two similar stories are confused): Squire (1995: 211); on misattribution (when an action or story is attributed to the wrong source): Schacter (2001: 88–111).

58 On the 'distinctiveness heuristic': Schacter (2001: 102–104); on the value of imagery as a prompt to memory, see above. On *loci* and *imagines*: Yates (1966: 1–3); and see below.

As I have discussed elsewhere, spatial relations appear to be relatively easy for an oral traditional poet to manage.[59] It has been observed that 'epic heroes are always on the move'.[60] Since landscape features have the capacity to prompt memory for other related material, such as narrative, changes of location within a tale allow the poet to organize his memory for the story in such a way that new episodes are prompted and interference is reduced.[61] The homeward journeys in the *Odyssey* of Nestor, Menelaus, Agamemnon, and Odysseus, each of which unfolds in a sequence of distinct locations, exemplify this phenomenon: visual and spatial memory combine, allowing the poet to recreate in his mind's eye an appropriate setting and the events that occur in that setting. The poet of the *Odyssey*, furthermore, makes economical use of a single geographical marker (Cape Malea) as a prompt, to designate the point at which a new and disastrous episode in a *nostos*-tale begins (for Agamemnon, Menelaus, and Odysseus).[62] By exploiting strategies such as these Homer is able to manage his narrative sequences. Even so, this exercise in complex narration demands considerable forethought, concentration of a high order, and regular practice.

Conclusion

As has frequently been observed, the poet of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, makes intensive use of the voices of his characters. As Aristotle noted (*Poetics* 1460a), Homer clearly prefers to relinquish his position centre-stage, as narrator, and to allow his characters to speak. This has been attributed to his desire for dramatic effect—and I will not deny that this must be so. Nevertheless, although the poet

59 On an oral poet's uses of spatial memory as an aid in composition: Minchin (2008).

60 Rubin (1995: 61–62).

61 Cognitive psychology confirms intuitions from the ancient past that locations, whether rooms in a house or features of the landscape, cue recollections. Such observations about the organization of memory are encapsulated in the stories told about Simonides or Cicero and the artificial memory system of *loci* and *imagines*, which makes the task of retrieval from memory less burdensome for the poet: Neisser (1989); Winograd and Church (1988: 5).

62 On Cape Malea as a critical point: for Menelaus, 3.286–290; for Agamemnon, 4.514–518; for Odysseus on the way home, 9.79–81; and, remarkably, in an invented tale concerning his voyage to Troy, 19.186–189. Cf. the Scaean gate of the *Iliad*, at which significant events occur: it is where Hector meets Andromache (6.390–398) or where Hector stands awaiting his fate (22.5–6); or the ford on the Scamander: here Hector recovers from his wound, 14.433–436; Achilles divides the mass of the fleeing Trojans, 21.1–5; Hermes meets Priam, 24.349–353, and later leaves him, 692–694.

may be only dimly aware of them, there are other advantages in structuring his performance as he does.

The secondary stories told in the *Iliad*, which generally have persuasion as their goal, are framed by their context and are firmly linked to the character of the speaker. These stories reflect the larger themes of the epic. If the poet in rehearsal is to access the appropriate story-gist or *fabula* for a tale of a thematic kind, he must bear in mind the context and the character of the speaker and of the internal audience. He uses this information as 'bait' as he 'fishes' for appropriate 'labels' in his reservoir of stories. There is therefore no confusion between the stories that Nestor, or Agamemnon, or Achilles, or Odysseus tell in the *Iliad*. Each story is true to its teller. Each one is also appropriately analogous to its context, even if the poet has engaged in some adaptation to bring the story into line with his purpose. As for the many voices that recount the *nostoi*-stories of the *Odyssey*, we observe here an important extension of our natural capacity for using visual and spatial cues as a retrieval tool for associated material. As the poet moves in his mind's eye from one speaker to another (and from *locus* to *locus*) he impersonates each character in the new location and, as it were, unlocks his individual story of return.

My discussion of an oral poet's management of his repertoire of story-material and a selection of strategies for performance might be summarized in a number of succinct observations from cognitive psychology: Roger Schank's claim that effective organization of information—including information about individuals' goals and plans—facilitates its subsequent retrieval; Wallace and Rubin's observation that a range of poetic constraints sharpens the focus of the mind and facilitates recall; Winograd and Church's empirical demonstration that location cues recollection; Schacter's 'distinctiveness heuristic', which mitigates interference and misattribution; and Bjork's and Roediger's observations that repeated retrieval ensures long-term retention. The secondary narratives that I have considered illustrate important aspects of one particular oral poet's special relationship with his memory. I argue that unless he had, in the first place, a capacious and well-organized memory store that supported his ambition, secondly, efficient strategies of access that allowed him to retrieve promptly the very material he needed—strategies, too, to forestall confusion—and, finally, adequate time to prepare and perfect his song, the poet we call Homer could not have composed and performed these complex and—for his audiences—very satisfying epic tales.

Bibliography

Alden, M. 2000. *Homer Beside Himself: Para-Narratives in the* Iliad. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Austin, N. 1966. 'The Function of Digressions in the *Iliad*', *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 7: 295–312.

Bakker, E. 2005. *Pointing at the Past: From Formula to Performance in Homeric Poetics*. Washington: Center for Hellenic Studies.

Barsalou, L. 1988. 'The Content and Organization of Autobiographical Memories' in U. Neisser and E. Winograd, eds. *Remembering Reconsidered: Ecological and Traditional Approaches to the Study of Memory*, 193–243. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bergren, A. 1983. 'Odyssean Temporality: Many (Re)turns' in C. Rubino and C. Shelmerdine, eds. *Approaches to Homer*, 38–73. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Bjork, R.A., 1988. 'Retrieval Practice and the Maintenance of Knowledge' in M. Gruneberg, P. Morris, and R. Sykes, eds. *Practical Aspects of Memory: Current Research and Issues*, vol. 1, 396–401. Chichester: John Wiley and Sons.

Braswell, B. 1971. 'Mythological Innovation in the *Iliad*', *Classical Quarterly* 21: 16–26.

de Jong, I. 2001. *A Narratological Commentary on the* Odyssey. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ebbott, M. 2010. 'Error 404: Theban Epic Not Found', *Trends in Classics* 2: 239–258.

Edwards, M. 1991. *The* Iliad*: A Commentary*, vol. 5. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Foley, J.M. 1991. *Immanent Art: From Structure to Meaning in Traditional Oral Epic*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Gentner, D. and L. Smith. 2012. 'Analogical Reasoning' in V.S. Ramachandran, ed. *Encyclopedia of Human Behaviour*, 2nd edn. 130–136. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Gentner, D. 1997. 'Structure Mapping in Analogy and Similarity', *American Psychologist* 52; 45–56.

Gentner, D. 1989. 'The Mechanisms of Analogical Learning' in S. Vosniadou and A. Ortony, eds. *Similarity and Analogical Reasoning*, 199–241. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Haft, A. 1984. 'Odysseus, Idomeneus and Meriones: The Cretan Lies of 'Odyssey' 13–19', *Classical Journal* 79: 289–306.

Heubeck, A. and A. Hoekstra. 1989. *A Commentary on Homer's* Odyssey, vol. 2. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Janko, R. 1992. *The* Iliad*: A Commentary*, vol. 4. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kirk, G.S. 1985. *The* Iliad*: A Commentary*, vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kirk, G.S. 1990. *The* Iliad*: A Commentary*, vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lang, M. 1983. 'Reverberation and Mythology in the *Iliad*' in C. Rubino and C. Shelmerdine, eds. *Approaches to Homer*, 140–164. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Lord, A.B. 2000. *The Singer of Tales*, 2nd edn. (S. Mitchell and G. Nagy, eds.). Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Martin, R. 1989. *The Language of Heroes: Speech and Performance in the* Iliad. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Minchin, E. 2001. *Homer and the Resources of Memory: Some Applications of Cognitive Theory to the* Iliad *and the* Odyssey. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Minchin, E. 2005. 'Homer on Autobiographical Memory: The Case of Nestor' in R. Rabel, ed. *Approaches to Homer: Ancient and Modern*, 55–72. Swansea: The Classical Press of Wales.

Minchin, E. 2008. 'Spatial Memory and the Composition of the *Iliad*' in E. Anne Mackay, ed. *Orality, Literacy, Memory in the Ancient Greek and Roman World*, 9–34. Leiden: Brill.

Minchin, E. 2011. '"Themes" and "Mental Moulds": Roger Schank, Malcolm Willcock and the Creation of Character in Homer', *Classical Quarterly* 61: 323–343.

Neisser, U. 1989. 'Domains of Memory' in P.R. Solomon, G.R. Goethals, C.M. Kelley, and B.R. Stephens, eds. *Memory: Interdsiciplinary Approaches*, 67–83. New York: Springer Verlag.

Ready, J. 2012. 'Comparative Perspectives on the Composition of the Homeric Simile' in E. Minchin, ed. *Orality, Literacy and Performance in the Ancient World*, 55–87. Leiden: Brill.

Reed Hunt, P. and H.C. Ellis. 2004. *Fundamentals of Cognitive Psychology*, 7th edn. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Roediger, H.L. III. 1999. 'Why Retrieval is the Key Process in Understanding Human Memory' in E. Tulving, ed. *Memory, Consciousness, and the Brain*, 52–75. Ann Arbor: Psychology Press.

Rubin, D. 1995. *Memory in Oral Traditions: The Cognitive Psychology of Epic, Ballads, and Counting-out Rhymes*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Schacter, D. 2001. *The Seven Sins of Memory: How the Mind Forgets and Remembers*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Schank, R. and R. Abelson. 1977. *Scripts, Plans, Goals and Understanding: An Inquiry into Human Knowledge Structures*. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Schank, R. 1995. *Tell Me a Story: Narrative and Intelligence*. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press.

Schein, S. 2001. 'Herakles and Odysseus' Bow: Mythological Allusion in the *Odyssey*' in M. Païsi-Apostolopoulou, ed. *Eranos: Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on the* Odyssey *(2–7 September 2000)*, 395–406. Ithaca: Centre for Odyssean Studies.

Scodel, R. 2008. *Epic Facework: Self-Presentation and Social Interaction in Homer*. Swansea: The Classical Press of Wales.

Slatkin, L. 1991. *The Power of Thetis: Allusion and Interpretation in the* Iliad. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Squire, L. 1995. 'Biological Foundations of Accuracy and Inaccuracy in Memory' in D. Schacter, ed. *Memory Distortion: How Minds, Brains, and Societies Reconstruct the Past*, 197–225. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Trahman, C. 1952. 'Odysseus' Lies (*Odyssey* 13–19)'. *Phoenix* 6: 31–43.

Wallace, W. and D. Rubin. 1988. '"The Wreck of the Old '97": A Real Event Remembered in Song' in U. Neisser and E. Winograd, eds. *Remembering Reconsidered: Ecological and Traditional Approaches to the Study of Memory*, 283–310. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

West, M. 2013. *The Epic Cycle: A Commentary on the Lost Troy Epics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Willcock, M. 1964. 'Mythological Paradeigma in the *Iliad*', *Classical Quarterly* 14: 141–154.

Willcock, M. 1973. 'The Funeral Games of Patroclus', *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 20: 1–11.

Willcock, M. 1977. '*Ad Hoc* Invention in the *Iliad*', *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 81: 41–53.

Willcock, M. 1983. 'Antilochus in the *Iliad*' in E. Delebecque, ed. *Mélanges Edouard Delebecque*, 477–485. Aix-en-Provence: Université de Provence.

Winograd, E. and V. Church 1988. 'Role of Spatial Location in Learning Face-Name Associations', *Memory and Cognition* 16: 1–7.

Yates, F. 1966. *The Art of Memory*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

CHAPTER 3

Which Limits for Speech Reporting? Messenger Scenes and Control of Repetition in the *Iliad*

Ombretta Cesca

The oral transmission via a messenger (ἄγγελος)[1] is a type of verbal communication we frequently encounter in the *Iliad*. We count a large number of messenger scenes in the poem,[2] which involve both professional messengers, humans and gods (Talthybios in Book 4, Idaios in Book 7, Thoötes in Book 12, Iris in Book 8, 11, 15 and 24) and non-professional ones (Dream in Book 2, Athene in Book 2 and 4, Hektor in Book 6, Patroklos in Book 11, Antilochos in

1 By *messenger* (ἄγγελος) I mean a character in charge of delivering a message (often an order). In the Homeric poems, the term ἄγγελος does not describe a profession, but rather a temporary function. The only exception is Iris, who is permanently considered a divine messenger (on Iris, see Bonadeo 2004). When I mention professional messengers among men, I mean heralds who accomplish the task of ἄγγελος when needed. For the difference between ἄγγελος and κῆρυξ, see Durán López (1999: 30) and Pisano (2014: 66).

2 By *messenger scene* I mean a scene where a messenger repeats *verbatim* the words of the character who entrusted him (or her) with a message. Both Character A's speech and the messenger's speech are presented in direct form. To identify these scenes I will refer to Irene de Jong's Appendix V (de Jong [2004: 241–242]) where the scholar collects twenty-two messenger-speeches. Only some of them are included in messenger scenes, according to my use of the term: I do not consider real messenger scenes Β 158–165 = Β 28–32 [+33–34], Γ 68–73 [+74–75] = Γ 88–94, Η 38–40 = Η 49–51, Κ 208–210 = Κ [406–408+] 409–411, Κ 308–312 = Κ 395–399, Π 454–457 = Π 671–675 but rather as simple cases of repeated speeches. Morover, I am not dealing with the embassy to Achilles in Book 9, for in my opinion it would require a specific study of its own. On the contrary, I add to de Jong's list a scene from Book 11, where Achilles seeks information about the identity of the wounded man (Macaon) carried safely from the battlefield. He sends Patroklos to Nestor's tent, to ask "who is this wounded man he brings in from the fighting" (ὅν τινα τοῦτον ἄγει βεβλημένον ἐκ πολέμοιο, l. 612). Patroklos obeys: "Honored, and quick to blame, is the man who sent me to find out who was this wounded man you were bringing (ὅν τινα τοῦτον ἄγεις βεβλημένον, l. 650)". Patroklos himself declares that he has to act as a ἄγγελος at l. 652. However, he will not report the answer to Achilles: in the meanwhile Nestor convinces him to persuade the hero to return to battle or at least to lend his armor (l. 791–803). When Patroklos returns to Achilles (16. 1–45, in de Jong's list Λ 658–662 + 794–803 = Π 23–27 + 36–45), he is no longer a ἄγγελος, even if he repeats part of Nestor's speech *verbatim*: he has rather become "an advocate of the Achaians" (Hofmeister [1990: 14]).

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2017 | DOI: 10.1163/9789004329737_004

Book 17 and 18, Thetis and Priam in Book 24). The latter become messengers for contingent needs and at someone's request—for the most part a superior's demand[3]—and, after having accomplished the ἀγγελίη, they return to their prior existence. Messengers, of any kind, share the task of transmitting someone else's words. Their speeches are based on speech reporting and share some common features:[4] messengers always use the indirect form[5] and systematically repeat *verbatim* the sender's words.[6] By *verbatim* I mean that the part of repeated speech almost perfectly reproduces the formulation of the original utterance, except for some required changes. These changes consist in adapting all the elements having a relative referent (verb persons, pronouns, adjectives, deixis) to the new speaker perspective. However, sometimes messengers slightly manipulate the message, changing the order of arguments,

3 Ready (2014: 32–33).

4 By *speech reporting* I mean the process of representing a speech pronounced by others, or by ourselves in a different situation. I have chosen the term *speech reporting* over the more common *reported speech* to avoid any ambiguity. In fact, the label *reported speech* defines both the process of representing speeches and the result of this process, i.e. the specific speech represented. Here I will use the term *reported speech* only in this second sense, to refer to the result of speech reporting (this choice will also assure coherence with the Italian terminology I use in my current PhD dissertation about messenger scenes in the *Iliad*). Speech reporting is a fertile subject of study. Since it is placed at the crossroad of many disciplines (linguistics, sociolinguistics, conversational analysis, literature, philosophy of language, philology …) over the last several decades it has been studied according to different approaches. For a summary of the question, see Holt (2009: 190–192).

5 Homeric language offers messengers a relatively large range of syntactic possibilities: direct quotation, indirect and free indirect speech, and speech mention. See Beck (2012). Messengers, though, always use indirect quotation. A possible exception would be Agamemnon's report of Dream's speech in Book 2 (l. 56–71). However, it depends on how we want to consider this repetition: we can consider it an extension of the basic messenger path or a separated report in direct speech. In the first case, the scene would present two repetitions of the original utterance and two characters functioning as messengers: Dream for Zeus' will and Agamemnon on his own initiative. It would be the only case in the whole poem where a messenger quotes the instruction speech directly. However, I prefer to consider the whole path as a messenger scene with an additional report in direct speech. In fact, the last link in the chain is not necessary for the accomplishment of Zeus' initial order. In Book 24 (l. 144–199) we can observe a very similar case, though the repetition is very short and the quotation is indirect.

6 See also Zeus' recommendation to Dream in 2. 10 (πάντα μάλ' ἀτρεκέως ἀγορευέμεν ὡς ἐπιτέλλω) and to Iris in 15. 159 (πάντα τάδ' ἀγγεῖλαι). Cf. Létoublon's idea of a Homeric messenger as a "magnetophone": "Sauf exception le messager homérique est un magnétophone qui redit un texte retenu par cœur" Létoublon (1987: 131).

adding or, most rarely, omitting short parts.[7] These modifications, which do not produce great alterations on content, are linked to the re-contextualization of the original message and, occasionally, to the messengers' own motivations.[8] It has to be specified that the concept itself of reporting someone's words *verbatim* can be relative for many reasons.[9] For our study the most relevant one is that *verbatim* reproduction does not seem to have the same value in oral and literate cultures. In fact, literate cultures' habits impose on repeated segments a degree of standardization hardly possible in oral traditions.[10] In this crossroad between oral and literate cultures, the place occupied by Homeric poems is difficult to define. I will not get into details about the

7 For example, when in Book 18 Antilochos must tell Achilles that Patroklos is dead, he only partially repeats Menelaus' words: he replaces πέφαται (17. 689) with the euphemistic κεῖται (18. 20) and he omits the request of helping to get the body back (17.693). We find two cases in the poem where a messenger adds a personal comment: Idaios in Book 7 (l. 387; 390; 393) and Iris in Book 8 (l. 423–424). Idaios adds a few words probably aiming at *captatio benevolentiae* and, for the same reason, changes the order of Paris' assertions (l. 362–364~389–393); in fact, his mission is at half way between a messenger scene and an embassy. In Book 8, Iris' rough comment about Athene's insanity seems completely dissonant in respect of Iris' usual attitude. For this reason the question of its authenticity remains open. Cf. Kirk (1990: 331).

8 See de Jong (2004: 185). As we will explain later, messengers impose their own focalization on the information they convey.

9 First of all, it depends on how each language segments the linguistic *continuum* and consequently it is subject to the number and kind of possibilities that are available. For example, the choice between direct and indirect quotation is not available in all languages: direct speech is a linguistic universal, while indirect speech (with other halfway forms of quotations) is not. Additionally, when languages have both, the distance between the former and the latter can still vary, since different languages have different ways of integrating reported speech in the speaker's sentence. With Coulmas, we measure this distance depending on how much is coded in the grammar (Coulmas [1986: 14]). As we know, direct and indirect speech differ very little in ancient Greek, to the extent that a direct quotation can be introduced by ὅτι. Moreover, completive constructions introduced by ὅτι and ὡς keep the same tense and mood of direct speech, though the use of an optative is possible, and temporal deixis does not need to be adapted. See R. Kühner (1904^3[1835]), *Ausführliche Grammatik der Griechischen Sprache*, revised by B. Gerth. Hannover, Leipzig: Hahnsche Buchhandlung, v. 2: 367. Second, "given that reports are not just fragments of inviolable prior text 'repeated', with or without paraphrase, in a parrot-like, unintentional, decontextualized manner, their meaning must necessarily be constrained by their contextualization" (Collins [2001: 3]). Third, as we will discuss, there are differences between oral and literate cultures (cf. *infra*).

10 See Coulmas (1986: 11).

longstanding Homeric question: I simply propose here to consider the *Iliad* as a poem issuing from an oral tradition and originally performed before a live audience.[11] This starting point is essential to my argument and justifies, amongst other things, a slight flexibility in the concept of *verbatim* repetition.

My analysis includes all messenger scenes that, besides the rare modifications we have mentioned, present a *verbatim* repetition of the original utterance.[12] These messenger scenes have a standard structure that can be schematized as follows:

Character A	→	Messenger (B)	→	Character C
	Instruction Speech		Delivery Speech	
	Original Utterance		Repetition	

Despite this general scheme, they can differ from one another for many reasons. For example, the original utterance is for the most part represented by an order, but can also be a question or news.[13] The messenger often declares his status as mediator and the origin of the message he is carrying; nevertheless sometimes he does not (zero quotation).[14]

11 See Minchin (2001: 7).

12 The shortest sequence repeated *verbatim* by a messenger is in 11. 612 = 650 (Patroklos); the longest ones in 6. 90–98 = 271–278 (Hector) and in 11. 187–194 = 202–209 (Iris, with 189~204). As I have already specified, the embassy to Achilles is not taken into account here.

13 For questions, see the episode of Achilles' inquiry about Machaon in Book 11 (l. 611–615 and 644–654). However, this option causes an atypical dynamic: if the message is a question, it means that the messenger has to return to Character A and report the answer. This is typical of embassies (see Book 9 or Idaios' mission in Book 7), but not of messenger scenes. Cf. O. Cesca, "Entre ambassades et « messenger-scenes »: enjeux narratologiques dans l'*Iliade*" forthcoming in the volume *Conseillers, Ambassadeurs, Experts. Regards sur l'Antiquité* of the Université de Franche-Comté, Besançon. For news, see the end of Book 17 (l. 640–699) and the beginning of Book 18 (l. 1–21), when Antilochos is designated to inform Achilles about Patroklos' death.

14 Reported speeches without a prefatory component or framing clause are known as "zero quotatives". See Holt (2009: 194–195). One example is found in Book 6: Hector gives Hekube some instructions to address an offering and a prayer to Athene (l. 269–278) without mentioning that they come from Helenos (l. 86–97). On the contrary, when the source of the message is Zeus, the messenger often declares his status as mediator: the expression Διὸς δέ τοι ἄγγελός εἰμι is common to Dream in Book 2 (l. 26), Thetis and Iris in Book 24 (l. 133 and 173).

The object of my interest is the fact that a few messenger scenes present an expansion of this basic path: although the information does pass from Character A to Character C via a messenger, who delivers the original utterance in a form of repetition, these messenger scenes do not follow an entirely linear path. Through the analysis of those scenes, I intend to study in this paper a peculiar aspect of speech reporting in the *Iliad*, i. e. the complexity, in terms of length, that a chain of communication can reach, without losing its efficacy.

One Repetition or More

I will start by quoting a case of speech reporting in Book 6 where the basic path A tells B *to tell* C is expanded. In fact, it presents two repetitions of the original utterance. In this episode Helenos asks Hektor to order their mother Hekabe to make an offering to Athene, while the Trojan army risks surrendering under the pressure of Greek attack:

> Ἕκτορ ἀτὰρ σὺ πόλιν δὲ μετέρχεο, εἰπὲ δ' ἔπειτα
> μητέρι σῇ καὶ ἐμῇ: ἣ δὲ ξυνάγουσα γεραιὰς
> νηὸν Ἀθηναίης γλαυκώπιδος ἐν πόλει ἄκρῃ
> οἴξασα κληῗδι θύρας ἱεροῖο δόμοιο
> *πέπλον, ὅς οἱ δοκέει χαριέστατος ἠδὲ μέγιστος*
> *εἶναι ἐνὶ μεγάρῳ καί οἱ πολὺ φίλτατος αὐτῇ,*
> *θεῖναι Ἀθηναίης ἐπὶ γούνασιν ἠϋκόμοιο,*
> *καί οἱ ὑποσχέσθαι δυοκαίδεκα βοῦς ἐνὶ νηῷ*
> *ἤνις ἠκέστας ἱερευσέμεν, αἴ κ' ἐλεήσῃ*
> *ἄστύ τε καὶ Τρώων ἀλόχους καὶ νήπια τέκνα,*
> *ὥς κεν Τυδέος υἱὸν ἀπόσχῃ Ἰλίου ἱρῆς*
> *ἄγριον αἰχμητὴν κρατερὸν μήστωρα φόβοιο,*
> ὃν δὴ ἐγὼ κάρτιστον Ἀχαιῶν φημι γενέσθαι.
> *Il.* 6.86–98

> But you, Hektor, go back again to the city, and there tell your mother and mine to assemble all the ladies of honor at the temple of gray-eyed Athene high on the citadel; there opening with a key the door to the sacred chamber let her take a robe, which seems to her the largest and the loveliest in the great house, and that which is far her dearest possession, and lay it along the knees of Athene the lovely haired. Let her promise to dedicate within the shrine twelve heifers, yearlings, never broken, if only she will have pity on the town of Troy, and the Trojan wives, and their

> innocent children. So she might hold back from sacred Ilion the son of Tydeus, that wild spear-fighter, the strong one who drives men to thoughts of terror, who I say now is become the strongest of all the Achaians.[15]

The occasion to transmit Helenos' order comes further in Book 6, when Hektor meets Hekabe on the walls. In his speech, lines 90–97 are repeated *verbatim*:

> ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν πρὸς νηὸν Ἀθηναίης ἀγελείης
> ἔρχεο σὺν θυέεσσιν ἀολλίσσασα γεραιάς:
> *πέπλον δ', ὅς τίς τοι χαριέστατος ἠδὲ μέγιστος*
> *ἔστιν ἐνὶ μεγάρῳ καί τοι πολὺ φίλτατος αὐτῇ,*
> *τὸν θὲς Ἀθηναίης ἐπὶ γούνασιν ἠϋκόμοιο,*
> *καί οἱ ὑποσχέσθαι δυοκαίδεκα βοῦς ἐνὶ νηῷ*
> *ἤνις ἠκέστας ἱερευσέμεν, αἴ κ' ἐλεήσῃ*
> *ἄστύ τε καὶ Τρώων ἀλόχους καὶ νήπια τέκνα,*
> *αἴ κεν Τυδέος υἱὸν ἀπόσχῃ Ἰλίου ἱρῆς*
> *ἄγριον αἰχμητὴν κρατερὸν μήστωρα φόβοιο.*
> *Il.* 6.271–278

> But go yourself to the temple of the spoiler Athene, assembling the ladies of honor, and with things to be sacrificed, and take a robe, which seems to you the largest and the loveliest in the great house, and that which is far your dearest possession, and lay it along the knees of Athene the lovely haired. Also promise to dedicate within the shrine twelve heifers, yearlings, never broken, if only she will have pity on the town of Troy, and the Trojan wives, and their innocent children. So she might hold back from sacred Ilion the son of Tydeus, that wild spear-fighter, the strong one who drives men to thoughts of terror.

Hekabe obeys her son: with the help of her handmaidens, she assembles the ladies of honor (l. 286–287) and chooses the loveliest robe in design and the largest she has in the house (ὃς κάλλιστος ἔην ποικίλμασιν ἠδὲ μέγιστος, l. 294), then they go together to the temple. As Hektor ordered, an offering is made to Athene, and a solemn promise is pronounced, with the same words that occurred already twice:

15 Unless otherwise noted, English translations of the *Iliad* are from R. Lattimore (2011^2[1951]), *The Iliad of Homer*, Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press. I use Lattimore's spelling of proper nouns.

πότνι’ Ἀθηναίη ἐρυσίπτολι δῖα θεάων
ἆξον δὴ ἔγχος Διομήδεος, ἠδὲ καὶ αὐτὸν
πρηνέα δὸς πεσέειν Σκαιῶν προπάροιθε πυλάων,
ὄφρά τοι αὐτίκα νῦν δυοκαίδεκα βοῦς ἐνὶ νηῷ
ἤνις ἠκέστας ἱερεύσομεν, αἴ κ’ ἐλεήσῃς
ἄστύ τε καὶ Τρώων ἀλόχους καὶ νήπια τέκνα.
Il. 6.305–310

Oh lady, Athene, our city’s defender, shining among goddesses: break the spear of Diomedes, and grant that the man be hurled on his face in front of the Skaian gates; so may we instantly dedicate within your shrine twelve heifers, yearlings, never broken, if only you will have pity on the town of Troy, and the Trojan wives, and their innocent children.

Since the fulfillment of Helenos’ order includes, besides actions, a verbal act of promise to Athene, the original utterance is repeated twice. Surprisingly, the speaker is not Hekabe, as expected, but Athene’s priestess Theano. She is the one who welcomes Hekabe and the older women in the temple and takes care of the offering, putting the robe on Athene’s knees (θῆκεν Ἀθηναίης ἐπὶ γούνασι ἠϋκόμοιο, l. 303 = 273 = 92). Both the acts of offering the robe and promising the immolation of twelve heifers were entrusted to Hekabe in Helenos’ plans. However, in the text there is no transfer of information between Hekabe and Theano: the priestess simply takes over, without any explicit relay. The logic of the narration would require a second mediator, who is actually missing. A sort of extension occurs in the basic path A tells B *to tell* C but not in the way we could expect. In fact, the new path is not A tells B *to tell* C *to tell* D but A tells B *to tell* C, plus an additional, juxtaposed ring (D prays). Why is the chain broken and the last ring untied?

To answer this question, we can try to connect this episode with other atypical messenger scenes in the *Iliad*. It happens two other times in the poem that a message—or part of it—is repeated more than once. The first case is a famous episode in Book 2, where Zeus sends a deceptive message to Agamemnon via a dream and then Agamemnon repeats it to the Council on his initiative.[16] The second case concerns a message sent by Zeus to Priam via Iris, repeated a second time to Hekabe by the same Priam, looking for advice.[17] In these cases, unlike the prayer to Athene in Book 6, the last repetition is not

16 *Il.* 2. 1–75.

17 *Il.* 24. 143–199.

essential for the fulfillment of Character A's order. It is rather a complement added by Character C, on the side of the main communicative path. However, what these three cases of speech reporting have in common is that in none of them the transfer of information works exactly as Character A had imagined. In fact, the last repetition does not belong to Character A's plans. On the contrary, it comes from the spontaneous choice of another character.

What we have empirically observed in the previous examples has a larger dimension. Should we examine all the messenger scenes in the *Iliad*, we will never find a structure like: A tells B *to tell* C *to tell* D. Although multiple repetitions are clearly possible in messenger scenes, what seems not to be possible is the foreseeing of a multiple chain in Character A's plans. In other terms, Character A, mortal or god, cannot—or does not want to—conceive a multiple transfer of information with the intervention of more than one messenger.

Avoiding Multiple Relay

The analysis of two other messenger scenes encourages us to pursue our considerations. These are two situations that, from a narrative point of view, could welcome a multiple chain: in these cases we observe not only the absence of double relay, but even an explicit concern in avoiding it.

The first example is in Book 15 and involves the divine messenger Iris. In the famous episode of Hera's trickery, while the goddess seduces Zeus, Poseidon takes advantage of his lack of attention to help the Greeks. When Zeus realizes that he has been sidetracked, he immediately wants to recapture control of the war by threatening Poseidon and stopping Hektor. To achieve this, he needs mediators able to operate directly on the battlefield, and thus he chooses Iris and Apollo. Since they are not on hand at the moment of his decision, he summons them, ordering Hera to make the call. The choice is not fortuitous. By choosing Hera, the father of the gods obliges the one who has just tried to challenge his authority to take an active part in the restoration of order. This is not the only case in the poem where a messenger assignment represents a strategy of exercising power.[18]

18 We find another example in Book 4, when Hera enjoins Zeus to give an order to Athene, who is present to the discussion. This is the only case in the poem where the instruction speech is given in the presence of Character C. It means that Character C has to listen to the instruction speech twice, whereas it would not be necessary from a narrative point of

ἔρχεο νῦν μετὰ φῦλα θεῶν, καὶ δεῦρο κάλεσσον
Ἶρίν τ' ἐλθέμεναι καὶ Ἀπόλλωνα κλυτότοξον,
ὄφρ' ἣ μὲν μετὰ λαὸν Ἀχαιῶν χαλκοχιτώνων
ἔλθῃ, καὶ εἴπῃσι Ποσειδάωνι ἄνακτι
παυσάμενον πολέμοιο τὰ ἃ πρὸς δώμαθ' ἱκέσθαι
Ἕκτορα δ' ὀτρύνῃσι μάχην ἐς Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων [...]
Il. 15.54–59

Go now among the generations of the gods, and summon Iris to come here to me, and Apollo the glorious archer, so that Iris may go among the bronze-armored people of the Achaians, and give a message to lord Poseidon to leave the fighting and come back to the home that is his. Also let Phoibos Apollo stir Hektor back into battle [...]

Since Hera is not in a position to refuse, she carries out Zeus' order and addresses Iris and Apollo. She is informed of the mission Iris and Apollo will have to accomplish, but since she is not required to tell them, she only makes the call:

Ζεὺς σφὼ εἰς Ἴδην κέλετ' ἐλθέμεν ὅττι τάχιστα:
αὐτὰρ ἐπὴν ἔλθητε, Διός τ' εἰς ὦπα ἴδησθε,
ἕρδειν ὅττί κε κεῖνος ἐποτρύνῃ καὶ ἀνώγῃ.
Il. 15.146–148

Zeus wishes both of you to go to him with all speed, at Ida; but when you have come there and looked upon Zeus' countenance, then you must do whatever he urges and orders you.

The two gods obey. Once they are in the presence of Zeus, they both listen to the different missions he entrusts them with. We focus now on Iris' side:

---

view. Repetitions normally obey to the logic of communication between characters: only the external audience perceives them, while characters always—except for this episode—listen to the utterance they need. As de Jong (2004: 242) points out, in Book 4, "the role of the intermediary (Zeus) is therefore, not so much to carry a message from one place to another, as to *authorize* what character **a** (Hera) wishes to impose on character **c** (Athene)". I would argue that Hera, by doing that, also wishes to stress her victory over Zeus.

> βάσκ' ἴθι Ἶρι ταχεῖα, Ποσειδάωνι ἄνακτι
> πάντα τάδ' ἀγγεῖλαι, μὴ δὲ ψευδάγγελος εἶναι.
> *παυσάμενόν μιν ἄνωχθι μάχης ἠδὲ πτολέμοιο*
> *ἔρχεσθαι μετὰ φῦλα θεῶν ἢ εἰς ἅλα δῖαν.*
> *εἰ δέ μοι οὐκ ἐπέεσσ' ἐπιπείσεται, ἀλλ' ἀλογήσει,*
> φραζέσθω δὴ ἔπειτα κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμὸν
> μή μ' οὐδὲ κρατερός περ ἐὼν ἐπιόντα ταλάσσῃ
> μεῖναι, *ἐπεί εὑ φημὶ βίῃ πολὺ φέρτερος εἶναι*
> *καὶ γενεῇ πρότερος: τοῦ δ' οὐκ ὄθεται φίλον ἦτορ*
> *ἶσον ἐμοὶ φάσθαι, τόν τε στυγέουσι καὶ ἄλλοι.*
>
> *Il.* 15.158–167

> Go on your way now, swift Iris, to the lord Poseidon, and give him all this message nor be a false messenger. Tell him that he must now quit the war and the fighting and go back among the generations of gods, or into the bright sea. And if he will not obey my words, or thinks nothing of them, then let him consider in his heart and his spirit that he might not, strong though he is, be able to stand up to my attack; since I say I am far greater than he is in strength, and elder born; yet his inward heart shrinks not from calling himself the equal of me, though others shudder before me.

After having listened to Zeus' words, Iris finds Poseidon and repeats the message, partially *verbatim*:

> ἀγγελίην τινά τοι γαιήοχε κυανοχαῖτα
> ἦλθον δεῦρο φέρουσα παραὶ Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο.
> *παυσάμενόν σ' ἐκέλευσε μάχης ἠδὲ πτολέμοιο*
> *ἔρχεσθαι μετὰ φῦλα θεῶν ἢ εἰς ἅλα δῖαν.*
> *εἰ δέ οἱ οὐκ ἐπέεσσ' ἐπιπείσεαι, ἀλλ' ἀλογήσεις,*
> ἠπείλει καὶ κεῖνος ἐναντίβιον πολεμίξων
> ἐνθάδ' ἐλεύσεσθαι: σὲ δ' ὑπεξαλέασθαι ἄνωγε
> χεῖρας, *ἐπεὶ σέο φησὶ βίῃ πολὺ φέρτερος εἶναι*
> *καὶ γενεῇ πρότερος: σὸν δ' οὐκ ὄθεται φίλον ἦτορ*
> *ἶσόν οἱ φάσθαι, τόν τε στυγέουσι καὶ ἄλλοι.*
>
> *Il.* 15.174–183

> I have a certain message for you, dark haired, earth-encircler, and came here to bring it to you from Zeus of the aegis. His order is that you quit the war and the fighting and go back among the generations of gods, or

> into the bright sea. And if you will not obey his words, or think nothing of them, his threat is that he himself will come to fight with you here, strength against strength, but warns you to keep from under his hands, since he says he is far greater than you are in strength, and elder born; yet your inward heart shrinks not from calling yourself the equal of him, though others shudder before him.

The structure of this messenger scene is quite complicated: in order to send a message to Poseidon, Zeus sends Hera to call Iris, he then proceeds to tell Iris in person to transmit his threat to Poseidon. Why would he partake in such a muddled detour? It would have been quicker to directly tell Hera to give Iris the message to transmit to Poseidon. For some reason this possibility is discarded. Zeus' choice can be justified by different hypotheses. First, certainly Hera is less reliable as a messenger, since she has just tricked him. Second, we can also suppose that, besides Hera's reliability, Zeus prefers as a general rule to entrust his words to a professional, faithful, expert messenger like Iris.

However, a third messenger scene contradicts the last hypothesis. In Book 24, the gods are angry because of Achilles' behavior: he refuses to eat and keeps raging over Hektor's body. Zeus declares that he will talk to Thetis so she can persuade her son to stop his foolish behavior:

> ἀλλ' εἴ τις καλέσειε θεῶν Θέτιν ἆσσον ἐμεῖο,
> ὄφρά τί οἱ εἴπω πυκινὸν ἔπος, ὥς κεν Ἀχιλλεὺς
> δώρων ἐκ Πριάμοιο λάχῃ ἀπό θ' Ἕκτορα λύσῃ.
>
> *Il.* 24.74–76

> If one of the gods would summon Thetis here to my presence so that I can say a close word to her, and see that Achilleus is given gifts by Priam and gives back the body of Hektor.

At this call, Iris rises among the gods, ready to obey to Zeus' will. Again, like Hera in Book 15, she informs Thetis about Zeus' summons but, even if she knows the content, she does not mention it:

> ὄρσο Θέτι: καλέει Ζεὺς ἄφθιτα μήδεα εἰδώς.
>
> *Il.* 24.88

> Rise, Thetis, Zeus whose purposes are infinite calls you.

Thetis even asks herself τίπτε με κεῖνος ἄνωγε μέγας θεός; (what does he, the great god, want with me? l. 90). The question—rhetorical, indeed—receives no answer, until she reaches the presence of Zeus:

> αἶψα μάλ' ἐς στρατὸν ἐλθὲ καὶ υἱέϊ σῷ ἐπίτειλον:
> *σκύζεσθαί οἱ εἰπὲ θεούς, ἐμὲ δ' ἔξοχα πάντων*
> *ἀθανάτων κεχολῶσθαι, ὅτι φρεσὶ μαινομένῃσιν*
> *Ἕκτορ' ἔχει παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν οὐδ' ἀπέλυσεν,*
> αἴ κέν πως ἐμέ τε δείσῃ ἀπό θ' Ἕκτορα λύσῃ.
> *Il.* 24.112–116
>
> Go then in all speed to the encampment and give to your son this message: tell him that the gods frown upon him, that beyond all other immortals I myself am angered that in his heart's madness he holds Hektor beside the curved ships and did not give him back. Perhaps in fear of me he will give back Hektor.

As Zeus asks, Thetis enters Achilles' tent. She speaks to Achilles with kindness, rebuking him for not taking care of himself (l. 128–130) and reminding him of his sad destiny of premature death (l. 131–132). She then declares her role of messenger and repeats *verbatim* Zeus' words:

> ἀλλ' ἐμέθεν ξύνες ὦκα, Διὸς δέ τοι ἄγγελός εἰμι:
> *σκύζεσθαι σοί φησι θεούς, ἑὲ δ' ἔξοχα πάντων*
> *ἀθανάτων κεχολῶσθαι, ὅτι φρεσὶ μαινομένῃσιν*
> *Ἕκτορ' ἔχεις παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν οὐδ' ἀπέλυσας.*
> ἀλλ' ἄγε δὴ λῦσον, νεκροῖο δὲ δέξαι ἄποινα.
> *Il.* 24.133–137
>
> But listen hard to me for I come from Zeus with a message. He says that the gods frown upon you, that beyond all other immortals he himself is angered that in your heart's madness you hold Hektor beside the curved ships and did not redeem him. Come, then, give him up and accept ransom for the body.

As in Book 15, Zeus prefers a longer path than simply telling B (Iris) *to tell* C (Thetis) *to tell* D (Achilles).[19] Instead, he asks Iris to call Thetis, and then gives

19 The dynamics of communication in Book 24 are analyzed in Létoublon (1987).

Thetis the message for Achilles. Again, he is ready to cause a complicated series of to and fro and lose precious time, in order to be able to speak in person with Thetis. In this case, however, unlike in Book 15, Zeus' choice cannot be explained by the messenger's low reliability or weak professionalism. In the *Iliad*, Iris is the messenger *par excellence*, but Zeus' attitude is not any different toward her than toward Hera.

The Reliability of Messengers

With regard to the problem of messengers' reliability in the *Iliad*, it is useful to recall some reflections different scholars have made. Professional or not, human or god, the messenger is in generally considered as a reliable figure. As Jonathan Ready writes, "characters for the most part have great confidence in the process of transmission via a messenger".[20] Françoise Létoublon points out that in the Homeric poems there are no epithets associated with messengers meaning *faithful*, *truthful*, the only explicit quality of a messenger being speed.[21] Ἐτήτυμος, *faithful*, occurs only in Book 22 to highlight the absence of a messenger:

> οὐ γάρ οἵ τις ἐτήτυμος ἄγγελος ἐλθὼν
> ἤγγειλ' ὅττί ῥά οἱ πόσις ἔκτοθι μίμνε πυλάων.
> *Il.* 22.438–439

> for no sure messenger had come to her and told her how her husband had held his ground there outside the gates.

Apart from this occurrence, Homeric epics do not explicitly mention faithful messengers. Taking her stand from this reticence, Létoublon states her *argumentum ex silentio*: the messenger's reliability is never mentioned because it is

20 Ready (2014: 32). See also Barrett (2002: 23–25 and 56).

21 Létoublon (1987: 131–132). The messenger with the wider range of epithets in the *Iliad* is Iris: χρυσόπτερος (of the golden wings 8.398, 11.185), ταχεῖα (swift 8.399, 11.186, 15.158, 24.144), ἀελλόπος (storm-footed 8.409, 24.159), πόδας ὠκέα (swift-footed 8.425, 11.199, 24.188), ποδήνεμος ὠκέα (swift wind-footed 11.195, 15.160, 15.200). Among mortals, Talthybios is sacred (θεῖος 4.192), Idaios has a great voice (ἠπυτα 7.384), Thoötes is brilliant (δῖος 12.343) and Antilochos is a swift-footed messenger (πόδας ταχὺς ἄγγελος 18.2). For an etymological study of messengers' epithets linked with speed, see Bader (1991).

taken for granted.[22] In fact, we can observe that messengers in Homer always do their best to fulfill the expectations of Character A. No one ever betrays his mission, and the external audience can always verify it thanks to the proximity of the original utterance. As we have already said, some minor modifications can occur, but they affect neither the content nor the entirety of the message they convey.

Another epithet that deserves attention is ψευδάγγελος. In Book 15, Zeus recommends Iris to transmit the entire message and not to be a false messenger: πάντα τάδ' ἀγγεῖλαι, μηδὲ ψευδάγγελος εἶναι (l. 159). In James Barrett's opinion, Zeus wants to be sure that Iris will pass his message on without weakening or softening his words.[23] Ready goes further and suggests: "this admonition represents an acknowledgement that the process could break down".[24] The adjective, a compound of ψευδ- and ἄγγελος, is a *hapax* in Homer.[25] It is not simple to fully understand what Zeus means by "pseudo-messenger". Does he really believe that Iris, the divine messenger, could modify his words to the point of twisting his message? Or is he convinced that softening and adapting is enough to consider someone a false messenger? It is a common fact that a messenger, even if he is reliable and respectful of Character A's requests, can sometimes reframe certain parts of the instruction speech in the name of efficacy.[26] We also have to consider that litotes are frequent in the formal apparatus of messenger scenes. In fact, this figure of speech often represents the narrative frame of Character A's instruction speech: "So he spoke, and Hektor did not disobey his brother";[27] "He spoke, nor did the herald disobey when he heard him";[28] "He spoke, and swift wind-footed Iris did not disobey him".[29] The abundance of litotes in messenger scenes suggests the possibility of a rhetorical interpretation for Zeus' recommendation. Despite the exact meaning of "nor to be a

22 "L'épopée ne mentionne pas plus de 'messager véridique' à la forme positive qu'elle ne mentionne de messagers mensongers parce que la véridicité du messager va de soi dans cette culture" (Létoublon [1987: 132]).

23 Barrett (2002: 24).

24 Ready (2014: 32).

25 After ψευδάγγελος in *Iliad* 15, the earliest occurrence of a compound of ψευδ- and a derivative of ἄγγελος is in Aristophanes' *Birds*, where we find an infinitive form of the denominative verb ψευδαγγελέω (l. 1340).

26 Cf. *supra*.

27 Ὣς ἔφαθ', Ἕκτωρ δ' οὔ τι κασιγνήτῳ ἀπίθησεν (*Il.* 6. 102).

28 Ὣς ἔφατ', οὐδ' ἄρα οἱ κῆρυξ ἀπίθησεν ἀκούσας (*Il.* 12. 351).

29 Ὣς ἔφατ', οὐδ' ἀπίθησε ποδήνεμος ὠκέα Ἶρις (*Il.* 15. 168). See also 2. 166, 4. 68, 4. 198, 11. 195, 17. 697 and 24. 120.

false messenger", an important point is represented by the composition of the adjective ψευδάγγελος. To express the idea of someone who fails in transmitting a message, the poet uses the term ἄγγελος with a negative prefix. Ψευδ-, from a root that means *blow*, then *lying*, denies what comes next, showing that the noun implies in itself the concept of reliability and good fulfillment of messengers' missions.[30]

Since messengers in the epics are considered reliable figures, mistrust of them does not seem a convincing element to explain the absence of multiple relay in the *Iliad*. One important element is the social and authoritative value of Zeus' choice. As we have already pointed out, using a disobedient Hera as a messenger might be a strategy to stress power. This argument is partially valid for the episode in Book 24: the choice of speaking in person with a suffering Thetis might allow Zeus to manage his negotiation according to his will. Nevertheless, it is less effective in explaining the missing ring in Book 6, with Theano praying as if she had received Hektor's instructions instead of Hekabe. Arguments internal to narrative, such as characters' social behavior and the carefulness towards messengers, cannot be the sole explanation for the limit of speech reporting. In my opinion, the object of Zeus' mistrust in Book 15 and 24 is due to multiple mediation rather than to the quality of the mediator itself.

Moreover, Zeus is not the only one who avoids such a transfer of information in the *Iliad*: all the characters of the poem seem to share the same mistrust, since nobody ever conceives a chain like A tells B *to tell* C *to tell* D. This state of affairs may have its roots in the contemporary habits of communication. In fact, the technique of transmitting messages in relay is not attested in ancient Greece before the Hellenistic Era.[31] However, the scarcity of sources, partly due to the oral nature of communications, does not give us sufficient evidence to draw conclusions. A deeper reason for the absence of relay in the *Iliad* can be found in the meta-epic dimension, i. e. in the architecture of the poem itself.

Messages as Embedded Speeches

To approach the question of the poem's architecture in connection with messenger scenes, we have to recall that messenger speeches are a type of embed-

30 In Ancient Greek more than a hundred and twenty compounds in ψευδ- and ψευδο- are documented (e.g. ψευδόμαντις, ψευδοκῆρυξ …). The Greek ψυδ- as the Armenian *sut*, *lie*, can be associated to the root **bhes-* > **bhs eu*, *blow*. In many languages the blowing of the wind is a common metaphor for lying (Chantraine *s.v.* ψεῦδος).

31 Longo (1981: 100).

ded speech. In the *Iliad* we find two strategies to represent embedded speeches: direct quotation (direct embedded speeches) and indirect quotation (indirect embedded speeches).[32]

Direct embedded speeches are not frequent: only 20 direct quotations out of 698 are uttered by characters, while all the others belong to the main narration.[33] One example of direct embedded speech is Agamemnon's report of Dream's instructions in Book 2 (l. 56–71). As with messenger scenes, we can observe a line of complexity that is never crossed. In fact, triple embedment may not be found anywhere in the *Iliad*. It means that the narrator can make only two characters speak in direct form, with their speeches embedded in one another. A fourth speech-embedding actor may not be found. The maximum of the complexity in the poem is: Character A says: "Character B said / will say: «x»".

1	Narrator		
2	Character A says:	single embedment	Hektor said:
3	"Character B said / will say: «x»"	double embedment	"Achilles must have told you: «x»"

Direct embedded speeches in the *Iliad* are mainly of three types. The first is the report type: a character tells a story or remembers a past event, like Agamemnon's report.[34] The second type is represented by hypothetical speeches: invented, plausible speeches that a specific character could have pronounced in the past. An example is Hektor's speech to a dying Patroklos in Book 16 (l. 839–841): in his opinion, Achilles would have ordered Patroklos to fight and

32 Some features of the speech representational spectrum in the *Iliad* according to Beck's statistics: 56 % of the speeches are quoted directly, 24 % are quoted in indirect form, 20 % are speech mentions and the remaining 3 % are represented by free indirect speech and other modes of speech presentation. Most of the time the main narrator quotes characters' speech directly, more rarely by indirect form or speech mention. Moreover, the narrator can embed other speeches in these quotations, in direct or indirect form. Beck (2012: 156).

33 Cf. de Jong (2004: 171).

34 Other examples are the prophecy of Calchas as recalled by Odysseus in Book 2 (l. 323–329), Bellerophon's story told by Glaucus in Book 6 (l. 164–165) or Hera's trickery narrated by Agamemnon in Book 19 (l. 95–133). In this last example, Agamemnon quotes Hera and Zeus directly. David Bouvier points out that Agamemnon is the only character in the *Iliad* who is allowed to lend a voice to Zeus, assuming the divine "je". Bouvier (2009: 25–28).

not to come back before having killed his enemy, while Homer's audience knows that Achilles told him the opposite.[35] The last type is represented by τις speeches.[36] They are projections into the future, such as "And some day one of the men to come will say …".[37] They always reflect the character's concern about his destiny and κλέος.[38] The last two types are invented speeches, aiming to a highly rhetorical effect. On the contrary, report-speeches are supposed to reproduce an utterance that has really taken place in the past. However, in her recent book, *Speech Presentation in Homeric Epic*, and already in a 2008 article, Deborah Beck observes that these embedded direct quotations often express a lie, or deceptive speech.[39] She bases her observations on two episodes: the story told by Agamemnon in Book 19 about how Ate misled Zeus, supporting Hera's trickery, and Bellerophon's misadventure, reported by Glaucus in Book 6, about Anteia's unfair accusation of rape. In Beck's opinion, Agamemnon and Glaucus' quotations are in direct form because they are both linked to deception, as if the narrators wanted to put some distance between them and the lie they are reporting. In fact, the former reproduces Hera's deceptive words to Zeus and the latter Anteia's false accusation. It is a common fact, as well as in ordinary language, that a speaker who quotes words directly often "means to stand in a relation of reduced personal responsibility for what he is saying".[40] Nevertheless, this is not the only use of direct speech in the *Iliad*. Calchas' prophecy,

35 *Il.* 16. 83–100. The audience has just listened to Achilles' true speech at the beginning of Book 16. This is one of the examples of inconsistency that Malcom Willcock lists to demonstrate the presence of *ad hoc* inventions in the *Iliad*. Willcock (1977: 47).

36 Scholars such Anton Fingerle and Irene de Jong have classified under the name of τις speeches both the type of embedded direct speeches I have described (the "potential" τις speeches according to de Jong's terminology) and the speeches uttered by an undefined speaker included in the narration (the "actual" τις speeches for de Jong). See Fingerle (1939: 283–293) and de Jong (1987: 69). I do not consider here this second group of τις speeches, since they are not embedded speeches.

37 *Il.* 7. 87–90.

38 According to Beck, τις speeches are particularly frequent in the Trojans' talk (Beck [2008: 164–165]). For τις speeches as a result of Hektor's particular concern for his κλέος, see also Mackie (1996: 97–99).

39 "When characters refer to speeches that are lies, they quote the lies directly. Indeed, quotation is more suitable than indirect speech for presenting lies" (Beck [2012: 38]). For more details about lies or deceptive speeches quoted directly in Homeric poems, see Beck (2012: 38–42) and (2008: 177–181), though I am not entirely convinced about the fact that the presence of a female character is essential to this narrative choice.

40 Holt (2009: 192) quoting E. Goffman (1974), *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience*, New York: Harper and Row.

quoted by Odysseus in Book 2 (323–329), does not have a counterpart in the poem and it is impossible to verify its truthfulness. However, Odysseus' audience is supposed to have taken part in the event he is reminding them of. This circumstance somehow suffices to make his claim reliable, or at least not completely untrue. Odysseus exploits, in this case, another skill of direct quotation: making arguments more robust and effective.[41]

Compared to direct embedded speeches, indirect embedded speeches are more frequent in the *Iliad*: they are the preferred way for characters to quote someone else's words.[42] As we have already noted, it is the way in which messenger speeches work. We have seen that no third level embedding may be found in the *Iliad* in relation to direct embedded speeches. On the contrary, for indirect embedded speeches this possibility exists. A triple embedment appears once in the poem: in Book 2, when Agamemnon directly quotes Dream. Since his message already embeds Zeus' instructions in indirect form, we find three levels of embedding: Agamemnon's level, Dream's level and Zeus' level.

1	Narrator		
2	Character A says:	single embedment	Agamemnon said:
3	"Character B said / will say: «x»"	double embedment	" Dream said: «x»"
4	«Character C said that …»	triple embedment	«Zeus told me that …»

This is the highest complexity the text reaches, while a more standard path is: Character A says: "Character B says that …".[43]

1	Narrator		
2	Character A says:	single embedment	Iris said:
3	"Character B said that …"	double embedment	" Zeus told that …"

41 On this use of direct speech see Holt (2009: 192) quoting R. Wooffitt (1992), *Telling Tales of the Unexpected: the Organisation of Factual Discourse*. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf. On Odysseus quoting Calchas' omen, see Beck (2008: 167–168).

42 Cf. de Jong (2004: 171).

43 In this respect, the *Odyssey* works differently: since second level direct embeddings are in general longer and more recurring—with Books 9–12 entrusted to Odysseus' narration—, triple embedding is more frequent as well. We have five examples of triple embedding: *Od.* 9. 511–512, 11. 127–128, 12. 158–164, 12. 272–275, 17. 140–144.

One of the reasons explaining the situation is probably the concern for the audience's comprehension threshold. Besides requiring a certain attention and energy for the poet, multiple embedding is certainly difficult to follow, in particular in the case of direct speeches.[44] We have to imagine that, in an oral epic, the bard did not simply *tell* characters' speeches but he somehow gave them expression. As Mario Cantilena points out, although bards and actors are not the same, they share common traits.[45] The epic poet is different from other kinds of narrators: "in the novel we can talk of the narrator hiding behind a character only figuratively, whereas in an oral epic the passages in direct speech are delivered by a narrator *qua* actor".[46] In quoting speeches the poet *becomes* the characters he is quoting, therefore the frequency of embeddings could generate confusion in the audience and interfere with the main narration.

Focalization Degrees

Besides this limit of complexity, direct and indirect embedded speeches share another common feature, which is stressed by Irene de Jong in her *Narrators and Focalizers*:

> [...] embedded speeches display a range of varieties as regards their reliability: they can be truthful quotations or reports, they can be adapted to a greater or lesser degree or they can be wholly invented. In this respect, embedded speeches differ from character-texts. The latter, being introduced by the NF$_1$ (= *first narrator focalizer, scil. the poet*), are, at least in the *Iliad*, to be regarded as reliable quotations of characters' words. On the contrary, embedded speeches, being quoted by characters themselves, do not have this automatic stamp of authority.
>
> 2004: 178

The poet's narration is authoritative, because of the divine inspiration provided by the Muses, while characters can lie and deceive. In terms of reliability, characters and poet's narration have a different status. Ruth Scodel explains this fact by pointing out that characters' speeches are always subordinate to the contingent needs and aims of a particular occasion, while bardic narration

44 "The number of embeddings is, in principle, indefinite, although too many embeddings will, for reasons of intelligibility, be avoided" (de Jong [2004: 35]).

45 Cantilena (2002: 33).

46 Richardson (1990: 70).

is not.[47] On the contrary, de Jong underlines the question of different degrees of focalization. She defines the focalizer "the agent through whose eyes the narratee perceives the events".[48] In her narratological analysis of Homeric epic, she identifies many levels of narration and focalization. The Homeric poet functions as primary narrator and focalizer (NF_1). The NF_1 is able to embed in his narration a character's point of view or lend him voice via direct quotation. In the former case, that character becomes a second focalizer (F_2), while in the latter he becomes a second narrator-focalizer (NF_2), since the poet hands over both narration and focalization. If NF_2 embeds someone else's words in his speech we reach a third level of focalization.[49]

Back to Messenger Scenes

In the last two sections, we have considered the presence of speeches embedded in character-text and, according to de Jong's narratological system, their status in terms of focalization. We have observed that double embedment is not frequent in the *Iliad* and that triple embedment appears only once. In all the other cases, triple embedment is avoided. As a general rule, in simple narrator-text, we have a maximum of two speaking characters whose speeches are embedded in one another.[50] This corresponds to a third level of focalization.

We can now state that messengers, like many characters, are second narrators-focalizers and their speeches, reproducing Character A's point of view, introduce a tertiary focalization.[51] If we multiply messengers—a choice which Zeus and all characters avoid making—we also multiply the levels of embedment and, consequently, the degrees of focalization. If in Book 24, instead of

47 Scodel considers bardic performances "potentially meaningful far beyond their immediate contexts, but with the details of content not specific to particular occasions, even if the subject of the song has been requested by a member of the audience". She sees narrative as a *continuum* with different nuances of subordination to communicative needs, with the bardic performances on one extreme and the false tales told to Penelope and Eumaeus in *Od.* 14 on the other. Scodel (1998: 173).

48 De Jong (2004: xxi).

49 De Jong (2004: 33–40).

50 For the difference between simple narrator-text, complex narrator-text and character-text see de Jong (2004: 41–220).

51 About tertiary focalization, cf. de Jong (2004: 37): "The internal secondary narrator-focalizer embeds in his character-text the focalization of another character, who, thus, functions as a tertiary narrator-focalizer".

summoning Thetis and entrusting her with the message to Achilles, Zeus had told Iris *to tell* Thetis *to tell* Achilles his words, the narration would have reached a fourth degree of focalization. In fact, the narrator would have presented Thetis' words, which would have reported, in addition to her focalization of Iris' speech, also Iris' focalization of Zeus' order.

	Character C says:	"Character B said that	Character A said that …"
Narrator	C = Thetis	B = Iris	A = Zeus
F_1N_1	F_2N_2	F_3	F_4

A multiple relay, with two or more messengers, would increase the depth of the narration to the point of having four focalizers. Why does this possibility have to be avoided? The reason is that messengers, even if considered reliable figures in the *Iliad*, are still vectors of focalization. Increasing their number in a communicative path would enlarge the distance from the original utterance. In fact, according to de Jong, the influence of the narrator on characters' speech is less pervasive than the influence of characters themselves on the speeches they quote:

> […] the relation between secondary narration-focalization and tertiary focalization is of a different nature than that between primary narration-focalization and secondary focalization: whereas the NF_1 in cases of embedded focalization does indeed hand over focalization to the characters and only seldom intrudes […], speaking characters (functioning as NF_2) to a far greater degree, interfere with tertiary focalization, exploiting it for the purposes of their own speech.
>
> 2004: 171

For these reasons it seems that the limit of speech reporting in the *Iliad* is fixed to two steps: Character B's speech (messenger or not), presented by the narrator, and Character A's speech, presented by Character B. A further step would disturb the narration, leading it too far from its source.

Conclusions

Upon closer analysis, the reason of the absence of multiple mediation in the *Iliad* is not to be primarily found *inside* the narration but *beyond* it, in a meta-

narrative dimension. In fact, the mistrust toward long chains of communication does not belong to characters: it involves them only by reflex, intersecting with other contingent facts, such as social habits, strategies of persuasion, power, trickery … On the contrary, the poet is the one who is actually concerned about the solidity and reliability of his narration. Behind Character A's rejection of putting too many messengers between his utterance and the final delivery speech, we glimpse the poet's concern regarding his distance from his source of poetic knowledge: the Muses. Like the messenger, the Homeric poet also is responsible for reporting an authoritative utterance. In the first scenario, the authority is intra-narrative and derives from Character A, while the poet draws his song from a divine source. With Barrett, who insists on the parallelism between messenger and poet,[52] we say that "in his voice (*scil.* the messenger) one hears that of the source of the 'message', whether king, Muse, or poet".[53] Poet and messenger must both be a reliable *medium* of transmission fulfilled through repetitions. However, while repetition needs to be as accurate as possible, focalization interferes with the authoritative value of the source because it shades the information provided by the Muses, undermining the bases of the poem itself. Therefore, as a high number of messengers may twist Character A's original message, too many speaking speech-embedding characters threaten the efficacy and reliability of the poetic performance. In this equation I find a convincing explanation of the rules that presides over speech reporting in the *Iliad*, arguing that the limit of speech reporting is linked to the depth, in terms of focalization, that the poem can reach.

Bibliography

Bader, F. 1991. "Les messagers rapides des dieux: d'Hermès eriourios à Iris aellopos, podemnemos okea". *Studi classici e orientali* 41: 35–86.

Barrett, J. 2002. *Staged Narrative. Poetics and the Messenger in Greek Tragedy*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Beck, D. 2008. "Character-Quoted Speech in the *Iliad*". *Phoenix* 62.2: 162–183.

———. 2012. *Speech Presentation in Homeric Epic*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Bonadeo, A. 2004. *Iride: un arco tra mito e natura*. Firenze: Le Monnier Università.

Bouvier, D. 2009. "La voix et le « je » de Dieu chez Homère et dans la Septante" in D. van Mal-Maeder, A. Burnier, and L. Nuñez, eds. *Jeux de voix: énonciation, intertextualité et intentionnalité dans la littérature antique*, 19–37. Bern: Peter Lang.

52 See Barrett (2002: 23–25 and 56–69).

53 Barrett (2002: 69).

Cantilena, M. 2002. “Sul discorso diretto in Omero” in F. Montanari, ed. *Omero tremila anni dopo*, 22–39. Roma: Edizioni di storia e letteratura.

Chantraine, P. 1968. *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque*. Paris: Editions Klincksieck.

Collins, D.E. 2001. *Reanimated Voices. Speech Reporting in a Historical-Pragmatic Perspective*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.

Coulmas, F. 1986. “Reported Speech: Some General Issues” in F. Coulmas, ed. *Direct and Indirect Speech*, 1–28. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

de Jong, I.J.F. 2004[2] [1987]. *Narrators and Focalizers. The Presentation of the Story in the* Iliad. London: Bristol Classical Press.

———. 1987. “The Voice of Anonymity: tis-Speeches in the *Iliad*”. *Eranos* 85: 69–84.

Durán López, M.A. 1999. “Bardos, heraldos y mensajeros en los poemas homéricos” in A. Pérez Jiménez and G. Cruz Andreotti, eds. *Aladas palabras. Correos y comunicaciones en el Mediterráneo*, 9–37. Madrid: Ediciones Clásicas.

Fingerle, A. 1939. *Typik der Homerischen Reden*. Unpublished diss. München.

Hofmeister, T.P. 1990. “Iris’ Role in *Iliad* 23”. *Syllecta Classica* 2: 9–16.

Holt, E. 2009. “Reported Speech” in S. D’hondt, J.-O. Östman, and J. Verschueren, eds. *The Pragmatics of Interactions*, 191–205. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.

Kirk, G.S. 1990. *The Iliad. A Commentary*, Vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Létoublon, F. 1987. “Le messager fidèle” in J. Bremer, I. de Jong, and J. Kalff, eds. *Homer: Beyond Oral Poetry. Recent trends in Homeric interpretation*, 123–144. Amsterdam: B.R. Grüner.

Longo, O. 1981. *Tecniche della comunicazione nella Grecia antica*. Ercolano: Liguori Editore.

Mackie, H. 1996. *Talking Trojan. Speech and Community in the* Iliad. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Minchin, E. 2001. *Homer and the Resources of Memory: Some Applications of Cognitive Theory to the* Iliad *and the* Odyssey. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Pisano, C. 2014. *Hermes, lo scettro, l’ariete. Configurazioni mitiche della regalità nella Grecia antica*. Napoli: M. D’Auria Editore.

Ready, J.L. 2014. “Omens and Messages in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*: A Study in Transmission” in R. Scodel, ed. *Between Orality and Literacy: Communication and Adaptation in Antiquity*, 29–55. Leiden: Brill.

Richardson, S. 1990. *The Homeric Narrator*. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press.

Scodel, R. 1998. “Bardic Performance and Oral Tradition in Homer”. *American Journal of Philology* 119.2: 171–194.

Willcock, M.M. 1977. “Ad Hoc Invention in the *Iliad*”. *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 81: 41–53.

CHAPTER 4

The Voice of the Seer in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*[*]

Deborah Beck

Homeric epic regularly uses two systems of words for referring to seers and their prophecies. The more common of the two is built on the root μαντ-, found in Homeric epic in the words μάντις (seer), μαντεύομαι (I make a divinely inspired utterance), and μαντοσύνη (seercraft, plus one instance of μαντήιον ["instance of seercraft," *Od.* 12.272]).[1] The other group uses the root θεοπροπ-, found in θεοπρόπος, θεοπροπέω, and θεοπροπίη (or, twice, θεοπρόπιον).[2] Sources from antiquity to the present have seen the words derived from these two roots as synonyms: a D scholion on *Iliad* 1.85 defines θεοπρόπιον as μάντευμα (θεοπρόπιον. Τὸ ἐκ θεῶν μάντευμα), and a recent discussion of prophecy calls these "two mutually interchangeable groups of terms" (Finkelberg 2011: 694).[3] In fact, however, the usage patterns of these two roots vary enough to suggest that they have different,

* I would like to thank Niall Slater for being such an affable and engaging host of the conference at which this paper was originally presented and for shepherding the present volume through the publication process; the other conference participants for their many astute and engaging questions; and the anonymous reader, who provided both encouragement and acute suggestions for improving the argument.

1 Dillery (2005: 169–170) discusses the various ancient and modern opinions about the etymology of μάντις. He argues not only that it is formed from a "madness" root, found in e.g. μαίνομαι, but that the Greeks themselves were aware of the connection. In contrast, Casevitz (1992), which includes a survey of the Homeric instances of μαντ- words for seers in search of the original meaning of the word μάντις, argues that the etymology is related to μηνύω "inform, denounce."

2 θεοπροπ- words derive from θεός + πρέπω, or "someone who makes the god, or the divine thought, known" (Kirk [1962: 62], discussing the definition in Chantraine's *Dictionnaire étymologique*).

3 Roth (1982: 84) and Dillery (2005: 171) both say that θεοπρόπος is a metrical variant or synonym of μάντις. Flower (2008) defines "seer" as μάντις (2) without mentioning the θεοπροπ- system of words. Generally speaking, studies that aim to define the qualifications or actions of Homeric seers do not discuss θεοπροπ- words for them and their activities (e.g. Di Sacco Franco [2000], Suárez de la Torre [2009]). Karp (1998: 18), however, does distinguish μάντις and θεοπρόπος based on "method of divination:" a μάντις is a "seer" and a θεοπρόπος is "one who reveals the divine will." Beyond this statement, which essentially restates the different etymologies of the two words, the article does not make a clear or consistent argument about the difference in meaning between these terms.

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2017 | DOI: 10.1163/9789004329737_005

but overlapping, meanings: θεοπροπ- refers to an skeptical, angry, or doubtful response from the addressee of a divinely inspired utterance. μαντ- words *can* have such a meaning, but they also have a range of others, whereas θεοπροπ- words refer *specifically* to this kind of negative or problematic reaction. In other words, μαντ-and θεοπροπ- form a marked/unmarked pair that is marked for the reaction of an addressee of a divinely inspired utterance, where θεοπροπ- is the marked term.[4]

This understanding of the meanings of these two roots opens up fruitful questions about the relationship between seers, language, and power. First, how do various kinds of participants talk about seers in the context of power struggles? While the θεοπροπ- words consistently express a refusal to simply accede to a prophecy, most often in the context of some kind of broader conflict about the relative social positions of a more and a less sympathetic character, different characters use these words to express different kinds of negative or skeptical feelings depending on their own role in the larger power struggle. Second, how do differences in vocabulary that have generally been overlooked play a key role in giving voice both to the characters' own emotional reactions within the poems and to the main narrator's story about these reactions? As we will see, μαντ- and θεοπροπ- have consistent meanings at various levels in the Homeric poems, in the speeches of different characters, in the narrated parts of each poem, and in the *Odyssey* as compared to the *Iliad*. At the same time, those meanings manifest themselves quite differently depending on the needs of the story. In other words, these words act like many other features of Homeric poetry in combining a fundamental sameness in their basic properties with a dynamic variety in how the words are used in specific contexts.

Abuse or skepticism about seers in the Homeric epics happens predominantly in connection with characters who become unsympathetic to the audience because of their central roles in ill-fated power struggles that turn out badly both for themselves and for their friends and comrades. That is, characters who address personally abusive speeches to particular seer characters also make notably aggressive and unsympathetic attempts to seize power to which they are not entitled, and they ultimately come to no good in their attempts. The manner in which these characters refer to seers and prophecy—and in which other characters talk about them as a result of the power conflicts that power-hungry characters set in motion—stems from these power conflicts, which in practice are not limited to the seers or inspired utterances whom the power-seeker abuses. Rather, a conflict that is about something else plays

4 Nagy (1990: 5–6) offers a concise and clear presentation of "marked/unmarked."

out partly around the seer.[5] The ways in which individual characters talk about seers during such conflicts help to create unsympathetic portraits of them and their responses to the issues raised by the larger conflict.

Calchas, *Iliad* 1: A Case Study in Prophecy and Power Dynamics

In the Greek assembly in *Iliad* 1, Calchas serves as the fuse that sets off the conflict over power and status between Agamemnon and Achilles, a central theme not only of this episode but of the poem as a whole. Indeed, the series of speeches centering on Calchas that begins the assembly (*Iliad* 1.59–120) shows all of the typical usage patterns that characterize the various words for seers and their activities throughout the Homeric poems. As the assembly begins, Achilles sums up the grim situation of the plague-stricken Greeks (59–61) and suggests that they consult a seer to find out what the problem is (ἀλλ' ἄγε δή τινα *μάντιν* ἐρείομεν ἢ ἱερῆα, / ἢ καὶ ὀνειροπόλον … ὅς κ' εἴποι ὅ τι τόσσον ἐχώσατο Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων [but come, let us ask some *seer* or priest or dream-wrangler … who might tell us why Phoebus Apollo is so angry], 1.62–64).[6] This is an uncontroversial idea, insofar as no one objects to it. Moreover, as Calchas rises to speak, the main narrator describes him at some length (1.68–72) in such a way as to "*recommend* [emphasis original] the speaker to the [audience]."[7]

τοῖσι δ' ἀνέστη
Κάλχας Θεστορίδης, *οἰωνοπόλων ὄχ' ἄριστος*,
ὃς ᾔδη τά τ' ἐόντα τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα,
καὶ νήεσσ' ἡγήσατ' Ἀχαιῶν Ἴλιον εἴσω
ἣν διὰ *μαντοσύνην*, τήν οἱ πόρε Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων.

5 In contrast, arguments that Homeric seers face pervasive and fundamental problems or weaknesses with their authority can be found in Karp (1998) and Trampedach (2008), and to a lesser extent Collins (2002). Another strand of scholarship on Homeric seers and authority has sought to explore how the πόλις affects the presentation and role of seers (e.g. Chirassi Colombo [1985]), but these works do not provide tools that can help us to understand the meaning of θεοπροπ- language.

6 Greek is quoted from Monro and Allen 1920 (*Iliad*) and Allen 1917/1919 (*Odyssey*); translations are my own.

7 de Jong (2004: 199), where she gives other examples of such introductions preceding a formulaic speech introduction and provides further details of the various ways that they relate to the larger contexts in which they appear.

Among them arose
Calchas the son of Thestor, *by far the best of the bird-wranglers*,
who knew the present, the future, and the past,
and who led the way to Troy on the ships of the Achaeans
on account of his *seercraft*, which Phoebus Apollo granted him.

The main narrator “recommends” Calchas here by praising his ability as a seer, both for its excellence in comparison to other seers (οἰωνοπόλων ὄχ’ ἄριστος, 69) and for the practical usefulness of his skill to the Greeks in bringing them to Troy. Thus, before Calchas speaks, both Achilles’ speech and the main narrator’s introduction depict seers in general and Calchas in particular as uncontroversial and admired sources of authority.[8]

However, Calchas himself evidently does not see the situation as straightforward or uncontroversial. He refuses to explain the plague without a guarantee of personal safety from Achilles (1.74–83), which he fears will be necessary because his speech will anger unnamed people who hear it. Indeed, his speech contains no fewer than four references to anger in six verses (78–83).

“ἦ γὰρ ὀΐομαι ἄνδρα *χολωσέμεν*, ὃς μέγα πάντων
Ἀργείων κρατέει καί οἱ πείθονται Ἀχαιοί·
κρείσσων γὰρ βασιλεὺς ὅτε *χώσεται* ἀνδρὶ χέρηϊ·
εἴ περ γάρ τε *χόλον* γε καὶ αὐτῆμαρ καταπέψῃ,
ἀλλά τε καὶ μετόπισθεν ἔχει *κότον*, ὄφρα τελέσσῃ,
ἐν στήθεσσιν ἑοῖσι· σὺ δὲ φράσαι εἴ με σαώσεις.”

“Indeed, I think that I will *anger* the man, who over all Argives
is very powerful, and the Achaeans obey him.
For a king is quite strong when he is *angry* with a weaker man.
And even if he swallows down his *anger* on the day itself,
nevertheless, in the future he holds his *grudge*, until it comes to fulfillment,
in his heart. You tell me if you will keep me safe.”

8 Latacz (2000, *ad* 69–73) discusses in detail the various elements of Calchas’ introduction here, concluding that these features authorize Calchas’ prophecy and direct the audience’s expectations for it (54). Similarly, Trampedach (2008: 210) asserts that “both Achilles and the poet himself legitimate Calchas’ disclosure,” but he links this effect specifically to references to Apollo as the source of his mantic abilities.

Without naming names, Calchas makes very clear that he expects not only to arouse Agamemnon’s anger, but that this anger will lead Agamemnon to retaliate against him. Calchas’ view of his own authority (and its limits in the face of the anger of a powerful leader) contrasts strongly with the straightforwardly positive terms in which both Achilles and the main narrator present Calchas before he speaks. It will soon transpire that Calchas has correctly divined Agamemnon’s likely response, which indirectly—and ironically—shows his competence as a seer.

In his reply, Achilles urges Calchas to convey to the Greeks whatever divine pronouncements he knows about (1.85–87, quoted below) and promises to protect him from negative repercussions even from Agamemnon himself (88–91). In contrast to the tone of Achilles’ first speech suggesting that the Greeks consult a seer, Achilles now acknowledges that Calchas’ divine pronouncements will arouse strong negative feelings in at least some of his listeners, even while he promises to ward off the harmful effects of those emotions for Calchas personally.

“θαρσήσας μάλα εἰπὲ *θεοπρόπιον* ὅ τι οἶσθα·
οὐ μὰ γὰρ Ἀπόλλωνα Διῒ φίλον, ᾧ τε σύ, Κάλχαν,
εὐχόμενος Δαναοῖσι *θεοπροπίας* ἀναφαίνεις …”

“Take heart, state whatever *divine pronouncement* you know.
For by Apollo dear to Zeus, to whom you, Calchas,
pray when you show forth your *seercraft* to the Danaans …”

Here, Achilles refers to Calchas’ prophetic abilities using words with a θεοπροπ- root, even while the main narrator continues to identify him as a μάντις.[9] From this point in the *Iliad* onward, Calchas and his authority arouse strong and often contradictory feelings among various Greeks. In expressing such feelings, Achilles as well as other characters[10] refer to Calchas and his prophecies with both μαντ- words and θεοπροπ- words. Contexts in the *Iliad* featuring a θεοπροπ- word consistently allude in some way to such conflicting views about prophecy, although—as in Achilles’ speech above—it is not necessarily the particular

9 In the introduction to Calchas’ reply explaining the source of the plague, 1.92: καὶ τότε δὴ θάρσησε καὶ ηὔδα μάντις ἀμύμων (and then indeed the blameless seer took heart and spoke). The main narrators of both Homeric poems only use μαντ- words, never θεοπροπ- words.

10 Odysseus, *Il.* 2.284–332; Oilean Ajax, 13.69–70. On these passages, see further in the next section.

speaker who is using a θεοπροπ- word who feels the doubts or anger about seers' authority that the word expresses.

Calchas, reassured (θάρσησε, 92), tells the Greeks that Apollo has stricken them with plague because Agamemnon refused to ransom Chryseis back to her father, and that she must be returned before the plague will cease (1.93–100). And, as Calchas had feared in his initial speech, Agamemnon becomes extremely angry. The main narrator describes Agamemnon in detail before his speech begins (101–105), a passage whose form resembles the introduction for Calchas' first speech (68–72). However, instead of implicitly praising or recommending Agamemnon, the narrator's depiction dwells on Agamemnon's anger as much as Calchas himself had done in his speech. At the very least, this does not inspire confidence about Agamemnon in the audience, given the positive way that both the main narrator and Achilles have spoken about Calchas already. Indeed, Agamemnon begins speaking in extremely angry terms,[11] partly by making *ad hominem* attacks on Calchas in a manner that is unique in the *Iliad* (101–110).[12]

τοῖσι δ' ἀνέστη
ἥρως Ἀτρεΐδης εὐρὺ κρείων Ἀγαμέμνων
ἀχνύμενος· μένεος δὲ μέγα φρένες ἀμφὶ μέλαιναι
πίμπλαντ', ὄσσε δέ οἱ πυρὶ λαμπετόωντι ἐΐκτην·
Κάλχαντα πρώτιστα ***κάκ'*** ὀσσόμενος προσέειπε·
"*μάντι κακῶν*, οὐ πώ ποτέ μοι τὸ κρήγυον εἶπας·
αἰεί τοι *τὰ κάκ'* ἐστὶ φίλα φρεσὶ *μαντεύεσθαι*,
ἐσθλὸν δ' οὔτέ τί πω εἶπας ἔπος οὔτ' ἐτέλεσσας·
καὶ νῦν ἐν Δαναοῖσι *θεοπροπέων* ἀγορεύεις
ὡς δὴ τοῦδ' ἕνεκά σφιν ἑκηβόλος ἄλγεα τεύχει …"

Among them arose
the hero Atreides, broadly ruling Agamemnon,
grieved. His black spirit was bursting
with passion, and his eyes were like glowing fire.

---

11 Latacz (2000, *ad* 1.103) notes that ἀχνύμενος in particular—and the feeling it depicts "combining resignation and aggression (sich Resignation … und Aggression miteinander verbinden)"—is emphasized both by enjambment and by the strong break immediately after it.

12 But compare the suitors' abuse of seers in the *Odyssey* (Eurymachus abuses Halitherses, 2.178–207; the suitors abuse Theoclymenus, 20.376–383), on which see further pp. 11–13.

> Right off he addressed Calchas, **glancing balefully** at him:
> "*Seer of evils*, never at any time did you say a thing agreeable to me.
> It is always dear to your spirit to *prophesy bad things,*
> but you never yet either said a good word or brought it to fulfillment.
> And now you are *making a divine pronouncement* among the Danaeans
> that for the sake of this man here, the far-shooter fashions pains for us
> …"

Agamemnon, unlike any other character in the *Iliad*, displays negative feelings about a seer by directly criticizing and belittling one to his face. Moreover, only here in the *Iliad* does a character use μάντ- words to address a seer in unambiguously negative terms. Agamemnon begins his speech with a unique vocative, μάντι κακῶν (106); in very similar language, he describes Calchas' past inspired utterances as κάκ' … μαντεύεσθαι (107).[13] The conjunction καὶ νῦν in 109 introduces Agamemnon's next point, in which he uses the periphrasis θεοπροπέων ἀγορεύεις to refer to Calchas' previous speech about the source of the plague on the Greek camp. This sentence structure implies that Agamemnon is using θεοπροπέων ἀγορεύειν[14] as a synonym for κακὰ μαντεύεσθαι in 107. At the same time, the repeated abusive μάντις expressions at the beginning of the speech help to mark θεοπροπέων here as a term for prophetic language that arouses negative emotions. Both the repetition of unique or rare "bad seer" language in these opening verses of Agamemnon's speech, and the contrast between the way Agamemnon talks to Calchas and the narrator's positive reference to him at 1.92 (μάντις ἀμύμων), strongly highlight the unusual and abusive tone of what Agamemnon says.

Agamemnon's language here sets up several key ideas, both for the *Iliad* and for Homeric epic in general: while Agamemnon speaks to and about Calchas in a particularly nasty way, the basic features of his language and of this speech are consistent with Homeric patterns for seer-related language. First, only characters use θεοπροπ- words, which regularly express some kind of subjective response evoked by seers—either abuse or doubt—rather than simply descrip-

13 Latacz (2000, *ad* 1.106–108) sees this as a reference specifically to Calchas' role in the sacrifice of Iphigeneia. Flower (2008: 80–81) notes that neither this nor a similar passage from the Hebrew Bible (1Kings 22) suggest that seers did (or could) draw on personal animus to persuade the gods to act against the kings by whom they are consulted.

14 Used three times in Homeric poetry (here, *Il.* 2.322 [also for Calchas], and *Od.* 2.184), always in contexts where the authority of a seer or his utterances is directly at issue.

tion or identification of a prophecy.[15] Moreover, whenever characters use θεοπροπ- words to take issue with seers and prophecy, the larger context involves a conflict over power about which a key character has very strong feelings. The exact nature of these feelings varies substantially depending on the way in which the speaker is involved in the power conflict at issue. Various bystanders refer to Calchas using θεοπροπ- words, but without the negative expressive force of Agamemnon's speeches to Calchas. In contrast, characters who are most directly affected by a power grab like Agamemnon's use θεοπροπ- language to indirectly give voice to their own angry feelings about how they are being treated. While all the instances of θεοπροπ- words entail a personal, emotional reaction to a divine utterance, the range of ways in which individual characters use such language to talk about seers and their utterances contributes to the characterization of those speakers.

The next section explores how various characters talk about seers: first, the ways that Agamemnon's attitude in *Iliad* 1 affects how other characters refer to Calchas; second, a close parallel to Agamemnon's behavior that appears in *Odyssey* 2, the abusive and disrespectful behavior of Eurymachus toward Halitherses; and third, the ways that remarks about seers figure into the reactions of Achilles and Telemachus, respectively, to the overbearing behavior of Agamemnon and Eurymachus.

How Do Different Characters Talk about Prophecy and Power?

The concerns about Calchas that Agamemnon has expressed with such strongly negative feelings are regularly voiced outside the assembly in *Iliad* 1, but the tone of these speeches is milder and less emotional: they use both μαντ- words and θεοπροπ- words for Calchas in terms of doubt or uncertainty, rather than of angry personal abuse. In these passages, no words for "bad," "hateful," or the like appear alongside μαντ- words referring to Calchas, so that the μαντ- words on their own function largely as they do when used by the main narrator to identify and praise a seer. At the same time, whenever characters—unlike the main narrator—refer to Calchas, they always include a θεοπροπ- word as well as a μαντ- word. The overall effect of this is to cast a shadow of doubt or concern on Calchas without the kind of *ad hominem* attacks that characterize the speeches of Agamemnon (and of Eurymachus, in reference to Halitherses in *Odyssey* 2).

15 For the greater predominance of words expressing emotions and judgments in characters' speeches compared to narrator text, see Griffin (1986).

For example, when Achilles tells Thetis about the plague and Calchas' interpretation of it, he calls Calchas a μάντις (1.384) but refers to his utterances as θεοπροπίας ἑκάτοιο (1.385).[16] At *Il.* 2.322, Odysseus uses the expression θεοπροπέων ἀγορεύειν to introduce a direct quotation of a speech by Calchas interpreting an omen before the Greeks went to Troy to fight (323–329). Here, Odysseus' purpose in speaking is to persuade the Greeks to stay at Troy, and the main way that he does that is to explore possible doubts about whether Calchas' prophecies are reliable (ὄφρα δαῶμεν / ἢ ἐτεὸν Κάλχας *μαντεύεται*, ἦε καὶ οὐχί [so that we may learn whether Calchas *prophesies* truly or not], 2.299–300). While the reliability of Calchas—or lack thereof—is a central feature of this speech, Odysseus himself clearly believes that Calchas has spoken truly (Trampedach 2008: 213). In sum, characters never refer to Calchas *without* some form of θεοπροπ-, once the Greek assembly in *Iliad* 1 gets under way.[17] These characters *express doubts* about specific seers and pronouncements (in the third person), and as we will see, they sometimes *disdain* seers or seercraft in general or hypothetical situations.

Other than Agamemnon, the only character to directly abuse a seer to his face is Eurymachus in *Odyssey* 2. Only characters who are very unsympathetic and who are seen elsewhere to have overblown and problematic feelings about the scope of their own power are shown abusing a specific seer by addressing him directly.[18] Several features of Eurymachus' response to Halitherses' interpretation of a bird omen in *Odyssey* 2 evoke Agamemnon's behavior to Calchas in *Iliad* 1. First, he uses μαντ- words as an aggressive and hostile form of direct address, which is found only in these two passages. While he does not make the explicitly negative statements that Agamemnon does, he is if

16 In reporting to Thetis what Calchas said, Achilles leaves out the fact that the speech occurred in an assembly that Achilles himself had called for the purpose of consulting a seer (Latacz [2000, *ad* 1.384], citing a T scholion).

17 One additional and rather entertaining instance of a θεοπροπ- word that reflects doubt about Calchas occurs when Poseidon appears on the battlefield disguised as Calchas (*Il.* 13.45). After urging the two Ajaxes to defend the Greeks (47–58), he flies away like a bird (62–65). Oilean Ajax comments as follows: *μάντεϊ* εἰδόμενος κέλεται παρὰ νηυσὶ μάχεσθαι, / οὐδ' ὅ γε Κάλχας ἐστί, *θεοπρόπος* οἰωνιστής ([some god] resembling a *seer* orders us to fight beside the ships, but it isn't Calchas, the *prophet* who understands birds), 69–70. Here the doubt about Calchas' prophetic authority stems from doubt about whether the speaker was Calchas at all.

18 Collins (2002) notes this aspect of Eurymachus' character, but because he focuses on bird divination in particular (which does not feature prominently in *Iliad* 1), he both misses the parallel with Agamemnon and does not fully appreciate how unusual Eurymachus' language is.

anything even more condescending and threatening. He opens his speech by telling Halitherses to go home and prophesy to his children (ὦ γέρον, εἰ δ' ἄγε δὴ *μαντεύεο* σοῖσι τέκεσσιν / οἴκαδ' ἰών, 2.178–179), denigrating both Halitherses and prophecy even further by proclaiming himself to be a superior interpreter of the bird omen (2.180). He suggests that death would be both an appropriate and a desirable way to get Halitherses to stop prophesying (2.183–184).

> ὡς καὶ σὺ καταφθίσθαι σὺν ἐκείνῳ
> ὤφελες. οὐκ ἂν τόσσα *θεοπροπέων ἀγόρευες*.

> You should have perished too along with that man [Odysseus].
> Then you would not *prophesy* so much.

As in Agamemnon's speech, the strongly negative and personal tone of the speaker's remarks about his addressee's prophetic utterances immediately before the use of the periphrasis θεοπροπέων ἀγορεύειν give this expression a vivid negative cast. Toward the end of Eurymachus' speech, he makes a similar point using similar language, boldly declaring both that the suitors disregard Halitherses' prophecy and that they hate him who offers it (2.201–202).

> οὔτε *θεοπροπίης* ἐμπαζόμεθ', ἣν σύ, γεραιέ,
> μυθέαι ἀκράαντον, ἀπεχθάνεαι δ' ἔτι μᾶλλον.

> We do not give a fig for the *prophecy* which you, old man,
> speak without fulfillment, and you are becoming still more hateful.

θεοπροπ- words appear just four times in the *Odyssey*, of which half occur in this speech of Eurymachus. This strongly highlights Eurymachus and his feelings here, lending them a kind of expressive force and shock value that helps to depict him as the most unpleasant of the arrogant and power-hungry suitors.

While θεοπροπ- always evokes at least the idea of doubt, and sometimes also anger or abuse, Agamemnon and Eurymachus are the only characters who use such language to directly address a specific seer in combination with explicitly negative and abusive μαντ- words.[19] Not coincidentally, both of them are conspicuously unappealing characters who appear unsympathetic partly because

19 Here I differ from Trampedach (2008), who infers from Eurymachus' behavior that "in the Homeric world, a recognized seer, even when he is old, is assured neither immunity nor uncontested authority" (221); see Collins (2002: 22) for a similar view of how broadly we should understand the suitors' behavior in this scene. Piepenbrink (2001: 16) takes a more

of the way they abuse a respected seer in a public assembly in one of their early speeches. Indeed, both Agamemnon and Eurymachus stand out among Homeric characters for inflated ideas about their own power and importance that ultimately cause a great deal of harm to their own people. Their public acts of disrespect toward old and respected seers help to draw their characters in such a way.

Just as Agamemnon and Eurymachus, respectively, display their overweening urge for power partly through their manner of addressing seers, so also Achilles and Telemachus—the characters who are most directly affected by the power-grabbing behaviors of Agamemnon and Eurymachus—express their reactions of anger and powerlessness partly through skepticism about prophecy. In particular, both of them use the same phrase that Eurymachus does, οὔτε ἐμπάζεσθαι θεοπροπίης,[20] to express their disregard of and skepticism about prophecy. However, Eurymachus uses this phrase as a disrespectful form of direct address to a particular seer, while both Achilles and Telemachus speak more generally or hypothetically about prophecy. Thus, each side of the power struggles that play a central role in both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* gives voice to skepticism about prophecy, but the characters who feel wronged by these power struggles express their skepticism differently than those who try to overpower them. This places attitudes toward seers and prophecy at the center of conflicts about power in both Homeric poems, even though prophecy is not the root issue in either case.

All four instances of θεοπροπ- words in the *Odyssey* appear in the first two books, as the narrative establishes the relative positions of Telemachus and the suitors in the power vacuum in the palace on Ithaca that Odysseus' extended absence has created.[21] While Eurymachus uses θεοπροπέων (2.184) and θεοπροπίῃ (2.201) in direct address to a specific seer, helping to convey his scorn both

measured stance, arguing that it is "problematisch" to conclude from this episode that the suitors feel an overall disposition against divine signs and their significance.

20 Eurymachus attributes this disregard to all the suitors (ἐμπαζόμεθ', *Od.* 2.201); Achilles and Telemachus speak only for themselves (οὔτε θεοπροπίης ἐμπάζομαι, *Il.* 16.50 = *Od.* 1.415). On the basis of these three occurrences, Dillery (2005: 176) calls this expression a "Homeric formula."

21 Gottseman (2014), which focuses mainly on Telemachus' role in depicting the killing of the suitors as just, includes a illuminating overview of the politics and power structures on Ithaca: "In the king's long absence, it seems, authority has been held in a state of suspension between the competing claims of the suitors and the immaturity of Telemachus, and abetted in no small part by the delaying tactics of Penelope. The assembly in Book 2 illustrates the vacuum of authority" (34–35).

for Halitherses and for prophecy more generally, Telemachus uses very similar language in a quite different conversational contexts: he answers Eurymachus's question about the new visitor to the palace (*Od.* 1.400–411) by saying that he has not received either a message or a prophecy (413–418).

> "Εὐρύμαχ’, ἦ τοι νόστος ἀπώλετο πατρὸς ἐμοῖο·
> οὔτ’ οὖν ἀγγελίῃ ἔτι πείθομαι, εἴ ποθεν ἔλθοι,
> οὔτε *θεοπροπίης* ἐμπάζομαι, ἥν τινα μήτηρ
> ἐς μέγαρον καλέσασα *θεοπρόπον* ἐξερέηται.
> ξεῖνος δ’ οὗτος ἐμὸς πατρώϊος ἐκ Τάφου ἐστί,
> Μέντης …"

> "Eurymachus, indeed the return home of my father is lost.
> Neither do I obey a message any longer, if one should come from somewhere,
> Nor do I heed a *prophecy*, if my mother
> asks for one, after calling a *seer* into the palace.
> This man says he is my father's guest-friend from Taphos,
> Mentes …"

While Telemachus clearly distances himself from prophecy by disclaiming reports both actual ("I have not received a message or a prophecy") and hypothetical ("I would not heed one even if I did get one"), nothing in the language that Telemachus uses here has the unambiguously negative tone of Eurymachus' speech to Halitherses at 2.178–207, even though they share phrasing and vocabulary that is found nowhere else in the *Odyssey*. In particular, Telemachus does not abuse or disclaim any seer or divinely inspired utterance that has in fact occurred.

At the same time, Telemachus' skeptical attitude toward seerdom does arise from the power struggle between him and the suitors that forms a key part of the narrative in *Odyssey* 1–2. For the beleaguered Telemachus, Penelope represents a figure who lacks power even more decidedly than himself, both because of her gender and because she is more directly beset than he is by the suitors. Thus, he tries to establish his own comparative authority partly by regularly disregarding or silencing Penelope's words, as when he rebukes her for asking Phemius not to sing (1.346–359).[22] In this context, when Telemachus

22 Telemachus' speech arouses Penelope's astonishment (θαμβήσασα, 360) as well as her obedience, which may suggest that Telemachus has not done such a thing before.

names Penelope as the seeker-out of the hypothetical words of seers that he will not heed (415–416), he implies that prophecy offers a respected source of information for people who uncontrovertibly do *not* hold the kind of power that both he and the suitors are trying to wield, through Penelope, on Ithaca.[23]

Both Telemachus and the suitors, albeit in very different ways, try to strengthen their own power partly by stating their lack of attention to prophecy as a source of authority. But the suitors, unlike Telemachus, repeatedly abuse particular seers either with direct address or in the seer's presence.[24] Thus, the way the suitors refer to seers and their prophecies depicts the suitors as unsympathetic and their attitude toward both seers and their own power as problematic. In contrast, Telemachus expresses a more hypothetical and general skepticism specifically in reaction to the suitors' attempts to assert power over him, and he does so only at the point in the story when he feels most victimized by the suitors and the narrative is most concerned to highlight his predicament. That being so, his attitude should be understood as a reaction to the specific problems that the suitors cause, rather than as evidence either that Telemachus does not respect seers on an ongoing basis or that there is a consistent and wide-spread tendency in Homeric epic for the authority of seers and rulers to collide.

Similar language refers to Achilles in the *Iliad* in similar dramatic circumstances: θεοπροπ- words appear as a particular character (Achilles, Telemachus) grapples with a conflict in which he feels angry and resentful as another character tries to overpower him. As we have already seen, Achilles himself regularly uses θεοπροπ- language to refer to Calchas specifically, but he and other char-

23 Indeed, Penelope herself makes a similar statement to the disguised Odysseus when she says that she no longer heeds the claims of various kinds of visitors that Odysseus will return: τῷ οὔτε ξείνων ἐμπάζομαι οὔθ' ἱκετάων / οὔτε τι κηρύκων (therefore, I heed neither guests nor suppliants, nor heralds at all, 19.134–135).

24 In addition to Eurymachus' behavior in Book 2, in Book 20, a generalized suitor identified as τις … νέων ὑπερηνορεόντων ("some arrogant young man," 375) responds to Theoclymenus' statement that the suitors will perish (367–370) with scorn and abuse for the nature of Telemachus' visitors: Τηλέμαχ', οὔ τις σεῖο κακοξεινώτερος ἄλλος … αὖτέ τις οὗτος ἀνέστη *μαντεύεσθαι* ("Telemachus, no one has worse guests than you … and then this fellow stood up to *prophesy*," 376 and 380). This is typical of the way characters in general refer to or address Theoclymenus as a guest rather than (or instead of) as a seer. At the same time, Di Sacco Franco (2000), who notes that Theoclymenus is the guest of Telemachus rather than his resident seer, likens Theoclymenus to Calchas on the grounds that both come in for similar abuse (38). In fact, close examination of the speeches addressed to each—and of the abuse that the suitors direct at Halitherses, who is inarguably treated as a seer—shows that Theoclymenus is addressed differently from both Calchas and Halitherses.

acters also use θεοπροπίη in a more general way as Nestor and Patroclus try unsuccessfully to persuade him to return to the fighting. Toward the end of Nestor's long speech in which he urges Patroclus to tell Achilles either to return to the fighting himself or to send Patroclus in his place, he speculates on the possible reasons that Achilles might be refusing to fight (11.790–797):

> ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν
> ταῦτ' εἴποις Ἀχιλῆϊ δαΐφρονι, αἴ κε πίθηται.
> τίς δ' οἶδ' εἴ κέν οἱ σὺν δαίμονι θυμὸν ὀρίναις
> παρειπών; ἀγαθὴ δὲ παραίφασίς ἐστιν ἑταίρου.
> εἰ δέ τινα φρεσὶν ᾗσι *θεοπροπίην* ἀλεείνει
> καί τινά οἱ πὰρ Ζηνὸς ἐπέφραδε πότνια μήτηρ,
> ἀλλὰ σέ περ προέτω, ἅμα δ' ἄλλος λαὸς ἑπέσθω
> Μυρμιδόνων, αἴ κέν τι φόως Δαναοῖσι γένηαι.

> But still,
> you might now say these things to skilled Achilles and he might obey.
> Who knows whether in persuading him, you might rouse his spirit,
> with the help of a god? The persuasion of a comrade is a good thing.
> But if he is intentionally avoiding some *prophecy*
> and his lady mother has told him something from Zeus,
> instead, let him send you out, and let the host of Myrmidons
> follow along, in the hope that you might become a light to the Greeks.

While the main point here is clearly the hope that Patroclus might persuade Achilles either to fight or to send Patroclus himself out to battle instead, Nestor frames his suggestion specifically as a way of addressing the possibility that Achilles is not fighting because he wants to "avoid some prophecy" (τινα … *θεοπροπίην* ἀλεείνει, 794). Patroclus asks Achilles about this directly, using essentially the same language as Nestor did, when he reports the conversation he has had with Nestor (εἰ δέ τινα φρεσὶν ᾗσι *θεοπροπίην* ἀλεείνεις / καί τινά τοι πὰρ Ζηνὸς ἐπέφραδε πότνια μήτηρ, 16.36–37). By using θεοπροπίην ἀλεείνει to refer to this hypothetical prophecy, Nestor (and Patroclus) cast it both as lacking authority over its recipient and also as implicitly dangerous and harmful, since ἀλεείνω in the *Iliad* often governs κήρ as a direct object.[25] Thus, the word choice here implies Achilles would be acting in an understandable manner in trying to evade such a prophecy.

25 κῆρ' ἀλεείνων, 7× out of 18 occurrences in the *Iliad*.

Achilles himself, however, shows a more dismissive attitude in his reply to Patroclus. His answer appears to deny only the *existence* of a prophecy, but the specific language he uses suggests that he would not *respect* a prophecy either (16.49–51).

> ὤ μοι, διογενὲς Πατρόκλεες, οἷον ἔειπες·
> οὔτε *θεοπροπίης* **ἐμπάζομαι**, ἥν τινα οἶδα,
> οὔτε τί μοι πὰρ Ζηνὸς ἐπέφραδε πότνια μήτηρ.
>
> Ah, divinely born Patroclus, what sort of thing have you said.
> I neither **heed** any *prophecy* I know about,
> nor did my respected mother tell me anything from Zeus.

θεοπροπίης ἐμπάζομαι, as we have seen, appears twice in the *Odyssey*, where it clearly indicates that the speaker disregards, rather than avoids, either an actual prophecy (Eurymachus, *Od.* 2.201) or a hypothetical one (Telemachus, *Od.* 1.415). While ἐμπάζομαι appears only here in the *Iliad*, in the *Odyssey*, it is used positively as a rhetorical device to urge an addressee to pay attention (ἐμπάζεο μύθων, 1.271, 1.305) and negatively with various important, sacred objects in addition to θεοπροπίη (sacrifices, 9.553; suppliants, 16.422; suppliants, heralds, and ξένοι, 19.134–135), always when the speaker feels powerless and frustrated about their own situation and mentions this disregard of various forms of sacred authority or communication as a function of this frustration. Moreover, when the main narrator uses ἐμπάζομαι, it always follows a speech by the suitors (or one of them) to say that either Odysseus (17.488) or Telemachus (20.275 and 384) disregards what the suitors just said. Just as Eurymachus shows his arrogance partly through his condescending dismissal of Halitherses (2.178–207), the same language is used when sympathetic characters show the suitors the lack of respect that they have shown they deserve. Thus, while on the surface Achilles seems to say, "there is no prophecy that I know about," the specific words he uses suggests that his words should be read much more expressively and dismissively, consistent with the way other characters speak about prophecy in predicaments of angry powerlessness.[26]

26 This appears to be the understanding of a T scholion on ἥν τινα οἶδα in 16.50, which says ἵν' ᾖ ἠθικώτερον· εἰ καὶ οἶδά τινα μαντείαν, οὐ φροντίζω. Note also that the scholion equates μαντεία with θεοπροπίη.

Prophecy in the *Iliad* Compared to the *Odyssey*

Thus, all of the instances of θεοπροπ- words share one basic meaning, which is marked in relation to μαντ- words: the addressee of a divinely inspired utterance does not respect or will not heed the utterance, the seer who gives voice to it, or both. μαντ- words, in contrast, *can* have this meaning, most noticeably in the speeches of Agamemnon and Eurymachus, but unlike θεοπροπ- words they do not *always* carry negative implications. In fact, we can infer that θεοπροπ- words cannot have a straightforwardly neutral or positive sense both from the specific contexts in which they appear and because they are restricted to characters' speeches. Under the umbrella of this basic meaning, θεοπροπ- words express different feelings of skepticism or scorn on the part of different characters in different narrative contexts.

In each poem, the highest concentrations of θεοπροπ- language are found when the addressee of a particular seer becomes an unsympathetic character as a result of his disrespectful attitude toward the seer. Indeed, both Agamemnon in the *Iliad* and the suitors in the *Odyssey* become unsympathetic to the audience partly because they abuse a respected seer in a public assembly early in the story. In each poem, these abusive speeches play a role in launching a larger conflict over relative positions of power within a social hierarchy,[27] in which the abusive speaker is depicted as overreaching the appropriate limits of his power. By the end of the poem, each character has lost his bid for power and either he himself or those close to him (or both) have suffered grievous losses in the process. Agamemnon has to return both Chryseis and Briseis, and many Greeks are killed during Achilles' absence from battle; although the suitors harbor grand visions of killing Telemachus and marrying Penelope, when Odysseus at length returns home, he and Telemachus kill all the suitors instead. Thus, the self-aggrandizement attempted by Agamemnon and the suitors at the expense of both seers and fellows does not seem to be recommended or approved—or, indeed, widespread—in the Homeric poems.

Most other instances of θεοπροπ- language appear as characters react in various ways to the actions of Agamemnon or the suitors. Once Calchas becomes the object of Agamemnon's anger, other characters in the *Iliad* always refer to

27 Elmer (2013) studies these social structures by focusing on the language used to express group consensus (or lack thereof). In the beginning of *Iliad* 1, he sees Agamemnon's attempt to act unilaterally as "call[ing] into question the fundamental structure of authority in Achaean society" (70). Similarly, "the greater part of the *Iliad* can be understood as an extended exploration of the questions raised" by Agamemnon's behavior (71).

Calchas using θεοπροπ- words, thus casting him as a seer whose pronouncements are a matter of debate. In this way, they acknowledge Agamemnon's emotional reaction to him without themselves sharing or endorsing those feelings. Both Achilles and Telemachus, the individuals whose standing would be most directly affected by the behavior of Agamemnon and the suitors, express their anger and sorrow about the way they are being treated partly through skeptical comments about prophecy that include θεοπροπ- language. Given that neither Achilles nor Telemachus voices negative personal views about prophecy anywhere else, such remarks should be seen not as signs that either Achilles or Telemachus scorn prophecy in general, but rather, as a function of the negative emotions that a specific power conflict arouses on both sides. This in turn suggests that seers are *not* doubted or abused in this way when broader power structures are operating properly: abuse of seers is one symptom that something is amiss, and that whoever started the problem has acted inappropriately and ultimately ineffectively.

While the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* have basically the same vocabulary for talking about seers both within and outside power conflicts, such conflicts play quite different roles within each poem. As a result, the usage patterns for μαντ- and θεοπροπ- language in the *Iliad* differ substantially from those in the *Odyssey*. In particular, the power struggle between Agamemnon and Achilles in the *Iliad*, which begins with Agamemnon's angry speech to Calchas and ultimately leads to so much suffering and destruction, plays a more central role in the *Iliad* overall than does the comparable conflict between Telemachus and the suitors.[28] However, outside of Calchas' role in the conflict between Agamemnon and Achilles, seers do not figure prominently in the *Iliad*. In the *Odyssey*, on the other hand, the conflict between Telemachus and the suitors that takes center stage in Books 1–2 does not shape the story overall to nearly the same extent as the problems between Agamemnon and Achilles in the *Iliad*. Moreover, the *Odyssey* features several named seers besides Halitherses as characters, most notably Teiresias.[29] As his prophecies are not questioned and he is not involved in any way in the power struggles on Ithaca, he is never referred to with θεοπροπ- language, even though his name appears only in character speech: Odysseus mentions him six times while telling the story of his wanderings, always with μαντ- words (10.493, 10.538, 11.99, 12.267, 12.272, 23.251).

28 It is notable, for instance, that Gottesman (2014) focuses on Telemachus in relation to Odysseus, rather than as a central figure in his own right.

29 See above on Theoclymenus, who is referred to by characters in the *Odyssey* primarily as a guest rather than as a seer, even though the narrator introduces him at some length as a skilled seer who comes from a family of seers (*Od.* 15.223–257).

As a result of these thematic differences between the two stories, θεοπροπ- language is much less prevalent in the *Odyssey* than in the *Iliad*, both in absolute terms (4× *Odyssey*, 11× *Iliad*) and in proportion to μαντ- words (μαντ- words appear 21× *Odyssey* [not including two instances of the proper name Μάντιος in the genealogy of Theoclymenus], 14× *Iliad*).[30] In each Homeric poem, μαντ- words and θεοπροπ- words have the same meaning, both individually and relative to each other, but the ideas evoked by each root have quite different roles to play in the two stories overall.

Conclusions

This study of how μαντ- and θεοπροπ- words contribute to telling different kinds of tales involving seers sheds light on several features of the Homeric poems. First, we can see that a would-be authority figure who speaks abusively or slightingly about prophecy in the context of a larger power struggle is not represented as a natural or normal part of the social order in the Homeric world. On the contrary, such a conflict always reflects very badly on the authority figure—who comes across as conspicuously unsympathetic to the audience partly because of his treatment of seers and prophecy—and the conflict does not turn out well for the authority figure in the end. Furthermore, when other characters use similar language to talk about seers, the contexts suggest that their negative feelings arise from the circumstances created by the overreaching authority figure rather than expressing the speaker's general attitude toward prophecy. In other words, talking about seers in a skeptical or disrespectful way is associated specifically with dysfunctional power relations, not with well-functioning or unremarkable forms of social organization. This undercuts the claim that conflict between seers and authority figures in the Homeric poems is widespread or normative.

This study sheds light, too, on various qualities of the narrating voices of the Homeric poems. To begin with, we gain a richer texture and subtlety of language for the poems once we understand that θεοπρόπος and its relatives θεοπροπίη and θεοπροπέω are marked terms that—while they overlap in meaning with the umarked alternatives μάντις, μαντοσύνη, and μαντεύομαι—capture the emotional, subjective reaction of an addressee to prophecy. In particular, we

30 θεοπροπίη in particular lies behind this difference: while θεοπρόπος and θεοπροπέω appear comparably often in the two poems (each one is 2× *Iliad* and 1× *Odyssey*), θεοπροπίη is found 5× *Iliad* (plus two instances of the possible synonym θεοπρόπιον, absent from the *Odyssey*) and 2× *Odyssey*.

can see that in prophecy—just as in many other genres of Homeric speech—the way that someone responds to a prophecy[31] affects not simply how the speech is presented in the narrative (for example, how much of an introduction or conclusion the narrator provides, and what information such speech frames include) but how the speech is *defined*. That is, on the one hand, θεοπροπ- words and μαντ- words show substantial, consistent differences in how they are used, most notably the absence of θεοπροπ- words from both narrator text and contexts without a strong element of conflict, anger, or doubt. At the same time, μαντ- and θεοπροπ- words can and do refer to the same utterance. Hence, it is clear that they do not refer to objective criteria of a given speech. Rather, the θεοπροπ- root is marked in reference to an addressee's negative reaction to or view of prophecy.

Finally, the differences in the distribution of seer-related language between the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* stems from thematic and story differences between the two poems, not from a fundamental difference in the meanings of words as they appear in one poem compared to the other. Many features of the Homeric poems work in just this way, including but not limited to the meaning of individual words such as θεοπροπίη: their basic properties (here, what the word means) are the same in both epics, but the feature in question is used more or less often, or with different narrative effects, in each poem because the *Iliad* tells a different story and has a somewhat different outlook compared to the *Odyssey*. The Homeric words for "seer" contribute one tile to a mosaic depicting a single storytelling language at work in both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*.

Bibliography

Casevitz, M. 1992. "Mantis: le vrai sens." *Revue des études grecques* 105: 1–18.

Chirassi Colombo, I. 1985. "Gli interventi mantici in Omero: Morfologia e fuzione della divinazione come modalità di organizzazione del prestigio e del consenso nella cultura greca arcaica e classica." in M. Fales and C. Grottanelli, ed. *Soprannaturale e potere nel mondo antico e nelle società tradizionali*, pp. 141–164. Milan: F. Angeli.

Collins, D. 2002. "Reading the Birds: Oiônomanteia in Early Epic." *Colby Quarterly* 38 (1): 17–41.

31 Karp (1998: 24) raises just this issue when he says that "mortals tend to respond to prophetic messages not with dread or blind obedience but with the critical tools they use to evaluate other persuasive attempts. In order to understand prophecy in Homer, for example, one must see it as one of a number of means by which human beings can be inspired, persuaded, or motivated to action."

de Jong, I.J.F. 2004. *Narrators and Focalizers: The Presentation of the Story in the* Iliad. Bristol: Bristol Classical Press (2nd ed.).

Di Sacco Franco, M.T. 2000. "Les devins chez Homère." *Kernos* 13: 35–46.

Dillery, J. 2005. "Chresmologues and *Manteis*: Independent Diviners and the Problem of Authority." in S.I. Johnson and P.T. Struck, ed. *Mantikê: Studies in Ancient Divination*, pp. 167–231. Leiden: Brill.

Elmer, D.F. 2013. *The Poetics of Consent: Collective Decision Making and the Iliad*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Finkelberg, M. 2011. "Prophecy." in M. Finkelberg, ed. *Homer Encyclopedia* Volume II (H–Q), pp. 694–695. Malden/Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Flower, M.A. 2008. *The Seer in Ancient Greece*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Gottesman, A. 2014. "The Authority of Telemachus." *Classical Antiquity* 33 (1): 31–60.

Griffin, J. 1986. "Homeric Words and Speakers." *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 106: 36–57.

Karp, A. 1998. "Prophecy and Divination in Archaic Greek Literature." in R.M. Berchman, ed. *Mediators of the Divine: Horizons of Prophecy, Divination, Dreams and Theurgy in Mediterranean Antiquity*, pp. 9–44. Atlanta: Scholars Press.

Kirk, G.S. 1985. *The* Iliad*: A Commentary* (*Volume I: Books 1–4*). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Latacz, J., ed. 2000. *Homers Ilias Gesamtkommentar* Vol. I Fasc. 2. Munich: K.G. Saur.

Nagy, G. 1990. *Pindar's Homer: The Lyric Possession of an Epic Past*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Piepenbrink, K. 2001. "Prophetie und soziale Kommunication in der homerischen Gesellschaft." in K. Brodersen, ed. *Prognosis; Studien zur Funktion von Zukunftsvorhersagen in Literatur und Geschichte seit der Antike* pp. 9–24. Münster: LIT.

Roth, P.A. 1982. Mantis: The Nature, Function, and Status of a Greek Prophetic Type. Ph.D. dissertation, Bryn Mawr College.

Suárez de la Torre, E. 2009. "The Portrait of a Seer: The Framing of Divination Paradigms Through Myth in Archaic and Classical Greece." in U. Dill and C. Walde, ed. *Antike Mythen: Medien, Transformationen und Konstruktionen*, pp. 158–188. Berlin: de Gruyter.

Trampedach, L. 2008. "Authority Disputed: The Seer in Greek Epic." in B. Dignas and K. Trampedach, ed. *Practitioners of the Divine: Greek Priests and Religious Officials from Homer to Heliodorus*, pp. 207–230. Washington: Center for Hellenic Studies.

CHAPTER 5

The Individual Voice in *Works and Days*

Ruth Scodel

How can we identify the voice of an individual performer/composer who works within an oral tradition? "Voice" includes everything that marks a particular implied author, though the term is a poignant reminder of what we lack, since in living performance traditions the individual performer has, very literally, a voice, even if individuality is marked in no other way. One leading scholar of the South Slavic tradition, Zlatan Čolaković, has argued that every capable singer has an individual and recognizable style.[1] He has also generated a debate by characterizing exceptionally creative bards as "post-traditional."[2] Our surviving early Greek hexameter poems often present what seem to be striking and probably individual characteristics: the *Iliad*'s sympathy for the characters, the wit of the *Hymn to Aphrodite*, the *Theogony*'s inclusion of abstractions alongside gods of cult and epic.

It is probably the *communis opinio* now, especially among Americans, that "Hesiod" is more a traditional character than a particular person who composed particular poems, that poets adopted the figure of Hesiod when performing poetry of the kind they regarded as "Hesiodic."[3] This paper, however, will not consider the actual autobiographical statements in *Works and Days* and whether they are likely to be fictional. The question it asks is not about the relation between the speaker of the poem and the real world, but about the presence of a distinct personality in the poem that is not entirely the product of either a deliberate self-presentation, whether real or fictive, or the tradition. The autobiographical material is itself so specific that it must refer to a particular individual, who won a tripod at the funeral games of Amphidamas (WD 654–659). The abuse of Ascra (WD 639–40)—entirely undeserved—is also distinctive.[4] Such autobiography, however, could be a form of deliberate self-presentation available to many performers. So, perhaps, could such basic traits of the Hesiodic persona as misogyny and superstition, which appear elsewhere

1 Since I do not know Serbo-Croatian, I take this from Danek (2005: 281).
2 Čolaković (2007: 567–597); Danek (2012a: 120–121); Danek (2012b); Currie (2012: 578–579).
3 Nagy (1990: 72–74); Rosen (1990); Martin (1992); Lamberton (1988: 10–11); Aloni (2010).
4 On the pleasant situation and climate of Ascra, see Snodgrass (1985: 93–94).

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2017 | DOI: 10.1163/9789004329737_006

in archaic poetry and could be assumed.[5] Some features, however, do not appear elsewhere.

When scholars debate the individuality of a text at the most fundamental level, on matters of authorship, they are most confident when they can cite evidence that seems unlikely to be the result of conscious decision. Hence, much stylometric analysis depends on function words.[6] Statistical analysis is invaluable for early Greek hexametric poetry, but while it can show with high probability, tantamount to proof, that two texts could not have been composed by the same poet, it cannot give a strong positive result, because two texts that are linguistically very similar could indicate close affiliation in the tradition.[7]

This paper will mainly address characteristics of *Works and Days* that lie between the stylometric level, where we simply do not have enough data and the traditional language might make the identification of individuals impossible, and the larger-scale qualities of the poem that a rhapsode who wished to present himself as "Hesiod" might adopt. It looks at three features. First, there are a few places where Hesiod's variations of formulae may indicate an individual rather than a branch of tradition. Second, an oral tradition would very probably have erased the extreme risk-aversion of some of Hesiod's advice. Some of Hesiod's recommendations are eccentric in their caution. Had they not been incorporated into what became a canonical text, they would not have been preserved, and Hesiod is unlikely to have inherited them, because oral traditions tend to revert to a norm. Third, the attention of the poem in its agricultural section is very constrained, as scholars have often noticed—the poem's agricultural section deals only with cereals and vines. Yet Hesiod incorporates traditional material (whether already in hexameter or not) that implies a much wider field of activity than his core agricultural advice implies, and his advice about the matters he does cover is sometimes peculiarly slanted.

Where Hesiod's advice is odd, it has little or no effect on later tradition. This is not really surprising. The South Slavic performers who were most outstanding as individual performers did not significantly influence the larger tradition. M. Parry could not find a way to distinguish the students of the celebrated Cor Huso from others; only Avdo Međedović's son tried to continue his unique

5 Griffith (1983) argues that Hesiod's autobiography and personality are functions of the poems in which they appear.

6 For Shakespeare, see Wells and Taylor (1987), particularly 69–144.

7 Janko (1982: 58–61, 222–223); and Janko (2012).

style; the great nineteenth-century singer, Mehmed Kolakovic, also left little trace.[8] This cannot always have been the case, since without the contributions of exceptional singers the tradition could not have developed and grown, but it seems to be a clear tendency. The parallel with Hesiod is, to be sure, imprecise, since the issue evident in Hesiod is not primarily one of stylistic or narrative innovation, but one that is relatively technical. However, these Hesiodic examples are effective because it is clear that Hesiod's advice is eccentric, and that many, probably most, members of an archaic Greek audience would recognize its eccentricity.

The poem sometimes shows formulaic variants that look individual. In the Nautilia, for example, Hesiod gives ships a genitive plural epithet unique in early hexameter, πολυγόμφων (660). The Homeric poems do not need an epithet of ships with this shape because νηῶν at line-end is normally preceded by a preposition. Hesiod's epithet presents ships not as swift, or beautiful, but as complex pieces of carpentry, with many parts needing to be attached to each other, and parts, unlike the rowers' benchs or oarlocks, that were not especially conspicuous. The epithet is not truly strange (Ibycus uses it later, 272.17–18 Davies), but it does not look traditional. It is, however, an epithet we might expect from a poet who warns that a wagon requires a hundred pieces of wood (456) and who lists the different woods best suited to the different parts of a plow (435–436): this epithet befits a poet who is interested in how much work is involved in making things. In the same passage, Hesiod at 653 inverts the Homeric epithets when he refers to the Greeks who sailed from Aulis, Ἑλλάδος ἐξ ἱερῆς Τροίην ἐς καλλιγύναικα, "from holy Hellas to Troy of beautiful women." In Homer Greece has beautiful women (Hellas 2×, Achaiis 2×, Sparta once) while Troy is most often sacred. Scholars have suggested various interpretations of the unusual epithets.[9] Whether they have their origin in humor, polemic, or inadvertance, these epithets set this poem apart.

Eccentric content, though, is more revealing than isolated epithets. Around the middle of the *Works and Days*, Hesiod, having advised the farmer to prepare two plows in case one breaks, turns to the draft animals:

βόε δ' ἐνναετήρω
ἄρσενε κεκτῆσθαι· τῶν γὰρ σθένος οὐκ ἀλαπαδνόν·
ἥβης μέτρον ἔχοντε· τὼ ἐργάζεσθαι ἀρίστω.

8 See Danek (2002: 19); (2012), especially 41.

9 Edwards (1971: 81–82); Arrigetti (2007: 44); Delibasi (2008: 32–33); Scodel (2012: 502–504).

οὐκ ἂν τώ γ' ἐρίσαντε ἐν αὔλακι κὰμ μὲν ἄροτρον
ἄξειαν, τὸ δὲ ἔργον ἐτώσιον αὖθι λίποιεν.
WD 436–440

Get a pair of nine-year old oxen, males. For their strength is not weak, they are mature. These are best for working. For these would not fight in the furrow and break the plow, and leave the work there in vain.

West gives us the ancient authorities: from Aristotle (*HA* 575a31) we learn that bulls are in their prime at 5 and live until 15 or 20; Varro (1.201) advises buying oxen at 3 or 4; and Virgil (*G.* 3.61–62) says that oxen can plow from 5 to 10. Hesiod's recommendation is an outlier among ancient sources, and does not correspond to modern practice among farmers who use oxen, whether in the recent Mediterranean or among back-to-the-land pioneers.[10] A team of oxen is fully trained at four or five. A cautious buyer might want to look for a slightly older team to make sure they were fully settled—oxen are a big investment, but nine seems absurd. This team will probably need to be replaced in six years. Some do work longer, but this is exceptional. To be sure, an older team might be cheaper (although we may also wonder if such teams would be readily available in what was probably a very limited and local market). A farmer who followed this recommendation would be trading the likelihood that he would have to do more work over time when he had to replace the oxen against the chance that younger oxen would give him trouble. West proposes that the epic tradition provided words only for five and nine years old. Ercolani, supporting West's suggestion that the age is conventional, cites *Od.* 10.19, where Aeolus gives Odysseus a bag made of leather from a nine-year-old, or perhaps nine-season-old, cow or ox.[11] This is perhaps evidence, though it is weak, that nine is a conventional number for mature cattle, but the context is utterly different from Hesiod's, and the word used is not the same, either.

This "conventionality" explanation is weak, because the age of the oxen is precisely the point of the advice. A poet might well use a conventional number when the number was not essential, but even the most traditional oral poet would hardly choose a conventional term that utterly distorted his meaning. Perhaps "nine-year-old" means something like "older than six and younger than twelve," but it surely indicates a genuine age that is unusually mature. Hesiod, in this section of the poem, is displaying his authority by offering precise

10 On modern Mediterranean practice, see Halsted (2014).

11 West 1978 on 436 (p. 269) and Ercolani (2010) (also on 436, pp. 302–303).

information. The sentence before this one describes the best wood to use for the different parts of a plow: “poles of laurel or elm are most resistant to worm. / Make the share of oak, the plow-tree of holm-oak” (δάφνης δ’ ἢ πτελέης ἀκιώτατοι ἱστοβοῆες. / δρυὸς δ’ ἔλυμα, γύην πρίνου, as emended).[12] There are four words in this short passage that do not appear elsewhere in epic, and however we emend the line, the scansion of δρυὸς will be eccentric. That is, the poet wanted this list of woods for these parts of the plow; where he thought two woods were equally suitable, he offered a choice; and if this precision forced a metrical irregularity, he was willing to pay that price.

West uses the same “conventional” explanation just below at 441, where Hesiod discusses the plowman: τοῖς δ’ ἅμα τεσσαρακονταετὴς αἰζηὸς ἕποιτο, “let an energetic man of forty years follow them [the oxen],” so that he will plow a straight furrow, “no longer glancing around for his agemates, but having his heart on his work” (μηκέτι παπταίνων μεθ’ ὁμήλικας, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ ἔργωι / θυμὸν ἔχων).[13] The poet repeats this advice just below: κουρότερος γὰρ ἀνὴρ μεθ’ ὁμήλικας ἐπτοίηται, “a younger man is overexcited toward his agemates.” An older man is more careful about sowing, too: τοῦ δ’ οὔ τι νεώτερος ἄλλος ἀμείνων / σπέρματα δάσσασθαι καὶ ἐπισπορίην ἀλέασθαι (“In no way is another, younger man better for apportioning seeds and avoiding overseeding”).[14] Again, it seems obvious that it would not be prudent to hire a teenager to plow or sow, or to use a teenaged slave—it is not clear whether Hesiod is talking about assigning work to a slave or hiring a worker. But plowing in particular is very hard work, and one would expect some balance between the need for stability and strength, which is typically starting to decline by forty. At least in classical Athens and Sparta, there is abundant evidence that thirty was the usual age for full civic participation, such as public office—a man of thirty was fully responsible, past the light-mindedness of youth. Here, again, Hesiod is an obvious outlier. The plowman is unlikely to be as efficient as a slightly younger man would be, if the younger man were fully reliable; but using an older man avoids the risk of serious trouble from a plowman who is not reliable.

West, following Edwards, compares *WD* 441 to the recurring formula from the Catalogue of Ships, which opens the same way: τοῖς δ’ ἅμα τεσσαράκοντα

---

12 This is West’s text (adopted by Most [2006]); see West 1978 on 436 (p. 269) and Ercolani (2010) (also on 436, pp. 302–303).

13 West (1978), on 441 (p. 270).

14 Sowing and plowing were performed by different workers, but West’s “beside him” (followed by 2006), is unnecessary: Wilamowitz (1928) on 442 (p. 96) is surely right that the master himself either plows or scatters the seed, and the older man is better for either task (this interpretation removes any contradiction with 465–469).

μέλαιναι νῆες ἕποντο ("With them forty ships followed").[15] Again, the formula would have provided the easiest way for the poet to produce his line, but it is difficult to believe that he would provide numbers that he did not mean. He did not need to present a specific age for either oxen or plowman if the number available in the formulaic repertory did not fit his intention, and the number here in each case is not an ornamental epithet, but the Focus, the significant new information. "Nine" and "forty" are unlikely to be intended as precise figures, distinct from eight-and-a-half or forty-one, but they surely mean "older than you intuitively seek."

Mazon remarks on the oxen and the plowman, "The choice of these two ages is significant: Hesiod always seeks security."[16] That is true. However, the "security" Hesiod seeks here is truly exceptional, and exceptional in a way that anyone in Hesiod's world might have noticed, since it is not especially technical, and even someone who had not worked with oxen would surely have recognized forty as unusually old for a plowman. This advice is unlikely to be traditional, because at any point in a chain of transmission somebody could notice that it is not standard and is by the usual norms just wrong. A man in his thirties is not an excitable youth. Hesiod wants to avoid the worst outcome, an inaccurate and time-wasting man who will toss seed carelessly, and suggests so large a margin of safety that he gives up what is not only optimal, but a common choice. For Hesiod, having to replace oxen more often than someone who started with a younger team is not a great disadvantage, because this extra work and investment is predictable and allows the farmer to prepare. As soon as the farmer notices that his oxen are not as strong as they were, he can begin looking for a new team.

The same aversion to risk may help explain the difficulties of the section on collecting wood:

> ὅλμον μὲν τριπόδην τάμνειν, ὕπερον δὲ τρίπηχυν,
> ἄξονα δ' ἑπταπόδην· μάλα γάρ νύ τοι ἄρμενον οὕτω·
> εἰ δέ κεν ὀκταπόδην, ἀπὸ καὶ σφῦράν κε τάμοιο.
>
> 423–425

> Cut a three-foot mortar, and a three-cubit pestle, and a seven-foot axle-tree. For it is very suitable this way. If you were to cut it at eight feet, you could cut out a mallet.

---

15 Edwards (1971: 74).

16 Mazon (1914: 108–109).

The three-foot recommendation for the mortar must be for the length of a section of tree trunk, to be hollowed out as a container for the grain to be ground. Using the shortest known foot (29.4 cm), the poem recommends about 88 cm, 34 1/2 inches. Although West comments "Its height of 3 feet is convenient for a standing person," he does not seem to have considered that women did most of the grinding in antiquity, and that most of them were short by modern standards. In both modern photographs and ancient vase-paintings that show people using such mortars, the top of the mortar is typically at hip height or lower, though it can be only a little below the waist or as low as the knees.[17] Judging from ancient skeletal remains, the average height of a woman would have been 153–156 cm (from about 5 ft. 1/4 inch to 5 ft. 1.4 inches).[18] A mortar could easily be as low as 55 cm, and 80 cm is about the highest that would be plausible. Hesiod directs the woodcutter to take a bigger piece than he will need, to make sure that he does not have one that it too short. If the mortar is relatively high and the foot is very short, the caution here may be reasonable, but it is certainly caution, and it is likelier to be greater than reasonable.

The following instructions for cutting wood with which to build a wagon are among the most difficult and disputed sections of the poem. Hesiod tells the farmer to select a seven-foot axle-tree, and whether he is again allowing an exceptionally generous margin of error depends mainly on the length of foot he imagines. But the passage nonetheless displays his aversion to taking the chance of wasted effort. In line 425, εἰ δέ κεν ὀκταπόδην, ἀπὸ καὶ σφῦράν κε τάμοιο, he is probably not recommending "cut an extra foot for a mallet, if you need one" but "if you overestimate and cut beyond what I have suggested, you can still make good use of the excess." The topic of this section is collecting wood for making tools, not the manufacture of the tools themselves; this is important, because Hesiod so consistently stresses the importance of preparation. If the farmer is to have a cart when he needs it, he must first make the cart, and if he is to be able to make a cart, he needs to have gathered wood at the right time and in usable sizes and shapes. The imagined gatherer is unlikely to have a handy, reliable, portable measuring tape that he carries to the woods; he judges by the eye. So the poet advises a wide margin of error. The farmer should cut a piece longer than he could possibly need for this purpose, because he can use the excess wood for another purpose, but if the branch is too short, he will have to go back and find another that is suitable.

17 Ancient illustrations are listed in Sparkes (1962: 122).

18 The best evidence comes from Metapontum: Henneberg and Henneberg (2001). Cf. Schwartz (2013: 165–167).

Again, the Nautilia ends with recommendations about caution:

> δεινὸν δ’ ἐστὶ θανεῖν μετὰ κύμασιν· ἀλλά σ’ ἄνωγα
> φράζεσθαι τάδε πάντα μετὰ φρεσὶν ὡς ἀγορεύω.
> μηδ’ ἐν νηυσὶν ἅπαντα βίον κοίλῃσι τίθεσθαι,
> ἀλλὰ πλέω λείπειν, τὰ δὲ μείονα φορτίζεσθαι·
> δεινὸν γὰρ πόντου μετὰ κύμασι πήματι κύρσαι·
> δεινὸν δ’ εἴ κ’ ἐπ’ ἄμαξαν ὑπέρβιον ἄχθος ἀείρας
> ἄξονα καυάξαις καὶ φορτία μαυρωθείη.
>
> 689–690

> It is terrible to die among the waves. But I urge you to consider all this in your mind, as I declare it. Do not put all your sustenace in hollow ships, but leave more, and take the lesser part as cargo. For it is terrible to meet with misery amid the waves of the sea. And it is terrible if you lift an excessive load onto the wagon and should break the axle, and the freight be ruined.

The poet uses the same word, δεινόν, in close proximity, for dying at sea, for meeting with trouble at sea, and for breaking a wagon by overloading it. Just before these lines, he criticizes those who sail during the alternate, riskier season. Then he advises against more purely economic risks, and does not simply advise against risking more than one can afford to lose, but makes his rule proportionate rather than absolute: however much a man has, he should not send more than half to sea. Finally, he turns to the wagon, since the produce to be traded overseas first needs to be brought to the port. In this passage, Hesiod’s caution is not obviously eccentric as it is in the treatment of oxen or plowmen, but he seems to treat all unnecessary risks as equally foolish, whether what is risked is life, a year’s surplus, or a wagonload. His advice about the wagon follows the pattern we have already seen: he implicitly says that it is better to load less than the wagon can handle than to take any chance of breaking the axle.

If Hesiod is only recommending that a farmer not trade with his entire crop, his advice is reasonably cautious, but surely no farmer in a fundamentally subsistence economy would trade before setting aside his own household’s needs, so ἅπαντα βίον means, in effect, “all your [surplus] sustenance.” The poet again seems most concerned to avoid sudden, large losses, while accepting lesser ones. There would always be some loss from surplus kept in storage, no matter how careful the farmer and his household were to dry and sieve their grains and inspect stores frequently: insects, mice, fungus, and mold must

always have been a problem.[19] Hesiod does not mention losses in storage, just as he ignores the disadvantages of older oxen. Indeed, he almost denies them:

361 εἰ γάρ κεν καὶ σμικρὸν ἐπὶ σμικρῶι καταθεῖο
362 καὶ θαμὰ τοῦτ' ἔρδοις, τάχα κεν μέγα καὶ τὸ γένοιτο·
ὃς δ' ἐπ' ἐόντι φέρει, ὃ δ' ἀλέξεται αἴθοπα λιμόν.
οὐδὲ τό γ' εἰν οἴκωι κατακείμενον ἀνέρα κήδει·
365 οἴκοι βέλτερον εἶναι, ἐπεὶ βλαβερὸν τὸ θύρηφιν.

> If you add a little on top of a little, and do this often, soon this too could become large. Who brings [more] on top of what is there, that man will avoid ravening famine. And what is laid up in the house does not worry a man. At home is better, since outside is prone to harm.[20]

While we can surely assume that the ideal farmer does all he can to reduce storage losses, some are inevitable. In sowing, he more openly addresses a similar problem:

ὁ δὲ τυτθὸν ὄπισθε
δμῶος ἔχων μακέλην πόνον ὀρνίθεσσι τιθείη
σπέρμα κατακρύπτων·
469–471

> A little behind may a slave with a mattock make difficulty for the birds, hiding the seeds.

By having the slave cover the seed as quickly as possible, the farmer minimizes losses to birds, but it does not sound as if the birds can be entirely driven away. Once the farmer does his best, he assumes a certain level of loss. This is "built in" to all his calculations, and so he hardly counts it as loss. In contrast, exceptional and avoidable losses—cargo jettisoned at sea, a broken plow, a worker who does not sow evenly—are highly salient.

Peasants stereotypically prefer to uncertainty the small losses to which the farmer is accustomed. Around the world, peasants often follow "safety first"

19 Garland (1991: 97–98).

20 This citation retains the line order of the mss.; Most reorders 360, 364–367, 361–363, 368.

strategies in an effort to guarantee subsistence. While economists and anthropologists have extensively debated the universality, rationality, and causes of this conservatism, it is certainly typical.[21] However, Hesiod's advice is extreme. Further, although many have claimed that peasants typically prefer leisure to extra work once they have met the basic needs of their households (a pattern that accompanies "risk-buffering"), Hesiod does not in any way promote this "satisficing" strategy.[22] Indeed, the poem could be read as a polemic against it, for it constantly encourages accumulation and effort. For example, it warns against the temptation of the smithy or *lesche* in the winter (493–495), insisting that the farmer can find useful work to do. Although Hesiod allows for leisure and enjoyment in the passage on summer (582–596), the poem constantly urges his audience to maximize profit. Although he speaks about how to avoid famine (299–300, 302, 363, 404, 647), Hesiod also repeatedly mentions the possibility of becoming wealthy (21, 281, 308, 313, 379, 381). The economic attitude of Hesiod is his own, since he is at once exceptionally averse to unpredictable loss, apparently indifferent to the constant marginal loss of storing food over extended periods, and eager to acquire wealth. It is an unusual combination.

The extended treatment of the correct way for a man to urinate provides a further example from a different section of the poem of the exceptional caution that defines the speaker's personality:

> μηδ᾽ ἄντ᾽ ἠελίου τετραμμένος ὀρθὸς ὀμιχεῖν,
> αὐτὰρ ἐπεί κε δύῃ, μεμνημένος, ἔς τ᾽ ἀνιόντα,
> μήτ᾽ ἐν ὁδῶι μήτ᾽ ἐκτὸς ὁδοῦ προβάδην οὐρήσῃς·
> μηδ᾽ ἀπογυμνωθείς· μακάρων τοι νύκτες ἔασιν.
> ἑζόμενος δ᾽ ὅ γε θεῖος ἀνήρ, πεπνυμένα εἰδώς,
> ἢ ὅ γε πρὸς τοῖχον πελάσας εὐερκέος αὐλῆς.

Neither urinate standing up facing the sun, but when it sets, mindfully, and before it rises. Do not urinate while walking, either in a road or outside a road, and do not expose yourself. Nights, you know, belong to

21 Ellis (1993: 85–98). Scholars disagree about the extent to which the behavior is culturally specific and situational (Heinrich and McElreath [2001], for example, found that in a gambling game peasants took more risks than American undergraduates).

22 "Satisficing": the term was created by Simon (1956). There is continuing debate about whether how universally peasants behave this way, but many evidently do. Cf. Cartledge (2002), 160: "Rather than profit-maximization, the overall goal of most peasants was one of 'satisficing.'"

the blessed ones. But the divine man, one who is prudent, sitting or having come close to the wall of a well-fenced courtyard.

The core of the advice is obvious. Hesiod urges men to be careful not to expose their genitals, because the exposure may offend divine powers. While the sun is apparently especially open to offense, the "divine man" squats or stands against a wall, so that he can maintain proper modesty. Even at night care is required in respect to the powers to whom night belongs.

The injunction not to urinate facing the sun is found among the sayings attributed to Pythagoras (Iamblichus *Protrep.* 21, 58. C6.ιε D-K), and West cites similarly elaborate rules from the Laws of Manu.[23] However, most Greek men were certainly not this fussy, and as for squatting, Herodotus identifies the Egyptian custom that men urinate squatting, women standing, as the opposite of the Greek (2.35–36). So Hesiod's advice here is unusual in its Greek context. Indeed, it goes far beyond the rule attributed to a marginal religious group. It is even more eccentric than the recommendation about oxen.

To be sure, this advice continues other recommendations that accord fully with Greek belief. At 336–341, the poem advises the hearer to propitiate the gods with libations and minor offerings when he goes to bed and at dawn. So just before the advice about urination, the poem warns against pouring the morning libations with unwashed hands:

μηδέ ποτ' ἐξ ἠοῦς Διὶ λείβειν αἴθοπα οἶνον
χερσὶν ἀνίπτοισιν μηδ' ἄλλοις ἀθανάτοισιν·
οὐ γὰρ τοί γε κλύουσιν, ἀποπτύουσι δέ τ' ἀράς.
WD 724–726

And never in the morning pour a libation of red wine to Zeus with unwashed hands, nor to the other gods. For they do not heed the prayers, but spit them out.

Parallels for hand-washing before libation are abundant in early epic, but the language here is exceptionally vehement.[24] The vehemence underlines the

23 West 1978 on 727–732, 757–759 (pp. 334–336).

24 So Hector at *Il.* 6.266–267 says that he feels too much reverence (ἅζομαι) to pour a libation with unwashed hands, and that one cannot (οὐδέ πῃ ἔστι) pray to Zeus while spattered with gore, but this is much milder. In the sense "reject," ἀποπτύουσι is not found elsewhere before Aeschylus, and West expresses some suspicion about the line (West 1978 on 726), especially since the form κλύουσιν (from the aorist) is also exceptional in archaic

caution. Good relations with the gods are essential for success, so an injunction that might seem minor is not.

The instructions on urination describe what a θεῖος ἀνήρ, a "divine man," does.[25] θεῖος ἀνήρ is a hapax in early hexameter and very rare in Greek (it is said in several sources, notably Plato *Men.* 99a, that Laconians used σεῖος ἀνήρ as a term of special praise). Hesiod modifies it with γε, and since he does not use particles freely, the limitative point is strong: only a particular kind of man behaves this way. In apposition, clarifying and specifying its meaning, is the epic formula πεπνυμένα εἰδώς, which in the *Odyssey* is the epithet of the herald Medon (other expressions with πεπνυμένα are used of other characters). Telemachus rescues Medon during the slaughter of the suitors, not because of his sacred function, but because Medon cared for him as a child (*Od.* 22.357–358). So in Hesiod θεῖος ἀνήρ probably does not remove the divine man to a different sphere, but instead stresses that he shows to an exceptional degree the everyday wisdom the poem has taught. Still, this passage acknowledges that it sets a high standard—nowhere else has the poem assumed that anyone in its audience aspires to be a θεῖος ἀνήρ. Hesiod is again recommending caution beyond the norm, here towards the gods, but in a new way.

In the Days, Hesiod claims special knowledge, although it is not sacred knowledge, but another path to material benefit:

> Παῦροι δ' αὖτε ἴσασι τρισεινάδα μηνὸς ἀρίστην
> ἄρξασθαί τε πίθου καὶ ἐπὶ ζυγὸν αὐχένι θεῖναι
> βουσὶ καὶ ἡμιόνοισι καὶ ἵπποις ὠκυπόδεσσι,
> νέα τε πολυκλήιδα θοὴν εἰς οἴνοπα πόντον
> εἰρύμεναι· παῦροι δέ τ' ἀληθέα κικλήσκουσιν.
>
> *WD* 814–818

> Few, furthmore, know that the twenty-seventh of the month is excellent for starting a storage jar and putting the yoke on the neck of oxen, mules, and swift-footed horses, and for dragging a swift ship with many benches to the wine-dark sea. Few call it by its true name.[26]

---

poetry. However, ἀποπτύουσι may imply that the gods do not just reject such prayer, but spit it out as polluted.

25 Currie (2007) argues that the poem is profoundly ascetic and the speaker is a "holy man."

26 I think this means that they do not call it μηνὸς ἀρίστην for these activities, not that calling it τρισεινάς is truer (so West [1978] and Ercolani [2010] on 818).

At 820, few know that the 21st is excellent at dawn, not so good at evening. The poet's knowledge of these matters does not come from the Muses or from any other supernatural source. Instead, Hesiod complains, people are ignorant: "different people praise different kinds of day, but few know" (ἄλλος δ' ἀλλοίην αἰνεῖ, παῦροι δὲ ἴσασιν, 824). The Days are recondite but not outside the realm of human knowledge. This special knowledge, however, is directed largely at the most practical activities: when a woman should start a weaving project (779), or when to geld and shear sheep, cattle, mules, and pigs. Other items within the Days concern the characters of children born on particular days. Even though some days have their special qualities because they are the birthdays of gods, the Days include no ritual instructions. The Days represent yet an additional level of fussy caution: by observing the correct Days for his activities, the farmer improves his chances of success.

If Hesiod is extremely cautious, he is also peculiarly limited in a way that the Days help reveal. This is the last of his peculiarities. He does not just recommend relatively old oxen, but he concentrates relentlessly on the team of oxen for agricultural work, even though his tradition and probably his experience provided other possibilities. For example, he speaks of the man without oxen:

> ἥ τ' ἀρότοιό τε σῆμα φέρει καὶ χείματος ὥρην
> δεικνύει ὀμβρηροῦ, κραδίην δ' ἔδακ' ἀνδρὸς ἀβούτεω·
> δὴ τότε χορτάζειν ἕλικας βόας ἔνδον ἐόντας·
> ῥηΐδιον γὰρ ἔπος εἰπεῖν· "βόε δὸς καὶ ἄμαξαν·"
> ῥηΐδιον δ' ἀπανήνασθαι· "πάρα [δ'] ἔργα βόεσσιν."
>
> *WD* 450–454

> Which brings the sign for plowing and points to the season of rainy winter, and it bites the heart of a man without oxen. Then feed up your twisty-horned oxen who are inside. For it is easy to say, "Give me a pair of oxen and a wagon," and easy to refuse: "There is work for the oxen."

The logic is perplexing, since the instruction to feed up the oxen before their season of intensive work (δὴ τότε χορτάζειν ἕλικας βόας ἔνδον ἐόντας) interrupts the imagined bad luck of the man without oxen. The advice takes extra point from ἔνδον ἐόντας—the farmer is to feed them at home, and not let them outside, where danger lurks, because an injury at this time is so devastating. Again, Hesiod's greatest concern is to avoid the disaster of not having oxen at plowing time.

Poor farmers in the modern Mediterranean often borrowed oxen, so that they plowed later than their more fortunate neighbors, reciprocating the help

with labor. It is also possible to plow with mules, or with one ox, or with a cow, depending on the conditions.[27] The poem never considers this possibility. Instead, Hesiod he turns to the man who is "wealthy in his mind," and who says that he has constructed a wagon, without considering how big a job that is (455–457). Hesiod's man without oxen is not someone who does his best with few resources, but is a fool who does not realize how bad his situation is. So the poet ignores alternative plow animals, and at 608 instructs that, when the harvest has been safely stored, it is time to give the slaves a rest and to unyoke the oxen, βόε λῦσαι. Yet a simile at *Il.* 10.351–353 says that mules are better than oxen for plowing fallow, and even Hesiod himself has said at 46 that if the gods had not hidden sustenance, the labor of oxen and mules would vanish (ἔργα βοῶν δ' ἀπόλοιτο καὶ ἡμιόνων ταλαεργῶν).[28] The collocation strongly suggests that mules could be used for plowing. Mules are oddly situated in the poem. The farmer is warned at 606–607 to bring in fodder, including chaff and other crop waste, as fodder for both oxen and mules. Favorable days for castrating, starting to tame, and first yoking mules, along with other animals, are mentioned again at 791, 796, and 816. Yet at 405, Hesiod lists the basic requirements for the farmer as at 405 are a house, a wife, and an ox for the plow—a single ox.

It is likely that the references to mules in the Days are traditional; they belong in these lists of animals that would be used on a farm. Line 46 has a distinctly epic tone, and the addition of mules to oxen adds solemnity to it. The advice to make sure of fodder for oxen and mules is closer to the didactic center of the poem—the addressee has mules. Mules are in the farmer's world, but he gives his attention to oxen. Mules are an unusually clear example of the poem's tendency to keep certain concerns at the center while leaving others at the periphery. So, although he rebukes the *basileis* for not knowing the benefit of mallow and asphodel, he never discusses foraging. His maiden has olive oil for her winter bath (522–523), but he says nothing about olive cultivation. The successful man is rich in flocks (308), but there is nothing in the poem about tending them—until the Days. The Days explain when to shear sheep (775), when to castrate sheep and goats (785), when to build a fold for them (786), and when to begin taming them (795). While the Days continue the poem's theme

27 Halstead (2014: 20, 42, 56, 167, 234, 299, 301, 303, 309–310).

28 The ancient exegetical commentary (bT) agreed: ἐν γὰρ τῇ πρώτῃ αὔλακι σχολαιοτέρων προσδεῖ ζῴων πρὸς τὸ βαθυτέραν γενέσθαι τὴν ἐντομήν, ἐν δὲ τῇ νειῷ ὀξυτέρων· προεσχημάτισται γὰρ τῷ ἔαρι "For in the initial furrowing, one wants the slower animals so that the cut will be deeper, but in fallow the more energetic. For it has already been broken up in the spring"—that is, for land that has been plowed while it was fallow, mules are better because they work more quickly.

of living in accordance with the seasons and the ordinances of Zeus, they also represent a world less rigorously filtered through the poet's personal views.

So the poem has a distinct individuality: it recommends a caution that is exaggerated even for a conservative smallholder, and it does not just concentrate on a particular group of the farmer's tasks, but presents them with a particular perspective and a distinct rhetorical slant. The speaker gradually extends his claims to special knowledge and asks for greater ambition from the audience. Everyone can and should be just. Realistically, only relatively prosperous landowners could afford to use only very mature oxen, or to have someone else do their plowing. The agricultural section of the poem assumes slaves and other helpers. The final section, with its careful ritual prohibitions and the Days, is for those who not only are willing to listen, but are willing to accept the poet's knowledge, even when it contradicts other lore that they have heard, and to make the effort to conform to it. Here, again, the poem is offering advice that may be traditional in some sense—the performer surely did not invent it—but it did not belong to the common store of wisdom.

One might, of course, take an oral-analytical position and argue that these are all different individualities, and that the poem is not the product of a single composer putting his peculiar stamp on traditional material but the work of many performers. This seems to me less likely. First, although the peculiarities of each section are different, they seem to me, at least, fundamentally consistent with each other, and indeed similar. Second, each innovation would need to be accepted by other performers to become part of the poem, and I have suggested that eccentricity would make this acceptance less likely during an evolutionary process, which would tend to a common denominator of shared beliefs. Hesiod's quirks help give the poem its distinctive voice, but each by itself is not salient enough to prompt later performers to introduce more eccentric advice. New versions would be likelier to remove peculiarities than to imitate them.

Nothing in this individuality would make Hesiod or his poem any less traditional or any less likely to be oral. *WD* has relatively low formulaic density (37%), although the *Theogony* is much higher (51%).[29] However, relatively little of the poem is narrative, so it did not often need the name-epithet system, and since Hesiod uses little direct speech, he rarely employs the formulae for opening and closing speeches. Since the other poem generally agreed to be by

29 Pavese and Venti (2000: 45). Their definition of "formula" includes expressions (with variation if the meter is unchanged) used twice in Hesiod himself or in Hesiod and Homer, the hymns and epic fragments, lyric, elegy, and inscriptional poetry through the fourth century, so other scholars would have lower numbers.

the same poet is highly formulaic, the relatively low density of *WD* is not an argument against orality. Hesiod appears to be what John D. Niles calls "a strong tradition-bearer," which means that he was both a transmitter of what he had heard and a refashioner of it.[30] His immediate influence, however, seems to have been uneven: some passages were, of course, profoundly important.[31] A few parts of *WD* were quoted repeatedly in antiquity, others almost never, and although ancient authors often characterize Hesiod as the poet of farming, passages about farming are rarely quoted, and the Days very rarely. While traditions of gnomic poetry and reflective moralizing continued to flourish, poets before the Hellenistic period did not imitate either the *Works and Days*' heterogeneity of content or the peculiarities of the poet's views.

Paradoxically, however, *WD* as a whole rapidly became a canonical text. This has an interesting effect. From one point of view, it is obvious that some parts of a canon are more canonical than others. The eccentric or esoteric contents were carried along with the rest, and they contributed to a popular figuration of Hesiod. Then the very status of the text as canonical makes its peculiarities harder to see.

Some of the odd features of the *Works and Days* are manifest—its heterogeneity of content, its perplexing transitions, the way Perses as addressee comes and goes. Others are more subtle, but these, I suggest, help us identify a genuinely individual voice.

Bibliography

Aloni, A. 2010. "*Esiodo* a *simposio*. La performance delle Opere e Giorni." In E. Cingano, ed., *Tra panellenismo e tradizioni locali: generi poetici e storiografia. Hellenica, 34*. Alessandria: Edizioni dell'Orso, 115–150.

Arrigetti, G. 2007. *Esiodo. Opere*. Milano: Mondadori.

Cartledge, P. 2002. "The political economy of Greek slavery." In P. Cartledge, E. Cohen, and L. Foxhall, edd., *Money, labour and land: Approaches to the economies of ancient Greece*. London: Routledge, 156–166.

Čolaković, Z., Međedović, A. 2007. *Epika Avda Međedovića: kritičko izdanje*. Podgorica: Almanah.

Currie, B. 2007. "Heroes and Holy Men in Early Greece: Hesiod's *theios aner*." In A. Cop-

30 Niles (1999: 173–193).

31 Koning (2010: 20–22): "the *Works and Days* thus seems to be not particularly remembered for their works and days").

poloa, ed. *Eroi, eroismi, eroizzazioni: dalla Grecia antica a Padova e Venezia: atti del convegno internazionale. Padova, (18–19 settembre 2006)*. Padua: Sargon 163–203.

———. 2012. "The *Iliad, Gilgamesh,* and Neoananlysis." In F. Montanari, A. Rengakos, and C. Tsagalis, edd., *Homeric Contexts. Neoanalysis and the Interpretation of Oral Poetry*. Trends in Classics 12. Berlin: de Gruyter, 543–580.

Danek, G. 2002. "Traditional Referentiality and Homeric Intertextuality."

———. 2005. Review of Z. Čolaković and M.-R. Čolaković, *Mrtva glava jezik progovara*. Podogrica: Almanah 2004, in *Wiener Studien* 118: 278–282.

———. 2012a. "The Doloneia Revisited." In Ø. Andersen and D. Haug, edd., *Relative chronology in early Greek epic poetry*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 106–122.

———. 2012b. "Homer und Avdo Međedović als 'post-traditional singers'"? In M. Meier-Brügger, ed. *Homer, gedeutet durch ein großes Lexikon*. Abhandlunger der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, NF 21. Berlin: de Gruyter, 27–44.

Debiasi, A. 2008. *Esiodo e l'occidente*. Roma: L'Erma di Bretschneider.

Edwards, G.P. 1971. *The Language of Hesiod in its Traditional Context*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Ellis, F. 1993. *Peasant Economics. Farm Households and Agrarian Development*. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ercolani, A. 2010. *Esiodo, Opere e giorni*. Rome: Carocci.

Gallant, T. 1991. *Risk and Survival in Ancient Greece: Reconstructing the Rural Domestic Economy*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.

Griffith, M. 1983. "Personality in Hesiod." *Classical Antiquity* 2: 37–65.

Halstead, P. 2014. *Two Oxen Ahead: Pre-Mechanized Farming in the Mediterranean*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Henrich, J., & McElreath, R. 2002. "Are peasants risk averse decision-makers?" *Current Anthropology*, 43(1), 172–181.

Henneberg, M.J. and Hennberg, R.J. 2001. "Analysis of Human Skeletal and Dental Remains from Metaponto (7th–2nd C BC)." In *Problemi della "Chora" Coloniale dall'Occidenta al Mar Nero. Atti del quarantesimo convegno di studi sulla Magna Grecia Taranto, 29 settembre–3 ottobre 2000*. Istituto per la Storia e L'Archeologia della Magna Grecia-Taranto, 461–474.

Janko, R. 1982. *Homer, Hesiod, and the Hymns: Diachronic Development in Epic Diction*. Cambridge [Eng.]: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2012. "πρῶτόν τε καὶ ὕστατον αἰὲν ἀείδειν: relative chronology and the literary history of the early Greek epics." In Ø. Andersen and D. Haug, edd., *Relative Chronology in Early Greek Epic Poetry*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 20–43.

Koning, H. 2010. *Hesiod: The Other Poet. Ancient Reception of a Cultural Icon*. Mnemosyne Supplement 325. Leiden: Brill.

Lamberton, Robert. 1988 *Hesiod*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Martin, Richard. 1992. "Homer's Metanastic Poetics." *Ramus* 21: 11–33.

Mazon, P. 1914. *Hésiode. Les Travaux et les Jours*. Paris: Hachette.

Most, G. 2006. *Hesiod*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Nagy, G. 1990. *Greek Mythology and Poetics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Niles, J.D. 1999. *Homo Narrans: The Poetics and Anthropology of Oral Literature*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Pavese, C. and Venti, P. 2000. *A Complete Formular Analysis of the Hesiodic Poems: Introduction and Formular Edition*. Amsterdam: Hakkert.

Rosen, R. 1990 "Poetry and Sailing in Hesiod's *Works and Days*." *Classical Antiquity* 9/1: 99–113.

Schwartz, A. 2013. "Big Weapons, Small Greeks." In D. Kagan and G. Viggiano, edd., *Men of Bronze: Hoplite Warfare in Ancient Greece*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 157–175.

Scodel, R. 2012. "Hesiod and the Epic Cycle." In F. Montanari, A. Rengakos, and C. Tsagalis, edd., *Homeric Contexts. Neoanalysis and the Interpretation of Oral Poetry*. Trends in Classics 12. Berlin: de Gruyter, 501–515.

Simon, H.A. 1956. "Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment." *Psychological Review* 63 (2): 129–138.

Snodgrass, A.M. 1985. "The Site of Askra." In G. Argoud and P. Roesch, edd., *La Béotie antique: Lyon—Saint-Étienne, 16–20 mai 1983*. Paris: Éditions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 87–95.

Sparkes, B.A. 1962. "The Greek Kitchen." *JHS* 82: 121–137.

Wells, S. and Taylor, G. 1987. *William Shakespeare, a Textual Companion*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

West, M.L. 1978. *Works & Days*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Ulrich von. 1928. *Hesiodos Erga*. Dublin: Weidmann.

CHAPTER 6

Nestor's Cup and Its Reception*

Jasper Gaunt

This paper seeks to bridge some gaps between the well-known description of Nestor's Cup in the *Iliad* and the astonishing skyphos found at Pithekoussai which is taken here to presuppose knowledge of it; the Hellenistic reception of the Cup richly documented by Athenaeus; and intermittent references to it in literature of the Roman period. Further evocations of the Cup in archaic, classical and Roman times are proposed to be discernable in the archaeological record, including a version likely made for Alexander the Great. As to what the poet of *Iliad* xi had in mind when describing the Cup, it is noted here that several elements are encountered on bronze cauldrons from the ancient Near East.

Book Eleven of the *Iliad* describes a day of intense and bitter fighting. In the course of this, Machaon, son of the healer Asklepios, is wounded in the right shoulder from an arrow shot by Paris (lines 504–507), prompting Idomeneus to urge Nestor to take him back to the Greek camp in his chariot (lines 510–515). Nestor agrees to this suggestion (lines 516–520); and, upon arrival, Eurymedon unharnesses the horses while the two men clean themselves up before entering Nestor's dwelling (lines 617–622). The servant girl, Hekamede, brings out a special table (τράπεζαν καλὴν κυανόπεζαν ἐΰξοον: lines 628–629), on which she sets a bronze basket, an onion for mixing into the drink, and barley bread. Next she fetches a drinking vessel, δέπας, which is the point of departure for this paper. Into it, she pours Pramneian wine, grated goats' milk cheese and white barley, thus preparing a refreshing drink (lines 630–631, 638–640).

The Cup itself is described as follows:

> … δέπας περικαλλές, ὃ οἴκοθεν ἦγ' ὁ γεραιός,
> χρυσείοις ἥλοισι πεπαρμένον· οὔατα δ' αὐτοῦ
> τέσσαρ' ἔσαν, δοιαὶ δὲ πελειάδες ἀμφὶς ἕκαστον

* My thanks to Niall Slater for the invitation to participate in the eleventh Orality conference, and for patient work as editor; to John Black, for practical assistance at Emory; and especially to the anonymous outside reader who saved me from several mistakes and offered many constructive suggestions. For help with photographs and permission to publish them, I thank Joan Aruz (Metropolitan Museum), David Saunders (Getty), and Moshe Bronstein (The Merrin Gallery).

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2017 | DOI: 10.1163/9789004329737_007

χρύσειαι νεμέθοντο, δύω δ' ὑπὸ πυθμένες ἦσαν.
ἄλλος μὲν μογέων ἀποκινήσασκε τραπέζης
πλεῖον ἐόν, Νέστωρ δ' ὁ γέρων ἀμογητεὶ ἄειρεν.

… a beautifully wrought cup which the old man brought with him
from home. It was set with golden nails, the eared handles upon it
were four, and on either side there were fashioned two doves
of gold, feeding, and there were double bases beneath it.
Another man with great effort could lift it full from the table,
But Nestor, aged as he was, lifted it without strain.[1]

Nestor's Cup is one of several instances of what Jasper Griffin once called "significant objects" singled out from time to time by the poet for special attention.[2] The most famous of these is, of course, the Shield of Achilles that is described in a monumental *ekphrasis* lasting over a hundred lines.[3] To borrow a term from Jan Paul Crielaard and Jonas Grethlein, these "significant objects" are, simply by virtue of being described, thereby accorded a "biography": a life, therefore, and thence a locus for memory.[4] It is surely not co-incidental that, of all the Greek heroes, it should be Nestor who was the owner of a special cup. His long speeches recalling the heroic feats of his youth are in many ways so much better suited to the symposium. Akin to the even more expansive autobiographical tales told by Odysseus in the palace of Alkinoos, these lengthy recitations have sometimes seemed misplaced on the dusty blood-soaked battlefield of Troy.[5] Despite the notable brevity of the description, a mere six lines and an important consideration to which we will return, the Cup of Nestor is remarkable for the degree of attention it attracted in antiquity. As Athenaeus would remark almost a thousand years after the Cup had been integrated into antiquity's primary literary epic, ever so many people—πλεῖστοι—had had something to say about it.[6]

Athenaeus, while describing the Cup's Hellenistic reception, could scarcely have dreamed that in October 1954 Giorgio Buchner would find a second "Cup

1 *Il.* xi 631–636. For the Greek text, see West (M) (1998 a). This translation is that of Lattimore (1951). For a commentary, see Hainsworth (1993: 291–294). For the grated cheese, see West (M) (1998 b); Ridgway (2009); compare also McGovern (2000).
2 Griffin (1980: 1–50, esp. 17–19 on cups).
3 *Il.* xviii 478–607.
4 Crielaard (2003); Grethlein (2008: 35–43).
5 On Nestor's speeches, see Pedrick (1983).
6 Ath. xi 781. For text and translation, see Olson (2009).

of Nestor" in the early cemetery at Pithekoussai (fig. 6,1–2).[7] Grave 168, by far the richest, would have been remarkable even without the famous inscribed skyphos, containing as it did 26 pieces of pottery made in several places (perhaps reflecting the origins of the friends and family of the deceased) and a silver fibula.[8] The vases included no fewer than four kraters: one potted in Euboea, another possibly so, and two locally made. Of the latter, one was special, for it was equipped with horned handles.[9] This is to my knowledge the only Western version that has yet come to light of a type well known in mainland Greece, Cyprus and the islands. Noël Oakeshott traced an unbroken (and for this writer deliberately evocative, memorializing) tradition for these from the celebrated late Mycenean Warrior Vase into Geometric times.[10] To go with the kraters, five

---

7 Museo Archeologico di Pithecoussai 166788: Buchner and Russo (1955); Buchner and Ridgway (1993: 219, T 168 no. 9; 751–758 with further bibliography [O. Vox]). On this skyphos and its inscription, see also: Hampe (1956: 36–38); Page (1956); Heubeck (1957: 43); Picard (1957); Woodhead (1957); Myres (1958: pl. 8); Manganaro (1959); Schadewaldt (1959: 413–419, 488); Webster (1959); Notopoulos (1960: 184); Guarducci (1961); Jeffery (1961: 235–236, 239 no. 1, pl. 47; 2nd ed. by A.W. Johnston 1990: 453); Carpenter (1963: 83–85); Heubeck (1964); Heitsch (1965: 43); Metzger (1965); Hommel (1966); Pfohl (1966: 610); Guarducci (1967: 226); Coldstream (1968: 277 no. 3, 278, 286); Raubitschek (1968); Rüter and Matthiessen (1968); Alpers (1969); Dihle (1969); Marcovich (1969); Meiggs and Lewis (1969: 1–2 no. 1); Guarducci (1970); West (M) (1970); Graham (1971); Burzachechi (1971); Langdon (1973); Peruzzi (1973: 24–26); Christyakova (1975); Johnston (1975); Watkins (1976): Hansen (P) (1976); Hiller (1976); Watkins (1976); Gallavotti (1977: 216–219); Guarducci (1978: 394–396); Heubeck (1979: 109–116); Graham (1982: 99–100); Hansen (1983: 252–253 no. 454); Johnston (1983); Hansen (P) (1985); Hurwit (1985: 89–91); Guarducci (1987: 365–367); Powell (1987: 11); Risch (1987); Hansen (O) (1988); Johnston and Andriomenou (1989); Latacz (1989: 80–85); Powell (1989: 338–340 no. 55); Appel (1991); Lang (1991: 70); Lapini (1991); Murray, Parsons, Potter and Roberts (1991: 189–190); Powell (1991: 163–167); Lambin (1992); Ridgway (1992: 55–57); Thomas (1992: 58–59); Dettori (1993); Robb (1994: 45–48); Arena (1994: 18–19 no. 12); Hurwit (1993: 28–29); Cassio (1994); Murray (1994); West (S) (1994); Bartonek and Buchner (1995); Cascia (1995); Danek (1995); Manganaro (1995: 142–146); Faraone (1996); Pavese (1996); Arena (1996); Watkins (1996); Baurain (1997: 383) Ridgway (1997); Boffa (1998: 152–155); Cassio (1998); Malkin (1998: 156–160); Pavese (1998: 82–83); Peruzzi (1998: 28–29); Cascio (1999); Lazzarini (1999); Mattingly (2001: 23–30); Wachter (2004: 313–315); Watson (1998); West (M) (1998 b); Lamboley (2001); Bennett (2002: 23–24); Lombardi (2003); Heinrichs (2003: 46–47); Farrell (2004: 256); Farnoux (2005); Osborne and Pappas (2007: 134–135); Dihle (2008); Latacz (2008); Faraone (2009); Ridgway (2009); Wachter (2010); Gerhard (2011); von Möllendorff (2011); Dell'Oro (2013); Voutiras (2014).

8 Grave 168: Buchner and Ridgway (1993: 212–223).

9 Buchner and Ridgway (1993: 217–218 no. 3, pl. cxxix).

10 Oakeshott (1966). For the Warrior Krater, Athens National Museum 1426, see Marinatos

FIGURE 6.1 *Inscribed Rhodian geometric skyphos. Museo Archeologico di Pithecoussai 166788.*
PHOTO: AFTER BUCHNER AND RIDGWAY 1993



FIGURE 6.2 *Inscription from fig. 6.1*
AFTER ARENA (1994)

drinking cups of different shapes were provided: an early Protocorinthian kantharos, an Argive monochrome cup, a locally made skyphos, a locally made cup and the Rhodian skyphos that bears the famous inscription. Three oinochoai, locally made, were likewise deposited, as was a jar for solids, also locally made. Finally, there were seventeen small lekythoi and aryballoi. Four were early Protocorinthian imports; the remainder were local, and presumably the latest of the vases. All these, with the exception of a few of the aryballoi and lekythoi

---

and Hirmer (1960: pls 232–233); http://www.namuseum.gr/collections/prehistorical/mycenian/myceniano8-en.html.

must have been broken deliberately over the pyre, and collected for transfer to burial afterwards, for they bear signs of burning and are missing fragments here and there.

Grave 168 was dug to bury a child: according to one pathologist, T.F. Spence, aged around ten years, or, according to another, M.J. Becker, twelve to fourteen.[11] In a cemetery in which it would appear that only the elite were cremated, while children were generally buried, it is all the more remarkable that a young boy should be accorded rites of cremation. The dense layer of ash co-mingled with the ashes of the deceased and pottery sherds carefully deposited within the grave's outline of a row of stones suggested to the excavator that a pyre must have been constructed nearby, the grave goods placed on it and ritually broken, and the remains subsequently carried for burial nearby. While the grave itself need not have interred a prominent aristocrat (a merchant is perhaps more likely), it is, as David Ridgway has pointed out, hard to avoid the conclusion that the family wished to emulate the Homeric description of funerals like that for Patroklos at which much grander dedications were made, before the flames were finally extinguished with wine, the ashes carefully wrapped and the remains—ultimately—enclosed in a ring of stones.[12]

On the evidence of the latest pieces of pottery, the grave should date a little before 700 BC. The inscribed skyphos, however, was made rather earlier: according to Nicholas Coldstream, around 720 BC, on the island of Rhodes.[13] It was inscribed in three lines, retrograde in the Phoenician manner, by a writer using Euboean script—whether in Euboea, or locally in Pithekoussai.[14]

The first line, sadly lacunose, makes reference to a Cup of Nestor, pleasant to drink from: Νέστορος ε[..]ι εὔποτ[ον] ποτέριο[ν]. The restoration of the verb has not been agreed upon, although, as Lillian Jeffery, Martin West, Peter Hansen and Alan Johnston among others have seen, much the most likely possibility from an archaeological perspective is εἰμὶ. This places the skyphos at the head of a venerable list of "speaking objects".[15] Uncertainty of restoration naturally

---

11 Their opinions are quoted in Buchner and Ridgway (1993: 212).

12 Ridgway (1992: 49–50). For the funeral of Patroklos, see *Il.* xxiii 108–257. Compare also the funerary banquet for King Midas: McGovern (2000).

13 Coldstream (1968: 277: Bird-kotyle Workshop no. 3).

14 Jeffery (1961: 235–236).

15 E.g. Jeffery (1961: 235–236); West (M) (1970: 171); Hansen (P) (1983); Johnston (1983). For speaking objects, see Burzachechi (1962); Wachter (2010). Other suggested restorations include: ἔ[ρρο]ι ε[ἴκο]ι ε[ἴκε]ι, Buchner and Russo (1955); ε[ν:τ]ι (ἦν τι), Page (1956); ε[ντο]ι, Manganaro (1959); ἔ[ην τ]ι, Heubeck (1979; 2008); ἐγωμι, Risch (1987); ἔ[ασον], Gerhard (2011).

bedevils any metrical analysis. While the words are certainly not hexametric like those in the following two lines, they nonetheless have a pleasant lilt to them and were surely intended to evoke something metrical. Martin West has suggested that we may do well to think of a rough trimeter.[16]

The second two lines, both hexameters, continue to say that whoever drinks from this cup will straightaway enjoy the pleasures of Aphrodite:

> *h*ὸς δ' ἄ⟨ν⟩ τõδε π[ίε]σι ποτερί[ο] αὐτίκα κε̃νον
> *h*ίμερ[ος *h*αιρ]έσει καλλιστε[φά]νο Ἀφροδίτες.

The precise significance of the inscription has been a matter of fierce scholarly debate. For our purposes, four matters are of importance. First, as many scholars have seen, the presence of the very name Nestor adjacent to two epic hexameter lines, regardless of how exactly to interpret them, together with formal touches like the adjective καλλιστεφάνος for Aphrodite, furnish sufficient evidence to be confident that "Nestor's Cup" mentioned in the inscription can only refer to or assume knowledge of the one that is famous to us from the *Iliad*.[17] Secondly, the date of the Pithekoussai cup's manufacture, securely anchored by its form and inscription around 720–700 BC, may well be earlier than the crystallization of the *Iliad* if the date "between 680 and 640" proposed by Martin West were to be accepted.[18] This realization leads in turn to a persuasive idea advanced by Georg Danek: the Pithekoussai skyphos suggests that Nestor's Cup must have been more famous than the brevity of its description in the *Iliad* would lead us to think, suggesting therefore that the poet was already alluding to another, fuller account of it elsewhere in the Epic Cycle.[19] Lastly, while the

16 West (M) (1970: whence many). Other suggestions include a trochaic trimiter catalectic: Guarducci (1961). For a more recent discussion, see Pavese (1996: 9–10). Another way to approach the first line is to suggest that its author may have thought of it as a combination of two parts. The first, Νέστορος ε[ἰμ]ὶ, is a statement of ownership, a tradition familiar from the archaeological record where objects often "speak," and setting off in dactylic epic meter, appropriate to the name. The second, εὔποτ[ον] ποτέριο[ν], is a comment about the cup, one probably taken from sympotic contexts. On metrical lines inscribed on pottery, stitched together as if rhapsodically, see Sider (2010: 547–552); Gaunt (2014 a: 115–118).

17 For a discussion of καλλιστεφάνος in archaic literature, see Richardson (1974: 242); Cassio (1994). For the opposite (unlikely) view, suggesting that the Pithekoussai skyphos merely belonged to someone who happened to be called Nestor and that the description of Nestor's Cup in the *Iliad* is therefore not relevant, see Pavese (1998: 82–83).

18 West (M) (2011: 19).

19 Danek (1995), suggesting that Nestors's Cup may have been described more fully in the *Cypria*. West (S) (1994: 14–15) proposed it emerged from a Peloponnesian epic tradition.

Pithekoussai skyphos cannot possibly have been known in Hellenistic times, it is striking that either one or possibly two "replicas" of Nestor's Cup described by Athenaeus (to which we will turn) came to be deposited in the important Temple of Diana Tifatina at Capua, just a few miles inland from the Bay of Naples—practically within sight of Pithekoussai.[20] Here the tradition that the polis of Metaponto, near Taranto, was founded by Nestor and the Pylians after the Trojan War comes to mind.[21]

In post-Homeric times, an academic tradition of interest in the *Iliad* is first attested by the scholiasts, and must, presumably, go back at least to and probably beyond the Peisistratid recension of the late sixth century.[22] With regard to Nestor's Cup, two scholarly questions were persistently addressed. One concerned the matter of size, the other how to understand the doves at the handles. Both these themes, it is argued here, can also be detected in the archaeological record.

The question of size, and why it was only Nestor, old though he was, who could lift the Cup when filled, was especially intruiging, and addressed by no fewer than three sophists, Glaukon, Antisthenes and Stesimbrotos.[23] The problem continued to be addressed in Hellenistic times, when Sosibios proposed a solution for the court of Ptolemy II Philadelphos (reigned 285–246 BC), and it was also addressed by Plutarch and Athenaeus.[24] A generation or two later, the setting of a philosophical dialogue by Lucian includes the vignette of a peripatetic philosopher Euthydemos getting knocked down in a brawl by a *σκύφον νεστορειόν*.[25] Here it is the great size of the original that presumably brought the Homeric Cup to mind. In the third century, one of the Homeric questions raised by Porphyry was, once again, why it was only Nestor who could lift the Cup when filled.[26]

To the evidence for this academic and literary interest, I here propose to add some vessels encountered in the archaeological record that seem intentionally

20 On the Temple of Diana Tifatina, see Pobjoy (1997). For the wider Campanian context, see Frederiksen (1959).

21 This is first mentioned by Bacchyl. xi, 20, and was repeated by Antiochus of Syracuse, a historian of the late fifth century (*apud* Strabo, 279).

22 Erbse (1974: 244–249). On the Peisistratid recension of Homer, see Pl. [*Hipparch.*] 228B. On the reception of Homer in Peisistratid Athens, see Shapiro (1989: 43–47). On Homer's ancient readers, see Richardson (1975); Lamberton and Keaney (1992).

23 See Morgan (2000: 96–97).

24 For Sosibius, see Ath. xi 493; for Plutarch, Ath. xi 461.

25 Lucian, *Hermot.* 12.

26 For Porphyry, see MacPhail (2011: 187 Λ 637).

FIGURE 6.3 *Attic black-figured band-cup from Bettolle*
PHOTO: COURTESY THE MERRIN GALLERY

to have evoked Nestor's Cup in the matter of heroic size: cups so large that, when filled, they were scarcely possible to lift. Over a span of two or three generations, between around 530 and 450 BC, a closely related group of Athenian potters and painters occasionally created truly giant cups that can measure over 27 cm in height and 45 cm in diameter. Early examples of these, like one from Bettolle (fig. 6.3), seemed to Sir John Beazley to have been decorated by an artist "not far from the Lysippides Painter."[27] All are decorated with at least one scene of battle that must be heroic, whether through the appearance of chariots or the participation of Amazons. Later, the tradition of these gigantic cups passes to the workshop of Euphronios, and includes, most suggestively, the great cup with the Sack of Troy that was decorated by Onesimos.[28] The subjects depicted on these cups already transport us to the plains of Troy. Their heroic scale and the very practical difficulties which the symposiasts would have encountered once they were filled, may well have been intended by the potters and painters to evoke the most famous of all heroic cups, that of Nestor. In considering this Athenian production, we should not forget that, besides two shadowy kings of

27 New York Market, Merrin: Beazley (1956: 265, 1). Height: 22.5 cm; diameter: 45.5 cm; width across handles: 55.3 cm. On these gigantic cups, see Greifenhagen (1971); Schauenburg (1974); Fellmann (1989: 63–66); Danile (2005); Heesen (2009, 83 n. 495, 163 n. 994 and *passim*).

28 Once Getty Museum 83.AE.362 + frr, and now Rome, Museo Nazionale Etrusco di Villa Giulia 121110: BAPD 13363. On this cup, see Williams (1991).

Athens, Kodros and Melanthos, the contemporary tyrant Peisistratos and his family claimed descent from the Neleids of Pylos.[29]

A second avenue of ancient enquiry concerned the doves that were placed around the handles. They featured prominently in the monograph by Asclepiades of Myrlaea; it was the doves that caught the Roman poet Martial's imagination, and in more modern times it was the doves that prompted Heinrich Schliemann to identify the famous gold kantharos with birds on the handles from the fourth Shaft Grave at Mycenae as the one described in the *Iliad*.[30] The placement of figures on or beside handles on Greek metal drinking vessels is exceedingly uncommon. While no example known to me features doves, it is, however, the very unorthodox and rare positioning of such elements, rather than their actual subject matter, that is germane. The subject matter of appliques that adorn archaic and classical bronze vessels generally feature symbols or metaphors for aristocratic power (lions, horses, livestock) and a narrow range of mythological creatures (Gorgons, Sirens).[31] In many ways, this repertoire, which seldom has engaged narrative significance, is broadly speaking interchangeable. With regard to the placement of these elements on vessels, however, the range of possibilities is severely restricted. Only four cups with figures on top of or beside the handles are known to me. The most famous, as well as the earliest, is the gold skyphos from the Bernardini tomb in Palestrina that is of Western—Etruscan—manufacture.[32] Here it is sphinxes, decorated with granulation, that appear on the handles. The date is early seventh century. Somewhat later from mainland Greece comes a series of bronze kantharoi and mugs, probably Peloponnesian, two of them found at sites in the heartland of post-Mycenean Greece: a mug from the Argive Heraion, that features a sphinx on the handle;[33] a kantharos from Olympia with horses on the handles (fig. 6.4);[34] and a second kantharos in a private collection in Boston with crouching lions.[35]

Entirely different in character and somewhat later, is an Attic red-figure kantharos of type D in Paris attributed to the Eretria Painter by Beazley and

29 Herodotus v 65.

30 For Asclepiades, see Ath. xi 489–492; Mart. viii 6; Schliemann (1880: 235–238).

31 Gaunt (2014 b: 355–356).

32 Rome, Museo Nazionale di Villa Giulia 61544: Strong (1966: 65, pl. 11a); Cristofani and Martelli (1983: 257 no. 19).

33 Athens, National Museum: Rolley (1986: 242 fig. 264; "the shape, with one handle only, is not normal, nor is the sphinx").

34 Furtwängler (1890: 96 pl. 35.671); Papadopoulos (2001: 386 fig. 4b).

35 Sotheby's, New York, *Catalogue* 7 December 2001, lot 286.

FIGURE 6.4 *Greek bronze kantharos from Olympia. Athens, National Museum 6115.* PHOTO: AUTHOR

dated around 435–430 BC by Adrienne Lezzi-Hafter.[36] It is signed by its potter Epigenes. The two sides show departure scenes from the Trojan War, each figure named by inscriptions. On one, Antilochos, armed with a sword and two spears and wearing the clothes of a traveller, a chlamys and a petasos, and Patroklos, fully armed as a hoplite (though without greaves) take their leave from Nestor and Thetis. On the other side, it is Achilles, armed just like Patroklos and Kymothea taking their leave of Agamemnon and Oukalegon. The kantharos of type D is a special shape, of great rarity in black- and red-figure. It is further remarkable not only for being obviously derived from metalware, but also for the fact that no fewer than two of this mere handful of preserved examples were signed by their potters, Sotades and Epigenes.[37] The certain—inscribed—

36 Bibliothèque Nationale, Cabinet des Médailles 851: Beazley (1963: 1251 no. 41); Lezzi-Hafter (1988: 289–290, 352 no. 285, pl. 184); BAPD 216978.

37 For the kantharos signed by Sotades in Cracow, Czartoryski Museum 76: Beazley (1928: pls.

presence of Nestor on one example of this drinking vessel of special shape suggests that the Cup described in the *Iliad* may well have been on the minds of Epigenes and the Eretria Painter when they made their kantharos. This one was destined for Vulci, where the profusion of Attic pottery strongly suggests that even in the context of Etruscan symposia for which it was intended, the allusion to Nestor's Cup would not have gone unnoticed. Besides this kantharos and the gold skyphos from the Bernardini tomb in Palestrina just mentioned, we may now add a third possible piece of evidence for Etruscan interest in Nestor's Cup: a representation of one of the gigantic cups on a Pontic (Etruscan black-figure) oinochoe in the British Museum.[38]

Evidence for the reception of Nestor's Cup in the Hellenistic world depends upon a remarkable variety of sources marshalled by Athenaeus.[39] Even more noteworthy is the record of a noun invented to denote Nestor's Cup, Νεστορίς, first used by Asclepiades of Myrlaea and perhaps by Dionysius of Thrace, and conveniently appropriated (although without especially good reason) by modern archaeologists to describe two unrelated pottery shapes that occur in late classical South Italian fabrics.[40] The earliest evidence known to Athenaeus for interest in Nestor's Cup apparently consisted of some beautiful drawings of how the handles should have been constructed made by one Apelles, whom he mentions twice by name.[41] The first reference occurs in a context that discusses the metal (toreutic) rivets in the Cup of Nestor described in the *Iliad* and here Apelles is called the metalworker (ὁ τορευτής). The second reference, however, speaks only of drawings made by an otherwise unspecified Apelles. His drawings of the handles are described as follows:

> "ἐκ μιᾶς οἱονεὶ ῥίζης, ἥτις τῷ πυθμένι προσκυρεῖ, καθ' ἑκάτερον τὸ οὖς διασχιδεῖς εἰσι ῥάβδοι ἐπ' ἀμφοῖν, οὐ πολὺ ἀπ' ἀλλήλων διηστῶσαι διάστημα. αὗται μέχρι τοῦ χείλους διήκουσαι τοῦ ποτηρίου καὶ μικρὸν ἔτι μετεωριζόμεναι κατὰ μὲν τὴν ἀπόστασιν τοῦ ἀγγέιου φυλάττουσι τὴν διάσχισιν, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἀπολή-

15–16); Beazley (1963: 764 no. 7); BAPD 209464. On the shape, see Sparkes and Talcott (1970: 116–117); Lezzi-Hafter (1988: 289–294).

38 British Museum 1926.6–28.1: Hannestad (1976: pl. 47); Martelli (1987: 304–305 no. 111, 159 ill.).

39 Ath. xi 461, 466, 477, 487–494, 501, 781.

40 Ath. xi 488 (Asclepiades); 489 d (Dionysos of Thrace). See also Ath. xi 487, where the word stands alone. For modern usage of nestoris, see Schneider-Herrmann (1980); Söldner (1989); Schierup (2014).

41 Ath. xi 488 d–e. Rather earlier than these drawings were those made by Parrhasios and widely used: see Rumpf (1951).

> γον πρὸς τὴν τοῦ χείλους ἔρεισιν πάλιν συμφυεῖς [εἰσιν]. καὶ γίνεται τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον τέτταρα ὦτα."
>
> "from a single root, as it were, attached to the base, extend split coils of clay on either side of the vessel, one per handle and not very far apart from one another. These stretch as high as the lip of the cup, and in fact rise a bit above it; as long as they are separated from the vessel, they maintain their distance from one another, whereas near the end, when they are about to touch the lip, they come back together. There are thus four handles."[42]

What is described—particularly the reeded treatment of the handles (ῥάβδοι), and their profile, rising above the level of the rim and curving back to unite there—sounds just like Late Classical or Hellenistic metalwork from Macedonia, for example the silver cups from Vergina tomb 3 or a calyx-kantharos from Vergina (fig. 6.5).[43] The drawings themselves can thus be dated independently in the second half of the fourth century or so. By the time of Asclepiades, therefore, they would have been two centuries old, indicating that they were executed by someone famous. Rather than posit an otherwise entirely unknown metalworker, I suggest here that the identification of Apelles as metalworker slipped in mistakenly on account of the involved discussion about metal rivets and studs, and that we should instead recognize none other than Apelles the celebrated court painter to Alexander the Great. Alexander's profound interest in Homer from childhood is well-known: it was said that he kept a copy of the *Iliad*, edited by Aristotle, under his pillow, and, while paying a visit to Troy, exchanged his own armor for that of Achilles that had been deposited in the temple of Athena.[44] While the tradition that Alexander was prone to heavy drinking is doubtless exaggerated, the story (preserved in the historian Ephippus of Olynthos) that he did have an enormous drinking cup is probably true because, as Frances Pownall has shown, vernacular knowledge of its existence is presupposed in a joke in Menander's *Kolax*, first produced just a few years after Alexander's death. There, Bias boasts that he has drunk a

---

42 Ath. xi 488 d–e.

43 Vergina, Great Tumulus tomb III: Zimi (2011: 211 no. 57). For silver cups from Vergina, see Zimi (2011: 203–206). For the kantharos from Derveni tomb 2, see Themelis and Touratsoglou (1997: 66–67).

44 Plut. *Vit. Alex.* 8.2, 26.1; Arr. *Anab.* 1.11.8. For Alexander the Great and Homer briefly, see Zeitlin (2012). On Alexander's visit to Troy, see Courtieu (2004).



FIGURE 6.5 *Profile drawing of a calyx cup from Vergina*
PHOTO: AFTER ZIMI 2011, 210 FIG. 1

cup of wine that contained ten kotylai (five pints) three times over. That's even more than Alexander, Strouthias replies.[45] Great size as a significant feature of Nestor's Cup has already been remarked upon. It is therefore tempting to associate Menander's passing reference to a very large cup belonging to Alexander the Great with Apelles' drawings for reconstructing a Cup of Nestor.

These drawings were made available in the late second or early first century B.C. to Asclepiades of Myrlaea (later Apamea in Syria), for his monograph on Nestor's Cup, Περὶ τῆς Νεστορίδος.[46] His account, quoted at length by Athenaeus, framed the discussion in cosmic terms, whereby the golden rivets mentioned in the *Iliad* became the stars and the (stated) silver wall, the night sky. From this, the doves at the handles went on naturally to sym-

45 Pownall (2010: 64). The exchange is preserved in Ath. x 434c.

46 Ath. xi 466, 488. On Asclepiades, see Bicknell (1967); Pagani (2007).

bolize the constellation of the Pleiades. Asclepiades would seem therefore to have had in mind also the two great shields of the ancient world, most especially that of Achilles described in the *Iliad*, which also featured the Pleiades, but also the chryselephantine shield made by Pheidias for his cult statue of Athena Parthenos, where Helios and Selene were present on the engraved Gigantomachy: both were bordered by the great river of Ocean and, in different ways, further accessed visions of the universe.[47]

Approximately contemporary with the treatise by Asclepiades of Myrlaea was a "replica" of Nestor's Cup that was made by Dionysius of Thrace, a pupil of Aristarchus of Samothrace the famous editor of Homer, who was active on Rhodes during the second half of the second century BC.[48] This project was supported by his pupils, who raised sufficient funds for its creation (τῶν μαθητῶν αὐτῷ συνενεγκάντων τἀργύριον). It is not clear whether τἀργύριον here means that the replica itself was made of silver or whether, in a surfeit of generosity, the loyal pupils contributed sufficient silver coins to have it made—for instance—in gold. This particular version was accompanied by a (second) commentary written by Promathidas of Herakleia (Προμαθίδας ὁ Ηρακλεώτης ἐξηγούμενος). The vessel is described as a skyphos, with the handles resembling the prows of ships and doves beside (σκύφον … ἔχοντα τὰ ὦτα, καθάπερ αἱ δίπρῳροι τῶν νεῶν, περὶ δὲ τὰ ὦτα τὰς περιστεράς). Once again, the shape of the handles resembling the prows of ships reminds us of Hellenistic silver cups whose handles sometimes have triangular thumb plates [compare fig. 6.5].[49] This particular reproduction evidently attempted to make something of the base described in Homer, although how to imagine it is far from certain. What became of this version is not clear.

A second "Cup of Nestor" that was dedicated in Capua was a lettered cup (ποτήριον γραμματικὸν).[50] To envisage such a vessel, Athenaeus quotes the comic poet Alexis who describes a certain cup (ἔκπωμα) that was rounded (στρογγύλον), very small (μικρὸν πάνυ), old (παλαιόν), its handles badly crushed (ὦτα συντεθλασμένον σφόδρα), and which bore a votive inscription running

47 For the Pleiades and the cosmos on shield of Achilles, see *Il.* xviii 483–489; for Ocean, *Il.* xviii, 606–607. Greek shields of the archaic and classical period usually have rims that are plated in bronze that is decorated with a guilloche, a pattern widely believed to reference water. On the Pheidian example, the rim will of course have been gold.

48 Ath. xi 489.

49 Kozani, Museum 589: Zimi (2011: 204–205 no. 46). Thessaloniki, Archaeological Museum B 5 from Derveni: Zimi (2011: 209 no. 54). Vergina, Archaeological Museum BE 15 from Tomb III: Zimi (2011: 211–212 no. 57).

50 Ath. xi 466e.

FIGURE 6.6 *Apulian black-glaze kantharos inscribed for the Dioskouroi. Malibu, J. Paul Getty Museum 86.AE.702.*
PHOTO: COURTESY MUSEUM

around the body (ἔχον κύκλῳ τε γράμματ') to Zeus Soterios (Διὸς Σωτῆρος). The verb συνθλάω describes a damaged pair of gold earrings dedicated at Eleusis in classical times, and shows therefore that Alexis had a metal cup in mind.[51] A series of Apulian ceramic kantharoi dating to the late fourth century, in black-glaze closely imitating metalwork, however, also fit physically just such a description, and by the third century would have been considered old: one, in Malibu (fig. 6.6), is inscribed for the Dioskouroi; another, in Lyons, is inscribed for Aphrodite.[52] Athenaeus goes on to say that it was a silver version of this kind of cup with gold lettering recording the Homeric verses about the

51 IG II.^{2} 1544, 21.

52 Malibu, J. Paul Getty Museum 86.AE.702: The Summa Galleries, *Auction* 1, 18 September 1981, lot 16; http://www.getty.edu/art/collection/objects/12846/unknown-maker-black-glaze-rattling-kantharos-greek-south-italian-4th-century-bc. Lyons, Musée des Beaux Arts: Alessandro Castellani sale, Rome, March 17–10 April 1884, lot 86. Slightly later is Chicago, Art Institute 1889.26, a Canosan kantharos with traces of gilding, which is inscribed for Aphrodite: http://www.artic.edu/aic/collections/artwork/183?search_no=1&index=0.

Cup of Nestor that was dedicated in the temple of Diana at Capua.[53] Oswyn Murray has pointed out that such an inscription would have been unusually long.[54]

What may or may not have been a third replica of the Cup of Nestor was dedicated in the Temple of Diana at Capua. The ποτήριον γραμματικὸν just discussed does not appear to resemble the version that was made by Dionysius of Thrace. Yet Athenaeus also mentions that one like the latter made its way to Capua.[55]

Some of these Hellenistic reproductions of Nestor's Cup share an important feature. The replicas appear to have been conceived at the scale of a canonical drinking vessel—*skyphos* or *poterion*—a feature already encountered in late fifth century classical ceramic examples alluding to the Cup. Thus, the issue of scale, that, while Nestor's Hekamede could lift the Cup when empty, only the hero could do so when filled, appears to have lost its appeal (presumably for practical reasons) and become irrelevant. With the reduction in size, the supporting structure enigmatically described in the *Iliad* becomes redundant, and likewise disappears.

A Roman host of the Flavian period satirized by Martial gives further evidence for the fascination of the ancient world with Nestor's Cup. The rich and ignorant Euctus harangues his guests explaining the insubstantial—and confused—provenances (*fumosa stemmata*) of his silver plate. This includes cups allegedly given to Apollo by Laomedon, king of Troy, for building the city walls, the very krater that started the battle of Lapiths and Centaurs, the mixing bowl of Achilles, the cup used by Dido to toast Aeneas, and the Cup of Nestor:

> hi duo longaeuo censentur Nestore fundi:
> pollice de Pylio trita columba nitet.
>
> These two bases are valuable because of long-lived Nestor;
> the dove shines, polished by the Pylian thumb.[56]

---

53 Ath. xi 466e.

54 Murray (1994). A more likely reading of the text (xi 466e), however, may be that the cup was created according to the words of the *Iliad* (ἐκ τῶν Ὁμηρικῶν ἐπῶν κατασκευασμένον) and inscribed simply with Nestor's name alone in gold (gilt?) letters (καὶ ἐντετυπομένα ἔχον τὰ ἔπη χρυσοῖς γράμμασιν, ὡς τὸ Νέστορος ὄν).

55 Ath. xi 489c.

56 Mart. viii 6; translation by Shackleton Bailey (1993: 165). On the poem recently, see Watson (1998); Watson and Watson (2003: 55 no. 33 and 204–208).

With this rich tradition in mind, it is illuminating to revisit a suggestion advanced some time ago by Klaus Parlasca, that a series of representations of doves perched on bowls (*lebetai*) and drinking vessels should be recognized as echoing the Homeric cup.[57] The longevity of the motif is indeed striking, for it persists into Coptic textiles and early Christian mosaics at Rome and Ravenna. With the latter, we are fast approaching the time of the famous twelfth century archbishop of Thessaloniki, Eustathius, whose commentary on the *Iliad* records his own lengthy response to Nestor's Cup.[58] Although Ludwig Braun rightly cautioned that the doves in the epic description and those depicted in the mosaic and subsequent images are engaged in different activities, it is the sheer wealth of this tradition that supports Parlasca's suggestion that these go back, at least indirectly, to the description in the *Iliad*.[59]

Doubtless the most famous work of art to be considered in this regard is the celebrated mosaic panel from Hadrian's Villa, now in the Capitoline Museums, that shows four doves, one of them feeding, on the rim of a bowl with two handles.[60] From a description in Pliny, we recognize this to be a copy of a detail of a mosaic known as the Unswept House, the Asorotos Oikos, by an artist called Sosos, who laid the original floor in Pergamon, probably during the reign of the Attalid king Eumenes II (197–159 BC).[61] The original, therefore, was contemporary with the treatise by Asclepiades, the reproduction by Dionysius of Thrace and its commentary by Promathidas of Herakleia, and the other Hellenistic reproductions. I would suggest therefore that, although the mosaic of the Unswept Floor had nothing to do with the Trojan War, for it represents the messy debris from a luxurious symposium that had not yet been cleaned up, nevertheless the motif—*topos*—of the doves on the rim of the bowl was intended to trigger memories of the most famous—heroic—piece of sympotic equipment: the Cup of Nestor. All these Hellenistic echoes can be thought of as in one way or another following in the wake of the version made for Alexander the Great.

As to how the poet of *Iliad* may have conceived Nestor's Cup, thoughts naturally turn first to the magnificent gold kantharos with two handles and birds looking in over the rim found by Heinrich Schliemann in 1876 in the Fourth Shaft Grave at Mycenae, which, as he said, "vividly reminds us of Nestor's

57 Parlasca (1963).

58 Van der Valk (1979: 267–283).

59 Braun (1973).

60 Musei Capitolini MC 0402, found at Hadrian's Villa in 1737: on the mosaic recently, see Kielau (2004).

61 Plin. *HN* xxxvi 60.

cup."[62] Scale, structure and the identification of the birds as Horus falcons by Spiridon Marinatos have quenched scholarly thirst for this particular association.[63] But, as Jeffrey Hurwit has stressed, the gold kantharos from the Shaft Graves does give the impression that the poet of the *Iliad* did describe something fairly specific, even if we can no longer identify it securely.[64]

We return to the description of Nestor's Cup in the *Iliad*. The four handles with which it was equipped finds a parallel on a Linear B tablet from Pylos.[65] The poet's term for our Cup, δέπας, a favourite word in both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, is presumably cognate with *di-pa*, the word for "cup" in the Linear B tablets, and possibly *dipssa* in Hittite.[66] In accessing archaic language, the poet may have intended to suggest something of venerable age. The only reference to the material or materials from which it was fashioned mentions gold rivets. Whether we infer that the Cup itself was of silver, as Asclepiades understood it to be, or whether entirely gold, is not especially significant: it is clearly precious metal. The poet's condition, that a woman (Hekamede) could lift it when empty but only Nestor himself could do so when full, is easily satisfied if we imagine a substantial vessel constructed in the traditional manner of the times, with light metal walls thinly hammered, and heavier cast handles.

The placement of birds on the rims of drinking vessels goes back to a remote past. Hilda Lorimer was struck by ceramic vessels potted in Cyprus around 2600–2100 BC.[67] Further afield in geographical boundaries but closer to our time is a conical, fluted beaker in electrum that features eight birds around the rim in the Metropolitan Museum of Art (fig. 6.7).[68] This has been assigned for stylistic reasons to the Bactria-Margiana Archaeological Complex, a designation for the bronze age civilization of Central Asia that persists into the second millennium (2300–1700 BC) and whose westerly edge lies beyond the Caspian Sea. Closer to the time of the formulation of the *Iliad*, we notice the occasional presence of birds on the rims of Geometric vessels, echoing the Shaft Grave kantharos.[69]

62 Schliemann (1880: 235–238).
63 Marinatos (1954).
64 Hurwit (1985: 50).
65 Ta 641: Ventris and Chadwick (1956: 336 no. 236, pl. IIIb).
66 Ventris and Chadwick (1956: 326–327 no. 202); Vermeule (1964: 309–311).
67 Lorimer (1950: 328–335).
68 New York, Metropolitan Museum of Art 1989.281.38: Pittman (1984: no. 31); *The Metropolitan Museum of Art Bulletin* 49.4 (Spring 1992) 56 no. 29 (unsigned).
69 E.g. Bothmer (1990: 98–99), on an oinochoe.

FIGURE 6.7 *Electrum beaker. New York, Metropolitan Museum of Art 1989.281.38.* PHOTO: COURTESY MUSEUM

Perhaps most suggestive of all, however, are the bronze cauldrons of the Ancient Near East, made in the ninth and eighth centuries in various parts of Syria and the Levant and imported voraciously into Greece.[70] The fortuitously well-preserved and monumental example from a princely tomb at Palestrina (fig. 6.8)[71] is rather larger in scale than what our poet had in mind, but smaller versions for table-top use were also made. These can be equipped with four handles, as, for example, the two consigned to the eighth century royal burial at Gordion.[72] Like Nestor's Cup in the *Iliad* these were used in the preparation of something more special than just wine, in this case a combination of grape

70 On these see Herrmann (1966; 1979); Aruz, Graff and Rakic (2014: 272–282).

71 Rome, Museo Nazionale di Villa Giulia: Aruz, Graff and Rakic (2014: 272–282).

72 Young (1958); Aruz, Graff and Rakic (2014: 272 fig. 4.14).

FIGURE 6.8 *Monumental cauldron from Palestrina. Rome, Museo Nazionale di Villa Giulia.*
PHOTO: ART RESOURCE

FIGURE 6.9 *Bronze cauldron attachment in the form of an eagle from the Acropolis. Athens, National Museum 6714.*
PHOTO: AUTHOR

wine, barley beer, honey mead and saffron.[73] Their cast adjuncts, furthermore, can be avian in form: an applique from a cauldron dedicated on the Athenian Acropolis takes the form of an eagle (fig. 6.9), while others take the form of extremely bird-like representations of griffins and sirens.[74] When empty, these

73 McGovern (2000), (2009: 134–135).

74 Eagles: e.g. Athens, National Museum inv. 6714, from the Acropolis: de Ridder (1896: 197 no. 538, fig. 177); Herrmann (1966: 70, 136 pl. 58). Olympia, Archaeological Museum br 13073: Herrmann (1966: 135 A 44 pl. 57.6). Bird-like griffins: Herrmann (1966: 134–136 A 38–42). Tehran, Iran Bastan Museum: Muscarella (1968: 16, figs. 15–16), comparing it to the Acropolis eagle. Sirens: Padgett (2003: 285–287 on no. 74); Aruz, Graff and Rakic (2014: 276–279).

vessels are light and easily carried; when filled, impossibly heavy to move. Being rounded bowls, they required stands, which were generally supplied either as rod tripods, or, more probably in our connection, in conical form. These conical stands were made in two separate parts (compare the epic δύω δ' ὑπὸ πυθμένες): the upper, foliate element was equipped with a flange below that fitted snugly inside the top of the flaring lower element. The two parts were held together by nothing other than gravity, meaning that they could be taken apart for ease of transport or storage and re-assembled for use. Martin West has put forward reason to believe that the description of the great and holy cup of Baal in the Ugaritic legend, and its description as both goblet (cup) and jar (krater?) may have inspired the dual function of Nestor's Cup.[75] If the poet of the *Iliad* was indeed thinking of Near Eastern cauldrons, at least in part, his description of Nestor's Cup may have been intended deliberately to bring yet more voices from the worlds of Near Eastern legends to the minds of his listeners.

Bibliography

Alpers, K. 1969. "Eine Beobachtung zum Nestorbecher von Pithekussai," *Glotta* 47: 170–174.

Appel, W. 1991. "Skyphos Nestora. Problemy interpretacyjne inskrypcji z Pithekussai," (with German synopsis), *Eos* 79: 171–185.

Arena, R. 1994. *Iscrizioni delle colonie euboiche. Iscrizioni greche arcaiche di Sicilia e Magna Grecia* 3. Alessandria.

Arena, R. 1996. "The Greek Colonization of the West: Dialects," in *The Greek World: Art and Civilization in Magna Graecia and Sicily*, G.P. Caratelli ed.: 189–200. Milan.

Aruz, J., Graff, S., and Rakic, Y. 2014. *Assyria to Iberia at the Dawn of the Classical Age*. New York.

BAPD. Beazley Archive Pottery Database. www.beazley.ox.ac.uk.

Bartonek, A., and Buchner, G. 1995. "Die ältesten griechischen von Pithekoussai," *Die Sprache* 37: 129–231.

Baurain, C. 1997. *Les Grecs et la Méditeranée Orientale des siècles obscures à la fin de l'époque archaique*. Paris.

Beazley, J.D. 1928. *Greek Vases in Poland*. Oxford.

Beazley, J.D. 1956. *Attic Black-figure Vase-painters*. Oxford.

Beazley, J.D. 1963. *Attic Red-figure Vase-painters*. Oxford.

Bennett, M. 2002. "The Euboeans and the West. Art, Epic Poetry, and History," in *Magna*

75 West (M) (1997: 202, 376).

Graecia: Greek Art from South Italy and Sicily M. Bennett, A.J. Paul, M. Iozzo, and B. White: 19–31. Cleveland.
Bicknell, P.J. 1967. "Aetius 2.14.3 and Asclepiades of Myrlea," *Apeiron 2.1*: 14–15.
Boffa, G. 1998. "L'insediamento euboico a Pitecussa," *PP* 53: 144–160.
Bothmer, D. von. 1990. *Glories of the Past. Ancient Art from the Shelby White and Leon Levy Collection*. Yale.
Braun, L. 1973. "Hellenistische Erklärungen des 'Nestorbechers'," *Mnemos.* 26.1: 47–54.
Buchner, G., and Russo, C.F. 1955. "La coppa di Nestore e un' iscrizione metrica da pitecussa del viii secolo av. Cr," *Rend. Linc.* 10: 215–253.
Buchner G. and Ridgway, D. 1993. *Pithekoussai* I. Rome.
Burzachechi, M. 1962. "Oggetti parlanti nelle epigrafi greche," *Epigraphica* 24: 3–54.
Burzachechi M. 1971. "Gli studi di epigrafia greca relativi alla Magna Grecia da 1952 al 1967," *Acta of the Fifth International Congress of Greek and Latin Epigraphy, Cambridge* 1967: 125–132.
Carpenter, R. 1963. Review of Jeffery 1961, *AJPhil.* 84: 76–85.
Cassio, A.C. 1994. "Κεινος, καλλιστεφανος, e la circolazione dell' epica in area euboica," *AnnAStorAnt* 1: 55–67.
Cassio, A.C. 1998. "La cultura euboica e lo sviluppo dell'epica greca," in *Euboica. L'Eubea e la presenza euboica in Calcidica e in Occidente. Atti del convegno internazionale, Napoli 13–16 Novembre 1996*: 11–22. Naples.
Christyakova, N.A. 1975. "The Inscription of Nestor from Pithekoussai," *VDI* 4: 28–40.
Coldstream, J.N. 1968. *Greek Geometric Pottery*. London.
Courtieu, J.G. 2004. "La visite d'Alexandre le Grand à Ilion/Troie," *Gaia* 8: 123–158.
Crielaard, J.-P. 2003. "The cultural biography of material goods in Homer's epics," *Gaia* 10: 49–62.
Cristofani, M., and Martelli, M. 1983. *L'Oro degli Etruschi*. Novara.
Danek, G. 1995. "Der Nestorbecher von Ischia, epische Zitiertechnik und das Symposion," *Wien. Stud.* 107–108: 29–44.
Danile, L. 2005. "Le coppe 'da parata' con decorazione figurata sotto il piede: un nuovo esemplare da Himera," *ASAtene* 83.1: 249–264.
Dell' Oro, F. 2013. "Après l'inscription de la coupe de Nestor: disposition du texte et formes de transtextualité dans les épigrammes de l'époque archaïque en Grande Grèce et Sicile," *Gaia* 16: 307–332.
De Ridder, A. 1896. *Catalogue des Bronzes trouvés sur l'Acropole d'Athènes*. Paris.
Dettori, E. 1993. "Osservazioni sulla Coppa di Nestore," *Museum Criticum* 25–28: 7–20.
Dihle, A. 1969. "Die Inschrift vom Nestor-Becher aus Ischia," *Hermes* 97.3: 257–261.
Dihle, A. 2008. "Interpunktionen in griechischen Inschriften archaischer Zeit," *RhM* 151: 26–36.
Erbse, H. 1974. *Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem*, III. Berlin.

Faraone, C. 1996. "Taking the 'Nestor's Cup Inscription' seriously: erotic magic and conditional curses in the earliest inscribed hexameters," *Cl. Ant.* 15.1: 77–112.

Faraone, C. 2009. "Stopping evil, pain, anger and blood. The ancient Greek tradition of protective iambic incantations," *GRBS* 49: 227–255.

Farnoux, A. 2005. "Art et littérature. La coupe de Nestor," *Aegaeum* 26: 89–96.

Farrell, J. 2004. "Roman Homer," *The Cambridge Companion to Homer*, ed. R. Fowler: 254–271. Cambridge.

Fellmann, B. 1989. *CVA: Deutschland 57: München—Museum Antiker Kleinkunst 11*. Munich.

Frederiksen, M.W. 1959. "Republican Capua: A social and economic study," *PBSR* 27: 80–130.

Furtwängler, A. 1890. *Die Bronzen und die übringen kleineren Funde von Olympia*. Olympische Forschungen IV. Berlin.

Gallavotti, C. 1977. "I due incunaboli di Atene e Pitecusa ed altri epigrafi arcaiche," *Rend. Linc.* 31: 207–238.

Gaunt, J. 2014 a. "The Poet and the Painter. A Hymn to Zeus on a Cup by the Brygos Painter," in R. Scodel ed., *Between Orality and Literacy. Communication and Adaptation in Antiquity. Orality and Literacy in the Ancient World 10*: 101–124. Leiden.

Gaunt, J. 2014 b. "Story and Status. The François Vase and the Krater from Vix," in A. Avramidou and D. Demetriou eds., *Approaching the Ancient Artifact: representation, narrative, and function: a Festschrift in honor of H. Alan Shapiro*: 349–363. Berlin.

Gerhard, Y. 2011. "La 'coupe de Nestor'. Reconstitution du Vers 1," *ZPE* 176: 7–9.

Graham, A.J. 1971. *Acta of the Fifth International Congress of Greek and Latin Epigraphy, Cambridge* 1967: 9–17.

Graham, A.J. 1982, "The Western Greeks," in J. Boardman and N.G.L. Hammond eds., *The Cambridge Ancient History* III part 3, *The Expansion of the Greek World, eighth to sixth centuries B.C.*: 163–195. Cambridge.

Greifenhagen, A. 1971. "Attisch schwarzfigurige Prachtschalen mit bemalter Standfläche," *JDAI* 86: 81–102.

Grethlein, J. 2008. "Memory and material objects in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*," *JHS* 128: 27–51.

Griffin, J. 1980. *Homer on Life and Death*. Oxford.

Guarducci, M. 1961. "Nuove osservazioni sull'epigrafe della coppa di Nestore," *Rend. Linc.* 16: 3–7.

Guarducci, M. 1967. *Epigrafia greca* 1. Rome.

Guarducci M. 1970. "Epigrafi greche arcaiche," *Rend. Linc.* 25: 51–57.

Guarducci, M. 1978. "Ancora di epigrafi archaiche," *Rend. Linc.* 33: 389–406.

Guarducci, M. 1987. *L'epigrafia greca dalle origine al tardo impero*. Rome.

Hainsworth, J.B. 1993. *The Iliad: a Commentary: Volume 3: Books 9–12*. Cambridge.

Hampe, R. 1956. "Die homerische Welt im Lichte des neuesten Ausgrabungen," *Gymnasium* 63: 1–57.

Hannestad, L. 1976. *The followers of the Paris Painter*. Copenhagen.

Hansen, O. 1988. "Nestor's cup. A new suggestion for restoration of the lacuna in line 1," *Ant. Cl.* 57: 280–281.

Hansen P.A. 1976. "Pithecusan humour: the Interpretation of Nestor's Cup reconsidered," *Glotta* 54.1: 25–44.

Hansen, P.A. 1983. *Carmina Epigraphica Graeca saeculorum VIII–V a. Chr n.* Berlin.

Hansen, P.A. 1985. "The date of 'Nestor's Cup,'" *ZPE* 58: 234.

Heesen, P. 2009. *Athenian Little-Master Cups*. Amsterdam.

Heinrichs, A. 2003. "Writing Religion: Inscribed Text, Ritual Authority and the Religious Discourse of the Polis," in *Written Texts and the Rise of Literate Culture in Ancient Greece*, ed. H. Yunis: 38–58. Cambridge.

Heitsch, E. 1965. *Aphroditehymnus, Aeneas und Homer*. Göttingen.

Herrmann, H.-V. 1966. *Die Kesssel der orientalisierenden Zeit I: Kesselattaschen und Reliefuntersätze. Olympische Forschungen* VI. Berlin.

Herrmann, H.-V. 1979. *Die Kesssel der orientalisierenden Zeit II: Kesselprotomen und Stabdreifüsse. Olympische Forschungen* XI. Berlin.

Heubeck, A. 1957. Reviews of *Die homerische Welt im Licht der neuesten Ausgrabungen* by R. Hampe and *Homer and his Forerunners* by M. Bowra, *Gnomon* 29: 38–46.

Heubeck, A. 1964. "Zum neueren Homerforschung V," *Gymnasium* 71: 43–72.

Hiller, S. 1976. "Der Becher des Nestor," *AW* 7.1: 22–31.

Hommel, H. 1966. Review of G. Pfohl, *Die inschriftliche Überlieferung der Griechen* (Stuttgart 1964): *Gnomon* 38: 606–611.

Hurwit, J.M. 1985. *The Art and Culture of Early Greece, 1100–480 BC*. Ithaca.

Hurwit, J.M. 1993. "Art, poetry and the polis in the Age of Homer," in S. Langdon ed., *From Pasture to Polis. Art in the Age of Homer*. Columbia.

Jeffery, L.H., 1961. *The Local Scripts of Archaic Greece*. Oxford.

Jeffery L.H., Johnston, A.W. 1990. *The Local Scripts of Archaic Greece*, revised edition with a supplement. Oxford.

Johnston, A.W. 1975. "Rhodian readings," *BSA* 70: 145–167.

Johnston, A.W. 1983. "The extent and use of literacy: the archaeological evidence," in *The Greek Renaissance of the Eighth Century B.C.: Tradition and Innovation*, ed. R. Hägg: 111–119. Stockholm.

Johnston, A.W. and A.K. Andriomenou. 1989. "A geometric graffito from Eretria," *BSA* 84: 217–220.

Kielau, S. 2004. "Das Taubenmosaik aus der Villa Hadriana und seine Beziehungen zu Pergamon. Neue Beobachtungen," *IstMitt* 54: 491–505.

Lamberton, R. and Keaney, J.J. 1992. *Homer's Ancient Readers. The Hermeneutics of Greek Epic's Earliest Exegetes*. Princeton.

Lambin, G. 1992. "Les coupes de Nestor," *Kentron* 8: 137–150.

Lamboley, J.L. 2001. "La coupe de Nestor. Etat de la question et essai de mise au point," *Gaia* 5: 29–39.

Lang, M.L. 1991. "The Alphabetic Impact on Archaic Greece," in D. Buitron-Oliver ed., *New Perspectives in Early Greek Art*: 65–80. Washington.

Langdon, M.K. 1973. "Two epigraphical notes," *AJArch.* 77: 195–196.

Lapini, W. 1991. "I turbamenti del vecchio Nestore," *Epigraphica* 53: 9–24.

Latacz, J. 1989. *Die erste Dichter des Abenlands*. Munich—Zurich.

Latacz, J. 2008. "Der Beginn von Schriftlicheit und Literatur," in *Homer der Mythos von Troia in Dichtung und Kunst*: 68–69. Munich.

Lattimore, Richmond 1951. *The Iliad, translated with an introduction by*. Chicago.

Lazzarini, M.L. 1999. "Questioni relative all'origine dell'alfabeto Greco," in *Scritture mediteranee tra IX e VII secolo a.C. Atti del Seminario*, eds. G. Bagnasco-Gianni and F. Cordano: 53–66. Milan.

Lazzarini, M.L. 2009. "L'alfabeto Euboico. Origine e diffusione," in *Cuma. Atti del 48 Convegno di Studi sulla Magna Grecia, Taranto 27 Settembre–1 Ottobre 2008*: 271–283. Taranto.

Lezzi-Hafter, A. 1988. *Der Eretria-Maler: Werke und Weggefährten*. Mainz.

Lombardi, P. 2003. "Il 'bere' di Nestore," in *Epigraphica. Atti delle giornate di studio di Roma e di Atene in memoria di Margherita Guarducci, 1902–1999*. 65–79. Rome.

Lorimer, H.L. 1950. *Homer and the Monuments*. London.

MacPhail, J.A. Jr. 2011. *Porphyry's Homeric Questions on the Iliad: Text, Translation, Commentary*. Berlin-New York.

Malkin, I. 1998. *The Returns of Odysseus: Colonization and Ethnicity*. Berkeley.

Manganaro, G. 1959. "Varia Epigraphica," *Siculorum Gymnasium* 12: 71–81.

Manganaro, G. 1995. "Rilettura di tre iscrizioni archaiche greche," *Kadmos* 34: 141–148.

Marcovich, M. 1969. "On the Earliest Greek Verse Inscriptions," *PP* 24: 217–223.

Marinatos, S. 1954. "Der 'Nestorbecher' aus dem IV. Schachtgrab von Mykene," in *Neue Beiträge zur Klassischen Altertumswissenschaft: Festschrift zum 60. Geburtstag von Bernhard Schweitzer*: 11–18. Stuttgart and Cologne.

Marinatos, S., and M. Hirmer, M. 1960. *Crete and Mycenae*. London.

Martelli, M. 1987. *La ceramica degli etruschi. La pittura vascolare*. Novara.

Mattingly, H.B. 2001. "Pots and potsherds," in *Greek Scripts. An Illustrated Introduction*, eds. P. Easterling and C. Handley: 23–30. Cambridge.

McGovern, P.E. 2000. "The Funerary Banquet of King Midas," *Expedition* 42.1: 21–29.

McGovern, P.E. 2009. *Uncorking the Past. The quest for wine, beer and other alcoholic beverages*. Berkeley.

Meiggs, R. and Lewis, D.M. 1969. *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the end of the fifth century B.C.* Oxford.

Metzger, H. 1965. "Sur la date du graffite de la coupe de Nestor," *Rev. Ét. Anc.* 67: 301–305.

Morgan K.A. 2000. *Myth and Philosophy from the Presocratics to Plato*. Cambridge.

Möllendorff, P. von. 2011. "Es war einmal … ein Becher des Nestor. Probleme von Intertextualität und Intermedialität am Beispiel des Skyphos von Ischia," in U. Egelhaaf-Gaiser, D. Pausch, and M. Rühl eds., *Kultur der Antike. Transdisziplinäres Arbeiten in den Altertumswissenschaften*: 413–433. Berlin.

Murray, O., P. Parsons, T.W. Potter, P. Roberts. 1991. "A 'Stork-Vase' from the Mola di Monte Gelato," *PBSR* 59: 177–195.

Murray, O. 1994. "Nestor's cup and the origins of the Greek symposion," in B. D'Agostino and D. Ridgway eds., *ΑΠΟΙΚΙΑ: I più antichi insediamenti Greci in Occidente: funzioni e modi dell'organizzazione politica e sociale: scritti in onore di Giorgio Buchner*: 47–54. Naples.

Muscarella, O.W. 1968. "Winged Bull Cauldron Attachments from Iran," *MMJ* 1: 7–18.

Myres, J.L. 1958. *Homer and his Critics*. London.

Notopoulos, J.A. 1960. "Homer, Hesiod and the Achaean Heritage of Oral Poetry," *Hesp.* 29.2: 177–197.

Oakeshott, N.R. 1966. "Horned-head vase handles," *JHS* 86: 114–133.

Olson, S.D. 2009. *Athenaeus. The Learned Banqueters*. v. Harvard (Loeb edition).

Osborne, R. and A. Pappas, 2007. "Writing on archaic Greek pottery," in Z. Newby and R. Leader-Newby eds., *Art and Inscriptions in the Ancient World*: 131–155. Cambridge.

Padgett, J.M. 2003. *The Centaur's Smile. The Human Animal in Early Greek Art*. Princeton.

Pagani, L. 2007. *Asclepiades, of Bithynia: I frammenti degli scritti omerici*. Rome.

Page, D.L. 1956. "Verses from the eighth century B.C.," *CR* 6.2: 95–97.

Papadopoulos, J.K. 2001. "Magna Achaea. Akhaian Late Geometric and Archaic Pottery in South Italy and Sicily," *Hesp.* 70.4: 373–460.

Parlasca, K. 1963. "Das pergamenische Taubenmosaik und der sogenannte Nestor-Becher," *JDAI* 78: 256–293.

Pavese, C.A. 1996. "La iscrizione sulla kotyle di Nestor da Pithekoussai," *ZPE* 114: 1–23.

Pavese, C.A. 1998. "Rhapsodic Epic Poems as oral and independent poems," *HSCP* 98: 63–90.

Pedrick, V. 1983. "The Paradigmatic Nature of Nestor's Speech in *Iliad* xi," *TAPA* 113: 55–68.

Peruzzi E. 1973. *Origini di Roma II: Le Lettere*. Bologna.

Peruzzi, E. 1998. *Civiltà greca nel Lazio preromano*. Florence.

Pfohl, G. 1966. *Griechische Inschriften*. Munich.

Picard, C. 1957. "La coupe de Nestor et l'inscription d'un vase de la nécropole de Pithékoussai Baie de Naples," *Rev. Arch.* 49: 82–83.

Pittman, H. 1984. *Art of the Bronze Age*. New York.

Pobjoy, M. 1997. "A new reading of the mosaic inscription in the Temple of Diana Tifatina," *PBSR* 65: 59–88.

Powell, B.B. 1987. "The Origin of the Puzzling Supplementals ΦΧΨ," *TAPA* 117: 1–20.
Powell, B.B. 1989. "Why was the Greek Alphabet Invented? The Epigraphical Evidence," *Cl. Ant.* 8.2: 321–350.
Powell, B.B. 1991. *Homer and the Origin of the Greek Alphabet*. Cambridge.
Pownall, F. 2010. "The Symposia of Philip II and Alexander III of Macedon: the View from Greece," in E. Carney and D. Ogden eds., *Philip II and Alexander the Great. Father and Son, Lives and Afterlives*: 55–68. Oxford.
Raubitschek, A.E. 1968. *L'Epigramme Grecque*. Entretiens Hardt 14: 9–11.
Richardson, N.J. 1974. *The Homeric Hymn to Demeter*. Oxford.
Richardson, N.J. 1975. "Homeric professors in the Age of the Sophists," *PCPS* 201: 65–81.
Ridgway, D. 1992. *The First Western Greeks*. Cambridge.
Ridgway, D. 1997. "Nestor's cup and the Etruscans," *OJA* 16: 325–344.
Ridgway, D. 2009. "La coppa di Nestore e una grattugia da Vulci," in S. Bruni ed., *Etruria e Italia preromana. Studi in onore di Giovannangelo Camporeale*: 789–791. Pisa.
Risch, E. 1987. "Zum Nestorbecher aus Ischia," *ZPE* 70: 1–9.
Robb, K. 1994. *Literacy and Paideia in Ancient Greece*. Oxford.
Rolley, C. 1986. *Greek Bronzes*. London.
Rumpf, A. 1951. "Parrhasios," *AJArch.* 55: 1–12.
Rüter, K., and Kj. Matthiessen. 1968. "Zum Nestorbecher von Pithekussai," *ZPE* 2: 231–255.
Schadewaldt, W. 1959. *Von Homers Welt und Werk*, 3rd edition. Stuttgart.
Schauenburg, K. 1974. "Zu attischen Kleinmeisterschalen," *Arch. Anz.* 89: 198–219.
Schierup, S. 2014. "The Nestorides. Invention and ambivalence in the early South Italian red-figure production," *Acta Hyperborea* 14: 387–425.
Schliemann, H. 1880. *Mycenae. A narrative of researches and discoveries at Mycenae*. New York.
Schneider-Herrmann, G. 1980. *Red-figured Lucanian and Apulian nestorides and their ancestors*. Amsterdam.
Shackleton Bailey, D.R. 1993. *Martial Epigrams, edited and translated by*, II. Harvard (Loeb edition.)
Shapiro, H.A. 1989. *Art and Cult under the Tyrants in Athens*. Mainz.
Sider, D. 2010. "Greek verses on a vase by Douris," *Hesp.* 79: 541–554.
Söldner, M, 1989. "Die Bonner Nestoris des Brooklyn-Budapest Malers," in *Beiträge zur Ikonographie und Hermeneutik. Festschrift für Nikolaus Himmelmann*, eds H.U. Cain, H. Gabelmann and D. Salzmann: 205–213. Mainz.
Sparkes, B.A., and L. Talcott. 1970. *The Athenian Agora: xii: Black and Plain Pottery*. Princeton.
Strong, D. 1966. *Greek and Roman Silver Plate*. London.
Themelis, P.G., Touratsoglou, G. 1997. *Ηοι ταφοι του Δερβενιου*. Athens.
Thomas, R. 1992. *Literacy and Orality in Ancient Greece*. Cambridge.

Van der Valk, M. 1979. *Eustathii Archiepiscopi Thessalonicensis Commentari ad Homeri Iliadem Pertinentes* I–III. Leiden.

Ventris, M., Chadwick, J. 1956. *Documents in Mycenean Greek. Three hundred selected tablets from Knossos, Pylos and Mycenae with commentary and vocabulary*. Cambridge.

Vermeule, E. 1964. *Greece in the Bronze Age*. Chicago.

Voutiras, E. 2014. "Το ποτήρι το Νέστορα: μύθος και πραγματικότητα," in P. Valavanis and E. Manakidou *ΕΓΡΑΦΣΕΝ ΚΑΙ ΕΠΟΙΕΣΕΝ. Μελετες κεραμικης και εικονογραφιας προς τιμην του καθηγητη Μιχαλι Τιβεριου*: 85–94. Thessaloniki.

Wachter, R. 2004. "Χαῖρε καὶ πίει εὖ. AVI 2," in J.H.W. Penney ed., *Indo-European Perspectives: Studies in Honour of Anna Morpurgo Davies*: 300–322. Oxford.

Wachter, R. 2010. "The origin of epigrams on 'speaking objects,'" in M. Baumbach, A. Petrovic, I. Petrovic eds., *Archaic and Classical Greek Epigram*: 250–260. Cambridge.

Watkins, C. 1976. "Observations on the 'Nestor's Cup' Inscription," *HSCP* 80: 25–40.

Watkins, C. 1996. "Greece in Italy outside Rome," *HSCP* 97: 35–50.

Watson, L. and P. 2003. *Martial: Select Epigrams*. Cambridge.

Watson, P.A. 1998. "Ignorant Euctus: Wit and Literary Allusion in Martial 8.6," *Mnemos.* 51.1: 30–40.

Webster, T.B.L. 1959. "Notes on the Writing of Early Greek Poetry," *Glotta* 38: 251–263.

West, M.L. 1970. "Bemerkungen zu Verseinschriften," *ZPE* 6: 171–173.

West, M.L. 1997. *The East Face of Helicon. West Asiatic Elements in Greek Poetry and Myth*. Oxford.

West, M.L. 1998a. *Homeri Ilias*. Stuttgart.

West, M.L. 1998b. "Grated Cheese Fit for Heroes," *JHS* 118: 190–191.

West, M.L. 2011. *The Making of the Iliad*. Oxford.

West, S. 1994. "Nestor's bewitching cup," *ZPE* 101: 9–15.

Williams, D. 1991. "Onesimos and the Getty Iliupersis," *Greek Vases in the J. Paul Getty Museum* 5: 41–64.

Woodhead, G. 1957. "New Inscriptions," *SEG* 14: 604.

Young, R.S. 1958. "The Gordion Tomb," *Expedition* 1: 3–13.

Zeitlin, F.I. 2012. "Alexander the Great." *The Homer Encyclopedia*

Zimi, E. 2011. *Late Classical and Hellenistic Silver Plate from Macedonia*. Oxford.

PART 2

Lyric and Dramatic Voices

CHAPTER 7

Pindar's Voice(s): The Epinician *Persona* Reconsidered

Claas Lattmann

One of the most salient features of Pindar's epinician odes, it might seem, is the voice of Pindar himself, a swift bee loving to boast about its superior poetic powers, just as in *Pythian* 10.51–54:[1]

> κώπαν σχάσον, ταχὺ δ' ἄγκυραν ἔρεισον χθονί
> πρῴραθε, χοιράδος ἄλκαρ πέτρας.
> ἐγκωμίων γὰρ ἄωτος ὕμνων
> ἐπ' ἄλλοτ' ἄλλον ὥτε μέλισσα θύνει λόγον.

> Hold the oar, quickly plant the anchor in the earth
> from the prow as a safeguard against the jagged reef,
> for the finest of revelry hymns
> flit like a bee from one thought to another.

As is well known, there are many such passages in the epinician odes. They not only easily outnumber the passages that explicitly address the current victory itself, but one also gets the impression that it is just here where Pindar becomes really enthusiastic. Pindar's main concern does not seem to be the

1 Pindar's epinician odes are quoted according to Snell and Maehler (1997); the English translations according to Race (1997a and 1997b) (with modifications); the *scholia vetera* to Pindar according to Drachmann (1903–1927); Bacchylides according to Maehler (2003). I am grateful to the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation for awarding me a Feodor Lynen Fellowship. My academic host Peter Bing and his colleagues have made my research stay at the Department of Classics at Emory University a most enriching experience. Special thanks go to Niall Slater, not only for organizing this wonderful conference, but also for generously taking it upon himself to improve the English of this paper; the anonymous referee, too, has made many valuable suggestions. I also feel obliged to express my gratitude to the American Friends of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation for awarding me the Calder Fellowships 2013, 2014, and 2015. Finally, heartfelt thanks to Lutz Käppel for his constant and generous support as well as for all that he has taught me about Pindar.

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2017 | DOI: 10.1163/9789004329737_008

praise of the victor, but the praise of himself, and this, ultimately, *for* praising himself. Pindar, apparently, is less a "Dichter des Siegers" than a "Dichter des Dichters."[2]

While such a view belongs to the most widespread clichés about Pindar and his epinician odes, it actually is, as I want to argue in the following, not only misleading from a general cultural historical point of view, but also hardly compatible with the text of the songs itself.

This paper will suggest a new perspective on the epinician voice. Its basis will be a reconsideration of the primary pragmatic setting of the songs. The main claim will be that it is never adequate to interpret the epinician "I" as referring to Pindar himself, whether (among other possibilities) Pindar the historical author or Pindar reduced to the textual function of the *laudator*. This result will in particular be shown to apply to the numerous, allegedly "poetological" passages, that is, to those passages in which the epinician *persona* self-reflexively talks about the aims and details of singing the odes.

In short, this paper will demonstrate that there is no Pindar in Pindar. This will be done in three successive steps. First, I will briefly sketch the state of research concerning the epinician *persona* and discuss why the theories put forward thus far appear to be problematic. Second, I will propose a reconstruction of the performance situation of the songs that is textually and historically more adequate than the *communis opinio*. Finally, I will trace some of the most important implications resulting from these insights with regard to the epinician *persona*.

The guiding question will be whose voice it is that speaks to us out of the epinician odes. An answer to this, admittedly already quite often discussed, question will, I hope, contribute to a better overall understanding of Pindar's poetry in its historical context and, thus, of one of the most important parts of early Greek culture, the production and performance of song.

This might be especially rewarding insofar as Pindar's epinician odes originate from a period of time in which Greek poetry was trapped between orality and literacy. This dialectical tension, it will be shown, is woven into the poetic fabric of the songs itself: Composed by the author Pindar in Thebes as highly artificial and complex poems with the help of writing and with the purpose of being disseminated into the whole Greek world in order to be preserved forever,[3] their primary historical performance situation was a highly ritualized public procession in the context of which the singers pretended to devise them

2 Cf. Bremer (1992: 391–392 and 401–412); Bowra (1964: 1).

3 On the last point see Hubbard (2004).

on the spot as spontaneous and thus purely oral revelry songs, sung not by the actual author himself, but by their so-to-speak intended authors, the friends of the victor, who were filled with excitement and joy over the shining victory.

Pindar's Voice

The basis for an adequate understanding of the nature of the speaker of Pindar's epinician odes is a critical assessment of the common theories on the epinician *persona*. Within the scope of this paper, however, it will not be possible to review every detail of the history of the controversy. The status of the epinician *persona* has been discussed since Alexandrian times at the latest.[4]

What makes matters complicated—beyond the often severe interpretive problems the texts themselves pose—is that attempts to identify the epinician *persona* may be given from various, not seldom incompatible perspectives, a fact that often goes unnoticed. Do we look for the actual, historical performers of the songs? Do we look for the intratextual "I"? Is any of these instances identical with the historical author, that is, Pindar, or, more generally, with each other? Are we in principle allowed to give one single, uniform answer that is applicable to and valid for all epinician odes? Or should we allow for the possibility of many answers, depending on the singular historical situation in which each individual song was performed, including even different answers with regard to different portions of the very same poem?[5]

Especially the latter two questions point to the fact that, apart from the general methodological problem, matters are further complicated by our lack

4 For an insight into the debate see Currie's (2013) recent article. Important contributions have been, among others, Lefkowitz (1963), Slater (1969: 89–90), Felson Rubin (1984), Rösler (1985), Lefkowitz (1988), Heath (1988), Burnett (1989), Carey (1989), Bremer (1990), Carey (1991), Goldhill (1991: 128–166), Heath and Lefkowitz (1991), Lavecchia (1993), Morgan (1993), Anzai (1994), D'Alessio (1994), Nagy (1994/1995), Lefkowitz (1995), Schmid (1998), Vigneri (2000), Neumann-Hartmann (2005), Calame (2010), Eckerman (2011), Maslov (2015: 97–116).

5 For the first three questions cf. Schmid (1998: 151) from a narratological perspective: "Much of the ambiguity derives from the very word 'speaker', a term which has been employed rather loosely in the recent performance debate, and which encompasses at least three different concepts: the author of the odes, the person whose viewpoint is expressed, and the performer." For the last two questions cf. Currie (2013: 245): "The main division of opinion concerns whether to demand consistency or to admit flux in the reference of the first person, and there is further disagreement whether flux would or would not be intrinsically desirable."

of knowledge with regard to when and where the songs were actually performed (that is, to be clear, for their intended primary public performance).[6] Given the sparse historical and archaeological data, one might—quite arbitrarily, as it often seems, depending on one's general premises—hold that epinician odes were sung at such diverse places or occasions as the site of the games or the victor's *polis*, at private *symposia*, at public festivals, or in the royal *megaron privatissime*—or even hold that each single song was performed at different times at several or all of these places and / or occasions[7] or that some of the poems were written never to be sung at all, but only to be read in solitude. Each of these possibilities, evidently, implies different answers to the question of with whom we might or should identify the epinician voice. If performed at all, the songs have been assumed to be sung by a solo voice, often Pindar's own, or by a professional or local chorus with or without Pindar, either together or in some sort of *amoibaion* with different singers for the different parts of the songs, perhaps even including the victor himself.[8]

In all, there seems to be no easy solution, at least no easy *general* solution—but perhaps, one might argue, for the simple reason that, actually, the problem of the epinician voice "is a critical problem that is probably insoluble" and "defies resolution because it is so delicately poised between our *a priori* expec-

6 For the available evidence see Neumann-Hartmann (2007 and 2009). Cf. the section "The Pragmatic Setting of Epinician Odes" below.

7 Cf. Neumann-Hartmann (2007 and 2009) for a thorough compilation and discussion of the proposals that have been made for each single epinician ode written by Pindar and Bacchylides.

8 Cf. Currie (2005: 19, and esp. at 19–21 for a brief general overview): "At one end of the spectrum it has been argued (a) that the first person never excludes the poet, but may exclude a chorus. At the other end, it has been held (b) that the first person never excludes the chorus, but may exclude the poet. Between these is the intermediate position (c) that the first person is capable sometimes of referring to the poet to the exclusion of the chorus, sometimes of referring to the chorus to the exclusion of the poet, and that this variation may be possible even within a single ode." For example: (a) Lefkowitz (1991); (b) Stehle (1997); (c) D'Alessio (1994); Calame (2010). That the epinician first person might even include the victor has recently been argued for by Currie (2013), the two main passages adduced being *Pythian* 8.56–60 and *Pythian* 9.89–92 (on these see below with n. 38). Eckerman (2015: 148–149; all quotes at 148), on the other hand, argued that "Pindar was a soloist dialoguing with his chorus in multiple odes" and that such a position, by removing "unsound implicit assumptions regarding the nature of performance for epinician odes," would effectively solve the "solo vs. choral debate [which] was so contentious because each group was half right and half wrong."

tations and the evidence of our texts."[9] So it might indeed be wise not to "insist on a single context and a uniform mode of performance."[10]

Be that as it may. The traditional (and still widespread) approach has been basically to identify the epinician voice with the historical author Pindar himself. Admittedly, the texts lend themselves to this identification, not the least because the epinician speaker ubiquitously speaks about his composing the songs. To whom, one might ask, could such a description fit better than to Pindar the master poet himself? After all, he actually *did* compose these songs, didn't he?

Though one might adduce abundant evidence for the apparent adequacy of this view from nearly all of Pindar's epinician odes, a representative and instructive example is *Olympian* 1. In this song, the speaker right from the beginning self-reflexively speaks about himself with regard to his being the speaker of the odes, and this often to *himself*: in the proem he tells his heart that there are no other games worthy to sing about than those at Olympia (3–7) and, a little bit later, that one should take the *phorminx* into one's hand to praise Hieron's victory (17–19); then he asserts, on the basis of general considerations on the correct content of mythical stories, that he wants to speak about Tantalus in a more correct and pious way than former people did (30–36) and, in the middle of the mythical narrative, that he is disgusted by the stories commonly told about Tantalus (52–53); at the end of the song he declares that he now must praise Hieron in song (100–103) and that he hopes to do so again in the future (108–111), not the least because he has the power and means to do this well (111–112). May it be, so the song concludes, that Hieron will be victorious in the future and that the speaker will have the opportunity to be his companion during this time as someone who is famous in all of Hellas because of his *sophia* (115–116). Add to this, finally, that he is not at all shy of outright fawning in proclaiming Hieron to be the most wonderful and righteous man living on earth (103–105).

We seem to possess the authentic expression of the inner, personal thoughts of one of the most important poets of ancient Greece. And not only that: all these remarks apparently give a most valuable insight into Greek society outside of Athens in the early fifth century BCE, especially with regard to the relation between poets and aristocratic elites. In view of this, it might just be "the prominence of the 'I' that keeps us interested in Pindar's poetry":[11] "Of all

9 Currie (2013: 244–245 and 243–244, respectively).

10 Heath (1988: 192); cf. Agócs (2012: 211–212).

11 Lefkowitz (1980: 48); cf. below n. 19.

the mystifying aspects of Pindar's poetry, perhaps none is as intriguing as the identity and nature of the speaker(s) of his first-person statements."[12] Though, to be true, the extensive self-centered, not seldom quite opportunistic self-praise these first-person statements often seem to exhibit might at times be seen as quite detrimental to our admiration of Pindar the author.

As straightforward as it might in principle be, however, such a view results in severe problems. In particular, it directly leads to a whole array of—at a closer look, quite odd—autobiographical fictions. For example, the premise that Pindar himself is the speaker of the odes impels us to think that Pindar ultimately had Stymphalian origins (*Olympian* 6.84–87)—and, at the same time, that his ancestors came from Thera *via* Sparta (*Pythian* 5.72–76) *and* also from Aegina (*Pythian* 8.98); or to endeavor to reconstruct Pindar's itineraries including the exact dates and to determine when and where he met with the important rulers and aristocrats of the Greek world.[13]

Identifying the epinician voice with the historical poet Pindar is no modern invention. Ultimately, this approach goes back to the *scholia vetera*, that is, to the very beginnings of philology in Hellenistic times,[14] by the way in potential accordance with as early a literary theoretician as Aristotle, whose general classification of literature in the third chapter of his *Poetics* could, in particular after poetry had lost its genuinely oral character, be understood as defining lyric (and similar poetry) in general as that genre in which the speaker is the same as its historical author.[15]

12 Morgan (1992).

13 Cf., of course, Wilamowitz' (1922) Pindar book. See Lattmann (2010: 222–228) for the analysis of another striking and instructive example (with further literature).

14 Cf. the general remarks on "Ancient Literary Criticism and the Narrative Voice" by Nünlist (2009: 132–133) (against the backdrop of the whole chapter on focalization in the ancient *scholia*: 116–134).

15 In *Poetics* 1448a19–24, Aristotle attempts to define "lyric" (etc.) poetry by the attribute of its ποιητής not undergoing a change, but staying the same: while such a description might indeed seem to be (more or less) straightforward in the case of monodic, iambic or elegiac poetry, in the case of choral lyric it lends itself to misinterpreting the original pragmatic situation by equating and thus confusing the historical performer(s) and the author, especially if the texts are only read and not performed orally. However, from a technical point of view, Aristotle's definition itself might be seen to just (and correctly) apply to the historical performers, namely as those individuals who were, after all, the "true," intended authors of the texts, irrespective of the contribution of such so-to-speak intermediary helpers as poets—whose profession, after all, it was to just write songs for others. On the whole passage see Lattmann (2005). It has to be noted that Aristotle's classification does not rely on Plato's (so-called) "Redekriterium," but may best be understood from the viewpoint of a

Nonetheless, already in antiquity it was recognized that unqualifiedly identifying Pindar with the speaker of the epinician odes is not always possible. Sometimes it seems to be beyond doubt that the epinician voice must belong to the chorus or even the victor. Accordingly, we are told by some scholiasts that at some passages, Pindar had taken on the role of someone else, even during the course of one single epinician ode.[16]

The result of all this seems to be that there is no single point of reference of the "I" of Pindar's epinician odes. In consequence, it might indeed be necessary to "admit flux in the reference of the first person," and this irrespective of whether it "would or would not be intrinsically desirable."[17] The criterion, then, one might maintain, for deciding whom the epinician "I" refers to should not be conceived of as based on *a priori* considerations, but rather on *empirical* investigations: whomever outside the text any utterance of the epinician voice appears to fit best, this historical entity must be regarded as the specific extratextual reference at this specific point. For example, all utterances concerned with *composing* the odes one might assign to Pindar; and all utterances concerned with *performing* them to a chorus—or, depending on one's overall understanding of the songs, to Pindar, too. In effect, the word "I" (and its semantic equivalents, of course) in Pindar's epinician odes has several referents, and it is our task to empirically determine, by scrutinizing each relevant passage, to which referent this "I" has to be mapped in every single instance. Eventually, this process will lead to an exhaustive list of possible referents (that is, given the interpretive problems of not a few passages, at least potentially).

Insofar as this polyphonic epinician voice theory seems to be able to straightforwardly account for the apparent instability and flux in the references of the first person without leading—as, evidently, is analytically true—to inconsistencies resulting from supposing only one single historical reference of this voice, it has (in slightly different variants, though) easily acquired the status of being the prevalent theory of the epinician *persona* in contemporary Pindar scholarship.[18] Not the least, I might add, because this theory has always resonated with classical scholars for obvious reasons: what better thing could be wished for than an author who loves to tell us constantly about what he is doing

communication model that sufficiently differentiates the various historical and fictional entities involved in the production and reception of texts. At least in the case of tragedy the change from, so-to-speak, orality to literacy seems to have taken place just in the times of Aristotle: see Lattmann (2015).

16 See Currie (2013); cf. Σ *Pythian* 8.78 and Σ *Nemean* 7.123.

17 Both quotes from Currie (2013: 245); for the whole quote see above n. 5.

18 For an overview see Currie (2013: esp. at 243–248). Cf. above n. 4.

and why? We seem to be allowed a glimpse into Pindar's workshop, to see into Pindar's mind and, in effect, to truly understand and appreciate his poetry and, by this proxy, a most important part of ancient Greek culture in general.[19] And this all the more so as the prominence of Pindar's voice seems to fit so well into the story of the (alleged) 'discovery of the mind.'[20]

Nonetheless, it should raise considerable suspicion that this theory is a direct (even if amended) continuation of the ancient approach of Alexandrian philology, which has proved inadequate (not only) with regard to the autobiographical fictions it leads to. It should also raise considerable suspicion that by equating the epinician speaker and Pindar, the result is a prototypical Hellenistic poet-philologist, whose first and foremost aim is to engage in polemical quarrels with his peers such as Simonides and Bacchylides.[21] And apart from the fact that epinician odes would have been, in effect, some sort of mini-drama—without having a comparable pragmatic setting and without ever making this (more or less) explicit like (quite exceptionally) Bacchylides' *Ode* 18—, all of this, finally, would not square well with the "Sitz im Leben" of these songs, for their primary pragmatic function evidently would have been put in jeopardy. Actually, it is hardly believable that the victor might have been honored by the poet's honoring himself, let alone *effectively*.[22]

---

19 Even if we understand Pindar's voice on a more abstract level. Cf. Lefkowitz (1980: 48 and 49, respectively): "But if, as I have argued, the 'I' is not historical, what can we learn from it? I would suggest that Pindar found in the abstract, impersonal nature of the poet's traditional first-person statement an opportunity to describe for his audience the general meaning of a victor's achievement"; "Pyth. 8 would be far less interesting if the poet did not portray the victor's achievement in terms of his understanding of his own art."

20 Cf. Snell (1986) and also Fränkel's (1962) study.

21 Cf. Bundy (1972). A notorious example is the beginning of *Isthmian* 2, which has so often been interpreted as being directed against Simonides (cf. the overviews in Woodbury [1968] and Cairns [2011]). In general, this is the common approach we find in the *scholia vetera*: cf., *exempli gratia*, Pindar's alleged rivalry with Simonides and / or Bacchylides in Σ *Olympian* 2.154; 157; 158 (S. / B.); Σ *Pythian* 2.97; 131; 132; 163; 166; 171 (B.); Σ *Nemean* 3.143 (B.); Σ *Nemean* 4.60 (S.); Σ *Isthmian* 2.9; 15 (S.).

22 Cf. Lattmann (2010: 1–5). Though, *prima vista*, it might seem to be plausible to maintain that, in principle, "the poet's glory—his self-glorification—is a constant grounding for the glorification of the victor" (Goldhill [1991: 165]), in the case of Pindar's epinician odes, this surely cannot be the whole story, if indeed the "I" of the texts only represented a mercenary poet whose only relation to the victor was his being paid by him or his family. All the more so, if, on the other side, Kurke's (2007: 157) attempt at reconciling the various viewpoints expressed in the odes is correct and in any way representative for the situation in general: "The 'I' here [*sc. Pythian* 11.50–58] is nominally the poet's persona, but the values and

The Pragmatic Setting of Epinician Odes

Against this backdrop, the second step of the analysis will re-investigate the pragmatic setting of epinician odes. Exact knowledge about this seems to be paramount, not the least because early Greek lyric in general was essentially an oral, public and festive form of literature with a genre-specific social function,[23] in the case of epinician odes, basically, the public praise and glorification of the victor.[24] Therefore, it must be regarded as a basic fact that, as Elroy Bundy put it, "there is no passage in Pindar and Bakkhulides that is not in its primary intent enkomiastic—that is, designed to enhance the glory of a particular patron,"[25] and this, I should add, first and foremost in the historical context of a specific extratextual occasion, that is, the celebration of a sports victory.[26]

Although we, all in all, lack sufficient historical and archaeological evidence concerning the pragmatic dimension of epinician odes,[27] the situation is not as desperate as one might think. The epinician odes themselves, when viewed from the right angle, clearly and transparently hint at what their actual context might have been, for they explicitly locate themselves self-reflexively in only one generic performance situation. Although this situation, admittedly, is not represented completely in any single ode, all extant epinician songs written by

choices it espouses, sung in unison by a chorus of the victor's fellow citizens, are meant to represent or mirror the victor's own. Thus the victor's civic contribution is affirmed and the envy of his fellow citizens allayed."

23 On the oral, public, and festive character of early Greek poetry see Kannicht (1996: 68–99, esp. at 70–71 and 87–92); see also Käppel (1992: 17–21) on the "Sitz im Leben" in general and, with regard to epinician odes in particular, Bundy (1986: 35) and Kurke (1991: 1–12). Important contributions to understanding the pragmatic dimension of Greek poetry are, e.g., Calame (1990), Rösler (1980), Gentili (1990), Käppel (1992), and Schmitz (2002). However—and this claim will implicitly be made plausible in the following—there are important differences between the archaic and the classical times, and these differences are often, especially with regard to epinician odes, not taken account of sufficiently.

24 Cf. Lattmann (2010: 1–5) (with further literature).

25 Bundy (1986: 3).

26 This is not to say that potential re-performances might be altogether irrelevant—quite to the contrary, and this in a most important dimension: it is the constant remembrance of this special occasion that will bring about never-ending remembrance of the victor's achievement, and this remembrance will be mediated (that is, in effect, generated) by the epinician song itself (cf. Lattmann [2012: esp. at 71]). On the re-performance of epinician odes see Currie (2004) and Hubbard (2004).

27 See Neumann-Hartmann (2009: 3–9) and Morrison (2007: 5–10). On the available archaeological and historical evidence in particular see Neumann-Hartmann (2009: 125–127).

Pindar and Bacchylides can be shown to be compatible with it. Because I have already argued for the adequacy of this position in another place, suffice it here to repeat the basic results of this analysis.[28]

Viewed from the intratextual perspective, the pragmatic setting of the epinician odes is as follows: right after having been witness to the glorious victory at the games, the spectators and, at any rate, all the victor's friends who are present spontaneously begin a festive revelry—a *komos*—with the purpose of bringing the victor home and celebrating the victory there with a lavish feast; during their whole journey they are singing *impromptu* songs of praise for the victor.

The different parts of this basic sequence of events are represented in different odes more or less comprehensively and extensively;[29] suffice it here to adduce some illustrative examples that give a rough idea of the details of the intratextual description of the performance situation. First, the victor triumphs at the games and his friends, who are among the spectators, praise him spontaneously (for example, by singing the, maybe customary, brief and simple "victory song of Archilochos") and, doing this, begin a *komos*, during which they later on feel the urge to express their praise by way of new and more elaborate songs which fit the current situation more closely (*Olympian* 9.1–8):

> Τὸ μὲν Ἀρχιλόχου μέλος
> φωνᾶεν Ὀλυμπίᾳ,
>   καλλίνικος ὁ τριπλόος κεχλαδώς,
> ἄρκεσε Κρόνιον παρ' ὄχθον ἁγεμονεῦσαι
> κωμάζοντι φίλοις Ἐφαρμόστῳ σὺν ἑταίροις·
> ἀλλὰ νῦν ἑκαταβόλων Μοισᾶν ἀπὸ τόξων
> Δία τε φοινικοστερόπαν σεμνόν τ' ἐπίνειμαι
> ἀκρωτήριον Ἄλιδος
> τοιοῖσδε βέλεσσιν, […]
>
> The song of Archilochus
> resounding at Olympia,
>   that triumphal hymn thrice swelling,

28 See Lattmann (2012) with a detailed explication of the claims made here, including a discussion of the scholarly literature and separate analyses of the relevant passages in each of Pindar's and Bacchylides' odes.

29 For an in-depth discussion of the following passages see Lattmann (2012: 25–43) (with further literature).

sufficed for Epharmostus to lead the way by Cronus' hill
as he made revelry with his close companions,
but now, from the far-shooting bows of the Muses
shoot a volley of arrows such as these
at Zeus of the red lightning
and at the sacred hilltop of Elis, […]

In their great and enthusiastic joy, the *komasts* are eager to bring the victor all the way home to his house while continuing to sing their songs of praise (*Nemean* 9.1–3, which is, of course, being *sung* and thus part of the *komos* the text itself refers to):

Κωμάσομεν παρ' Ἀπόλλωνος Σικυωνόθε, Μοῖσαι,
τὰν νεοκτίσταν ἐς Αἴτναν, ἔνθ' ἀναπεπταμέναι
  ξείνων νενίκανται θύραι,
ὄλβιον ἐς Χρομίου
  δῶμα.

Let us go in revelry from Apollo at Sicyon, Muses,
to the newly founded Aetna, where the wide-open gates
  are overwhelmed by guests,
to Chromius' blessed
  home.

At the victor's house a lavish feast (including a *symposium*) is awaiting them all, that is, the *komasts* including the victor, who is still being praised with (as the common intratextual descriptions of the activities of the speaker make clear) spontaneous songs (*Nemean* 1.19–24):[30]

ἔσταν δ' ἐπ' αὐλείαις θύραις
ἀνδρὸς φιλοξείνου καλὰ μελπόμενος,
ἔνθα μοι ἁρμόδιον
δεῖπνον κεκόσμηται, θαμὰ δ' ἀλλοδαπῶν

30 For the *symposium* rounding off the *komos* cf. *Olympian* 1.17–23 (with Lattmann [2012: 44]). In general, the (in particular archaic) *symposium* proper follows upon the *deipnon*, both taking place in the *andron*: for a brief general overview see Murray (2009: esp. at 515). On the spontaneity that is implied in καλὰ μελπόμενος see below, in particular the remarks on the so-called "oral subterfuge."

οὐκ ἀπείρατοι δόμοι
ἐντί·

And I have taken my stand at the courtyard gates
of a generous host as I sing of noble deeds,
where a fitting feast
has been arranged for me, for this home
is not unfamiliar with frequent visitors
from abroad.

While this appears to be the basic sequence of the events following the victory according to the inner perspective of the epinician odes, it has to be conceded that such a *komos*, in all probability, may never have been the actual performance situation in the case of celebrating victories at the Panhellenic games—alone for the reasons that, doubtless, no such revelry band ever traveled several dozens or hundreds of miles, let alone across the sea, and that the songs the *komasts* sung (if they actually were to be equated with the epinician odes, as this reconstruction would evidently imply) were, as songs written by Pindar in Thebes, definitely not spontaneous songs. These claims would be untenable, of course. Therefore, the whole reconstruction based on the inner perspective of the odes, even if correct, seems to be of no help in understanding the historical pragmatic dimension of Pindar's epinician poetry.[31]

Nonetheless, there is a solution to this problem. We only have to question the (historicist) premise that the intratextual representation of the performance situation has to be a direct, so-to-speak naturalistic representation of the outer world—and allow for the possibility that the intratextual representation of the historical events might also represent them (or *vice versa*: see below) in a transformative mode, and this in such a way that the single stages of the one side are mapped uniformly and consistently onto the single stages of the other side.

If one accepts this premise, it is not difficult to see that the following historical pragmatic situation might indeed have been compatible with the intratextual perspective as sketched above: at some point after his victory, which was celebrated by a spontaneous and short local revelry, the victor left the site of the games (presumably together with an official delegation sent by his home *polis*, that is, a *theoria*, with which he also had come), traveled back to his home

31 Cf. Heath (1988) and, recently, Neumann-Hartmann (2009: 125–127), Agócs (2012).

polis and not far away from there, he met a group of fellow-citizens who officially conducted him to his city within a festive procession—during which procession pre-composed epinician odes were performed, like those written by Pindar. As a rule, then, epinician odes would have been sung during a ritualized public procession that was held on the occasion of the first homecoming of the victor after his victory.[32] Accordingly, epinician odes proper essentially would have been processional songs—which were, I should add, never to be sung at the site of the games themselves.[33]

If all this is right, we must strictly and categorically differentiate between an intratextual fictional and an extratextual historical dimension of the performance of the odes—of which dimensions, although obviously highly interdependent, the intratextual dimension (that is, the inner view of the ritual) is the semantically prior one: it is this dimension that determines the *meaning* of the odes, of which the actual historical performance, then, is nothing but a semantically secondary "enactment," serving as a (to a certain degree contingent) "interpretation" of the intratextual "true" reality.[34]

---

32 Nearly all of Pindar's and Bacchylides's epinician odes can be located in this default setting. Nonetheless, one has to allow for slight modifications for some of the odes, which however can be easily explained in the given framework: see Lattmann (2012: 65–66) for a synopsis of the results with regard to each single ode. There seem to be only three real exceptions in the whole corpus: *Pythian* 6 (the occasion is not the victor's homecoming, but a procession with the purpose of making a votive offering at Delphi); *Isthmian* 1 (no regular epinician ode, but rather a combination of *paian* and epinician ode); and *Nemean* 11 (no epinician ode). We also might have to add *Pythian* 7 (potentially no procession in the home *polis* for political reasons) and *Nemean* 10 (the occasion might not have been the celebration of a single victory) to this group. But then again, all these exceptions can be transparently explained in the framework put forward here.

33 For the claim that some songs were also performed at the site of the games see Gelzer (1985) and Bagordo (1995/1996). See, however, Eckerman's (2012) recent discussion and cf. my remarks on the relevant odes in Lattmann (2012).

34 Cf. Nagy (1994/1995). It may indeed be helpful to understand the "fictional" dimension with Nagy as "generic" dimension, for this latter label does not convey that the intratextual situation is merely fictitious (in the sense of 'unreal'), but that it rather is compatible with the situation's being the archetypal celebratory situation. In general, the reconstruction put forward here has certain similarities with Nagy's proposal, though, among other things, it differs from it by reconstructing the whole sequence of events as represented in the epinician odes (that is, the archetypal ritual) and by closely mapping these "fictional" events onto (and thus reconstructing) the extratextual situation.

Pindar's Voices

Taken seriously—and this leads to the third and last step this analysis will take—, the proposed understanding of the intra- and extratextual dimensions of the pragmatic setting of epinician odes has several important implications with regard to the question of with whom to identify the various voices connected with the performance of these songs.[35]

To begin with, the most important methodological insight is that it is not adequate to start by asking with which *historical* person we empirically can identify the speaker of the odes.[36] This would be the historicists' approach, as exemplified by Wilamowitz, but apparently still not abandoned in contemporary research. As we have seen above, there is a strong and unquestioned consensus that we have to find that historical entity that the textual "I" points to as direct referent.[37] However, given the results of the analysis so far, such an approach is not adequate, not only for the general *a priori* reasons sketched above, but also because it does not fit the intratextually represented situation of the odes. Instead, we have to start from the fictional facts, that is, from the *semantic* side of the ritual—of which the actual performance is only a secondary instantiation.

Therefore, first, the primary referent of the "I" of the epinician odes is a person partaking in the *komos* joyfully traveling all the way from the games to the victor's home. This person has, primarily, only an intratextual (or fictional) mode of being: it is the idealized spectator of the victory whose main (and, accordingly, only) intent is to sing *impromptu* songs of praise for the

35 Some of the following points I have already briefly put forward in Lattmann (2012: 67–68).

36 Cf. for this widespread approach Currie (2013: 244): "Among the possible referents frequently mooted for the Pindaric first person are the historical poet Pindar, the chorus who performs the ode, and the athlete whose victory is being celebrated." It is mainly with regard to the differentiation of the "fictional" and the "historical" dimensions of the odes that there is a striking difference between the analysis put forward here and, *exempli gratia*, Heath (1988), Eckerman (2010), Agócs (2012) and older, especially historicist interpretations of the evidence. Though for some of the odes the textual references to the *komos* have already been understood as actually referring to the pragmatic extratextual context, this *komos* has always been regarded as a historical, 'real' entity and has thus been equated with the (actual) 'chorus.' However, conflating these two dimensions leads to several severe problems (cf. the remarks made above).

37 Cf. also the most recent contributions to the scholarly debate by Neumann-Hartmann (2005, 2007, and 2009).

awe-inspiring victory he had witnessed. Often, this person is characterized as one of the fellow-citizens and friends of the victor or, more generally, as a Greek.[38]

38 On the general level, a decision with regard to the last point is not necessary. However, we might expect that the *komast* is simply a Greek when there is a reference to his being a ξένος (more or less, "guest-friend") of the victor, of his family or of (some of) the inhabitants of the victor's *polis* (cf. *Olympian* 1.103; *Olympian* 9.83; *Pythian* 3.69); and that the *komast* is a fellow-citizen or friend of the victor's if he is explicitly or implicitly characterized as such (cf. *Pythian* 8.98–100). Whether or not we should expect a default case is another question yet to be answered. But whatever the answer will be, it will not affect the general assessment of the situation. Only different and exclusive characterizations within the same ode might potentially be regarded as problematic (though not necessarily so, for ξένος and fellow-citizens / friends might have been represented as *komasts* in the very same *komos*, and, apart from that, both notions are not strictly exclusive). One potential candidate might be *Nemean* 7, an ode that Currie (2013: esp. at 247–248 and 273–274) adduces as strong evidence for the general possibility of flux in the reference of the epinician first person even in one and the same ode. However, the relevant passages in this song can (and should) be interpreted differently. While it is true that the reference in 61 (ξεῖνός εἰμι: "I am a guest-friend") and in 65–66 (καὶ προξενίᾳ πέποιθ', ἔν τε δαμόταις ὄμματι δέρκομαι λαμπρόν: "I also trust in my host's hospitality, and among his townsmen my gaze is bright") is to the speaker as a ξένος and thus to a non-Aeginetan, in 84–86 (λέγοντι γὰρ Αἰακόν νιν ὑπὸ ματροδόκοις γοναῖς φυτεῦσαι, ἐμᾷ μὲν πολίαρχον εὐωνύμῳ πάτρᾳ, Ἡράκλεες, σέο δὲ προπράον' ἔμμεν ξεῖνον ἀδελφεόν τε: "for they say that through the mother who received his seed he begat Aeacus 'to be ruler of cities in my illustrious land, and, Heracles, to be your kindly guest-friend and brother'"; note the added quotation marks within the translation), it is not necessarily implied that the epinician speaker represents himself as an Aeginetan. Insofar as, first, the whole clause from ἐμᾷ until τε serves as consecutive clause that explicates the consequence resulting from the infinitive construction dependent on λέγοντι; and insofar as, second, the whole sentence expresses what the Aeginetans say; it follows that the first infinitive construction may be interpreted as indirect speech, whereas the consecutive clause may be interpreted as direct speech. In effect, then, ἐμᾷ in the consecutive sentence does not refer to the epinician speaker, but rather (with an unproblematic change of number) to a single member of the group of whom the epinician speaker says λέγοντι. In the given context, this would be an Aeginetan, of course. Such a change from indirect to direct speech is not uncommon, even in the same sentence and even upon entering subordinated sentence parts (like here): cf. Kühner / Gerth § 595 n. 3; see Lattmann (2010: 186 n. 15) and cf. *Isthmian* 8.31–45 and *Pythian* 4.1–60. But, irrespective of whether this interpretation is right or not (this passage is often regarded as "an unresolvable crux": cf. Robbins [1997: 269]), it would, for the reasons given above, not be a severe problem if the epinician speaker in this ode spoke, at different places, both as Aeginetan *and* ξένος. By the way, there is also no problem with regard to the passage *Pythian* 8.56–60 vs. 100 that Currie (2013) adduces, for a statement like this would

Second, the mediated (and only that) referent of the "I" of the epinician odes is that historical entity that actually performed the odes. This entity evidently cannot in all respects be identical with the fictional speaker of the odes—not the least because, historically, there was no continuous *komos* coming from the Panhellenic games and, second, because Pindar's most artfully composed epinician odes were, in all probability, not *spontaneous* songs, but had been written well in advance in Thebes.

Nonetheless, who that historical entity actually was, we cannot tell with certainty, for we lack sufficient historical evidence. (And, by the way, it is only here that this fact is relevant at all.) But given the hypothetical reconstruction of the pragmatic setting proposed here and the general social function of early Greek (especially choral) lyric, it may safely be assumed that there must have been at least *some* actual correlation between this historical entity and the fictional *persona*.

Therefore, it is a plausible assumption that the odes indeed were performed by a chorus, most likely of fellow-citizens, but possibly also of professional performers (all the more so if the epinician *persona* is characterized as a Panhellenic spectator: see above). Such an identification is not only implied by the first person's utterances often being made interchangeably in the same ode in the singular and the plural or by the speaker's addressing his companions by exhortations in the second person singular or plural (both resembling the lyric parts of tragedy, by the way);[39] the fact that the fictional *persona* often refers to his having been bestowed with bliss and glory by the victor's victory (which can only be meaningful if the victor at least in some way belongs to the same social group as the speaker);[40] or the fact that the given recon-

---

not be strange at all for a group of Aeginetan *komasts* who are now traveling back to Aegina and had, on their way to Delphi from Aegina, passed the Amphiaraion in the vicinity of Thebes (even if, in the fictional dimension, they had witnessed the prophecy only because the later victor whom they accompanied was its primary recipient, the description given by the speaker would be compatible with this circumstance). On this much-discussed and problematic passage see Hubbard (1993) (if his interpretation is right, the passage might be some form of oblique *sphragis*: cf. below; at any rate, equating the speaker with the poet here leads to the problem that native Thebans would not have been allowed to consult the Amphiaraion: cf. Robbins [1997: 272 as well as 268–273 on the epinician "voice" in general]). The same applies to the passage *Pythian* 9.89–92, for here the perspective is that of the *komast* who had prayed for Telesikrates's *Pythian* victory and, accordingly, is now filled with gratitude (see Lattmann [2010: 300–302]).

39 Cf. for the first *Pythian* 1.42 vs. 60; *Pythian* 3.1 vs. 65; *Nemean* 4.9 vs. 77; *Isthmian* 1.3 vs. 52; for the second *Isthmian* 8.5–6 vs. 62. Cf. Currie (2013: 244 n. 7); also Maslov (2015: 101–102).

40 Cf. *Isthmian* 1.10–12 and see Lattmann (2010: 4 and 72–75, with further literature).

struction implies that there actually *was* a group of fellow-citizens present at the time of performance, that is, in particular the *theoria* as well as the citizens welcoming the homecomers[41]—but also and foremost by the fact that during all of antiquity it was never called into question that the odes were performed by a chorus, with the result of their always being classified as *choral* lyric.

All these suggestions, however, are—though in the pragmatic dimension highly plausible and preferable—in no way necessary. In principle, it might also be assumed that, historically, only one single person sang the odes, and this single person indeed may, at least sometimes, even have been *Pindar* himself. But, and this is the methodologically important point: whomsoever one wishes to identify the performing entity with, this decision would have no consequence with regard to the *meaning* of the odes, that is, to be clear, to anything that is relevant within their intratextual dimension. Just as it would have no consequence with regard to any interpretive question pertaining to, for example, Euripides's *Hippolytus* whether the role of Phaedra was played by Euripides himself or not. Likewise in the case of epinician odes: viewed from inside the ritual, the epinician speaker is the *komast*. And this is it.

As a result, we can now see that to answer the given question from a historicist's viewpoint would be beside the point. Conflating the fictional and historical dimensions of epinician odes amounts to a category mistake. This is not to say, however, that these dimensions were not meant to be mapped onto one another—quite to the contrary: it is exactly herein that epinician odes were part of a religious ritual. But it is exactly herein, too, that the mapping does not happen in such way as to render both dimensions identical. In consequence, although we indirectly indeed might gain hints from the texts that might illuminate the extratextual situation, they themselves were intended to only represent the inner, in a certain sense timeless perspective of the ritual semantics.

Third, a necessary implication of all this is that there is no "Pindar" in Pindar's epinician odes (nor, I should add for clarity's sake, a "chorus").[42] That is, at least to such an extent as there is no Euripides in Euripides's tragedies. For irrespective of who actually performed and composed the songs, in the ritual semantics there simply is no such thing as a 'poet,' let alone a *professional* poet

41 Cf. the evidence collected by Neumann-Hartmann (2009: 125–127) (which she, however, interprets quite differently: see Lattmann [2011] and Lattmann [2012: 19–25]). Cf., in particular, what we know about the circumstances of Alcibiades' victory at Olympia: see Currie (2011: 301–305) and Gribble (2012).

42 See Lattmann (2012: 67–68 with n. 159).

(nor, again, a 'chorus'). The epinician voice is nothing but the idealized *komast*, and this *komast* is categorically different from the historical poet Pindar, and this not just in a trivial sense. Therefore, when referring to the first person of the odes, we may *never* speak (and, more important, think) of Pindar, but always and only of the "speaker" or "*laudator*" (or simply: "*komast*"). And this, I should add, not in the sense Elroy Bundy used this word: for Bundy, too, the "I" of the epinician odes was, ultimately, the poet Pindar—stripped, though, of his accidental historicity and reduced to his essential function as composer of songs of praise.[43]

This leads to a fourth point: all the numerous utterances that have been interpreted as "poetological" in the sense that they allow a glimpse into Pindar's workshop actually are, to the contrary, not "poetological" at all.[44] Rather, they only describe the inner perspective of the fictional *komast* who tries to express his overwhelming joy and gratitude by way of singing spontaneous *impromptu* songs of praise while deliberating on how he can achieve this in the best possible way. In effect, these statements (and *only* they) *construct* the *persona* of the epinician speaker, who thus exclusively has only those properties that are being assigned to him in this process, including his spontaneity, his constant searching for the right words, and his striving for singing unstinted songs of praise.[45] We may compare the example of *Olympian* 1 referred to above, with regard to which a consistent characterization of this *persona* emerges, namely that of a *komast* traveling to Syracuse and singing spontaneous *impromptu* songs of praise on his way, intent on finally celebrating the victory with a *symposium* at the victor's house.[46]

All this leads to recognizing that there is a transparent reason for why the odes exhibit features such as the distinct use of the first person future or the

---

43 Cf. Bundy (1986) and also Lefkowitz (1991). See in general Currie (2013: 248): "For the most part, and by default, the speaking persona of epinician may be seen as a characterless entity: the laudator (the 'I' whose task it is to praise the laudandus), the bardic first person (the 'I' as 'aoidos whose profession it is to recall the great deeds of the past'), or the first person indefinite (the 'I' as an espouser of commonly held truths)" (with n. 26).

44 There are abundant examples in Pindar's epinician odes, which to enumerate here would be pointless. However, cf. only *Nemean* 8 and *Nemean* 4 in the light of the discussion in Lattmann (2010: 6–77 and 118–162, respectively).

45 One could find examples for these aspects in nearly every epinician ode written by Pindar. However, cf. for the speaker's spontaneity 'Abbruchsformeln' like in *Nemean* 4.33–35; for his searching for the right words *Pythian* 10.1–6; and for his singing unstinted songs of praise *Pythian* 9.90–96.

46 Cf. Lattmann (2012: 44–45).

so-called "oral subterfuge"—whose very name "subterfuge," then, turns out to be rather misleading.[47] We can also see that all the passages in which the epinician "I" speaks about having come too late or having taken too long (and so on) are primarily intended to contribute to generating this specific fictional epinician *persona* and adequately and consistently locating it in the context of the historical performance situation. We may interpret these passages as indirect comments on the song's relation to the historical performance situation and its chronological relation to the victory at the games. For example, we can discern groups of songs that may have been performed at an occasion after the first return of the victor (cf. *Olympian* 11) or even without the return of the victor himself, the latter, it seems, often being the case when the victor happened to be a monarchic ruler and / or the victory happened to be won at an equestrian event (cf. *Pythians* 2 and 4).

In consequence, the only "poetology" Pindar's epinician odes contain is the "poetology" of a fictional ideal *komast* taking part in a spontaneous revelry, that is, if we still want to call this phenomenon "poetology" at all.

This point, fifth, leads to the further insight that it is, in principle, not adequate to see in any of the allegedly "poetological" passages (or any passage in Pindar's epinician odes at all) a reference to a rivalry with other poets such as Simonides or Bacchylides. Such a rivalry is merely a figment, obviously resulting, ultimately, from the inadequate presuppositions of Alexandrian literary poets and scholars, who ahistorically projected their own approach to literature back onto the early classical times.

But, sixth, one might be tempted to ask, is there really no place in the epinician odes where we can find Pindar himself? It might seem so. Actually, however, that is not the case—for, admittedly, there *is* one single, clearly defined type of statements that do allow a glimpse at the historical author Pindar, even if only indirectly. These are the passages in which the epinician voice refers to its being inspired by something coming from Thebes, such as in *Olympian* 6.84–87:[48]

> ματρομάτωρ ἐμὰ Στυμ-
>   φαλίς, εὐανθὴς Μετώπα,

47 On the so-called "oral subterfuge" see, e.g., Carey (1995: 99–103) and Bonifazi (2000). On the first person future see, e.g., Slater (1969), Pfeijffer (1999), and D'Alessio (2004).

48 More or less the only such passages seem to be *Olympian* 6.84–87; 90; *Pythian* 2.1–4; *Pythian* 4.299; *Isthmian* 6.74–75; *Isthmian* 8.16–16a (*Isthmian* 1.1–4 is not relevant here for obvious reasons). Cf. Currie (2013: 245 n. 14). There are similar, though again not many passages in Bacchylides: cf. 3.96–98 (nightingale from Keos).

πλάξιππον ἃ Θήβαν ἔτι-
  κτεν, τᾶς ἐρατεινὸν ὕδωρ
πίομαι, ἀνδράσιν αἰχματαῖσι πλέκων
ποικίλον ὕμνον.

My grandmother was Stymphalian,
  blooming Metope,
who bore horse-driving Thebe,
  whose lovely water
I shall drink, as I weave for spearmen
my colorful hymn.

Far from being an evidence for Pindar's (and the Thebans') having the Stymphalian Metope as an ancestor,[49] the actual purpose of this sentence is to identify the speaker as the Stymphalian fellow-citizens of the victor Hagesias and to assert that they are now weaving an artful song of praise (πλέκων ποικίλον ὕμνον) that was inspired from Thebes. And this, historically, no doubt means: composed by and coming from Pindar.

This passage, then, indirectly refers to (and confirms) Pindar's authorship. It may be regarded, more or less, as a *sphragis*.[50] However, there is at least one striking peculiarity this specific kind of *sphragis* exhibits: whereas usually an explicit reference is made to the very name of the author,[51] we do not find any such reference either in Pindar's or in Bacchylides's epinician odes. Rather, there are only veiled references like this one—but perhaps for an obvious reason: songs which ritually pretend to be composed and sung spontaneously by *komasts* might, without problems, be represented as coming from a god, but surely not as having been written by a human being days, weeks or months before the actual performance in Thebes. Accordingly, we might differentiate between an (indirect) *sphragis* oriented at historically locating the songs in the here and now of performance, and, on the other hand, a 'direct' *sphragis*, which is oriented at identifying and characterizing the (fictional, at least idealized) speaker in the ritualistic space.[52] Whereas we can find an abundant number

49 Cf. already Σ *Olympian* 6.144.

50 On the *sphragis* in general see Kranz (1961).

51 Cf., e.g., Theognis 19–26 against the background of Hubbard's (2006) discussion.

52 This would, of course, more or less comply with the original function and purpose of the *sphragis* in general: "the rhapsodic sphragis is [...] devoted to prayers or apologies to the god involving wholly or in part the singer's hope to please the god with his song" (Bundy [1972: 44]).

of the latter type in Pindar's and Bacchylides's epinician odes, there is (given the reconstruction here not surprisingly, though) only a very small number of the first type. It is rather the exception to single out explicitly the place the inspiration is coming from. Most of the time, the speaker just refers to the Muses without any further specification as to those divine beings who are providing the content of the present song.[53]

In consequence, there actually are references to Pindar in his epinician odes. But these references are very scant and, more important, never given in the first, but always in the third person. The speaker never leaves the semantic space of the ritual. And, equally important, the very existence of these passages, in effect, confirms the hypothesis put forward here, at least with regard to the intratextual dimension—for someone speaking of being inspired by something coming from Thebes may hardly be believed to be the same person *in* or *out of* Thebes from whom this inspiration is coming.

Conclusion

This paper has proposed and explicated a new approach to solving the grave and ever since antiquity often discussed problems pertaining to the voices connected with Pindar's epinician odes, including that of the epinician speaker.

The first step showed why and how the most widespread theories that address this issue seem to be problematic, in particular those theories that identify the "I" of the odes with the historical author Pindar himself or with a polyphonic group of voices including Pindar, the chorus, and the victor.

In a second step, I sketched a historically more adequate reconstruction of the pragmatic situation that Pindar's epinician odes as poems originating from an oral, public and festive culture stood in. In short, it was proposed that these songs were ritualized processional songs that were sung on the occasion of the victor's first homecoming after his victory, but that, at the same time, purported to be spontaneous *impromptu* songs that were sung during a *komos* revelry coming directly from the games.

This led, in a final step, to a new comprehensive suggestion as to what the diverse intratextual and extratextual voices connected with epinician odes were and what the relationship between them was: whereas the historical Pin-

53 On the Muses and their function in general see Kannicht (1996: 71–73 and 79–80); see also Lattmann (2010: 108 n. 101) for further literature.

dar is to be understood as nothing but the extratextual author[54] who nowhere appears in the texts as himself in the first person, he nonetheless lends in some sort of disguised inspiration his voice to the fictional *persona* of an idealized spectator of the victory and subsequent *komast*—whom the victor's actual fellow-citizens (or a professional chorus) in turn lend *their* voices by performing the song during a ritualized procession to glorify and thank the victor.

From this perspective, it might be worthwhile in a next step to take a fresh look at the different aspects of the characterization of the epinician *persona*, not only to understand itself better, but also in order to reevaluate in all its consequences what it really meant to publicly praise the victor by way of epinician odes. This would also include a comparison with archaic poetry on the one hand and later classical and Hellenistic poetry on the other hand.

As for now, however, it is enough that we have lost Pindar—and, instead, have found a coherent picture of the fictional and historical voices involved in the composition and performance of epinician odes.

Bibliography

Agócs, P. 2012. "Performance and genre. Reading Pindar's κῶμοι" in P. Agócs, C. Carey, and R. Rawles, eds. *Reading the Victory Ode*, 191–223. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Anzai, M. 1994. "First-Person Forms in Pindar: A Re-Examination," *BICS* 39: 141–150.

Bagordo, A. 1995/1996. "Μοῦσ' αὐθιγενής (Bacchyl. 2, 11)," *Glotta* 73: 137–141.

Bonifazi, A. 2000. "Sull'idea di *sotterfugio orale* negli epinici pindarici," *QUCC* 95: 69–86.

Bowra, C.M. 1964. *Pindar*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Bremer, D. 1992. *Pindar. Siegeslieder. Griechisch—deutsch. Herausgegeben, übersetzt und mit einer Einführung versehen von Dieter Bremer*. München: Artemis & Winkler.

Bremer, J.M. 1990. "Pindar's Paradoxical ἐγώ and a Recent Controversy about the Performance of his Epinicia" in S.R. Slings, ed. *The Poet's I in Archaic Greek Lyric*, 42–58. Amsterdam: VU University Press.

Bundy, E.L. 1972. "The 'Quarrel Between Kallimachos and Apollonios.' Part I. The Epilogue of Kallimachos's *Hymn to Apollo*," *CSCA* 5: 39–94.

Bundy, E.L. 1986. *Studia Pindarica*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Burnett, A.P. 1989. "Performing Pindar's Odes," *CPh* 84: 283–293.

54 Commissioned by whomsoever: see Currie (2011) for a comprehensive discussion of the available evidence.

Cairns, F. 2011. "Money and Poet: The First Stasimon of Pindar *Isthmian* 2," *Mnemosyne* 64: 21–36.

Calame, C. 1990. *Choruses of Young Women in Ancient Greece. Their Morphology, Religious Role, and Social Functions. New and Revised Edition* (= *Les Chœurs de Jeunes Filles en Grèce Archaïque*. Roma, 1977). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Calame, C. 2010. "Das poetische Ich. Enuntiative und pragmatische Fiktion in der griechischen Lieddichtung am Beispiel von Pindar, Ol. 6," *RhM* 153: 125–143.

Carey, C. 1989. "The Performance of the Victory Ode," *AJPh* 110: 545–565.

Carey, C. 1991. "The Victory Ode in Performance: The Case for the Chorus," *CPh* 86: 192–200.

Carey, C. 1995. "Pindar and the Victory Ode" in L. Ayres, ed. *The Passionate Intellect. Essays on the Transformation of Classical Traditions Presented to Professor I.G. Kidd*, 85–103. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Currie, B. 2004. "Reperformance Scenarios for Pindar's Odes" in C.J. Mackie, ed. *Oral Performance and its Context*, 49–69. Leiden / Boston: Brill.

Currie, B. 2005. *Pindar and the Cult of Heroes*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Currie, B. 2011. "Epinician *choregia*: funding a Pindaric chorus" in L. Athanassaki and E. Bowie, eds. *Archaic and Classical Choral Song: Performance, Politics and Dissemination*, 269–310. Berlin / New York: De Gruyter.

Currie, B. 2013. "The Pindaric First Person in Flux," *ClAnt* 32: 243–282.

D'Alessio, G.B. 1994. "First-Person Problems in Pindar," *BICS* 39: 117–139.

D'Alessio, G.B. 2004. "Past Future and Present Past: Temporal Deixis in Greek Archaic Lyric," *Arethusa* 37: 267–294.

Drachmann, A.B. 1903–1927. *Scholia vetera in Pindari carmina recensuit A.B. Drachmann*, 3 volumes. Stuttgart / Leipzig: Teubner.

Eckerman, C. 2010. "The ΚΩΜΟΣ of Pindar and Bacchylides and the Semantics of Celebration," *CQ* 60: 302–312.

Eckerman, C. 2011. "Pindar's Olympian 1.17 and Solo vs. Choral Epinician Performance," *Mnemosyne* 64: 83–85.

Eckerman, C. 2012. "Was Epinician Poetry Performed at Panhellenic Sanctuaries?" *GRBS* 52: 338–360.

Eckerman, C. 2015. "Notes to a Recent Edition of Pindar's Olympian Odes," *ExClass* 19: 147–156.

Felson Rubin, N. 1984. "The Epinician Speaker in Pindar's First Olympian. Towards a Model for Analyzing Character in Ancient Choral Lyric," *Poetics Today* 5: 377–397.

Fränkel, H. 1962. *Dichtung und Philosophie des frühen Griechentums. Eine Geschichte der griechischen Epik, Lyrik und Prosa bis zur Mitte des fünften Jahrhunderts*, 2nd edition. München: C.H. Beck.

Gelzer, T. 1985. "Μοῦσα αὐθιγενής. Bemerkungen zu einem Typ Pindarischer und Bacchylideischer Epinikien," *MH* 42: 95–120.

Gentili, B. 1990. "Die pragmatischen Aspekte der archaischen griechischen Dichtung," *A&A* 36: 1–17.

Goldhill, S. 1991. *The Poet's Voice. Essays on Poetics and Greek Literature*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gribble, D. 2012. "Alcibiades at the Olympics: Performance, Politics and Civic Ideology," *CQ* 62: 45–71.

Heath, M. 1988. "Receiving the κῶμος: The Context and Performance of Epinician," *AJPh* 109: 180–195.

Heath, M. and M. Lefkowitz. 1991. "Epinician Performance," *CPh* 86: 173–191.

Hubbard, T. 1993. "The Theban Amphiaraion and Pindar's Vision on the Road to Delphi," *MH* 50: 193–203.

Hubbard, T. 2004. "The Dissemination of Epinician Lyric: Pan-Hellenism, Reperformance, Written Texts" in C.J. Mackie, ed. *Oral Performance and its Context*, 71–93. Leiden / Boston: Brill.

Hubbard, T. 2006. "Theognis' *Sphrêgis*: Aristocratic Speech and the Paradoxes of Writing" in C. Cooper, ed. *Politics of Orality*, 193–215. Leiden / Boston: Brill.

Kannicht, R. 1996. *Paradeigmata. Aufsätze zur griechischen Poesie. Herausgegeben von Lutz Käppel und Ernst A. Schmidt*. Heidelberg: Winter.

Käppel, L. 1992. *Paian. Studien zur Geschichte einer Gattung*. Berlin / New York: De Gruyter.

Kranz, W. 1961. "Sphragis. Ichform und Namensiegel als Eingangs- und Schlußmotiv antiker Dichtung," *RhM* 104: 3–46 and 97–124.

Kühner / Gerth = R. Kühner, B. Gerth. 1898–1904. *Grammatik der griechischen Sprache. Zweiter Teil: Satzlehre*, 2 volumes, 3rd edition. Hannover / Leipzig: Hahn.

Kurke, L. 1991. *The Traffic in Praise. Pindar and the Poetics of Social Economy*. Ithaca / London: Cornell University Press.

Kurke, L. 2007. "Archaic Greek Poetry" in H.A. Shapiro, ed. *The Cambridge Companion to Archaic Greece*, 141–168. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lattmann, C. 2005. "Die Dichtungsklassifikation des Aristoteles. Eine neue Interpretation von Aristot. poet. 1448a19–24," *Philologus* 149: 28–51.

Lattmann, C. 2010. *Das Gleiche im Verschiedenen. Metapher des Sports und Lob des Siegers in Pindars Epinikien*. Berlin / New York: De Gruyter.

Lattmann, C. 2011. "Review of Neumann-Hartmann (2009)," *Gymnasium* 118: 185–186.

Lattmann, C. 2012. "Ritualisierter Siegpreis. Anmerkungen zur pragmatischen Dimension von Epinikien," *Nikephoros* 25: 19–78.

Lattmann, C. 2015. "Vom Nutzen der ὄψις: Aristoteles, *Poetik* 1450a12–14," *Philologus* 159: 251–271.

Lavecchia, S. 1993. "L'esecuzione solistica dell'epinicio: una tesi da ridiscutere," *ASNP* 23: 333–348.

Lefkowitz, M.R. 1963. "τὼ καὶ ἐγώ: The First Person in Pindar," *HSPh* 67: 177–253.

Lefkowitz, M.R. 1980. "Autobiographical Fiction in Pindar," *HSPh* 84: 29–49.

Lefkowitz, M.R. 1988. "Who sang Pindar's Victory Odes?," *AJPh* 109: 1–11.

Lefkowitz, M.R. 1991. *First-Person Fictions. Pindar's Poetic 'I'*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Lefkowitz, M.R. 1995. "The First Person in Pindar Reconsidered—Again," *BICS* 40: 139–150.

Maslov, B. 2015. *Pindar and the Emergence of Literature*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Morgan, K.A. 1992. "Review of Lefkowitz (1991)," BMCR 1992 (03.02.15). consulted 8 April 2016. http://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/1992/03.02.15.html.

Morgan, K.A. 1993. "Pindar the Professional and the Rhetoric of the ΚΩΜΟΣ," *CPh* 88: 1–15.

Morrison, A.D. 2007. *Performances and Audiences in Pindar's Sicilian Victory Odes*. London: Institute of Classical Studies.

Murray, O. 2009. "The Culture of the *Symposium*" in K.A. Raaflaub and H. v. Wees, eds. *A Companion to Archaic Greece*, 508–523. Chichester / Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

Nagy, G. 1994/1995. "Genre and Occasion," *Métis* 9–10: 11–25.

Neumann-Hartmann, A. 2005. "Wenn Pindar 'Wir' sagt: Überlegungen zur 1. Person Plural bei Pindar," *Aevum(ant)* 5: 145–162.

Neumann-Hartmann, A. 2007. "Der Aufführungsrahmen von Epinikien: ein Diskussionsbeitrag," *Nikephoros* 20: 49–112.

Neumann-Hartmann, A. 2009. *Epinikien und ihr Aufführungsrahmen*. Hildesheim: Weidmann 2009.

Nünlist, R. 2009. *The Ancient Critic at Work. Terms and Concepts of Literary Criticism in Greek Scholia*. Cambridge / New York: Cambridge University Press.

Pfeijffer, I.L. 1999. *First Person Futures in Pindar*. Stuttgart: Steiner.

Race, W.H., ed. 1997a. *Pindar. Olympian Odes. Pythian Odes*. Cambridge, MA / London: Harvard University Press.

Race, W.H., ed. 1997b. *Pindar. Isthmian Odes. Nemean Odes. Fragments*. Cambridge, MA / London: Harvard University Press.

Robbins, E. 1997. "Public Poetry" in D.E. Gerber, ed. *A Companion to the Greek Lyric Poets*, 221–287. Leiden: Brill.

Rösler, W. 1980. *Dichter und Gruppe. Eine Untersuchung zu den Bedingungen und zur historischen Funktion früher griechischer Lyrik am Beispiel Alkaios*. München: Fink.

Rösler, W. 1985. "Persona Reale o Persona Poetica? L'interpretazione dell' 'io' nella Lirica Greca Arcaica," *QUCC* 19: 131–144.

Schmid, M.J. 1998. "Speaking Personae in Pindar's Epinikion," *CFC(G)* 8: 147–184.

Schmitz, T.A. 2002. "Die 'pragmatische' Deutung der frühgriechischen Lyrik: Eine Überprüfung anhand von Sapphos Abschiedsliedern frg. 94 und 96" in J.P. Schwindt, ed. *Klassische Philologie inter disciplinas*, 51–72. Heidelberg: Winter.

Slater, W.J. 1969. "Futures in Pindar," *CQ* 19: 86–94.

Snell, B. 1986. *Die Entdeckung des Geistes. Studien zur Entstehung des europäischen Denkens bei den Griechen*, 6th edition. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
Snell, B. and H. Maehler, eds. 1997. *Pindari carmina cum fragmentis, pars I, epinicia post Brunonem Snell edidit Hervicus Maehler, editio stereotypa editionis octavae*. Stuttgart / Leipzig: Teubner.
Stehle, E. 1997. *Performance and Gender in Ancient Greece. Nondramatic Poetry in its Setting*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Vigneri, V. 2000. "Il coro dell'epinicio pindarico," *QUCC* 95: 87–103.
Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, U. v. 1922. *Pindaros*. Berlin: Weidmann.
Woodbury, L. 1968. "Pindar and the Mercenary Muse: *Isthm*. 2.1–13," *TAPhA* 99: 527–542.

CHAPTER 8

Poeta Loquens: Poetic Voices in Pindar's *Paean* 6 and Horace's *Odes* 4.6

Margaret Foster

Scholars have long observed that Horace's *Odes* 4.6 reworks in various ways Pindar's *Paean* 6.[1] The ode appropriates aspects of *Paean* 6's content, even paraphrasing certain verses.[2] It also follows *Paean* 6 in creating an "abrupt transition" out of its mythic portion: just as Pindar moves from the deaths of Achilles and Neoptolemus at the hands of Apollo to address his chorus directly, so Horace moves from Apollo's slaying of Achilles to address a chorus of boys and girls.[3] *Odes* 4.6 abounds in Homeric, Simonidean, and Vergilian resonances, but Pindar, and above all *Paean* 6, can claim to be the principal source of influence.[4] Although scholars have firmly established *Paean* 6 as an intertext, they have neglected to ask why Horace modeled his ode on this specific poem out of the entire Pindaric corpus. Alessandro Barchiesi observes that "this is one of the most extensive imitations of Pindar in Horace," but the precise appeal of *Paean* 6 for Horace remains underappreciated.[5] This chapter seeks to explain what made *Paean* 6 such a productive source for the poetics of *Odes* 4.6.

As Leslie Kurke discerns, *Paean* 6 stands out among Pindar's extant paeans both for the marked presence of the individual poet's voice within the paean and for the role that that poetic voice plays in ensuring the poem's choral

1 See, for example, Pasquali 1920: 751–755, Fraenkel 1957: 400–401, Syndikus 1973: 347–349, Hardie 1998, and Barchiesi 1996: 8–11.

2 See Thomas 2011: 163 for a list of these verses.

3 Quotation from Thomas 2011: 163. On the abruptness of this transition, we might note Fraenkel's (1957: 400) observation: "A modern reader may be tempted to think that the first six stanzas of the ode iv. 6, fine though they are in themselves, have little to do with the concluding part in which the poet's individual experience is directly and forcefully expressed." On the comparable transition in *Paean* 6, see Rutherford 1997, Kurke 2005, and below.

4 For the influence of these other poets, especially Simonides, on *Odes* 4.6, see Barchiesi 1996. As Thomas (2011: 164) notes, "The Pindaric element seems uppermost."

5 Barchiesi 2000: 178–179.

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2017 | DOI: 10.1163/9789004329737_009

integrity.[6] I suggest that *Paean* 6's attraction as a model for *Odes* 4.6 resides in these very qualities, namely, the exceptional nature of the poetic voice and the type of work that voice performs within the poem. For not only does *Odes* 4.6 conspicuously and unusually foreground Horace's own persona in a paeanic context but that persona also exhibits the same salient features associated with the poet's voice in *Paean* 6, albeit in terms that contribute to *Odes* 4.6's idiosyncratic agenda and that make sense within its own cultural framework. Beyond quasi-citations and a shared mythology, then, it is Pindar's voice that lies behind Horace's far-reaching and dynamic appropriation of *Paean* 6.

The Poetic *Ego* of *Paean* 6

Kurke perceives three distinctive features of *Paean* 6's *ego* that pertain directly to the speaking subject of *Odes* 4.6.[7] Before turning to these features, however, it is worth reviewing briefly *Paean* 6 itself, its performance context, and some of the scholarly issues associated with it. *Paean* 6 comprises three triads. In the first triad, the poem's speaking subject declares that he has come to Delphi and set up a chorus for the Theoxeny, an annual Panhellenic festival at which Delphi hosted visiting civic delegations.[8] In its second triad, the paean enters a mythic sequence, narrating Apollo's decisive role in the deaths of Achilles at Troy and Neoptolemus at Delphi. Neoptolemus meets his fate at the hands of Apollo after contesting for authority with the Delphic priests: "As he [Neoptolemus] quarreled with [Delphic] attendants over vast prerogatives Apollo slew him in his own sanctuary by earth's broad navel" (117–120).[9] A condensed paeanic refrain closes the second triad and then, in a sudden shift in topic, the third triad opens by addressing the island of Aegina directly: "You are famous in name, island ruling the Dorian sea, O bright star of Zeus Hellanios" (123–126). In Pindaric fashion, the island morphs into its eponymous nymph who conceives and gives birth to Aeacus, the progenitor of the Aeacid line of ancestral heroes to which Neoptolemus belongs. The text of this new mythic portion becomes quite fragmentary but the triad seems to continue to celebrate Aeacus and,

6 Kurke 2005.

7 I will use the terms *ego*, speaking subject, and *persona loquens* interchangeably throughout this chapter.

8 On the performance of visiting choruses at the Delphic Theoxeny, see Rutherford 1997: 17 and 2001: 330; D'Alessio 1997: 58; Kurke 2005: 92 n. 36. On the Delphic Theoxeny in general, see Burkert 1985: 107 and Kowalzig 2007: 181–201.

9 All translations of *Paean* 6 are by Rutherford 2001.

possibly, other Aeacids as well. The paean concludes with a series of injunctions: "love your native city, love this kind people, and cover them with garlands of all-blooming health. Receive, Paian, one who frequently possesses the harmonious strains of the Muses" (176–183).

Since the discovery of *Paean* 6, scholars have viewed the relationship between the second and third triads as startlingly discordant. Moreover, the degree of mythic friction produced by the juxtaposition of these two triads has proved to be troubling: the second triad recounts the deaths of the Aeacids Achilles and Neoptolemus, slaughtered by Apollo himself, while, in an about-face, the third praises the Aeacids and their home island. We might note here that "Myrmidons" has been restored at line 143, suggesting that Achilles and Neoptolemus, whose deaths have just been celebrated in the second triad, are mentioned again in this sequence of Aeacid acclaim.

In concert with this quandary, *Paean* 6 has also figured in the on-going general debate over the Pindaric *ego*.[10] At issue has been the identity of the speaking subject of the first triad and whether it is meant to represent the voice of the chorus or the poet. Kurke deciphers these two cruxes, that is, the harsh transition between the second and third triads and the identity of the *ego*, by enlisting the help of the paean's two titles. The papyrus of *Paean* 6 preserves in its margin the title "For the Delphians to Pytho."[11] In the nineteen nineties, a second marginal title was discovered for the final triad: "For the Aeginetans for Aecu a prosodion."[12] Following Ian Rutherford's suggestion, Kurke argues for a split performance of the paean by two separate choruses at the Theoxeny, a host chorus of Delphians who would have sung the paean's first two triads and a visiting Aeginetan chorus who would have sung its final, third triad.[13]

As Kurke underscores, *Paean* 6 faces an immense challenge, both in terms of its content and its performance context. For the paean must integrate into a harmonious ensemble a series of opposed and potentially fraught pairs: the two juxtaposed mythic traditions embedded in the poem, the two choruses performing their respective portions of it, and the two distinct communities these choruses represent. And yet, a solution to this challenge appears in the poem itself in the form of *Paean* 6's distinctive speaking subject.

I summarize here three of Kurke's main conclusions concerning the *ego* of *Paean* 6. First, the *ego* or *persona loquens* of the first triad must be poetic

10 For the poetic *ego* of *Paean* 6 (with references to earlier scholarship on the debate), see Kurke 2005: 86–90. For the Pindaric *ego* in general, the best place to start is D'Alessio 1994.

11 Grenfell and Hunt 1908.

12 Rutherford 1997. See also D'Alessio 1997.

13 Kurke 2005: 92.

rather than choral: the *ego* signifies the persona of the individual poet himself, not the collective body of chorus members.[14] Since the *ego* overwhelmingly represents the chorus in this genre, *Paean* 6's poetic *ego* can be seen as distinctive, even "anomalous."[15] Second, this exceptional poetic *ego* functions as a "screen" between the Delphic and Aeginetan choruses.[16] As noted above, we must imagine a potentially tense performance occasion at Delphi in which the Delphians sing to the Aeginetan chorus of the justifiable (as the Delphians saw it) death at that very site of Neoptolemus, one of Aegina's revered ancestral heroes. Yet, through a series of dictional cues, the *ego* places all negative associations connected to Neoptolemus onto itself and, in so doing, defuses the threat of reciprocal hostility between the Delphians and Aeginetans. The poetic *ego* thereby creates a means for the Delphians to receive hospitably the Aeginetans as well as for the two portions of the paean to work together in complementarity to complete the Theoxenic ritual. Third, in order to have the authority to reconcile the competing claims of the choruses, the poetic *ego* positions itself in relation to Delphi both as an autonomous, authoritative "outsider" and as an "insider" who enjoys a privileged relationship with the native Delphians.[17]

Paean 6, then, deviates from the generic norm in the way in which the poem's prominent *ego* signifies the poet. This poetic *ego*, by casting itself as a figure simultaneously detached from the host chorus of Delphians as well as an indispensible operative on its behalf, becomes the one figure capable of negotiating the poem's discordant components and, what is more, of presenting these components as mutually beneficial to the Delphians and Aeginetans within the ritual context of the Theoxeny. In contrast to the majority of Pindar's extant paeans in which the *ego* represents the chorus and the poet's own persona is absent, *Paean* 6 does not ignore the poetic persona in a choral context but instead depicts it as vital to its choral project.

With these conclusions in mind, let us turn now to *Odes* 4.6. The ode falls into two distinct sections. The first portion presents a mythological narrative

---

14 Kurke 2005 is not the first to arrive at this conclusion concerning the *ego* of *Paean* 6 (see also Fogelmark 1972 and D'Alessio 1994), but her defense of this position and the way in which she enlists the poetic *ego* to make sense of a number of other distinctive features of *Paean* 6 settles the question. I also note here the fluidity of the speaking subject in *Paean* 6. Thus while it must refer to the poet in the first triad, at other moments in the poem, such as during the paeanic refrain at the end of the second triad, it represents the voice of the chorus.

15 Kurke 2005: 81.

16 Kurke 2005: 109.

17 Kurke 2005: 114–115, 124.

about the fall of Troy and the death of Achilles at the hands of a powerful, avenging Apollo (1–24). The second portion shifts to present-day Rome and to Apollo as the god of the lyre. Critics have judged the bridge (25–28) between the two sections as harsh, and some nineteenth-century scholars even argued that a new poem began at verse 29.[18] At this moment of transition, as the ode shifts out of mythic time, Horace's persona appears. He arrives to address the god personally and to ask for protection. He then turns to credit Apollo with his own poetic powers and, as if to demonstrate this claim, proceeds to set in motion a double chorus of boys and girls (29–40). The chorus here is generally understood to be that of the *Carmen Saeculare*, the Roman paean composed by Horace for Augustus' *Ludi Saeculares* in 17 BCE.[19] The poem concludes with one of the female choristers looking back to her time in this performance (41–44). In terms of its genre, *Odes* 4.6 evokes the paean, not only through its close connection to *Paean* 6 but also because it manifests certain traits that link it to paeans more generally.[20]

Odes 4.6 may not have to contend with a split performance by two separate choruses but it risks its own kind of fragmentation. As in *Paean* 6, Horace constructs his poetic *ego* as a kind of binding agent that holds together the poem's potentially disjointed parts.[21] Furthermore, he does so by adopting strategies of self-presentation strikingly similar to the poetic *ego* of *Paean* 6.

The Poetic *Ego* of *Odes* 4.6

We can understand *Odes* 4.6's own poetic *ego* in relation to the three critical qualities summarized above for the speaking subject of *Paean* 6.

---

18 Thomas 2011: 163.

19 Barchiesi 2002 understands the *Carmen Saeculare*, which we know was performed by a real chorus, as an actual paean (in contrast to *Odes* 4.6).

20 I follow Barchiesi 2000 in understanding *Odes* 4.6 not literally as choral poetry but rather as playing with the tradition of choral, and, more specifically, paeanic poetry. The generic traits of the paean that *Odes* 4.6 adopts include an invocation to Apollo, concern for communal wellbeing, youth, and prophecy. On these generic features elsewhere in Horace's *Odes*, see, e.g., Barchiesi 2002 and Foster 2015.

21 On the self-conscious nature of *Odes* 4.6, see Barchiesi 2000: 178–179.

Feature 1: The Voice of the Individual Poet as a Distinctive and Discrete Presence within a Choral Framework

Odes 4.6 culminates in a final revelatory *sphragis*, *Horati* (44), a striking attribution that marks the only appearance of the poet's name within the entire *Odes*. The *sphragis* is not, strictly speaking, the poetic *ego*, but it is related to the poet-as-speaking-subject insofar as it calls attention to Horace as a discrete presence within *Odes* 4.6. The *sphragis* epitomizes the self-assertion that Horace's persona displays in the poem's second half. "*Horati*" emphatically caps off a reminiscence, placed in the mouth of a reflective female chorister:

> nupta iam dices "ego dis amicum,
> saeculo festas referente luces,
> reddidi carmen, docilis modorum
>   vatis Horati."
>
> *Odes* 4.6.41–44

> In due course, as a married lady, you will say, "When the cycle brought round its festal days, I performed the hymn to please the gods, having learned the tune from its eminent composer: Horace."[22]

Here the former chorister attributes the *Carmen Saeculare*, not *Odes* 4.6, to Horace. Yet, the *sphragis* also imprints *Odes* 4.6 with Horace's authorial voice. In a Horatian sleight of hand, the woman's declaration concerning the *Carmen Saeculare* simultaneously authorizes *Odes* 4.6 and, as the ode's final word, literally forms the *sphragis* to *Odes* 4.6 itself.[23]

Horace's *Carmen Saeculare*, *Odes* 1.2, and *Odes* 1.21 also present recognizable tokens of the paeanic genre, but each lacks a discrete poetic persona.[24] In the *Carmen Saeculare* and *Odes* 1.2, a chorus, whether real (as in the *Carmen Saeculare*) or imagined (*Odes* 1.2), acts as the speaking subject (e.g., *precamur* [*CS* 3]; *reporto … chorus* [*CS* 74–75]; *vidimus* [*C.* 1.2.13]; *precamur* [*C.* 1.2.30]). The situation in *Odes* 1.21 is more ambiguous since the imperatives (e.g., *Dianam tenerae dicite virgines* [*C.* 1.21.1]) could point either to choral self-address or to the voice of the poet.[25] Yet, even if the speaking subject of *Odes* 1.21 represents Horace, the

22 All translations of Horace are by Rudd 2004.

23 Cf. Lowrie 2007: 213.

24 See also Foster 2015 for the paeanic elements of *Odes* 4.1.

25 Lowrie 2009: 75–76.

poet's persona exists only as a disembodied and unidentified (albeit authoritative) voice behind a series of imperatives. *Odes* 4.6 alone among Horace's *Odes* seems to appropriate elements of the choral genre of paean while also presenting the poet as a discrete entity within that paeanic setting.

Thus the *sphragis*, issuing directly from the mouth of the chorister, accentuates the unusual fact that the ode evokes a paean but simultaneously foregrounds the poet's individual persona within that choral context.[26] We can align this showcasing of Horace's identity with *Paean* 6's presentation of Pindar's poetic *ego*. For, in this climatic declaration, the *sphragis* directly cites the poetic *ego* of *Paean* 6: as Alex Hardie notes, Horace's closing *vatis* (44) evokes Pindar's opening *prophatan* (ἀοίδιμον Πιερίδων προφάταν, "the famous prophet of the Pierian muses," *Pae.* 6.6).[27] That is to say, Horace's exceptional *sphragis* signposts the very moment when the chorus members of *Paean* 6 actually reveal the *ego* of the poem to be Pindar himself.

Feature 2: The Poetic Ego *Resolves the Ode's Discordant Components*

Horace's *sphragis* highlights the poet as a discrete presence within the choral framework of *Odes* 4.6. I will now consider one of the tasks that this conspicuous poetic voice performs within the ode. As noted above, *Odes* 4.6 comprises two distinct sections with an intervening bridge. I will argue that the poetic *ego* of *Odes* 4.6 takes on the burden of reconciling these two sections into an integrated, coherent whole. Horace achieves this feat through the way in which he fashions his persona with respect to the two other dominant figures in the poem, Achilles and Apollo. First, Horace functions as a corrective to Achilles, who becomes a negative paradigm for the poet. Second, Horace orchestrates Apollo's movement across the poem's bridge and thereby directs the course of the god's attendant transformation.

Horace and Achilles

Odes 4.6 begins its mythic portion with an address to Apollo but soon shifts the spotlight to his mortal nemesis, Achilles. Michael Putnam observes how the devastation Achilles notionally inflicts upon Troy in the myth mani-

26 There is an added level of complexity here, however, since the *sphragis* does not occur during the choral performance described in the poem but instead is projected into the future ("In due course, as a married lady, you will say …," *c.* 4.6.41). Lowrie (2009: 115) compares the effect of the chorister's future pronouncement to the so-called Pindaric future in the sense that it "defers and enacts at the same time."

27 Hardie: 1998: 253.

fests itself both as violence that disrupts speech and as violence against children.[28] These two motifs converge at the climatic moment of what Richard Thomas calls Achilles' "counterfactual aretalogy":[29]

ille non inclusus equo Minervae
sacra mentito male feriatos
Troas et laetam Priami choreis
  falleret aulam;
sed palam captis gravis, heu nefas! heu!
nescios fari pueros Achivis
ureret flammis, etiam latentem
  matris in alvo,
ni tuis flexus Venerisque gratae
vocibus divum pater adnuisset
rebus Aeneae potiore ductos
  alite muros—
    Odes 4.6.13–24

He would not have skulked in the wooden horse that pretended to be an offering to Minerva, or gulled the Trojans into fatal celebrations and the court of Priam into happy dancing, but quite openly he would have cruelly ill-treated the captives; ah, think of the enormity of it! He would have burnt with Achaean fire the children as yet incapable of speech, and even the infant lying in its mother's womb, had not the Father of the Gods been won over by your appeals and those of lovely Venus, and granted to Aeneas' fortunes walls marked out under happier omens.

Achilles would have immolated children "as yet incapable of speech" had Apollo not stopped him. Achilles' own actions are closely construed with those of the Greeks who did sack Troy. These other Greeks are meant to serve as a foil for Achilles: they deployed deceptive tactics to take the city whereas Achilles would have waged war in the open (*palam*, 17). And yet, just as Achilles' own hypothetical destruction, their form of violence also seems to be linked to speech and children when they are connected to the image of a doomed chorus (presumably of singing and dancing youths) in Priam's halls. We can contrast, then, the characterization of Achilles, and the Greeks in general, with that of Horace's persona in *Odes* 4.6.

---

28 Putnam 1986: 118–120.

29 Thomas 2011: 166.

In the second half of the poem, Horace trains Roman boys and girls to sing and dance in a chorus:

virginum primae puerique claris
    patribus orti,
Deliae tutela deae fugaces
lyncas et cervos cohibentis arcu,
Lesbium servate pedem meique
    pollicis ictum,
rite Latonae puerum canentes,
rite crescentem face Noctilucam,
prosperam frugum celeremque pronos
    volvere mensis.
        Odes 4.6.31–40

You, the foremost of our maidens and you, the sons of noble sires, wards of the Delian goddess who checks with her bow the fleet-footed lynxes and stags, observe the Lesbian beat and the snap of my fingers as you duly sing of Latona's son, duly of the Nightlighter with her crescent torch, who gives increase to our crops and swiftly rolls the hurrying months.

Horace restores at Rome what was lost at Troy. By casting himself as a *chorodidaskalos* (chorus master), he corrects the devastation directed against children and speech/song in the first, mythic section.

Achilles' and Horace's antithetical connections to children dovetail with their equally divergent relationships with Apollo. Apollo kills Achilles but grants Horace poetic authority. A dictional cue drives this contrast home. Achilles falls at the hands of the god like a pine tree struck down (*icta*, 9), while Horace, after receiving Apollo's gifts, directs his chorus to follow the beat (*ictum*, 36) of his thumb.[30]

The distinction between the mythic hero's and poetic *ego*'s affiliation with Apollo and the recurring imagery of children and speech/song that help define the distinction echo components of *Paean* 6. Pindar's *ego* announces in the first triad:

ὕδατι γὰρ ἐπὶ χαλκοπύλῳ
    ψόφον ἀϊὼν Κασταλίας

30 Putnam 1986: 124.

ὀρφανὸν ἀνδρῶν χορεύσιος ἦλθον
ἔταις ἀμαχανίαν ἀ[λ]έξων
τεοῖσιν ἐμαῖς τε τιμ[α]ῖς·
ἤτορι δὲ φίλῳ παῖς ἅτε ματέρι κεδνᾷ
πειθόμενος κατέβαν
στεφάνων καὶ θαλιᾶν τροφὸν ἄλσος Ἀπόλλωνος …
Paean 6.7–14

For at the water of Castalia with its gate of bronze hearing its sound bereft of the dancing of men, I have come to ward off helplessness from your townsmen and my privileges. Obeying my own heart as a child obeys its dear mother, I have come to Apollo's grove which nurtures garlands and banquets …

The speaker here figures a dearth of choral song at Delphi as childlessness (Castalia's "sound bereft [literally, "orphaned"] of the dancing of men"), which his arrival at the sanctuary promises to alleviate. Moreover, his rapport with Pytho resembles that between a child and his mother (12). This imagery exemplifies the *ego*'s strategy of adopting an intimate and deferential posture towards Apollo.[31] It also sets the *ego*'s mode of behavior in opposition to that of Neoptolemus who, in the paean's myth, contests Apollo's authority at Delphi and suffers the fatal consequences. Neoptolemus' role as a negative paradigm for the poetic *ego* also plays out on a figurative level: killed by Apollo because of his impiety, Neoptolemus never makes it home to see his "revered mother" (105), a metaphor that reverses the image of Pytho and the *ego*'s mother-child bond.[32]

In *Paean* 6, the conspicuous contrast between Neoptolemus and Pindar helps the poetic *ego* to function as a safeguard between the Delphians and Aeginetans by deflecting attention away from the Aeginetans' own connection to the problematic Neoptolemus. The opposition that *Odes* 4.6 formulates between Horace and Achilles (who, like Neoptolemus, is killed by Apollo) and the motifs of children and speech/song deployed to accentuate this opposition, take *Paean* 6 as their model. Horace's individual persona also appears in order to heal a form of choral dysfunction, conjured by the perverse fantasy of the doomed Trojan chorus dancing in Priam's halls, when he sets up his own

31 See Kurke 2005: 106–108.

32 See Kurke 2005: 108 for this point and for other ways in which the *ego* contrasts with Neoptolemus, including at the level of diction.

chorus of Roman boys and girls. In this way, Horace's *ego* operates as a kind of corrective to Achilles (and the rest of the Greeks) and generates a thematic resolution to the ode's first half. In both poems the poetic *ego* alone reconciles contradictory elements forced into close proximity within the space of the poem, thereby fashioning a coherent text.

Horace and Apollo

Horace's poetic *ego* triggers Apollo's transformation and the temporal and geographical migration that the god undergoes from the first to second section of the poem. In the first twenty-four verses of *Odes* 4.6, Apollo is the war-mongering god of the bow. Apollo's martial associations persist in the second half of the poem, but at verse 25 an abrupt shift occurs.[33] The poem suddenly leaves off praising Apollo's triumph at Troy and sings of the god in a different key:

> doctor argutae fidicen Thaliae,
> Phoebe, qui Xantho lavis amne crines,
> Dauniae defende decus Camenae,
> levis Agyieu.
> spiritum Phoebus mihi, Phoebus artem
> carminis nomenque dedit poetae.
> *Odes* 4.6.25–30

> Phoebus, minstrel-teacher of the clear-voiced Thalia, you who wash your hair in Xanthus' stream, protect the glory of the Daunian Muse, o smooth-faced Lord of the Highway! It was Phoebus who gave me inspiration, Phoebus who gave me the lyric art and the name of poet.

Horace inserts his own persona into the ode just as Apollo must travel out of mythical Troy and into Augustan Rome.[34] He shoulders the responsibility of transporting the god over the bridge of the ode and consequently between the two locations and across centuries of time. He does so by luring the god

33 For Apollo's martial associations in the second half of the ode, see Johnson 2007: 63.

34 Apollo's epithet, Agyieus, underscores this geographical shift to Rome. The title seems to be linked to the sanctuary of Palatine Apollo and Augustan iconography (Thomas 2011: 170). For the epithet's possible connection to homecoming, also appropriate in this context, see Thomas 2011: 170. See also Miller 2009: 293–294. Rudd (2004: ad loc.) translates the title as "highway" because this epithet for Apollo is connected to apotropaic pillars placed in the street before houses.

away from the banks of the Xanthus river to Italy through a personal appeal (*Phoebe, qui Xantho lavis amne crines, / Dauniae defende decus Camenae*, "Phoebus, you who wash your hair in Xanthus' stream, protect the glory of the Daunian Muse / o smooth-faced Lord of the Highway!" 26–27). *Decus* must refer to Horace himself, as Putnam and others have argued, since Daunia is an area roughly coterminous with northern Apulia, the birthplace of the poet.[35]

Horace's entreaty succeeds: no sooner does he complete his prayer than he announces that Phoebus has granted him the *spiritus*, *ars*, and *nomen* of a poet. It would seem that Horace possesses the requisite magnetic pull to entice Apollo. Endowed now with the god's favor, Horace enacts his gifts by putting a chorus to work in the following verses. The voice of the poet, by directing Apollo's attention away from Troy and toward the poet through prayer, carries the god over the transition from the ode's mythic narrative and into its concluding choral portion.

Feature 3: The Poetic Ego *is Characterized as an "Outsider" and "Insider"*

Finally, let us examine the implications of Horace's own self-characterization as both independent of and indebted to Apollo for his poetic authority. Horace enters the ode as the *Dauniae decus Camenae* (26). This tribute to Horace's hometown muse parallels Pindar's identification in *Paean* 6 as the "prophet of the Pierian Muses" (6). Both speaking subjects initially lay claim to local, non-Apolline sources for their prowess as poets. Yet, after citing the Daunian Muse, Horace reveals that Apollo has granted him the poet's *spiritus*, *ars*, and *nomen* (29–30). Just so, in *Paean* 6, immediately after the *ego* aligns himself with the epichoric Pierian goddesses, he emphasizes his close ties and ultimate deference to Delphi (i.e., Apollo).

As reviewed above, Kurke demonstrates that the formulation of Pindar's mediating *ego* as both an outsider and an insider vis-à-vis Delphi provides the speaking subject with the authority to accommodate the competing stances of both the native Delphic chorus and the visiting Aeginetan one. In *Odes* 4.6, Horace's persona, by casting itself as a figure whose poetic expertise derives from multiple sources, appropriates this authoritative stance from *Paean* 6. This intertext allows us to see that the Horatian *ego* cites two separate sources of inspiration (the Daunian Muse and Apollo) in order to grant itself the authority necessary to address the task at hand. Horace's persona must singlehandedly

35 See Putnam 1986: 121, Hardie 1998: 261–262 and Miller 2009: 293–294.

lure Apollo from Troy to Rome and guide the poem into its second half. Paradoxically for *Odes* 4.6, in order to entice Apollo at this moment, Horace adopts a stance that calls attention to the fact that the god is not the only source of his poetic abilities.

Horace's Poetic *Ego* in Context

We have seen how the distinctive form of *Paean* 6 and its extraordinary *ego* are generated by the context of the Delphic Theoxeny and the potentially fraught interaction of the Delphic and Aeginetan choruses performing their respective portions of the paean. In like manner, we can relate the bipartite structure of *Odes* 4.6 and its own prominent poetic *ego* to a Roman cultural context. As with *Paean* 6, there is a similarly sensitive concern that *Odes* 4.6 encodes in its discrete sections and simultaneously seeks to mitigate through the persona of the poet.[36]

Horace's representation of the Trojan War in the first half of *Odes* 4.6 alludes, as elsewhere in the *Odes*, to Rome's own civil wars.[37] In particular, scholars have noted that the opening of *Odes* 4.6 is redolent with evocations of Actium. Apollo's appearance in his capacity as *vindex* (2) recalls Octavian's attribution of his victory over Antony to this same avenging god.[38] Further, Apollo's initial target of the Niobids has been linked to the image of Niobe's children on one of the doors to the god's Palatine temple, an image that has been understood to symbolize Augustus' subjugation of his (and so Rome's) enemies.[39] Horace's vision of Troy in *Odes* 4.6 also notably culminates in Apollo's initiative to preserve Aeneas and to secure, by means of Jupiter's sanction, the hero's foundation of a new city (21–24). Apollo's protection of Aeneas thus also implicitly secures the eventuality of Augustus' prosperous and peaceful city and empire, the Rome that is fully realized in the poem's second half.[40]

In the first half of *Odes* 4.6, then, mythic Troy puts us in mind of Rome, and, more specifically, of Rome's civil wars. Yet, as John Miller observes, "It is

36 I wish to thank Kenneth Draper for calling my attention to this issue.

37 See Miller 2009: 290, citing Lowrie 1997: 338. See also Lowrie (1997: 247) on *Odes* 3.3: "Given Roman schizophrenia in their identification now with the Greeks, now with the Trojans in their national myth, one could see the Greeks against the Trojans as the Romans against themselves."

38 See, e.g., Miller 2009: 54–94 for the connection between Apollo, Actium, and Octavian.

39 See Miller 2009: 289–290. Propertius (2.31.12–14) describes the temple door.

40 See Miller 2009: 181–184. Miller also deciphers here the rich intertextuality of this moment.

astonishing to highlight such past violence during the present Apolline *saeculum*."[41] This striking feature of *Odes* 4.6, that is, its bold allusion to the civil wars, elicits another comparison with *Paean* 6. Just as *Paean* 6 must contend with the competing positions of Delphians and Aeginetans, *Odes* 4.6 produces its own cultural friction: It first inspires the memory of Romans pitted against Romans and then proceeds to form another surprising juxtaposition by pairing this painful recollection with a choral Apolline-Augustan celebration in the ode's second half.

At the same time, by adopting strategies deployed by *Paean* 6's own speaking subject, the poetic *ego* offers itself as a solution for mitigating this friction. Above we explored how the *ego* resolves certain thematic and structural tensions within the ode. In conjunction with these efforts is the work that the poetic *ego*'s self-presentation achieves for the ode's cultural allusions and context. Miller's perceptive reading of the transition between the poem's two halves (i.e., the moment at which Horace's own persona enters at verses 25–28) illuminates this capability of the poetic *ego* within *Odes* 4.6:

> [T]he swerve here from public to private, from retribution, war, and Roman destiny to Horatian poetry ruptures historical continuity, even if only for a handful of verses. We are suddenly transported a world away … Apollo's entreated defense of the poet clearly parallels his earlier protective exertions but is not a consequence of them … Therefore, the Augustan dimension of Apollo momentarily falls from view. The address *fidicen … Phoebe* does not summon to mind Apollo citharoedus in the Palatine Temple but rather a personal divine poetic mentor.[42]

I would connect Miller's interpretation of this hinge moment in the poem, and especially his observation that the ode's Augustan element temporarily recedes from the spotlight, to the ways in which Horace's poetic *ego* corresponds to the two main characters in the Trojan section, Achilles and Apollo. First, as discussed above, Horace constructs Achilles as the negative paradigm to his poetic *ego*. As a result, I would argue, in a context thick with allusions to the civil wars, Horace diverts attention away from any implicit comparisons that might arise between Achilles and Romans in the civil wars who, like Achilles, are ultimately defeated. Horace shortcuts the temptation to analogize Achilles

41 Miller 2009: 290, contrasting this feature to the sentiment expressed at *Odes* 4.15.17–18 as well as to Horace's tendency to downplay Apollo's role as violent avenger in the *Carmen Saeculare* (citing Putnam 2000 for this latter point).

42 Miller 2009: 293.

with a Roman equivalent and instead forces an association between Achilles and his own poetic persona through a series of thematic and dictional cues. Second, the personal bond that Horace forms between himself and Apollo during the transition from mythic time to present Rome distracts from Augustus' own connection to the god (or, as Miller puts it, "the Augustan dimension of Apollo momentarily fades from view"). In the transition's ahistorical and apolitical attention to Horace and his "divine poetic mentor," we lose sight of Augustus' own transition between Actium and empire. When Augustus resurfaces in the ode's second half, his *saeculum* appears in full swing. Thus, and without dismissing the surprising nature of *Odes* 4.6 and its jarring collocation of internecine violence and Augustan peace, it is possible to perceive that in the carefully developed connections to both Achilles and Apollo, Horace's poetic *ego* becomes the single, most potent reconciling force in the poem, not just at the thematic and structural levels but in cultural terms as well. The poet not only has the ability to settle opposing forces within the poem itself but also, it would seem, displays the Apollo-backed power to lift Rome out of its brutal past and introduce it to its prosperous Augustan present.

Horace's appropriation of *Paean* 6 and the resulting contrast that emerges between *Odes* 4.6 and the poet's other paeanic hymns are linked to *Odes* 4.6's place within the *Odes*. As others have noted, only *Odes* 4 dedicates itself so completely to choral poetry.[43] At the same time, and in conjunction with this new attention to various choral genres, *Odes* 4 ponders how "Horace the individual" will fare in this choral framework.[44] *Paean* 6 presents a solution to this problem. Its appeal for Horace surely rested in its ability as a paean to foreground a vivid poetic *ego*. In Horace's other earlier paeanic odes, most importantly the *Carmen Saeculare*, the chorus alone functions as the speaking subject, and the poet does not present himself as separate from that communal voice. This feature is in keeping with the tradition of paeans more generally. By contrast, *Odes* 4.6 offers a vision of a paeanic poem in which poetic and choral voices are not mutually exclusive. By carefully appropriating the salient features of *Paean* 6's own poetic *ego* and putting them to work for his own ends, Horace constructs *Odes* 4.6 as a poem that, rather than disregarding the poet's own persona in a choral setting, not only privileges that individual voice but also requires it.

43 On Horace's assumption of a more public and choral poetic persona, see, e.g., Lowrie 2007: 220. Barchiesi (2000: 178) sees an increase in "choral utterances and performances" as one moves through the *Odes*.

44 Quotation from Lowrie 2007: 224. See also Thomas 2011: 20–23.

Bibliography

Barchiesi, A. 1996. "Poetry, praise, and patronage: Simonides in Book 4 of Horace's *Odes*." *CA* 15: 5–47.
———. 2000. "Rituals in Ink. Horace on the Greek lyric tradition." In M. Depew and D. Obbink, edd., *Matrices of Genre*, 167–182. Cambridge, Mass.
———. 2002. "The uniqueness of the *Carmen saeculare*." In T. Woodman and D. Feeney, edd., *Traditions and Contexts in the Poetry of Horace*, 107–123. Cambridge.
Bitto, G. 2012. *Lyrik als Philologie: zur Rezeption hellenistischer Pindarkommentierung in den Oden des Horaz. Mit einer rhetorisch-literarkritischen Analyse der Pindarscholien. Litora classica*, Band 4. Rahden.
Burkert, W. 1985. *Greek Religion*. Trans. J. Raffan. Cambridge, Mass.
D'Alessio, G.B. 1994. "First-Person Problems in Pindar." *BICS* 39: 117–139.
———. 1997. "Pindar's Prosodia and the Classification of Pindaric Papyrus Fragments." *ZPE* 118: 23–60.
Fogelmark, S. 1972. *Studies in Pindar with Particular Reference to Paean VI and Nemean VII*. Lund.
Foster, M. 2015. "The Double Chorus of Horace *Odes* 4.1: a Paeanic Performance *in morem Salium*." *AJP* 136.4: 607–632.
Fraenkel, E. 1957. *Horace*. Oxford.
Grenfell, B.P. and A.S. Hunt. 1908. *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri. Part V*. London.
Hardie, A. 1998. "Horace, the *Paean* and Roman *Choreia* (Odes 4, 6)." *PLLS* 10.251–293.
Johnson, T. 2007. *A Symposion of Praise: Horace Returns to Lyric in* Odes *IV*. Madison, WI.
Kowalzig, B. 2007. *Singing for the Gods: Performances of Myth and Ritual in Archaic and Classical Greece*. Oxford.
Kurke, L. 2005. "Choral Lyric as "Ritualization": Poetic Sacrifice and Poetic *Ego* in Pindar's Sixth *Paean*." *CA* 24: 81–130.
Lowrie, M. 2007. "Horace: *Odes* 4." In S. Harrison, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Horace*, 210–230. Cambridge.
———. 2009. *Writing, Performance, and Authority in Augustan Rome*. Oxford.
Miller, J.F. 2009. *Apollo, Augustus, and the Poets*. Cambridge.
Pasquali, G. 1920. *Orazio lirico*. Florence.
Putnam, M. 1986. *Artifices of Eternity: Horace's Fourth Book of Odes*. Ithaca.
———. 2000. *Horace's* Carmen Saeculare*: Ritual Magic and the Poet's Art*. New Haven.
Rudd, N. 2004. *Horace: Odes and Epodes*. Cambridge, MA.
Rutherford, I. 1997. "*For the Aeginetans to Aiakos a Prosodion*: An Unnoticed Title at Pindar *Paean* 6, 123 and its Significance for the Poem." *ZPE* 118: 1–21.
———. 2001. *Pindar's Paeans: A Reading of the Fragments with a Survey of the Genre*. Oxford.

Syndikus, H.-P. 1973. *Die Lyrik des Horaz. Eine Interpretation der Oden, I*. Darmstadt.
Thomas, R.F. 2011. *Horace: Odes IV and Carmen Saeculare*. Cambridge.

CHAPTER 9

Melizein Pathe or the Tonal Dimension in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*: Voice, Song, and *Choreia* as Leitmotifs and Metatragic Signals for Expressing Suffering*

Anton Bierl

Since the 1990s, the traditionally text-focused field of classical philology has experienced the advent of a new paradigm of performance, especially Greek philology, particularly in drama research, where an emphasis on the media beyond the text—the consideration of voice, choral arrangement, musicality, lyric poeticity, performativity, and rituality as they pertain to a total work of art—has become apparent.[1]

As is well known, the chorus represents a multimedia and multimodal element, performing songs comprising voiced content, dance as a rhythmic bodily movement, and musical accompaniment. Chorality is predominately associated with ritual, honoring the gods and educating via a comprehensive explanation of the world steeped in mythical contexts. Tragedy emerged from the chorus; ancient theater did not, as was generally accepted, involve dramatic dialogue with choral intermissions; rather the chorus was the decisive element, to which interactive figures were later added.[2]

* I want especially to thank Niall Slater not only for organizing the excellent conference "Orality and Literacy in the Ancient World XI: Voice and Voices" at Emory University (September 17–21, 2014) but also for editing this volume. I also express my thanks to the anonymous referee for reviewing my contribution, giving me thoughtful criticism, and saving me from many errors. For discussion and feedback I am grateful to them, to the fellow-participants at the orality conference, and to gracious audiences at Rome, Frankfurt, Barcelona, Graz, and Regensburg. Last but not least I thank my student assistant Austin Diaz for helping me with a first translation and correcting my English.

1 For *choreia* and performance, see e.g. Calame (1997); Nagy (1990: esp. 339–381); Bierl (2001 [Eng. 2009]); for lyrical poeticity, see Nooter (2012); for silence, see Montiglio (2000); for *euphemia*, see Gödde (2011); for *goos* and lament, see Holst-Warhaft (1992); Dué (2006: esp. 8 n. 21 [for further literature]); and generally Alexiou (2002). In most cases the Teubner edition by M.L. West (1998) serves as a textual basis; the translations are my own, only in few places they are partially based on Lloyd-Jones (1979).

2 See generally Bierl (2001: 11–106 [Eng. 2009: 1–82]).

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2017 | DOI: 10.1163/9789004329737_010

In Aeschylus, the chorus remains still dominant, determining a broad section of the action in *Agamemnon*. Thus the first part of *Oresteia* provides, so to speak, the choral basis, a musical and multimedia prelude for a comprehensive approach and eventual solution to a fundamental and communal conflict, particularly since we also find lyric and musical passages of considerable length sung in monody. Additionally we should be aware of the fact that, next to the visual element, the acoustic aspect is of great importance for the ancient theater, even if the term theater (from θεᾶσθαι, "to watch") leads us to downplay the audible aspect.

In the following, I will demonstrate that especially the voices and the music, the choral and *choreia* arising from combined voice and dance, present key motifs of Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*. The acoustic element, as will be argued, does not merely represent one of many themes and discourses like sacrifice, clothing, marriage, etc., folded into the texture of *Agamemnon*, accentuating the whole cloth of the plot;[3] rather, in Aeschylus, steeped in a choral and song-centered culture, it becomes the central expressional method for directing *pathos* and creating a foundational sense for the audience. Through continual metatragic referencing at the vocal and musical level, Aeschylus layers meaning with other discursive elements and, in doing so, directs the audience's reception regarding the foreshadowing, the dramatic art, and plot developments in scenarios of increased *pathos* as well as the subsequent solution.[4]

When we regard a play through this metatheatrical and self-referential lens, we do not commit a postmodern anachronism or trendy projection. Already the ritualistic choral song, be it the dithyramb, paean or hymn, from which the tragic choral theater developed, refers continually to its own performance and composition. Obviously it required such self-referential indices to strengthen again and again its own enactment.[5] Increasingly such self-references to voice,

---

3 See Ferrari (1997); for a similar technique in the *Persians* and *Suppliants*, see Gödde (2000a and 2000b); for the *Oresteia* are the following discourses, motifs, images and metaphors represented as decisive: light-dark (Goldhill [1984]), sacrifice (i.a. Zeitlin [1965 and 1966]), libation, animals in general (i.a. Heath [1999]) (esp. birds, snakes, lions, dogs), agriculture, hunting (Vidal-Naquet [1988]), sickness and health, fire, beating, wind; for their interplay, see esp. Lebeck (1971); for all see Raeburn and Thomas (2011: lxv–lxix). For musicality, see so far Moutsopoulos (1959); Haldane (1965); Fleming (1977); Wilson and Taplin (1993).

4 For choral self-referentiality, see Henrichs (1994/1995) and Bierl (2001: esp. 37–51 [Eng. 2009: 24–36]). For the relationship to metatheatricality, see Bierl (2001: 43–45 [Eng. 2009: 29–31]).

5 See Bierl (2001, esp. 45–54, 300–314 [Eng. 2009: 31–38, 267–280]). The Greek song-theater incorporated, as is known, all genres of song culture. See Swift (2010).

musical accompaniment, and dance in drama were employed as the fundamental way to heighten meaning.[6]

Due to an Aristotelian dogma, metatheatricality and the self-referential-consciousness of a play within a play in ancient tragedy went unrecognized until in the 1980s an awareness slowly grew that this aspect also played a significant role. Although such assertions first met with heavy resistance, they are now commonly acknowledged.[7] The initial work on the *Oresteia* using this metatheatrical bent comes from Wilson and Taplin, while earlier the theme of musical references was treated rather positively as one among many:[8] Taplin first, like many other critics, decidedly rejected every metatheatrical reference in tragedy, but then revised his position in 1993, at least when it came to the *Oresteia*, which represented for him and Wilson, to cite the title of this influential article in their own words, the "aetiology of tragedy."[9] Wilson and Taplin rightly stressed the theme of the dissolution of the choral order and its final reintegration as a sign of order, in which the incorporation of the Erinyes represents the quintessence of the tragic in a self-reflective mode, i.e., to make dread fruitful for the polis. In this tonal vein, Gödde recently clarifies, in a comprehensive interpretation, the meaning of *euphemia* in the *Oresteia* and emphasizes how the ritual expression means not only a command for holy silence but also, as a whole, a performative expression, to determine things also loud and clear as good, to drown out and soften dangers, following ritualistic patterns, particularly sacrifices in this case.[10] The following general analysis will expand upon

6 See i.a. Segal (1997 [1982]: 215–271); Foley (1985: 205–258); Bierl (1991: 111–218); Henrichs (1994/1995); Ringer (1998); Dobrov (2001); Dunn (2011); Torrance (2013). For the Old Comedy, see Bierl (2001: esp. 37–86 [Eng. 2009: 24–66]); Dobrov (2001); Slater (2002); for the satyr play, see Easterling (1997: esp. 42–44); Bierl (2001: 64–86, esp. 76–79 [Eng. 2009: 47–66, esp. 58–61]); Kaimio et al. (2001); Bierl (2006); Lämmle (2013: 155–243). Research addressing the chorus and musicality are recently legion; i.a. for Euripides' *Helena*, see Barker (2007) and Ford (2010).

7 See Kullmann (1993) and Radke (2003). Radke's blanket criticism of this approach fails to convince, because she completely ignores attempts to relocate the question on a new basis; see Bierl (2001: esp. 37–86 [Eng. 2009: 24–66]) and Kaimio et al. (2001). One cannot simply disqualify research regarding the metatheatrical dimension, especially regarding the *Bacchae*, as postmodern or post-structural. For these questions, see also Segal's handling of them in the epilogue to the second, expanded edition of Segal (1997: 369–378, esp. 370–375) and his brilliant answer (*BMCR* 98.5.26) to Seaford's critical review (*BMCR* 98.3.10).

8 Wilson and Taplin (1993); for works regarding music in the *Oresteia*, see Moutsopoulos (1959); Haldane (1965); Fleming (1977).

9 See Taplin (1986); but Wilson and Taplin (1993); see also Belfiore (1992: 26–30).

10 See Gödde (2011: esp. 95–127). For the power of words, see Peradotto (1969).

these useful insights encompassing the voices and the *choreia* in performative, aesthetic, and metatragic perspectives.[11] We will see that Aeschylus composed *Agamemnon* along an ongoing conflict, inscribed into the texture of the play, between *euphemia* and *dysphemia*, between attempts of mitigating and silencing the horror of pure and object voice through aesthetic voice, ritual practice, and kinesics and the violent outbreak of *pathos* conveyed by shrieking cries, *goos*, and distorted body movements. Tragedy means the display of terror, horror, and suffering. Therefore in view of the abundance of woe and disruptive energy all euphemizing tendencies are bound to fail. But in this genre violence and lament, *pathos* and *goos*, though terrible, are acted out in musical, vocal, and aesthetic forms and underscored with self-referential markers. As will be shown, this quintessential paradox of *pathos* made beautiful is constitutive of tragedy.

Choreia and music represent *paideia* in archaic song culture, a proper upbringing to "the good" with the help of positive content and movements or, using reverse psychology, in effect, with negative, ugly behavior transgressing the norm.[12] The *mathein*, learning and knowledge, constitutes a central theme particularly in *Agamemnon*. Again and again the motto "learn from pain" (πάθει μάθος) is hammered home (177).[13] But of course, the figures of the play do not yet learn and understand everything; they clearly suffer from the dreadful events and express this pain on the stage with genre-appropriate voices, sounds, vocals, and music.

The constant connection to the vocal and choral in *Agamemnon* must therefore be put in the context of the polis religion and its tendency to conceal and sugarcoat the tragic reality through performative, musical, ritualistic, and rhetorical means. By collectively regimenting voices and kinesics, i.e., through a literal politics of the body, the polis tries to foster order, which proves impossible in the face of mounting troubles.

Let us now look in particular—going through all instances in the text—at how voice, song, and the *choreia* are employed in *Agamemnon* as dramatic signals and metatragic means to underscore the internal political situation in

11 Good remarks and examples can also be found in Loraux (1990: 263–268).

12 For both tendencies, see Bierl (2001: esp. 30–37 [Eng. 2009: 18–24]). Only on the former, educational aspect of "becoming virtuous," see Collins (2013). Plato's *Laws* Books 2 and 7 present an important, if philosophically constructed reflection of the archaic behaviors; see now Peponi (2013).

13 See Aesch. *Ag.* 250: τοῖς μὲν παθοῦσιν μαθεῖν …; see also *Ag.* 709–711: μεταμανθάνουσα δ' ὕμνον/ Πριάμου πόλις γεραιά/ πολύθρηνον ("and learning a different tune Priam's aged city, a tune of many sorrows," trans. Lloyd-Jones [1979]). See also *Ag.* 39.

Argos and to allow the tragedy to present to the public an aesthetic expression of suffering and the subsequent attempt to overcome it. The striking frequency of these occurrences makes it highly probable that choral, vocal, and musical self-references are not just one motif among others, but a central means in *Oresteia* to create and convey what tragedy is all about: the performative display of terror and *pathos* in an aesthetic manner, involving all senses via vocal as well as, of course, visual media—within the parameters of a choral song culture.

The Watchman as Individual Choreut

At the start, the watchman lies on the roof, desperately looking for the fire signal installed by Clytemnestra. He sings and whistles (ἀείδειν ἢ μινύρεσθαι 16) to stay awake; were he to cease these vocal and musical activities, "incising this remedy against sleep" (ὕπνου τόδ' ἀντίμολπον ἐντέμνων ἄκος 17), he would fall asleep; his singing is a drug,[14] both cure and poison, because he cannot help crying and lamenting the misfortune of the house (18).[15] Out of this choral *aoide* and *molpe* that due to his isolation have already become perverted and unofficially private, emerges a *goos*, a lament, something a man actually should not employ, because it is unseemly and against the official music and kinesics imposed by the new rulers.

When the appointed fire signal finally appears in the sky, the watchman greets it enthusiastically as "a flambeaux, that invokes daylight at night (φάος πιφαύσκων) and as the establishment of numerous choirs in Argos (χορῶν κατάστασιν/ πολλῶν ἐν Ἄργει)" (23–24).[16] The watchman therefore receiving the agreed upon signals (*semata*) forwards them to Clytemnestra (σημαίνω τορῶς 26)—the *Agamemnon* as prelude of the trilogy becomes thus a hermeneutic and signal interpretation: the Trojan war is won; Clytemnestra should in all haste leap from bed (27) and "shout for joy the *ololygmos*, the good-sounding cry of thanksgiving at these torches" (ὀλολυγμὸν εὐφημοῦντα τῇιδε λαμπάδι/ ἐπορθιάζειν 28–29). The *ololygmos* clearly is not only a nicely sounding cry

14 See Fraenkel (II 1950: 13 ad 17). For pharmaceutical notions regarding singing as a healing root sap, see Bollack and Judet de la Combe (I 1981–2001: 22–55 ad 17).

15 For the application of Derrida's (1972: 69–198 [Eng. 1981: 61–171]) famous analysis ("Plato's Pharmacy") of *pharmakon* regarding writing in Plato's *Phaedrus* to voice, see Dolar (2006: 46–47).

16 Denniston and Page (1957: 69 ad 23): "a common way of celebrating success," see also Fraenkel (II 1950: 17 ad 23 f.), with reference to Eur. *Alc.* 1154–1155, *HF* 763–764, and Soph. *El.* 278–280.

of celebration,[17] but also the shrill cry of women who, in a crisis situation, performatively drown out the moment of danger.[18] Especially just before the ritual slaughter of the sacrificial animal, an act normally accompanied by a chorus, such a cry emerges from the women in attendance (cf. ἐπορθιάζειν 29).[19] Thus with this ritual cry that becomes a vocal and self-referential leitmotif, Clytemnestra will not only celebrate the victory finally come but also very soon introduce and accompany her perverted sacrificial ritual of murder.[20]

The signal becomes the starting point for a chain of frightful events, which the watchman's diction implies with tragic irony; he himself as tyrannical subject first initiates the order according to agreed upon ritual procedures. He serves as the tail end of a communication structure that should unleash the signal for the citizens to celebrate the longed-for victory. After a long, sleepless watch, he is freed from suffering; and, using the typical "performative future,"[21] he utters his intention to start dancing the opening number out of joy and relief, the proem of a horrible hymn (φροίμιον χορεύσομαι 31).[22]

Admittedly, he dances the *choreia* isolated from the collective citizenry, which is tantamount to an anomaly.[23] The appointed contrivance concerning signals together with this reaction of spontaneous joy represents an initial overture, a prologue for *Agamemnon* and a prelude for the entire trilogy. He

17 According to Fraenkel (II 1950: 18 ad 28) and Raeburn and Thomas (2011: 70 ad 27–29). They, however, address the "problematic" character of this call regarding the killing of a relative as well: see Aesch. *Ag.* 587, 595, 1118; *Ch.* 387, 942. As an expression of joy, see Deubner (1941: 10).

18 See Deubner (1941: 14) (the discharge of fearful tension); Burkert (1985: 74) (moment of crisis and decision). See also Gödde (2011: 98–116) ("fear of danger" and "joy over the happy outcomes that … should be virtually evoked during the simultaneous 'discharge' of feelings of fear") (100). Particularly in female choruses: Sappho fr. 17.16 V. (now according to the most recent Sappho Papyrus find P. GC. inv. 105, fr. 2 col. II, 9–25, completed by Ferrari [2014: 15]) and Alcaeus fr. 130b.20 V. (in celebration). For its nearness to a cry of lament, "howling," see Connelly (2014: 267). On *ololygmos* in *Agamemnon*, see also Amendola (2005).

19 See Burkert (1983: 5, 12, 54 [on *ololyge*]) and Burkert (1985: 72, 74).

20 For perverted sacrificial ritual in tragedy, esp. in the *Oresteia*, see Zeitlin (1965); Zeitlin (1966); Burkert (1966: esp. 119–120); Pucci (1992); Henrichs (2000: esp. 180–184); Henrichs (2006: esp. 67–74); Gilbert (2003); for the beautiful sacrifice in *Agamemnon*, see Gödde (2010: 232–237). In general see also Bierl (2007: 33–37).

21 For the performative future, see the references in Bierl (2001: 329 n. 77 [Eng. 2009: 294 n. 77]).

22 Loraux (1990: 263 n. 40): "il revient en effet au veilleur de dire le prologue, mais, à vouloir danser, il anticipe l' entrée du choeur au vers 40."

23 Contra Fraenkel (II 1950: 19 ad 31).

himself holds to the ritual norm of the polis doctrine handed down by the ruling house, to rejoice in *euphemia* and to dance, the actual reaction and task of the citizen chorus. At the same time, because he cannot deliberately attempt to euphemize all the terrible facts with cries of jubilation (cf. εὐφημοῦντα 28), he prefers to remain silent regarding other matters, which is also a part of *euphemia*, implying sometimes holy silence. "A steer, a big one, steps onto the tongue" (βοῦς ἐπὶ γλώσσηι μέγας/ βέβηκεν 36–37), forbidding further speech.[24]

The house itself, so the watchman thinks, would, if it had a voice (φθογγὴν λάβοι 37) and speech to form words, speak the clearest (37–38). In the last one and a half verses he suggests how he would like to subtly communicate everything for those in the know, those who have learned, by such vocal means. Simultaneously he wants to keep the uninformed, those who have not learned, in the dark (μαθοῦσιν αὐδῶ κοὐ μαθοῦσι λήθομαι 39). The simple watchman thus acts almost like an initiate of a secret cult: the esoteric can be spoken among the insiders, but for the uninitiated the *lethe* precept holds fast: do not speak the unspeakable (*arrheton*) and remain silent.[25]

In doing so, the watchman holds to the rules handed down by a tyrannical polis. The *euphemia* will be split, according to customs, between the rulers and the ruled: 1) in a loud, performative shout of jubilation that helps to hide and drown out all the negative aspects and fears during this crisis situation of deciding whether everything will turn out well—particularly for inside the house, wondering if the revenge will go off smoothly as a sacrifice; 2) and in silence regarding all foreboding. The spontaneous and joyful reaction of the watchman's dance applies only to his personal relief from effort.[26]

The Marginal Chorus Assumes Its Authoritative Voice in the Parodos: A Web of Polyphonic Voices and *Parathelxis*

In contrast to the watchman, the choral group of old men is a typically marginalized chorus.[27] Above all it is a chorus that, due to old age and its politically oppressed status under the recently established tyranny of Clytemnestra and Aegisthus, scarcely dances and exerts little authority in its songs. At first it

24 For a parallel, with Fraenkel (II 1950: 23 ad 36 f.), see i.a. Thgn. 815.

25 For nearness to the diction of the mysteries, see also Bollack and Judet de la Combe (I 1981–2001: 40–41).

26 See also Gödde (2011: 98–103).

27 See Gould (1996); on the parodos, see Bollack and Judet de la Combe (I 1981–2001: 42–345) and Schein (2009).

gropes completely in the dark when trying to analyze the situation. It talks in riddles; with enigmatic images it anticipates things that, at this point, remain completely unknown.

In the *Oresteia* we find ourselves in a web of motifs that at times are counterfactually placed in relation to one another without the modern causal nexus.[28] The parodos (40–257) weaves such a locutionary web.[29] Images and events are jumbled, which at first make little sense.[30] The excessively long song constitutes the basis of the play, where the motifs of good and bad sound, the tension between the authoritative, euphemizing voice and the voice of *pathos* that is constantly under the threat of being silenced are highlighted by a meandering chorus endeavoring to drown out itself the dysphemic ground of suffering that constantly breaks through the surface. The chorus is eager to endow the events with higher sense but through the fusion of embedded voices that tend to underscore the choreuts' doing in the orchestra in a self-referential manner the audience loses track of the old men's 'big narration.'[31] While Clytemnestra concerns herself via linguistic and ritualistic manipulation with the course of the future, the *telos* of the coming events, and Cassandra foresees the future through prophecy, the chorus tries, in a type of 'prophecy after the fact,' to present their understanding of the terrible things that happened integrating the chain of motifs starting with the departure for war. Singing of two vultures nurturing a squawking brood (49–59), the chorus partially anticipates the bird signal of the eagle (112–120) that follows in the actual narration of the departure.

Birds, like stars, typically lend themselves to choral projections.[32] The two vultures can thus be understood in a self-referential manner: they are, in a way, metaphorical chorus leaders, circling high in the air. The verb στροφοδινοῦνται (51) can relate to the circles of the round dance; the vultures emit cries of lament (κλάζοντες 48) and aggression, not only because they cannot care for their chorus, the citizens of Argos so to speak, but even more because they cannot care for their own brood, in other words Helen and Iphigenia.[33] A

28 See Käppel (1998: esp. 25–38).

29 See Käppel (1998: 47–137).

30 See also Ferrari (1997).

31 On the concept of ventriloquism linked to the emission of different voices in the parodos that are fused, incorporated, and cannot be located, see Dolar (2006: 70). I owe this reference to Sarah Nooter, who presented a beautiful paper on the parodos, titled "Choral Voices and Ventriloquism in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*," on the occasion of the conference at Emory (20 Sept. 2014).

32 See Wilson (1999/2000) and Csapo (1999/2000).

33 Thiel (1993: 42) at first sees only the war cry that only later changes to a cry of lament.

god hears the *goos* as the squawking of birds (οἰωνόθροον γόον 56). *Goos* in *Agamemnon* always stands in contrast to the positive song expressing joy. A chorus inherently sings and dances from joy, for which reason the verb *paizein*, to move cheerfully as a child, serves as the terminus technicus for its activity. Yet in tragedy, song and dance often, in light of the excessive suffering, express *pathos*.[34] In typical fashion the vehicle (bird) and tenor (Greek war leaders) already overlap in a concrete and simultaneously enigmatic semantic. Reacting to the shrill (ὀξυβόαν 57) cry of these metics (τῶνδε μετοίκων 57)—both war leaders have already set forth to exact revenge, rendering the term μέτοικοι both resultative and proleptic—,[35] one of the gods sends "the wrathful Erinys" to the "transgressors," the Trojans (ὑστερόποινον πέμπει παραβᾶσιν Ἐρινύν 58–59). Likewise, Zeus Xenios sends Atreus' sons, robbed of their honor, after Paris (61–62), in order to exact revenge for his transgression, the abduction of Helen.

At the beginning of the trilogy the war appears to be over, yet according to the choreuts, neither the sacrifices of Clytemnestra nor the tears of *goos* can drown out, charm away, or cover up this wrath (69–71) (παραθέλξειν cf. 71). Choral performance as an aesthetic and authoritative *aoide* is likewise a *parathelxis*, which exercises a magical and charming effect over its recipients, touching also the gods here. The *Oresteia* continually thematizes precisely this beguiling enchantment, a drowning out of the *goos*-songs of tears as well as the mitigating strategies involving ritual practices such as sacrifice. Through aesthetic singing, also based on the voice, one tries to erect a "wall" against the uncanny and dangerous voice, turning "it into a fetish object." Silencing the *goos*, the dysphemic emission of corporeality, the aesthetic fetish nevertheless hints at the constitutive gap of absence that can never be closed. Any hope for a cure through the symbolic and beautiful form proves to be pure "illusion" since a singing voice cannot restore any "profound" and deeper meaning but simply obfuscated and concealed *pathos*.[36]

The choral "we" now sings that due to their old age they remained at home and therefore offer no eyewitness accounts of the events at Troy (72–74). With sticks (75) one "creeps along the way with a three-foot gait" (τρίποδας μὲν ὁδοὺς στείχει 81). The pronouncement directly reflects the actual movement of the

34 Bierl (2001: 85 [Eng. 2009: 66]).

35 Different in Fraenkel (II 1950: 37 ad 57), who relates the adjective to the far height, where the birds live in the air. At the end of the trilogy the war leaders will be referred to as metics, like the Erinyes metamorphosed into Eumenides (*Eum.* 1044). In this sense the chorus sounds all too optimistic, thinking the plaguing spirits will soon fall outside the house, i.e., like metics, and lie there (μέτοικοι δόμων, πεσοῦνται πάλιν *Ch.* 971).

36 See also Dolar (2006: 30–31).

chorus over to the orchestra; the weak chorus members act both like children (81) and elders, "a dreamlike image appearing in the daylight" (ὄναρ ἡμερόφαντον 82), simultaneously living and already dead. The authority and strength are missing.

As they inquisitively approach the palace gate to ask Clytemnestra after her reasons for the sacrificial fire,[37] the old men find it locked and reflect now at length, assuming authority finally as a chorus (104–106):[38]

> κύριός εἰμι θροεῖν ὅδιον κράτος αἴσιον ἀνδρῶν
> ἐκτελέων—ἔτι γὰρ θεόθεν καταπνεύει
> πειθώ, μολπᾶν ἀλκάν, ξύμφυτος αἰών—
>
> I have the authority to sing of the power of the heroes, who decamped beneath auspicious signs—as my age still animates me with the persuasion of words from divine inspiration, the strength of the choral song.

Divine inspiration[39] (θεόθεν καταπνεύει 105) impels the chorus, despite its age, to *peitho*, persuasion, and "the power of choral song" (μολπᾶν ἀλκάν 106). The chorus also, in its own opinion, possesses *peitho*, with which it, like Clytemnestra, insists upon sovereignty in interpreting things. *Peitho* is, as I understand it here, the persuasive ability to assess things on the basis of a theological consideration according to traditional ethical standards and, in doing so, also to palliate and euphemize them, because it is, allegedly, the will of the gods so that people finally follow these standards. That which the chorus claims with these words is exactly the prophetic, hermeneutic, and cajoling capacity due the collective citizenry of the chorus with its authoritative voice. However, claim and reality diverge. The chorus tries to endow the prior events with meaning, yet, despite all the embellishment, negative factors continually appropriate its voice, the hymnic praise brimming with lament.

In the chorus' voice, the past events become a web of enigmatic references, which refer to the course of events both impending and already passed.[40] The concrete omen of the two birds, the eagles, before the departure of the 'raptors,' seizing and ripping apart a pregnant hare (109–120), the chorus attempts to read, according to Calchas's embedded words (126–138 and 140–155), as a positive symbol of Troy's fall, but also as an expression of terrifying violence, which

37 See Käppel (1998: 48–53).
38 See Fraenkel (II 1950: 59 ad 104) and Denniston and Page (1957: 77 ad 104).
39 See Fraenkel (II 1950: 64–64 ad 106).
40 See Ferrari (1997: esp. 24–43).

befalls the young woman, i.e., Iphigenia, who stand in close connection with Artemis. The refrain-like intercalary verse αἴλινον αἴλινον εἰπέ, τό δ' εὖ νικάτω (121, 139, 159), functioning both as exhortation in prayer and lament, is, in a certain way, a magical means to express the hope that the good will prevail in a moment where the story focuses on the slaughter of a vulnerable sacrificial victim.[41] The choral voice typically tries to drown out and cajole over the ritual cry of lament that is vehemently and paradoxically emitted in the first part of the verse. In an emblematic manner this juxtaposition of voices can stand for the tragic paradox and the dramatic course of events in the entire *Oresteia*.

As the parodos is, by and large, a narration and hardly an authoritative explanation, we find the latter in the direct, embedded speeches of the authoritative and articulate prophet Calchas (126–138 and 140–155).[42] His voice cannot be attributed to a new figure but is appropriated by the chorus, assuming simultaneously different voices. As an expert regarding the proper theological sayings and the appropriate practices, Calchas also delivers an interpretation that, in the reproduced quote, remains as inscrutable as the chorus' telling, both voices blurring into a heterogeneous mixture.

Speech is a signifying mechanism that makes possible ambivalent and contrary explanations. The contrasts, oppositions, and tensions in the song are then laid drastically bare. The chaste Artemis (Ἄρτεμις ἁγνά 134) rebukes the winged hounds of her father Zeus—a conflict then arises already in the divine heaven. She is angry with them, "because they sacrifice the wretched hare, before the birth along with her own offspring" (αὐτότοκον πρὸ λόχου μογερὰν πτάκα θυομένοισιν 136 [cf. 134–136]). Artemis hates this sacrificial meal of the eagles (137), yet this feeling of unease is almost magically drowned out by the refrain-like verse of reflexive instigation αἴλινον αἴλινον εἰπέ, τὸ δ' εὖ νικάτω sung anew (139). *Menis*, Wrath, presiding over the house, cunningly recalls these things and avenges the child (οἰκονόμος δολία, μνάμων Μῆνις τεκνόποινος 155), all of which Clytemnestra, who becomes an Erinys, embodies. The speech of the prophet Calchas is described as a vocal utterance (ἀπέκλαγξεν 156), an author-

41 See Henrichs (2005: esp. 198): "In tragedy, ritual remedies usually fail, and instead of being the solution, ritual becomes part of the problem. That is why Kalkhas is so concerned, and why his words are apotropaic."

42 For the feature of embedded direct speeches of Calchas in the parodos that "suits the distinctive prophetic and epicizing style of choral lyric in *Agamemnon*," see Schein (2009: 393–395 [citation 395]). See also Fletcher (1999: esp. 30–32): "… the prediction of Calchas is a device by which the poet insinuates his voice into the discourse of the chorus in order to remind us of where the drama is headed" (31).

itative oracle in piercing sound tantamount to dreadful songs:[43] he mixes a horrible fate with great good (156)—in tune (ὁμόφωνον 158) with these fateful words the chorus emits its euphemizing and self-assuring verse again: αἴλινον αἴλινον εἰπέ, τὸ δ' εὖ νικάτω (159). As said above, the utterance addresses bad and good things simultaneously. The passage contains its own poetic and lyric tonal coloring through Calchas, and the chorus can again, through its speech act of exhortation, try to tip the scales in the direction of the good (159).

Also the famous hymn to Zeus (160–183) is, as a command, such a magical device to drown out and charm over the dreadful reality employing voice and music in ritual praxis. As an authority against Artemis, it is possible that evil arises from Zeus as well. The chorus emphasizes that whoever now "gladly sings the triumph of Zeus" (Ζῆνα δέ τις προφρόνως ἐπινίκια κλάζων 174), "wins insight into everything" (τεύξεται φρενῶν τὸ πᾶν 175), because the god brings men "to the way of thinking" (τὸν φρονεῖν βροτοὺς ὁδώ-/ σαντα 176–177) and therefore bestows them with the principle of *pathei mathos* (177), "making it a valid law" (τὸν πάθει μάθος/ θέντα κυρίως ἔχειν 177–178).[44] Just as the chorus claims to be κύριος (104), that is, to possess the authority of explanatory song, so does Zeus embody nothing other than the abstract formula, which the watchman already emphasized. *Pathos* is at hand, it brings the violent (cf. 183) insight of submission. Yet, if pain and sorrow gain the upper hand, the belief in the proper world order is finally lost. However through grace, *charis* (182), paired with violence, the gods force people beneath the yoke of the proper world order and way of thinking. The aesthetic charming over, obfuscating the dangerous object voice, is only partially successful, while the chorus becomes the mouthpiece of Zeus himself and thus the medium of the quintessential tragic experience: to convey suffering in aesthetic forms and to communicate thoughtful insights in view of the overwhelming *pathos*.

Faced with the dilemma of the calm sea at Aulis, given the choice set forth by Calchas either to lose his leadership position or sacrifice his daughter, Agamemnon, according to the chorus, chooses—again in embedded direct

---

43 Gödde (2011: 121) describes κλαγγή, like in the case of Cassandra (1153), as "prevalent, piercing, sometimes animalistic sounds." Often they are combined with horrible songs, see also Schein (2009: 391). The acoustic urgency Gödde (2001: 121 n. 85) interprets as "a sign for the unavoidable and destructive truth of the prophecy." Fraenkel (II 1950: 95 ad 156 f.), following Headlam, refers the expression to the volume and excitement of the voices.

44 Raeburn and Thomas (2011: 87 ad 176–178) maintain that, on the basis of *brotoi*, the assertions refer to humanity in general and so the public, which sympathizes with the protagonist. Lesky (1972: 163) sees the expression *pathei mathos* as a "keyword of Aeschylean tragedy."

speech—the way of vocal mitigation (206–217): the dreadful virgin sacrifice, described in the parodos (184–257), shall be good because it is right (217).[45] Therefore Agamemnon also conjures up a good outcome. Although the misdeed is before his eyes, Agamemnon enters upon the virgin sacrifice before her wedding (προτέλεια 227) to ensure the departure of the ships, an expression of his madness. The final tableau about Iphigenia's death becomes again a subtly nuanced metatheatrical *mise en abyme* of the struggle over the politics of voices between the people in power and the oppressed in *Agamemnon*. Even if you silence the voice of *pathos* it will always break through and find expression through other channels, in particular the visual. The leaders do not respond to the appeals and vocal pleas of the girl (λιτὰς δὲ καὶ κληδόνας πατρώιους 228) directed at her father (228–230).[46] Conversely, Agamemnon performs a prayer (εὐχάν 231) and authoritatively orders (φράσεν 231) the perverted sacrifice of his daughter like a goat.[47] Above all her "pretty-beaked mouth" (στόματός τε καλλιπρώιρου 235) should be kept from uttering "a curse against the house" (φθόγγον ἀραῖον οἴκοις 237), that is any curse that might stand against the positively colored discourse of power.

Now gagged, Iphigenia can no longer speak; however, even mute, the visual signals of supplication come through, piercing like an arrow. Desiring to speak out her dirge, she resembles a stark, muted image (242) full of eroticism, from which we can still read the gestures. She lets her saffron-robe stream downwards (239) and stands naked in front of him. This symbolic gesture not only indicates that Iphigenia, like the girls in Brauron, leaves maidenhood, but also that she is about to speak the unvarnished truth before her imminent death as a victim to be killed on the altar. To some extent this scene foreshadows Cassandra unveiled later in the play, when she, as anti-bride, speaks openly about her cruel end, the perverted sacrifice (1269–1330). Through her silent body language and gaze Iphigenia's communicative intention, her desire to address each of her sacrificers with supplicating and cursing voice, becomes clear,[48] especially as she so often sang the pure and faithful song

45 Fraenkel (II 1950: 126 ad 217): "Behind the phrase seems to lie a regular concluding formula from the language of prayer." West's emendation ἀπὸ δ' αὐδᾶι (216), on the contrary, acknowledges the wrongness of the sacrifice.

46 For the power of words and esp. cledonomancy, see Peradotto (1969).

47 See Henrichs (2006: 67–74).

48 With Lacan (1966: 808, 817 [Eng. 2006: 684, 692]), who, in his graphs of desire, defined the voice, alongside the gaze, as embodiment of his *objet petit a*, we could argue that, when voice is violently silenced, Iphigenia uses the other of these dangerously suggestive, hypnotic, ruinous, threatening media that produce emissions like darts and arrows (ἀπ'

with the right timbre in rooms full of beautiful tables covered with rich sacrifices (240–246); namely "the virgin, yet unwed, sang with holy voice" (ἔμελψεν, ἁγνᾶι δ' ἀταύρωτος αὐδᾶι 245) for the triple offering of her father, a libation to thank Paean, the musical substantiation of the healing god, Paean-Apollo (παιῶνα 247). Her song used to be a song of hope for salvation, auguring happiness, a song of ritual celebration that palliated everything, but now, when she wishes to sing a song of curse, understood as *dysphemia*, she is violently silenced.[49]

Justice is embodied by Zeus. With a little resignation, the password to suffer and to learn (cf. 177) and thereby not to complain (250) follows: Δίκα δὲ τοῖς μὲν παθοῦσιν μαθεῖν ἐπιρρέπει· "Justice sways the balance, bringing to some learning by suffering." As said above, in view of the excessive suffering tragedy—and thus also the chorus in *Agamemnon*—can only communicate some insight into the deeper mechanisms of justice under Zeus. Only via a final speech-act, the appeal that "action" (πρᾶξις), i.e., the course of the dramatic events in the trilogy, "may be prosperous" (255), the chorus can try to conceal and charm away the dread of the present anew. Hope is vain, and even though the chorus knows that the tragic reality can only mean lament, the wish for a good outcome metadramatically anticipates the denouement of the trilogy in *Eumenides*.

Clytemnestra's Appearance

Yet in the face of excessive suffering the mitigating mantra of Zeus' religion continually threatens to turn suddenly into lament. However, in view of Clytemnestra's eventual appearance, one prudently prefers to remain silent in the face of the boundless *pathos* and to accept the theological rhetoric of the context. As a reaction to the 'good messages' that lead to "hopes of happy tidings" (εὐαγγέλοισιν ἐλπίσιν 262), joy and tears permeate the chorus, but do not elicit dancing (270). One asks skeptically, if the longed-for victory over Troy is not just rumor (φάτις 276)[50] and that maybe Clytemnestra simply lends belief to her dreams (ὀνείρων φάσματ' εὐπειθῆ σέβεις 274). But the queen is completely sure, and

ὄμματος βέλει 240). See Dolar (2006: esp. 39–42). For the gaze (just like the voice) as a drive reaching "its aim without attaining its goal"—"its arrow comes back from the target"—in the typically Lacanian gliding signification process (*"glissement incessant du signifié sous le signifiant"* ["incessant sliding of the signified under the signifier"], Lacan [1966: 502, Eng. 2006: 419]), see Dolar (2006: 74).

49 See Degener (1996).

50 See Bollack and Judet de la Combe (III 1981–2001: 108–116).

thereby appears to associate the signal chain of torch fire with the divine. For her it is clear: there are conquerors and the conquered, separated like vinegar and oil (322). Eros, that is sexual lust, and lucre (341–342) are the only motivating forces that bring about the fall of a victor, and Clytemnestra, like the chorus in the parodos, affirms her wish for a happy outcome (τὸ δ' εὖ κρατοίη 349).[51]

The Force of Peitho's Voice

In the first stasimon (355–487), the chorus attempts anew to thank the gods for their favor with pious prayer (354).[52] Prayer and the authoritative word try to create a sense with which to explain, theologically, the events as Zeus' justice. "Wretched Peitho," the personification of persuasion, the blandishment, according to the chorus, is a violent force (βιᾶται δ' ἁ τάλαινα Πειθώ 385), Ate's cure is an illusion (386–387).[53] No matter how much one wants to mitigate, heal or moderate with voice, pain always breaks through. In this way, the past is further discussed in narrative, especially once again in the fusion of voices, while the inlaid perspective of the "prophets of the house" (409)—"almost a chorus within a chorus" since their cited voice is embedded in the choral song—helps to make everything enigmatic through polyphony and hybridization.[54] Menelaus had to bear Helen's infidelity in silence; she has left with Paris, and Eros and Pothos, the desire for the absent mistress of the house, find expression in "beautifully formed statues" (εὐμόρφων δὲ κολοσσῶν 416) that mean illusion, danger, and misery. But their charm is hateful for the husband since he suffers from the absence of all the power of Aphrodite (414–419).[55]

Such hallucinations of sorrow are deception arising from dreams (ὀνειρόφαντοι δὲ πενθήμονες … δόξαι 420–421), unable to be grasped (420–425). Out of Eros grow war and death. The fallen are grieved over; one can only euphemize and praise (εὖ λέγοντες 445) heroic deaths, yet in reality, doing so is mere delusion. The Erinyes pursue whoever kills (463)—later they become actors in the *Eumenides*, not just the narrative-explicating chorus. As the herald comes, the

51 Fraenkel (II 1950: 178 ad 348f.) sees in this expression a sort of "travesty" of the adages in the parodos.

52 See Bollack and Judet de la Combe (I 1981–2001: 369–493).

53 For this see Käppel (1998: 141–142) and Lloyd-Jones (1979: 50 ad 386).

54 See Fletcher (1999 [citation 36]).

55 See Bollack and Judet de la Combe (I 1981–2001: 429–437). See also Karamitrou (1999). For κολοσσός as double and substitute, see Bollack and Judet de la Combe (I 1981–2001: 432–435).

chorus once again expresses the wish that the good may join to the appearance of good (εὖ γὰρ πρὸς εὖ φανεῖσι προσθήκη πέλοι 500).

Suffering Bursts out of the Façade: The Paean of the Erinyes

The herald returned from Troy's realm of death is likewise anxious to let everything appear in the correct light for the leadership. Silence is the only "remedy against harm" (πάλαι τὸ σιγᾶν φάρμακον βλάβης ἔχω 548)—according to the chorus. Lament and foreboding are to be hidden.

After the report, the chorus is now ready to accept the victory (οὐκ ἀναίνομαι 583). Even old men learn well (εὐμαθεῖν 584)—yet in the victory the suffering is not absent. Clytemnestra exults out of joy (ἀνωλόλυξα μὲν πάλαι χαρᾶς ὕπο 587); this renewed *ololygmos* (595) is her method of self-assured suppression of the crisis and functions to introduce the sacrifice of atonement that turns out to be a perverted sacrifice of murder. The chorus clearly recognizes that Clytemnestra, as translator for clear interpreters (τοροῖσιν ἑρμηνεῦσιν 616), has the tonal and semantic sense making process under control (615–616). With *peitho* and a complacent (εὐπρεπῆ 616) speech, she declares the situation officially and explains everything in ritual form.[56]

Responding to the choreuts' inquiry after the state of other fighters, particularly Menelaus, a dimension of pain also cracks the herald's surface. Yet he tries to fight off this pain: "it is not fitting to mar a blissful day of good news and sounds with the tongue of bad report" (εὔφημον ἦμαρ οὐ πρέπει κακαγγέλωι/ γλώσσηι μιαίνειν· 636–637). That would mean blasphemy—"apart is the honor paid to the gods" (χωρὶς ἡ τιμὴ θεῶν 637)[57]—since the men try to let the gods appear in a good light. Ambivalence must be done away with, molded into the positive.

In light of the dead, "loaded with such sorrows" (τοιῶνδε μέντοι πημάτων σεσαγμένον 644), the herald underlines, "it is proper" for him "to intone this triumph song of the pursuing Erinyes" (πρέπει λέγειν παιῶνα τόνδ' Ἐρινύων 645), that is a song that emphasizes wrath and negativity. The paean is a song in crisis to vanquish danger.[58] The paradoxical connection of a song of healing in the

56 See Bollack and Judet de la Combe (III 1981–2001: 241–243).

57 See Bollack and Judet de la Combe (III 1981–2001: 250–251).

58 See Käppel (1992); for this see Gödde (2011: 119–120), who finds that the deictic τόνδ' refers not only to the words previously mentioned but also to the entire report, which, due to the "paradoxical" mixing of victory and sorrow, finds likewise its expression in "the triumph song [= paean] of the Erinyes" (120).

key of the Erinyes metatheatrically lays bare the tension between paean and *goos*, between a song of happiness and one of lament.[59] The juxtaposition of both song genres is again emblematic of the tragic paradox of the *Agamemnon*. Mixing "good with the bad" does not find a suitable enunciation, since the gods might react with awful voices, wrath and anger (648–649). The rulers and their subjects are eager to cover the negative with good and beautiful voices that are consonant with the ritual melodies. But in tragedy Dionysus is responsible for this mixture of both positive and negative contents and form, or in other words, for the paradoxical condition constitutive of the genre. Despite all endeavor to tidily separate both conditions and drown out or conceal *dysphemia*, the figures will become entangled in the typically tragic concatenation.

In the second stasimon (681–782),[60] the chorus sings pseudo-etymologically (cf. ἐτητύμως 681) about Helen, destroyer of ships, men, and cities (ἑλέναυς ἕλανδρος ἑλέπτολις 690). Zeus punished the Trojans who brought forth the "wedding song"—"loudly and discordantly" (ἐκφάτως 705–706), which they had to sing as brothers-in-law (707–708). Troy must now change the tune and "learn a different one" (cf. μεταμανθάνουσα 709), i.e., learn from pain, the wedding song changed into "a hymn of many sorrows" (ὕμνον … πολύθρηνον 709–711), meaning the song of joy veers into *goos* and threnody, the present mood. The tragic *metabole* is underscored by references to sounds and melodies in a self-referential manner. Helen, "the heart-wrenching flower of Eros" (743), came as "Erinys that brings tears to brides" (749) in her fully erotic form. From happiness can "insatiable woe" quickly arise (βλαστάνειν ἀκόρεστον οἰζύν 756). Despite all foreboding the chorus still tries to distance itself from the other tonality of lament (757).

As Agamemnon finally appears, the first greeting, the overture and proem (φροίμιον τόδε 829), is directed at the gods; he likewise invokes the good: "what is good, that it remains good for long, for this one should take counsel" (τὸ μὲν καλῶς ἔχον/ ὅπως χρονίζον εὖ μενεῖ βουλευτέον 846–847). Otherwise one should apply remedy for the resistance of illness, even such as those having to do with health and healing songs (φαρμάκων παιωνίων 848) (cf. 848–850). Afterwards Clytemnestra is able to allow Agamemnon to enter the house upon the red carpet, symbolic for the way of blood (855–974).

59 Fraenkel (II 1950: 321 ad 645) speaks of a "blasphemous paradox" and refers to *Ag.* 1144 and 1386–1387. Good and evil are mixed (*Ag.* 648), while Clytemnestra still thought to be able to separate vinegar and oil from one another (*Ag.* 322–323).

60 See Bollack and Judet de la Combe (II 1981–2001: 1–156).

The Lyre-Free Dirge of the Erinys Bursting out Spontaneously from within

In the third stasimon (975–1034) evil premonition now ultimately seizes the mood of the chorus,[61] after again and again trying to align its utterances with the principles of the leadership and to speak well accordingly. Its song is suddenly devoid of optimism, of a good mood; rather it sounds now like the prophecy of negativity, dream images of fear. Absent any instruction, the negative songs emerge spontaneously from within, intoning the threnody of the Erinys, the lyre-less (988–993):

πεύθομαι δ' ἀπ' ὀμμάτων
νόστον αὐτόμαρτυς ὤν·
τὸν δ' ἄνευ λύρας ὅμως ὑμνωιδεῖ
θρῆνον Ἐρινύ⟨ο⟩ς αὐτοδίδακτος ἔσωθεν
θυμός, οὐ τὸ πᾶν ἔχων
ἐλπίδος φίλον θράσος.

I recognize with my eyes
the return, I am a witness myself;
without the lyre, intones my breast nevertheless
from inside out the threnody of the Erinys completely without instruction,
without possessing in any way the confidence of hope.

All attempts to allow the healing songs along with theological and ritual meaningfulness as well as with assurance to prevail fail in the face of reality. From the chorus, now acting as a prophet, streams a spontaneous, internal voice, witnessing dream images of terror and premonition. Now the most internal part intones hymnically a threnody that an Erinys, soon Clytemnestra, defines. The heart of the chorus is whipped in circles by the dynamic whirlpool twisting towards the end (τελεσφόροις δίναις κυκλούμενον κέαρ 997), spinning like a chorus in a round dance. The old bodies after all begin to express themselves in dancing figures. The circular movement of the dance self-referentially reflects the storm of feelings. Spontaneously, "self-inspired," and without instruction by a choral trainer, the *chorodidaskalos* (cf. αὐτοδίδακτος 992),[62] the chorus

61 See Bollack and Judet de la Combe (II 1981–2001: 199–289).

62 See Hom. *Od.* 22.346–347: *autodidaktos* (referring to Phemius); see Fraenkel (II 1950: 446 ad 992).

turns to a threnody and expressive melody of lament. From the demanded yet tentative quest for meaning directed toward melodies of moderation and happiness, springs an uncontrollable dance, implying chaos and horror. It is certainly questionable if the dance actually took place or is merely projected, metaphorically, upon internal turmoil. Be it as it may, this song clearly underscores the tragic development in metatheatrical terms. A chorus in tragedy typically sings about its change of mood when the *pathos* cannot be pushed back again, in choral and musical terms. It is still a dirge of Erinyes who become only metaphorically visible. But this internal song and dance anticipate already the terrible songs of the Erinyes who act out their theatrical epiphany as a real chorus in the last play of the trilogy. The second antistrophe culminates in the thought that incantation cannot call back a dead man (πάλιν ἀγκαλέσαιτ' ἐπαείδων 1021). Singing incantations, the ἐπωιδαί, means exactly the charming speech act of 'singing upon' the horrible reality, thus initiating a reversal. To bring a dead man back to life is as impossible as to drown out evil or "timely wind off a ball of wool" (καίριον ἐκτολυπεύσειν 1032) where good and bad are garbled. Only Zeus can bring order and restrain the speech and phonetic production (1029), otherwise "the heart outstrips the tongue and pours this song forth" (1029). It murmurs (βρέμει 1030) in darkness, full of sad thoughts, in the appropriate sound of Bromios anticipating the cruel and tragic murders carried out under the auspices of the god of tragedy.

While the self-referential voice, musicality, and *choreia* have until now mainly concerned the chorus itself, which has been shown striving to win vocal and ritualistic control over the events in an authoritative way—and simultaneously failing to do so—, we have already seen in the watchman and Clytemnestra indications that likewise as individuals they are portrayed through these metatheatrical features. Now, with Cassandra, such characterization comes to the fore.

The Voice of Prophetic Cassandra: *Goos* vs. *Euphemia* (1035–1371)

Foreseeing via prophetic insight her own fate, the young Cassandra emits the voice of *goos*.[63] At first, however, she remains silent upon the stage after her arrival with Agamemnon, physically embodying the exact silence continually

63 For the Cassandra scene, see i.a. Reinhardt (1949: 97–105 [parallels and differences between Agamemnon and Cassandra; connections to the forthcoming *Eumenides*]); Knox (1972: 109–121 [Cassanda's role as third actor]); esp. Lebeck (1971: 28–39, 47–56, 61–62, 84–85) and Mitchell-Boyask (2006); for the entire scene, see also Thiel (1993: 289–347).

stressed by the watchman and others.[64] Faced with her persevering silence, the others guess that as a barbarian she does not understand Greek. Clytemnestra even suggests another form of communication, "instead of her voice" (ἀντὶ φωνῆς), Cassandra should communicate via sign language with her "barbarian hand" (καρβάνωι χερί 1061). A *hermeneus*, a translator and interpreter, seems necessary (1061). Yet Cassandra, just like Clytemnestra, understands everything crystal clear—unlike the chorus—and can explain herself.[65] Clytemnestra then threatens to yoke the girl with a brutal bridle (χαλινόν 1066) and leaves lest she incurs defeat at the hands of this young seer. The chorus, however, takes pity on Cassandra and through an *amoibaion* (1072–1177) engages with her directly.

Suddenly, Cassandra bursts into an inarticulate and urgent lament that rolls into an invocation of Apollo, its significance nearly disabled by its pure tonal character (1072–1073). Her appeal to the god becomes an imploring invocation of pain and threnody as she clearly foresees her death upon entering the house. Her invocation confuses the chorus; the god of healing and purification, the god of paeans, the very remedy against pain, has, on the surface, nothing to do with lament and threnody (1074–1075). Cassandra's shrill outburst ὀτοτοτοτοῖ ποποῖ δᾶ (1072) bleeds into "Apollo! Apollo!" (ὦπολλον ὦπολλον 1073)—the loud, inarticulate scream at first echoing all purely emotional Greek cries, devoid of any communication, a pure and spontaneous exclamation expressed performatively to avert crisis.[66] Here Apollo becomes a typical epiclesis, seemingly devoid of sense, a cry personifying the deity. To summon specifically Apollo's complementary divinity, i.e., Dionysus, likewise associated with barbaric epiphany, one slips into fury through inarticulate ejaculations, short and often repeated, with phonetic combinations like *iakch-*, *bakch-*, *eua-*, *eiu-*, *ie-*, *iy-*.[67] The personified ὦπολλον ὦπολλον cry merges with the pure lament ὀτοτοτοτοῖ ποποῖ δᾶ in senseless and purely emotional complaint[68]—the enunci-

64 For Cassandra's silence, see Thalmann (1985: 228–229) and Montiglio (2000: 213–216). For silence in general, see Dolar (2006: 152–162).

65 Clytemnestra is described as a *hermeneus* in *Ag.* 616.

66 For the scream that "epitomizes the signifying gesture precisely not signifying anything in particular," see Dolar (2006: 27–29 [citation 28]); as voice, although standing at the intersection between body and language, it is neither part of the body nor of language; see Dolar (2006: 73).

67 See also Versnel (1970: 27–34).

68 For the scream as expression of pain, see Bollack and Judet de la Combe (IV 1981–2001: 429–431 and 432). Heirman (1975) calls it a "glossolalia." For the voice "as an authority over the Other and as an exposure to the Other" and, *qua* drive, as excess between "emission and exposure," see Dolar (2006: 80–81).

ated o-sounds melting into one—and becomes an appellation of the god himself, connoting nothing other than impassioned performance. Simultaneously, these repeated ejaculations of phonetic combinations contain some "poetic function" as Roman Jakobson defines it.[69] The appalled chorus asks why she utters cries of woe to Loxias, who has nothing to do with dirges (1074–1075). Cassandra performs, as perverted lyric bard, for Apollo, but since she frenetically addresses her forthcoming woe at his hands, she slips into the Dionysiac dimension of *mania* and *pathos*, singing—from the choral perspective—for the absent yet present Dionysus. The genre is constituted by this oxymoronic overlap here thematized in self-referential manner.[70]

The chorus therefore views this scream as *dysphemia*, a vocal utterance inviting the god to witness a *goos*-situation against ritual decency (ἤδ' αὖτε δυσφημοῦσα τὸν θεὸν καλεῖ,/ οὐδὲν προσήκοντ' ἐν γόοις παραστατεῖν 1078–1079).[71] Here *goos* implies not the celebratory voice of the collective, rather the singular voice of a wailing, lamenting girl threatening to overthrow the existing order with her intensity. Cassandra associates, pseudo-etymologically, the cry with *apollymi* (ἀπώλεσας, "you destroyed" 1082), retroactively allocating to it a sense derived from the Greek language. As a barbarian she possesses the power of vocal communication without a translator. Apollo's actions destroyed her, so Cassandra complains, despite standing beneath his aegis.

Sight through Sound

A prophetess blessed by the god, Cassandra sees the house as a "slaughterhouse of men" (ἀνδροσφαγεῖον 1092). The chorus supposes her gifted, like an animal, with a keen sense of smell that allows her to recognize the blood and murder imbuing the house (1093–1094). The remark actually constitutes a more cynical defence: in the eyes of the chorus, Cassandra is like a bloodhound (κυνὸς δίκην 1093)—young women were often compared with other untamed animals[72]—as an actual person could not possibly know these things. Yet, in reality she possesses a keen sense of prophecy.

69 Jakobson (1960: esp. 358 [= *Selected Writings* III: 27]). See Tambiah (1985: 165) and Bierl (2001: 287–299, esp. 293 with n. 503, 331–346, esp. 335 with n. 92 [Eng. 2009: 254–265, esp. 259–260 with n. 503, 296–310, esp. 299 with n. 92]).

70 See Loraux (1990: 265).

71 See Gödde (2011: 121).

72 See Calame (1997: 238–244) and Seaford (1987: 111 [128 in reference to Cassandra]).

The chorus repudiates Cassandra: we seek no prophets at all (1098–1099). In her mind's eye images swell, finding only vocal expression in this acoustic space—Cassandra sees Agamemnon's murder in the bathtub (1100–1104, 1107–1110), yet the chorus, already left in the dark by the vision's meaning, fails to understand her insinuating and mysterious language (ἄιδρίς εἰμι 1105), still caught, for obvious reasons, in the realm of *euphemia*. The chorus remains ignorant (οὔπω ξυνῆκα 1112), emphasizing its uncertainty due to the mystification of Cassandra's vague prophecy (νῦν γὰρ ἐξ αἰνιγμάτων/ ἐπαργέμοισι θεσφάτοις ἀμηχανῶ 1112–1113).

In the vision of murder, Cassandra stresses that the *stasis*, insatiable discord, should be celebrated with an *ololygmos* (στάσις δ' ἀκόρετος ... κατολολυξάτω 1117–1118). *Stasis* as the action of positioning oneself (from ἵστημι) simultaneously recalls the choral *katastasis*, the formation of a chorus (cf. χορῶν κατάστασιν 23) and thus the choral group.[73] The chorus in and of itself is a paradoxical phenomenon, the establishment of a social group divided from the larger polis entailing both harmony and strife.[74] Thus we could understand a choral group of violent agents "whom family cannot sate" (1117), bursting out in the terrible *ololygmos* cry, particularly as Clytemnestra and the Erinyes use to howl in the same sound-formation.[75]

As it is, the chorus interprets the remark as a call for an Erinys to likewise cry out in joy (Ἐρινὺν .../ ἐπορθιάζειν 1119–1120), missing that Clytemnestra is herself the Erinys. Cassandra wails in a loud voice, evoking her own fate as well, pouring out and mixing her pain with the horror pertaining to others (τὸ γὰρ ἐμὸν θροῶ πάθος ἐπεγχέασα 1137).[76] The ὀλολύζειν alongside her other vocal yet inarticulate cries (ἐπορθιάζειν, θροεῖν) confuses further and appears the phonetic expression of insanity, rebelling against the rational order of the polis, and the religion of Zeus. But let us remember: in connection with Clytemnestra, exactly this *ololygmos* proved the leitmotif denoting not only celebration but also the high-pitched cries of women performatively drowning out the moment

73 For *katastasis*, 'establishment' of choral performance traditions in Sparta, see Nagy (1990: 343–344); for *stasis* as "*constitution* and *division*," see Nagy (1990: 366–367); on the passage, see Loraux (1990: 267); for the meaning 'choral group,' see *Ch.* 458 and *Eum.* 311.

74 See Nagy (1990: 366–367), esp. the citation (367): "In sum, the ritual essence of the choral lyric performance is that it is *constitutive* of society in the very process of *dividing* it."

75 Fraenkel (III 1950: 505 ad 1117) however puts forth three contrary reasons against this opinion, likewise Bollack and Judet de la Combe (IV 1981–2001: 452–454).

76 For threnody as libation (see ἐπεγχέασα M [ἐπεγχύδαν Headlam, accepted by West and Judet de la Combe]), see Bollack and Judet de la Combe (IV 1981–2001: 466–467).

of danger in a crisis, especially during a sacrifice.[77] Clytemnestra celebrated Agamemnon's homecoming with this shrill cry (ὀλολυγμὸν …/ ἐπορθιάζειν 28–29)—her shout anticipating the murder of the same, an act notoriously stylized as a sacrifice. The Erinyes and Cassandra, notionally, do the same in their performance, ironically thematizing yet again the slaughter as ritual sacrifice, connoting it euphemistically.[78]

Insanity, Lament, and Paradoxical Chant

Now the chorus turns away disgusted, striking up a song against the allegedly insane girl (1140–1145):

φρενομανής τις εἶ θεοφόρητος, ἀμ-
φὶ δ' αὑτᾶς θροεῖς
νόμον ἄνομον, οἷά τις ξουθά
ἀκόρετος βοᾶς, φεῦ, φιλοίκτοις φρεσίν
Ἴτυν Ἴτυν στένουσ' ἀμφιθαλῆ κακοῖς
ἀηδὼν μόρον.

You are out of your mind, divinely possessed;
you cry forth about yourself
a song that is no song, like a vibrant-throated bird
wailing insatiably, alas, with a heart fond of grieving,
the nightingale lamenting 'Itys, Itys!' for a death
in which both parents did evil.

In the chorus' eyes, Cassandra's inarticulate raving and purely vocal shouts of lament indicate a crazed and possessed disposition, shrugging off these horrible and haunting sounds as only a song thwarting the precepts of *euphemia*, of ritual euphony, which the polis and its rulers, anxious to put the previous and painful events in a positive light as well as simply drown them out through performance, demand of the chorus. For this reason, the chorus terms these piercing, near animal-like utterances a *nomos*—a typically paradoxical

77 See Aesch. *Sept.* 268–269; see above nn. 17–20.

78 For the motif of sacrifice, see Zeitlin (1965); Zeitlin (1966); Burkert (1966: esp. 119–120); Pucci (1992); Henrichs (2000: esp. 180–184); Henrichs (2006: esp. 67–74).

and oxymoronic intensification, at least for tragedy, as the melody presents no such *nomos*, lacking, as it does, the harmonic and celebratory euphony of the official order, posited likewise through voice and music.[79] And yet it remains a lyrical monody, a song by a single person (1140–1142)—one could hardly define it otherwise in the theatrical and musical genre of tragedy—dominated by lament. The chorus afterwards compares Cassandra's song to the famous Itys-lament of the nightingale, perpetually bewailing the death of her son. Cassandra replies that, in comparison, the gods gave the nightingale a sweet-sounding, bright life (or fate) (λιγείας βίος [μόρος Pauw, accepted by West] ἀηδόνος 1146), as they blessed Aedon with feathered form.[80] Whereas Aedon-Procne's metamorphosis—the name Aedon (from ἀείδω, 'to sing') encapsulating and embodying her melodious new existence[81]—functions as a cloak, paramount to the feathers, a musical and melodic beautification, a cleaver awaits to brutally split Cassandra open (1146–1149). The minced, dichotomous voice, which, through the theatrical medium of chants, conveys the *pathos* of corporeality in all its urgency to the audience, proleptically externalizes the

79 For *nomos* as law, cult law, ritual, and song form, see also Plato's *Laws*, where the *choreia* and music, along with the *nomoi*, are put in place for the raising and instilling of positive behavior and attitude toward the polis and the divine cosmos. For *nomos* as musical terminus and song genre (Plut. [*De Mus*] 1132d), see Nagy (1990: 355): "a lyric composition that followed a set mode of melodic pattern." See also Nagy (1990: 87). For the oxymoron, see Fraenkel (III 1950: 519 ad 1142).

80 For Aedon and a self-referential, metapoetic tradition, see Hom. *Od.* 19.519–523 (in her desperation and pain, Penelope compares herself to Aedon, Pandareos' daughter. Aedon, struck by insanity, killed her own son Itylos—in the Attic version Procne killed her son Itys to avenge her sister Philomela raped by Procne's husband Tereus) and the remark from Nagy (1996: 59–86) (the nightingale as a "model for Homer" [59]). Bollack and Judet de La Combe (IV 1981–2001: 470–474) speak of a separation between the literary comparison and the mythic figure since the notion of a beautiful lament is already attested in Homer. For the nightingale as a beautiful singer of lament, see also *Hymn. Hom.* 19.16–18 and the compilation of passages by Bollack and Judet de La Combe (IV 1981–2001: 472). The highlighted myth spreads its motifs: in her youthfulness, Cassandra resembles Itys, murdered like she will be; she also resembles Philomela, who suffered from masculine love and rape; while Philomela wove a tapestry, she laid bare her song through suffering (Ov. *Met.* 6.424–674). In the archaic tradition, a poet could describe himself as a nightingale: e.g. Bacchyl. 3.97. Later it served as a synonym for song (Callim. *Epigr.* 2.5). For reference to the Tereus-Procne-Philomela myth, see also McNeil (2005: 14–17). For the nightingale as a motif, see Barker (2004). For nightingale and weaving as metapoetic metaphors, see Papadopoulos-Belmehdi (1994: 155–156).

81 She is λιγεία "sweet-sounding" (1146), just as she, despite her lament, "sings beautifully" (καλὸν ἀείδῃσιν) in Homer (*Od.* 19.519).

imminent, and bodily concrete, cleaving. And yet, she still sings in the typically paradoxical manner of tragedy, beautifying the horror. The brutal death she envisions epitomizes, in a self-referential manner, Cassandra's attempt to split this *palintonos harmonia* of *goos* and euphony—she sings until the very end. Despite the other characters' efforts to split up everything neatly into opposite and suppress the non-euphemic *goos*, the oxymoron constituting tragedy remains intact.

For this reason the chorus wonders whence Cassandra derives her divine-driven madness, so that she "sounds out these fearful things in song, at once in ill-omened tones and notes loud and shrill" (τὰ δ' ἐπίφοβα δυσφάτωι κλαγγᾶι/ μελοτυπεῖς ὁμοῦ τ' ὀρθίοις ἐν νόμοις; 1152–1153)[82] (see 1150–1153). For the chorus, the music of *goos*, though opposing in its fearsomeness the ritual order, remains aesthetically pleasing and melodic, even as it spells out the truth of an imminent and truly horrible fate that ridicules all civilization and divine well-being. Within such a paradox hide the poetics and aesthetics of tragedy in its entirety.[83]

Gradually the chorus must admit to understanding Cassandra perfectly (τορὸν ἄγαν 1162), something even a child would be capable of doing (1163); the chorus' reaction as interior recipients is subsequently reflected as a bite in the soul (1164–1166). The chorus, continuing to stress the seer's divine inspiration, inquires after the "divinity that renders you ill-thinking … assailing you very heavily and causing you to sing of woeful, deadly suffering" (τίς σε κακοφρονεῖν τίθη-/ σι δαίμων ὑπερβαρὴς ἐμπίτνων/ μελίζειν πάθη γοερὰ θανατοφόρα 1174–1176), i.e., to impart to her "lamenting, death-tolling tales of woe in such melody"—the quintessential melody of tragedy. The chorus itself still felt the exposure to some interior power only moments ago (988–1000). The music emanates from within, spontaneously manifesting itself as we are in a tragedy continually referring to its own paradoxical medium, the horrible yet beautiful sound of suffering.

---

82 This eventually becomes an allusion to the *nomos orthios* (Haldane [1965: 39] and Fleming [1977: 231]); for this see Suda s.v. ἀμφιανακτίζειν, a quote from Terpander PMG 697; see also Nagy (1990: 358). In contrast see Bollack and Judet de la Combe (IV 1981–2001: 482), where they talk of a conscious transformation. For the poetry of ruptures, breaches, and innovation, see Bollack and Judet de la Combe (IV 1981–2001: 475–477). See also Fleming (1977). Regarding the verb μελοτυπεῖς, Bohrer (2006: 180) emphasizes the notion of the musical transformation from horror to beauty in harmony as "rededication/new coinage" ("Umprägung") and "creative minting."

83 See Loraux (1990: 265) and Bohrer (2006).

Cassandra as Prophetic Anti-Bride and the Terrible Music of the Internal Chorus of the Furies

Cassandra subsequently makes clear that her prophecies will not remain obscured by some beautiful, chaste veil and cloak (ὁ χρησμὸς οὐκέτ' ἐκ καλυμμάτων/ ἔσται 1178–1179)—or, put differently, by euphemistic sound and enigmatic words—rather they will rush forth, like light, shining, and tumbling to sunrise, an even greater amount of woe will roll, wave-like, beneath the rays of the sun (1180–1183). The visual fuses synaesthetically with the acoustic, both break free to expose the *pathos* in sound bites laid bare in the light. She draws a clear line to the Anakalypteria ritual of a young bride's marriage (νεογάμου νύμφης δίκην 1179).[84] For some time now this entire scene has been regarded as drawing heavily from a wedding scene, reflecting and subverting it, with Cassandra as the bride of Agamemnon to some extent, but much more as one of Apollo.[85] Yet Cassandra is a tragic and paradoxical bride, repudiated by her groom and doomed to join in unity with Hades in death, singing therefore dirges instead of *hymenaia*. Her melody is not that of a bride, rather, as with Helen (1156–1161) a horrible and blunt *goos*. The oxymoronic expression μελίζειν πάθη (1176) epitomizes the tragic paradox; Cassandra displays immense suffering but tragedy renders it in lyrical, musical, and highly aesthetic tones. The horrible imparted with beautiful notes—the violence embedded in language aesthetically transposed into lyric beauty. Cassandra's words outdo the chorus' "Erwartungs-Angst" (expectation anxiety) with "Erscheinungs-Schrecken" (appearance terror), a horror actualizing and transforming the mythic violence into tragic violence that takes on an epiphanic quality.[86] It is well known that violence cannot be acted out on the tragic stage. It therefore finds its enactment through *pathos*-song, lyrical, musical, and aesthetic tones simultaneously expressing terror and horror.

Lament and the ritual of death superimpose themselves upon the wedding ritual, causing these two song genres to bleed into one another. Leaving her parents' house and traveling to that of her bridegroom's is a *rite de passage*, acted out as crisis.[87] The bridegroom lifting the veil when he carries the bride

84 See Fraenkel (III 1950: 540 ad 1179). See also Raeburn and Thomas (2011: 193–194 ad 1178–1179); Seaford (1987: 124); Rehm (1994: 47–48); Mitchell-Boyask (2006: 277).

85 See Jenkins (1983); Seaford (1987: 127–128 [bride of Agamemnon]); Rehm (1994: 44, 50–52); Mitchell-Boyask (2006 [bride of Apollo, foil for the initiatory pattern, Cassandra as bride of Hades and surrogate of Iphigenia, Cassandra as Erinyes]); see also Debnar (2010).

86 See Bohrer (2006: 178–181).

87 See Alexiou (2002 [1974]: 120–122) and Seaford (1987). For Cassandra as a virgin facing marriage, see Debnar (2010).

across the threshold clearly relates to these events, the unvarnished character of truth. Cassandra, as anti-bride and prophetess, pursues the same requisite way into the house, meeting death, the "gates of Hades" (1291), becoming a bride of Hades. Like a bloodhound, she already perceives the signs with her olfactory sense (1090–1094), the traces (ἴχνος κακῶν/ ῥινηλατούσῃ 1184–1185) which portend the dreadful events.

Cassandra provides the reason (1186–1192):

> τὴν γὰρ στέγην τήνδ' οὔποτ' ἐκλείπει χορός
> ξύμφθογγος οὐκ εὔφωνος· οὐ γὰρ εὖ λέγει.
> καὶ μὴν πεπωκώς γ', ὡς θρασύνεσθαι πλέον,
> βρότειον αἷμα κῶμος ἐν δόμοις μένει,
> δύσπεμπτος ἔξω, συγγόνων Ἐρινύων·
> ὑμνοῦσι δ' ὕμνον δώμασιν προσήμεναι
> πρώταρχον ἄτην, …

> There is a chorus, a group of singers and dancers, that never leaves this house.
> They sing in unison, but not pleasantly, for their words speak of evil.
> Moreover, this revel-band, drinks human blood, thus emboldening itself,
> and then remains in the house,
> hard to send away—the bands of the house's kindred Furies.
> Besetting the chambers of the house, they sing a hymn
> of the ruinous folly that first began it all.

The chorus of Erinyes, whose consonance sounds evil, refuses to release the house from its fangs. As it speaks ill and reveals itself in no way to be *euphemia*, Cassandra refers to it openly, without whitewashing. In tragedy Cassandra cannot help imagining the Erinyes working in terms other than chorality.

This imaginary, internal chorus of the Erinyes has tasted the blood of men, not wine. It rages as a mad, perverted *komos*;[88] the reveling procession of uncivilized monsters enters not from the outside, but sits in the house, besieging it internally, a wild troop of blood-drunk ghosts of vengeance avenging murdered relatives. The hymn perverts the celebratory content, especially that of the epithalamion, specifically in terms of guilt and delusion, whence vengeance and revenge started, i.e., the adultery of Atreus' wife with Thyestes (1189–1192). Cas-

---

88 See Fraenkel (III 1950: 544 ad 1186 ff.).

sandra and the chorus already brought about something similar, hinting at past motifs. The chorus, witnessed only by Cassandra in her manic fantasy, becomes a real, active chorus in the *Eumenides*.[89] At first, though, the chorus is merely internal and metaphoric, transferring song and dance components to the adept acting as a soloist. The choral culture transposes even visions musically, with choreographed images that for the recipients witnessing the performance are "good to think with."[90] Even an oath confirming the truth of what Cassandra says can no longer, in the chorus' eyes, be a παιώνιον (1199), a "holy song of salvation." Unvarnished truth cannot halt the course of tragic events or direct them towards salvation, despite the fact that, were the chorus to believe Cassandra, they could intervene, vehemently, at the last second. Yet its members are too old and fragile for such ventures.

What lies behind Cassandra's accurate analysis, which so mercilessly unmasks that which should remain hidden? Eros and Himeros, those sex-crazed deities, bear the blame (see also 1441–1442, 1446). As personifications of desire they are usually involved in aesthetic fetishizations that tend to conceal the truth of a void that cannot be filled. As she acted against these gods, she unveils the truth. Her lover Apollo, the divinity responsible for purification, healing, enlightenment along with the euphemistic, celebratory paean, seeks revenge against Cassandra, who did not keep her promise to unite with him in love. The god employs his own tool, prophecy, as punishment. Apollo, however, chooses a rather treacherous variant, bringing about her downfall through a perverted form of prophetic artistry. Having lied to Apollo, she becomes an Apollonian priestess no one believes, leading to her destruction (1202–1212).[91] As she serves him, Apollo in this scene becomes a perverted bridegroom, lifting the veil of mystery that usually attends oracles and prophecies (1178–1179). In doing so, Apollo allows Cassandra to see clearly the totality of her horrible end in this false relationship with Agamemnon—leaving her only to intone a *goos*.

89 See Fraenkel (III 1950: 543 ad 1186ff.): "Here the poet, with magnificent simplicity, has erected one of the supporting pillars of his great edifice. In this passage the choir of the Erinyes makes its entry in to the trilogy, which it is to dominate until the end. The tale of the monsters who, surfeited with the blood of their victims, chant their sinister song looks forward to the choruses of the *Eumenides*, in particular to the δέσμιος ὕμνος." Indeed, in Aesch. *Eum.* 264–266 the chorus of the Erinyes is envisaged to drink blood.

90 A modification of a famous quote ["bonnes à penser"] from Lévi-Strauss (1966: 89) from *The Savage Mind*: "Animals are good to think with."

91 For a punishment on the god's own ritual domain, see Dionysus in *Bacchae* with Bierl (1991: 210–215) and Bierl (2013: 214).

In the end the chorus by and large believes her. Cassandra's last, dismissed seizure manifests itself anew in preludes of torsion, contortion, and gyration (στροβεῖ ταράσσων φροιμίοις 1216), a perverted form of the choral circle dance distilled in a single person (1214–1216). "The violent pains of true prophecy" (δεινὸς ὀρθομαντείας πόνος 1215) presented in bright tones, upright and correct as a phonetic utterance, characterized by mystification no longer murky, wracks her body and whirls her around, in a proem of pain. In response, the girl winds and twists herself as a solo dancer, modeling herself partially on the choral round dance of the Erinyes. Consequently, this performance foreshadows or preludes the song (*phroimion*), the truly terrible hymn, the actual murder performed as a dreadful and perverse scene of sacrifice in the house[92] and the real hymn of the Erinyes forthcoming in the *Eumenides*.

After Cassandra spells out the certain murder at the hands of Clytemnestra, who will kill with a precursory *ololygmos* (cf. 1236), the chorus leader once more warns her to obfuscate the truth, "to lull the mouth to sleep, so that it becomes *euphemon* and does not utter an ill-omened word" (εὔφημον ... κοίμησον στόμα 1247). Cassandra rejects the idea that a healer or a paean (Παιών 1248),[93] i.e., Apollo manifest as the god of choral paean, will still aid such good words (1248). Again the chorus puts this unvarnished truth aside, hoping it proves false (1249). According to Cassandra, supplication and prayer (cf. κατεύχῃ 1250) no longer help. Gripped anew by seizure, she spells out her own death and divests herself of the Apollonian trappings of her prophetic skill, namely the staff and fillet (1265–1267).

Apollo himself, as Cassandra portrays him, strips away her prophetic clothes (Ἀπόλλων αὐτὸς οὑκδύων ἐμὲ/ χρηστηρίαν ἐσθῆτ' 1269–1270) like a bridegroom.[94] In Apollonian garb, Cassandra was ridiculed as an enchantress, a beggar, a starveling (1274), because no one wanted to believe her. As Agyios, Apollo as bridegroom leads her not into the house, but down the path of death (1276). Although she must have experienced the god in full, enthusiastic *eudaimonia*, the chorus views her merely as a miserable and wise woman (1295), "possessed"

92 See φροίμιον τόδε 829, φροιμιάζονται 1354. Fraenkel (III 1950: 557–558 ad 1216) interprets it as "a prelude" ... "at the start of a new access of trance" (558); in a similar way, see Raeburn and Thomas (2011: 198 ad 1215–1216). The *prooimion* "'the front part of the song'" is a "prelude" and initial "framework" for a hymnos sung by the *kitharodos* beginning an *oime* for an Apollinian *nomos*; typically Apollo is addressed in prayer; see Nagy (1990: 353–356 [citation 353]).

93 See also Fraenkel (III 1950: 577 ad 1248), who associates the paean, the cry to avert danger, as well.

94 See also Mitchell-Boyask (2006: 278).

by Apollo (cf. 1297), as she proceeds fearlessly to the altar, like a crow whom the god impels (1297–1298). When she enters the house she recoils from the smell of blood (1306–1309), the chorus regarding the awful stink as the smell of sacrifice and Syrian fragrances (1310–1312)—again, for a moment, we switch from the mainly acoustic (and, of course, visual) to the olfactory.

Cassandra's Voice and the Bird Metaphor

As she enters, Cassandra stresses that she will not "to twitter unpleasantly and cry out in pain, like a bird before a bush, out of fear" (οὔτοι δυσοίζω θάμνον ὡς ὄρνις φόβωι 1316), recalling again the bird-metaphor of the nightingale. In the end she somehow rebukes the accusation of disgusting sounds, emphasizing that she dies with her head held high and with hope of vengeance (1316–1320). Proceeding inside, the cries (see οἰμώγμασι 1346) spill from the house, cries the chorus designates—along with the act of murder—again as "prelude/opening song" (see φροιμιάζονται 1354) for the grotesque *pathos*-hymn concerning the tyranny over the entire city.

According to Clytemnestra, Cassandra died after singing a swan song: "while she, after singing, swan-like, her final dirge of death" (ἡ δέ τοι κύκνου δίκην/ τὸν ὕστατον μέλψασα θανάσιμον γόον 1444–1445). In comparing Cassandra to the Apollonian bird, Clytemnestra contemptuously references the girl's prophetic gift (cf. 1440). Even in death she cedes completely to the tonal and atonal lament of death and with her *melos* foils every attempt to gag her like other victims, to stop her voice from ringing out a curse (*ara*), opposing Clytemnestra's euphemizing and rhetorical attempts with her *goos*.

External observers associate the suffering girl with escalating bird metaphors developing the metapoetic level of voice and music.[95] As she morphs from the swallow (1050) to the nightingale with its eternally modulating *goos* (1145) and finally the gorgeous swan, Cassandra's ever-increasing prestige becomes clear. The swallow stands for the chirping migratory bird,[96] arriving from other lands, singing in a barbaric way no one understands. The nightingale is

95 For the list of animal comparisons with Cassandra, see Raeburn and Thomas (2011: 183 ad 1050–1052): in addition to birds: predators (1063); horse (1066); blood hound (1093).

96 The raped Philomela, sister of Procne, morphs into a swallow. See also Hünemörder (2001, online http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/brill-s-new-pauly/swallow-e1105330): "Their singing (technical terms: χελιδονίζειν, τιττυβίζειν, ψιθυρίζειν, τραυλίζειν, τρύζειν, κωτίλλειν) is sometimes interpreted as a barbarous chatter (e.g. … Aristoph. *Av.* 1681)."

associated with nightly song production, with lament and harmony, metapoetic modulations of sounds,[97] Dionysian filicide, sexual threatening and tragic fate. Penelope also compared herself with the bird of lament (*Od.* 19.518–523). As a swan, Apollo's bird (Aristophanes' *Birds* 772), Cassandra sings her last Apollonian song—the swan being a prophetic medium for Apollo (Plato's *Phaedo* 85b2)—before her death, her voice full of sadness yet entrancing, not because she fears death and so laments, rather she perhaps presages her death and a better life in the underworld (cf. Plato's *Phaedo* 84e3–85b4).[98] We should perhaps also understand her swan song as a distraught expression of her erotic connection to Apollo,[99] whose son, the song-loving Kyknos (swan), drowned himself in the Eridanos, bereft over the loss of his love Phaeton, and became a swan.[100] For Clytemnestra, the girl's love connection to Agamemnon, who will follow her in death, emphasizes this erotic component above everything else (1440–1443, 1446).

The chorus later takes up this image of a bird, connected with choral singing. It describes anew the daemon besetting the house of the Atridae as a force rending its heart (κράτος … καρδιόδηκτον 1470–1471), like a hostile crow standing over a corpse, intoning an ugly hymn of victory. The melody, like Cassandra's voice and song, runs counter to the appropriate prayer, composed cacophonously (ἐπὶ δὲ σώματος δίκαν {μοι}/ κόρακος ἐχθροῦ σταθεὶς ἐκνόμως/ ὕμνον ὑμνεῖν ἐπεύχεται 1472–1474) (see 1468–1474).[101] In a coded way, this utterance zeroes in on the perverted choral dancer and singer, Clytemnestra, who takes up on the Erinyes hymn (1191).[102] Crows are notorious for their cawing, an ineloquent singing devoid of purpose.[103]

97 See above n. 80.

98 Perhaps she even hopes "to go to the god" and be reunited with him. See Plato's *Phaedo* 85a2. Although Plato makes use of the swan for his own philosophical purpose, we can interpret the metaphor based on a common Greek understanding to emphasize her imminent death and closeness to Apollo. See also Fraenkel (III 1950: 684 ad 1444 f.) (our passage is the first instance where the notion of the swan song before death is attested); for the swan as another metaphor for poets and singers, see Eur. *HF* 691 and *Bacch.* 1365.

99 Fraenkel (III 1950: 684 ad 1444 f.) notes that Clytemnestra's poetic expressions "breathe a lovely, tender melancholy, which for a moment makes it seem that it is the poet himself who speaks and not Cassandra's enemy."

100 See Ov. *Met.* 2.367–380, where Cycnus is the son of Sthenelus. Of course, there is no proof that this story was known as early as in Aeschylean times.

101 For ἐκνόμως/ ὕμνον ὑμνεῖν (1473–1474), see θροεῖς/ νόμον ἄνομον (1141–1142).

102 See the paean of the Erinyes: παιῶνα τόνδ' Ἐρινύων (645).

103 See Pind. *Ol.* 2.97 κόρακες ὣς ἄκραντα γαρυέτων.

In conclusion: alongside the visual impression we witness Cassandra's entrance into the palace, her own personal Hades, acoustically through the cacophony of voices. The Trojan girl, cursed with the gift of prophecy, first composes her song as a lament with an inarticulate and naked voice. The tragic "pathos formula" (Warburg) conveys a discordant, terrible song through lament.[104] The cries penetrate, in a way, the bodies and souls of the audience; the chorus, as an audience stand-in and communication partner, attempts to modulate the sounds of woe towards another tonality in accord with the vocal and motion-based order of the polis. In the extensive repertoire of musical media in the theater, the *choreia*, music, and voice again become a self-referential discourse that accentuates the action. The *pathos* constitutive of the tragedy manifests itself in a paradoxical music as anti-music. To change McLuhan's famous sentence "The medium is the message," we could say the scream as the medium is the message that "pertains to its voice;"[105] the faster it varies its volume, the stronger the effect upon the amygdala, the subcortical center of neurons with which humans process emotions, especially anxiety, fear, and terror. The modulated cry itself, cutting down to the marrow, has within its tonal structure, arrayed as it is with sounds devoid of all significance, a "poetic function" (Jakobson) in the sense of an aesthetic of dreadful things.[106]

As the scene progresses, the sound as purely atmospheric expression transforms into a voice that acoustically paints images upon the audience's mind's eye through poetic utterances. Cassandra's symbolic words—the symbolic contents is in her case very different to the purely aesthetic embellishment that conceals the truth—, at first, remain enigmatic because they allude to unimaginable grotesqueries of horror. From a murky voice devoid of semantic meaning, emerges slowly a voice heralding via signs the coming events, anticipating through the prophetess' foresight the fated death to take place backstage.

Coda: The Chorus Finds Its Voice and a Preview of the Rest of the Trilogy

In clashing with Aegisthus, the chorus finds its true voice following the catastrophe and rears up against the looming tyrant. Aegisthus threatens violence and learning the hard way. These public words against the rulers will become

104 Warburg (1906: 56).

105 McLuhan (1964: 23 and 23–35); for the twist see also Dolar (2006: 191 n. 1).

106 Jakobson (1960: esp. 358 [= *Selected Writings* III: 27]).

"the source of tears" (1628). Aegisthus continues that the chorus has a "tongue diametrically opposed to Orpheus" (1629): the mythical singer, so he yells at the chorus "led all things with the rapture of his voice, but you will be led in rebellion by your child-like barkings" (ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἦγε πάντ' ἀπὸ φθογγῆς χαρᾶι,/ σὺ δ' ἐξορίνας ⟨ν⟩ηπίοις ὑλάγμασιν/ ἄξηι 1630–1632). Aegisthus accuses the chorus of leaving the path of lyrical musicality leading to joy and aligning now with Cassandra's *goos* through its howling, which poses anathema and danger for the system.[107]

Agamemnon lies deceased in the spider's web (1492, 1516), woven, according to Aegisthus, from a robe both of the Erinyes (1579) and justice (1611). Metapoetically speaking, this is the poetic and musical web of the tragic performance[108] wrapped about the protagonist. Since the political and musical order collapsed, the *logos* of the text and the entire tragic tradition, the *choreia* itself along with harmonic music, threaten to cease to exist at the end of *Agamemnon*.

Yet, in light of later developments, the imminent deconstruction of tragedy is merely a *phroimion* in *Agamemnon*, an overture for the hymn of violence that the Erinyes will sing and dance themselves as the active chorus in the orchestra of the *Eumenides*. First in the *kommos* of the *Choephoroi* (*Ch.* 306–478) comes anew the horrid song of lament invoking the help of the dead Agamemnon,[109] simultaneously a source of hope for the chorus because "a god can lend a more beautiful ring to our song tones (κελάδους εὐφθογγοτέρους)" (*Ch.* 341); "in place of a sad threnody at the graveside, a paean" (ἀντὶ δὲ θρήνων ἐπιτυμβιδίων/ παιὼν) may bring reunion with Agamemnon (*Ch.* 342–344).[110] For the chorus, revenge becomes anew the celebratory song of *ololygmos* (ἐφυμνῆσαι … ὀλολυγμὸν) (*Ch.* 386–387). In the chorus' imagination, "this hymn" (ὅδ' ὕμνος), that is, the song of the *kommos*, arises with both Agamemnon and the underworld divinities from beneath the earth (*Ch.* 475) and becomes manifest in the orchestra. It sings the cruel truth that the remedy of the house lies in auto-destruction, in revenge exerted by Orestes; the hymn anticipates the triumph over the present situation of woe, also expressed in musical terms: the "distress inbred in the family and the discordant, unmusical, bloody strokes of ruin" (πόνος ἐγγενὴς/

107 See also Nooter (2012: 8).

108 For the metapoetic weaving of Penelope and weaving as poetic metaphor, see Papadopoulou-Belmehdi (1994: esp. 111–184); Nagy (1996: 39–86); Bierl (2004: esp. 110–111); Clayton (2004).

109 The choral group is present as formation, a *stasis* (*Ch.* 458; cf. *Ag.* 23) that accompanies the protagonists with terrifying sounds of lament, the evil tones piercing the ear (*Ch.* 451–452).

110 It is worth nothing, how also "… the image of hoped-for reversal … is here shaped completely acoustically" (Lesky [1943: 45]). See also Sier (1988: 116 ad 343).

καὶ παράμουσος Ἄτας/ αἱματόεσσα πλαγά) (*Ch.* 466–468).[111] The stroke itself is then introduced by the chorus with the call for an *ololygmos* (ἐπολολύξατ') (*Ch.* 942), marking the perverted sacrifice all over in the trilogy.[112]

In the moment when the deed is done, terror strikes Orestes' heart, "fear prepared to sing and the heart to dance in anger to the tune" (ἄιδειν ἕτοιμος, ἡ δ' ὑπορχεῖσθαι Κότωι) (*Ch.* 1024–1025).[113] Out of Cassandra's visionary imagination of the Erinyes-*komos* and then from Orestes' head at the end of the *Choephoroi*, comes an actual, theatrical chorus that threatens to unhinge not only the tonality of the *nomos* but also the entire political order. Its violence again manifests itself musically, vocally, and in the choral dance, above all in the famous binding song (ὕμνον … δέσμιον *Eum.* 306) (*Eum.* 307–396).[114] Only a god such as Athena can once again incorporate the chorus into the order and overall sound structure using *peitho*, enshrouding the Erinyes in red robes (φοινικοβάπτοις ἐνδυτοῖς ἐσθήμασι *Eum.* 1028), through which they finally become Eumenides, who can bring *aoidai*, joyful songs (*Eum.* 954) or tears (*Eum.* 954–955).

Tellingly, the final song reflects the Panathenaic procession performed by the festival chorus of the entire polis, which withdraws with celebratory cries (ὀλολύξατε νῦν ἐπὶ μολπαῖς *Eum.* 1043, 1047)[115] singing the *nomos* (*Eum.* 1032)[116] in *euphemia* and before the gathered population celebrating (εὐφαμεῖτε δὲ

111 For παράμουσος, "discordant," see *Ag.* 1187 (the imaginary chorus of the Erinyes). For the notion of the invocation of the dead, the so-called necromancy, via the medium of *goos* mostly on behalf of orientally drawn specialists, magical priests and *goetes*, *agyrtoi*, *magi*, see esp. the occult scene in the *Persians* (598–680, esp. the song 623–680), the *kommos* of the *Choephoroi* (306–478), and in general Ogden (2001: esp. 95–148, 161–268) and Johnston (1999: 82–125).

112 For the murder of Orestes and the celebration as supporting, ritualistic acclamation with cross references to Clytemnestra's deed in *Agamemnon*, see also Sier (1988: 135–136) and Aesch. *Ch.* 386–387.

113 Loraux (1990), referencing Nagy (1990: 351), points out that with this very word the subordination and "supporting role" of the dance with the choral song is expressed (see *hyporchema*). "The supporting role of a given component of choral lyric can entail an intensification of virtuosity for the performer" (Nagy [1990: 351]), for which reason a manic dance accompanies a song of horror.

114 For choral self-referencing via speech-act theory, see Prins (1991); Bierl (2001: 81–83 [Eng. 2009: 62–65]); Henrichs (1994/1995: 60–65); in reference to magical practices, see Faraone (1985).

115 See Belfiore (1992: 27 [with n. 59]) and Bowie (1993).

116 βᾶτε νόμωι, a conjecture by Merkel accepted by Murray. It is rejected by West and Sommerstein, but the argument of this paper might suggest a defense of it.

χωρῖται/ and πανδαμεί *Eum.* 1035, 1039). From lament (*goos*), and imminent destruction with the *ololygmos* serving as a howl to drown out the crisis, finally comes a victory celebration, a triumphal song (paean), joyful *choreia* expressed through the jubilant *ololygmos* reestablishing now the community following the terrifying events.

Conclusion

The *Oresteia* begins with a deconstruction of opposites, plummeting the established order into a critical decision stage, and progresses towards a happy ending—the chasm closes, everything returns to its rightful place. At the heart of the trilogy, the *choreia*, aligned with the theological order, serves, through its musicality, tonality, vocal expression, and bodily movement, not only as an accompanying motif, but also as a self-referential key to understanding the play in its entirety. The focus on the naked voice as a theatrical medium, i.e., the special focus on the acoustics beyond the visual display that constitutes actual theater (cf. *theasthai*), comes particularly to the fore in the first act of the trilogy. Next to the θέα, a show in the sense of a θέατρον—i.e., a showroom and the assembly of spectators[117]—Attic tragedy is also an ἀκοή, a place of listening or ἀκουστήριον—an auditorium and the assembly of *listeners*.[118] Sounds and voices engender *pathos* and transport an acoustic sense respective the action, along with all the aspects of visual presentation—gestures, bearing, bodily presence, masks, costumes, objects, and overall staging—all of which generates, in the mind of the public, internal images.

Tragedy is not merely plot, as Aristotle defines it with *mythos* and *mimesis*, but also, and above all, a performance, a play, the showing and externalization of pain. Especially in the *Agamemnon*, the presentation and development of the background, that is the prelude to the plot of the *Oresteia*, opens up into a special tonal space of lament and its overcoming that then is increasingly taken over by the normal dominance of the ascendant visual space.

A wide chasm exists between choral, musical poeticity, and the horrible experience of pain, yet they meet in the tragic aesthetic of horror. In tragedy, pain, and its accompanying lament, become beautiful. This rift shapes the

117 See Bierl (2001: 306 [Eng. 2009: 272–273]).

118 For the term and development in the *Oresteia* from an auditory to a visual theater, see Fischer-Lichte (2004: 347–352) and Fischer-Lichte (2007: 134–138) (regarding the staging of Peter Stein in the year 1980, the respective trilogy transferred from a audio-speech space to a visual space).

tragic language, especially the songs of the chorus and the performed expressions of pain—also ascribable to the general tension between Dionysus and Apollo. Oxymoronic formations that bind musical aesthetics with their opposites point directly to this genre's fragility, accompanied by the tragic paradox. The performative display of contradictions using sound, voice, and pointed formulations in a way clarifies this aesthetics of horror in miniature *mises en abyme*, in order to lead the recipient through the plot by means of this metatragic underscoring.

Bibliography

Alexiou, M. 2002. *The Ritual Lament in Greek Tradition*, second edition revised by D. Yatromanolakis and P. Roilos. Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield (first edition Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1974).

Amendola, S. 2005. "Il grido di Clitemestra. L'ololygmos e la 'donna virile'," *Lexis* 23: 19–29.

Barker, A. 2004. "Transforming the Nightingale: Aspects of Athenian Musical Discourse in the Late Fifth Century" in P. Murray and P. Wilson, eds. *Music and the Muses: The Culture of 'Mousikê' in the Classical Athenian City*, 185–204. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Barker, A. 2007. "Simbolismo musicale nell'*Elena* di Euripide" in P. Volpe Cacciatore, ed. *Musica e generi letterari nella Grecia di età classica*, 7–22. Naples: Arte Tipografica.

Belfiore, E.S. 1992. *Tragic Pleasures. Aristotle on Plot and Emotion*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Bierl, A. 1991. *Dionysos und die griechische Tragödie. Politische und 'metatheatralische' Aspekte im Text*. Tübingen: Narr (Classica Monacensia 1).

Bierl, A. 2001. *Der Chor in der Alten Komödie. Ritual und Performativität* (unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von Aristophanes' *Thesmophoriazusen* und der Phalloslieder fr. 851 PMG). Munich and Leipzig: Saur (reprint Berlin: De Gruyter 2012).

Bierl, A. 2004. "Die Wiedererkennung von Odysseus und seiner treuen Gattin Penelope. Das Ablegen der Maske—zwischen traditioneller Erzählkunst, Metanarration und psychologischer Vertiefung" in A. Bierl, A. Schmitt, and A. Willi, eds. *Antike Literatur in neuer Deutung. Festschrift für Joachim Latacz anlässlich seines 70. Geburtstages*, 103–126. Munich and Leipzig: Saur.

Bierl, A. 2006. "Tragödie als Spiel und das Satyrspiel. Die Geburt des griechischen Theaters aus dem Geiste des Chortanzes und seines Gottes Dionysos" in J. Sánchez de Murillo and M. Thurner, eds. *Kind und Spiel*, 111–138. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer (Aufgang: Jahrbuch für Denken, Dichten, Musik 3).

Bierl, A. 2007. "Literatur und Religion als Rito- und Mythopoetik. Überblicksartikel

zu einem neuen Ansatz in der Klassischen Philologie" in A. Bierl, R. Lämmle, and K. Wesselmann, eds. *Literatur und Religion I. Wege zu einer mythisch-rituellen Poetik bei den Griechen*, 1–76. Berlin and New York: De Gruyter (MythosEikonPoiesis 1.1).

Bierl, A. 2009. *Ritual and Performativity. The Chorus in Old Comedy*, trans. A. Hollmann. Washington DC and Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press (Hellenic Studies 20).

Bierl, A. 2013. "Maenadism as Self-Referential Chorality in Euripides' *Bacchae*" in R. Gagné and M. Hopman, eds. *Choral Mediations in Greek Tragedy*, 211–226. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bohrer, K.H. 2006. "Zur ästhetischen Funktion von Gewalt-Darstellung in der Griechischen Tragödie" in B. Seidensticker and Martin Vöhler, eds. *Gewalt und Ästhetik. Zur Gewalt und ihrer Darstellung in der griechischen Klassik*, 169–184. Berlin and New York: De Gruyter.

Bollack, J. and P. Judet de la Combe. 1981–2001. *L'Agamemnon d'Eschyle* (*le texte et ses interprétations*), vols. 1.1, 1.2 (by J. Bollack), 2 (by P. Judet de la Combe); *Commentaire des dialogues*, vols. 3, 4 (by P. Judet de la Combe) (Cahiers de Philologie 6–8, 18.1–2, publiés par le Centre de Recherche Philologique de l'Université de Lille III). Lille and Paris: Septentrion Presses Universitaires.

Bowie, A.M. 1993. "Religion and Politics in Aeschylus' *Oresteia*," *CQ* 43: 10–31.

Burkert, W. 1966. "Greek Tragedy and Sacrificial Ritual," *GRBS* 7: 87–121.

Burkert, W. 1983. *Homo Necans. The Anthropology of Ancient Greek Sacrificial Ritual and Myth*, trans. P. Bing. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Burkert, W. 1985. *Greek Religion. Archaic and Classical*, trans. J. Raffan. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

Calame, C. 1997. *Choruses of Young Women in Ancient Greece. Their Morphology, Religious Role, and Social Function*, trans. D. Collins and J. Orion. Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Clayton, B. 2004. *A Penelopean Poetics: Reweaving the Feminine in Homer's* Odyssey. Lanham MD: Lexington Books.

Collins, J.H. 2013. "Dancing the Virtues, Becoming Virtuous: Procedural Memory and Ethical Presence," *Ramus* 42: 183–224.

Connelly, J.B. 2014. *The Parthenon Enigma. A New Understanding of the West's Most Iconic Building and the People Who Made It*. New York: Knopf.

Csapo, E. 1999/2000. "Later Euripidean Music" in M. Cropp, K. Lee, and D. Sansone, eds. *Euripides and Tragic Theatre in the Late Fifth Century*, 399–426. Champaign IL: University of Illinois Press (= *ICS* 24–25).

Debnar, P. 2010. "The Sexual Status of Aeschylus' Cassandra," *CPh* 105: 129–145.

Degener, J.M. 1996. "*Symbolon Iphigeneias*: la kledonographia de l'*Agamemnon* d'Eschyle," *CGITA* 9: 31–51.

Denniston, J.D. and D.L. Page. 1957. *Aeschylus. Agamemnon*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Derrida, J. 1972. *Dissémination*. Paris: Seuil.

Derrida, J. 1981. *Dissemination*, trans. B. Johnson. Chicago: Athlone Press.

Deubner L. 1941. "Ololyge und Verwandtes," *Abhandlungen der Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Phil.-Hist. Klasse* 1: 3–28.

Dobrov, G.W. 2001. *Figures of Play. Greek Drama and Metafictional Poetics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dolar, M. 2006. *A Voice and Nothing More*. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.

Dué, C. 2006. *The Captive Woman's Lament in Greek Tragedy*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Dunn, F. 2011. "Metatheatre and Crisis in Euripides' *Bacchae* and Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus*" in A. Markantonatos and B. Zimmermann, eds. *Crisis on Stage: Comedy and Tragedy in Late Fifth-Century Athens*, 359–376. Berlin: De Gruyter (Trends in Classics, Suppl. 13).

Easterling, P.E. 1997. "A Show for Dionysus" in P.E. Easterling, ed. *The Cambridge Companion to Greek Tragedy*, 36–53. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Faraone, C.A. 1985. "Aeschylus' ὕμνος δέσμιος (*Eum*. 306) and Attic Judicial Curse Tablets," *JHS* 105: 150–154.

Ferrari, F. 2014. "Saffo e i suoi fratelli e altri brani del primo libro," *ZPE* 192: 1–19.

Ferrari, G. 1997. "Figures in the Text: Metaphors and Riddles in the *Agamemnon*," *CPh* 92: 1–45.

Fischer-Lichte, E. 2004. "Thinking about the Origins of Theatre in the 1970s" in E. Hall, F. Macintosh, and A. Wrigley, eds. *Dionysus Since 69. Greek Tragedy at the Dawn of the Third Millennium*, 329–360. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fischer-Lichte, E. 2007. "Berliner Antikenprojekte: 150 Jahre Theatergeschichte" in E. Fischer-Lichte and M. Dreyer, eds. *Antike Tragödie heute. Vorträge und Materialien zum Antiken-Projekt des Deutschen Theaters*, 111–140. Berlin: Henschel (Blätter des Deutschen Theaters 6).

Fleming, T.J. 1977. "The Musical Nomos in Aeschylus' *Oresteia*," *CJ* 72: 222–233.

Fletcher, J. 1999. "Choral Voice and Narrative in the First Stasimon of Aeschylus *Agamemnon*," *Phoenix* 53: 29–49.

Foley, H.P. 1985. *Ritual Irony. Poetry and Sacrifice in Euripides*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Ford, A. 2010. "'A Song to Match My Song': Lyric Doubling in Euripides' *Helen*" in P. Mitsis and C. Tsagalis, eds. *Allusion, Authority, and Truth: Critical Perspectives on Greek Poetic and Rhetorical Praxis*, 283–302. Berlin: De Gruyter (Trends in Classics, Suppl. 7).

Fraenkel, E. 1950. *Aeschylus. Agamemnon*, 3 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Gibert, J. 2003. "Apollo's Sacrifice. The Limits of a Metaphor in Greek Tragedy," *HSPh* 101: 159–206.

Gödde, S. 2000a. "Zu einer Poetik des Rituals in Aischylos' *Persern*" in S. Gödde and

T. Heinze, eds. *Skenika. Beiträge zum antiken Theater und seiner Rezeption. Festschrift zum 65. Geburtstag von Horst-Dieter Blume*, 31–47. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.

Gödde, S. 2000b. *Das Drama der Hikesie. Ritual und Rhetorik in Aischylos'* Hiketiden. Münster: Aschendorff.

Gödde, S. 2010. "Unschuldskomödie und Euphemismus. Walter Burkerts Theorie des Opfers und die Tragödie" in A. Bierl and W. Braungart, eds. *Gewalt und Opfer. Im Dialog mit Walter Burkert*, 215–245. Berlin and New York: De Gruyter (MythosEikonPoiesis 2).

Gödde, S. 2011. *euphêmia. Die gute Rede in Kult und Literatur der griechischen Antike*. Heidelberg: Winter.

Goldhill, S. 1984. *Language, Sexuality, Narrative: The Oresteia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gould, J. 1996. "Tragedy and Collective Experience" in M.S. Silk, ed. *Tragedy and the Tragic. Greek Theatre and Beyond*, 217–243. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Haldane, J.A. 1965. "Musical Themes and Imagery in Aeschylus," *JHS* 85: 33–41.

Heath, J. 1999. "Disentangling the Beast: Humans and Other Animals in Aeschylus' *Oresteia*," *JHS* 119: 17–48.

Heirman, F. 1975. "Kassandra's Glossolalia," *Mnemosyne* 28: 257–267.

Henrichs, A. 1994/1995. "'Why Should I Dance?': Choral Self-Referentiality in Greek Tragedy," *Arion* 3rd series 3.1: 56–111.

Henrichs. A. 2000. "Drama and *Dromena*: Bloodshed, Violence, and Sacrificial Metaphor in Euripides," *HSPh* 100: 173–188.

Henrichs, A. 2004. "'Let the Good Prevail': Perversions of the Ritual Process in Greek Tragedy" in D. Yatromanolakis and P. Roilos, eds. *Greek Ritual Poetics*, 189–198. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

Henrichs, A. 2006. "Blutvergießen am Altar: Zur Ritualisierung der Gewalt im griechischen Opferkult" in B. Seidensticker and Martin Vöhler, eds. *Gewalt und Ästhetik. Zur Gewalt und ihrer Darstellung in der griechischen Klassik*, 59–87. Berlin and New York: De Gruyter.

Holst-Warhaft, G. 1992. *Dangerous Voices. Women's Laments and Greek Literature*. London and New York: Routledge.

Hünemörder, C. 2001. "Schwalbe," *DNP* 11: 270–272; cited English version: "Swallow," *Brill's New Pauly*, eds. H. Cancik and H. Schneider. Brill Online, 2015. Reference. Universitaetsbibliothek Basel, consulted 05 August 2015. http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/brill-s-new-pauly/swallow-e1105330.

Jakobson, R. 1960. "(Closing Statement:) Linguistics and Poetics" in T.A. Sebeok, ed. *Style in Language*, 350–377. Cambridge MA: MIT Press (reprint in S. Rudy, ed. *Roman Jakobson. Selected Writings* III, 18–51. The Hague: Mouton).

Jenkins, I. 1983. "Is There Life After Marriage? A Study of the Abduction Motif in Vase Paintings of the Attic Ceremony," *BICS* 30: 137–145.

Johnston, S.I. 1999. *Restless Dead. Encounters Between the Living and the Dead in Ancient Greece*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Kaimio, M. et al. 2001. "Metatheatricality in the Greek Satyr-Play," *Arctos* 35: 35–78.

Käppel, L. 1992. *Paian. Studien zur Geschichte einer Gattung*. Berlin and New York: De Gruyter.

Käppel, L. 1998. *Die Konstruktion der Handlung in der* Orestie *des Aischylos: die Makrostruktur des 'Plot' als Sinnträger in der Darstellung des Geschlechterfluchs*. Munich: Beck (Zetemata 99).

Karamitrou, C. 1999. "Aischylos' Kassandra: A Human Trophy, *Entheos Eros*, Exposure, Liminality, Madness and Theatricality," *Parnassos* 41: 380–394.

Knox, B.M.W. 1972. "Aeschylus and the Third Actor," *AJPh* 93: 104–124.

Kullmann, W. 1993. "Die 'Rolle' des euripideischen Pentheus. Haben die *Bakchen* eine 'metatheatralische' Bedeutung?" in G.W. Most, H. Petersmann, and A.M. Ritter, eds. *Philanthropia kai Eusebeia. Festschrift für Albrecht Dihle zum 70. Geburtstag*, 248–263. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

Lacan, J. 1966. *Écrits*. Paris: Seuil.

Lacan, J. 2006. *Écrits. The First Complete Edition in English*, trans. B. Fink. New York and London: Norton.

Lämmle, R. 2013. *Poetik des Satyrspiels*. Heidelberg: Winter.

Lebeck, A. 1971. *The Oresteia: A Study in Language and Structure*. Washington DC and Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

Lesky, A. 1943. "Der Kommos der Choephoren," *SB Akad. Wien* 221.3.

Lesky, A. 1972. *Die tragische Dichtung der Helenen*, third revised edition. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

Lévi-Strauss, C. 1966. *The Savage Mind*, trans. E. Leach. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Lloyd-Jones, H. 1979. *Aeschylus. The Oresteia*, trans. with notes. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Loraux, N. 1990. "La métaphore sans métaphore. À propos de l''Orestie'," *RPhilos* 180: 247–268.

McLuhan, M. 1964. *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man*. New York: McGraw Hill; second edition New York 1966 (reissued Cambridge MA: MIT Press 1994).

McNeil, L. 2005. "Bridal Cloths, Cover-ups and *Kharis*. The 'Carpet Scene' in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*," *G&R* 52: 1–17.

Mitchell-Boyask, R. 2006. "The Marriage of Cassandra and the *Oresteia*: Text, Image, Performance," *TAPhA* 136: 269–297.

Montiglio, S. 2000. *Silence in the Land of Logos*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Moutsopoulos, E. 1959. "Une philosophie de la musique chez Eschyle," *REG* 72: 18–56.

Nagy, G. 1990. *Pindar's Homer. The Lyric Possession of an Epic Past*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Nagy, G. 1996. *Poetry as Performance. Homer and Beyond*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nooter, S. 2012. *When Heroes Sing. Sophocles and the Shifting Soundscape of Tragedy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ogden, D. 2001. *Greek and Roman Necromancy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Papadopoulou-Belmehdi, I. 1994. *Le chant de Pénélope. Poétique du tissage féminin dans l'Odyssée*. Paris: Belin.

Peponi, A.-E. 2013 (ed.). *Performance and Culture in Plato's* Laws. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Peradotto, J. 1969. "Cledomonancy in the *Oresteia*," *AJPh* 90: 1–21.

Prins, Y. 1991. "The Power of the Speech Act: Aeschylus' Furies and Their Binding Song," *Arethusa* 24: 177–195.

Pucci, P. 1992. "*Human Sacrifices* in the *Oresteia*" in R. Hexter and D. Selden, eds. *Innovations of Antiquity*, 513–536. New York: Routledge.

Radke, G. 2003. *Tragik und Metatragik. Euripides' Bakchen und die moderne Literaturwissenschaft*. Berlin/New York: De Gruyter.

Raeburn D. and O. Thomas 2011. *The* Agamemnon *of Aeschylus*: *A Commentary for Students*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rehm, R. 1994. *Marriage to Death. The Conflation of Wedding and Funeral Rituals in Greek Tragedy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Reinhardt, K. 1949. *Aischylos als Regisseur und Theologe*. Bern: Francke.

Ringer, M. 1998. *Electra and the Empty Urn. Metatheater and Role Playing in Sophocles*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Schein, S.L. 2009. "Narrative Technique in the *Parodos* of Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*" in J. Grethlein and A. Rengakos, eds. *Narratology and Interpretation. The Content of Narrative Form in Ancient Narrative*, 377–398. Berlin: De Gruyter (Trends in Classics, Suppl. 4).

Seaford, R. 1987. "The Tragic Wedding," *JHS* 107: 106–130.

Segal, C. 1997. *Dionysiac Poetics and Euripides'* Bacchae. Princeton: Princeton University Press (first edition 1982).

Sier, K. 1988. *Die lyrischen Partien der Choephoren des Aischylos. Text, Übersetzung, Kommentar*. Wiesbaden: Steiner.

Slater, N.W. 2002. *Spectator Politics. Metatheatre and Performance in Aristophanes*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Swift, L.A. 2010. *The Hidden Chorus. Echoes of Genre in Tragic Lyric*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Tambiah, S.J. 1985. *Culture, Thought, and Social Action. An Anthropological Perspective*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

Taplin, O. 1986. "Fifth-Century Tragedy and Comedy: A *Synkrisis*," *JHS* 106: 163–174.

Thalmann, W.G. 1985. "Speech and Silence in the *Oresteia* 2," *Phoenix* 39: 221–237.

Thiel, R. 1993. *Chor und tragische Handlung im 'Agamemnon' des Aischylos*. Stuttgart: Teubner.

Torrance, I. 2013. *Metapoetry in Euripides*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Versnel, H.S. 1970. *Triumphus. An Inquiry into the Origin, Development and Meaning of the Roman Triumph*. Leiden: Brill.

Vidal-Naquet, P. 1988. "Hunting and Sacrifice in Aeschylus' *Oresteia*" in J.-P. Vernant and P. Vidal-Naquet, eds. *Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece*, trans. J. Lloyd, 141–159, 439–452. New York: Zone Books.

Warburg, A.M. 1906. "Dürer und die italienische Antike" in K. Dissel, ed. *Verhandlungen der 48. Versammlung deutscher Philologen und Schulmänner in Hamburg vom 3. bis 6. Oktober 1905*, 55–60. Leipzig: Teubner.

West, M.L. 1998 (ed.). *Aeschyli Tragoediae*. Stuttgart and Leipzig: Teubner.

Wilson, P. 1999/2000. "Euripides' Tragic Muse" in M. Cropp, K. Lee, and D. Sansone, eds. *Euripides and Tragic Theatre in the Late Fifth Century*, 427–449. Champaign IL: University of Illinois Press (= *ICS* 24–25).

Wilson, P. and O. Taplin 1993. "The Aetiology of Tragedy in the *Oresteia*," *PCPhS* 39: 169–180.

Zeitlin, F.I. 1965. "The Motif of the Corrupted Sacrifice in Aeschylus' *Oresteia*," *TAPhA* 96: 463–505.

Zeitlin, F.I. 1966. "Postscript to Sacrificial Imaginary in the *Oresteia* (*Ag*. 1235–1237)," *TAPhA* 97: 645–653.

CHAPTER 10

Daphnis' Folksong: The Euphonist's Effect on the Creation of a Textual Performance

Naomi Kaloudis

This article pursues the tension between the production of oral and written poetry as Alexandrian poets experimented with oral genres passed down through transcripts separate from musical notation.[1] It is generally accepted that oral performance in the Hellenistic period in Alexandria lacked the musical accompaniment of Greece's previous song culture; poetry was spoken in a reading room or at court, not sung.[2] Outside factors largely contributed to this transition, including politics, education, philosophy as well as spatial and temporal distance from the song culture of mainland Greece. This article addresses this transition: to what extent had the Alexandrian Greeks lost their song culture? Should we consider any loss of a musical element merely a blip in the poetic history of the Greeks, or had something more profound happened? I suggest the latter. A shift from an oral to "literate" culture re-imagined traditional performance style; instead of singing to musical accompaniment, I suggest that Alexandrian poets reinterpreted songs stemming from previous musical tra-

1 Pfeiffer (1968: 181). Prauscello (2006: 10–28) points out evidence for some Alexandrian scholars perhaps referring to musical scores alongside the texts while writing, if they were able to read musical scores.

2 As Prauscello (2006: 5) states: "the (intentional) absence of music" is the result of the "process of re-appropriation of past literary tradition." Using Theocritus' *Idyll* 29 as an example, she suggests an intentional Hellenistic interpretation of Lesbian poetry without the aid of musical accompaniment. Although Fantuzzi and Hunter (2004: 26–27) assert that Alexandrian poetry was spoken and not sung to musical accompaniment, they clarify that in *other* areas of the Hellenistic world "traditional" oral performance may have continued. See also Bing (1993: 190) who explains that Alexandrian scholars understood lyrical poetry as "symbols or script by which the classical melopoeia was expressed and handed down from the Ionic and Attic ages to the third century." Hunter (1996: 3) likewise explains that a new trend began two centuries earlier when musical notation was added to texts lending to a decline in live musical performance, and with the continuing increase of the book trade in the fourth century BCE, lyric poems were beginning to be read more as "texts" because the actual performance was becoming unnecessary. West (1992: 7) gives a more conservative date: at least by the fourth century BCE, Greeks had a system of notation.

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2017 | DOI: 10.1163/9789004329737_011

ditions creating a new literary experience via the vocalization of "textual performances," thereby carrying on a musical tradition whose performance was influenced by current literary debate at court on euphonist theory.[3]

I define a "textual performance" as the imitation of musical performance through the sound of language alone without the aid of musical accompaniment—this is a tonal approach to texts from previous musical traditions which was debated in court at Alexandria.[4] Modern scholars call this approach "euphonist" theory, although this designation did not exist in the ancient world.[5] Philodemus (ca. 110–40 BCE), an Epicurean scholar working in the first century BCE in Herculaneum, represents the last stage of this literary debate in the Hellenistic world. He collected the third-century scholars, such as Pausimachus of Miletus and Andromenides, of this literary theory under the label "critics" in his treatise *On Poems*, and although the original texts of these men are lost, they greatly influenced later Hellenistic and Roman euphonist scholars.[6] Reading literary theory through the refutation of the lost work of the Stoic philosopher and grammarian for the Attalid court, Crates of Mallus (fl. 200–175 BCE), Philodemus endorsed that poetry should thoroughly enthrall the audience instead of instruct.[7] As the first purely aesthetic approach to literature, a study of their theory aids modern scholars in reconstructing the verbal *enargeia* of an ancient text. Philodemus and the third-century euphonists, whom he cited, praised poetry, which physically "tickled" the ear.[8] A modern audience misses out on this essential aspect of an ancient performance simply because we read in silence; but it has been well argued, in my opinion, that the ancient audience

3 Gutzwiller (2010: 338) states: "… [i]t appears, then, that already at the beginning of the Hellenistic Age literary criticism was practiced by a wide range of educated persons and that royal courts were a hotbed for discussion and debate about such issues." Fantuzzi and Hunter (2004: 33–34) state that Callimachus and Theocritus actually preserved lyric poetry by placing "recitative" meters, the elegiac and dactylic, onto previous genres.

4 See Gutzwiller (2010: 338).

5 For good summaries of euphonist theory, see Gutzwiller (2010: 2007), Halliwell (2013), Janko (2000), and Porter (2010 and 2011).

6 On the "critics" (κρίτικοι) of Philodemus, see Gutzwiller (2007: 207–208) and Porter (2011: 276–277 and 281–282). Gutzwiller (2007: 208) summarizes the theories of Pausimachus and Andromenides: Pausimachus was an extreme Epicurean who made a detailed analysis of sounds at the basic units of letters and syllables, while Andromenides provided a theoretical basis for the analysis of word choice in epic and tragedy. For more on Andromenides, see Halliwell (2013: 308) and Janko (2000).

7 Gutzwiller (2007: 209–210 and 212).

8 Gutzwiller (2007: 208).

read aloud and could listen for the musical tones of their language.[9] Greek texts thus should be read as musical scores and the system of accents as notational instructions to create musical sound with voice.[10]

As the Epicurean euphonist critics critiqued linguistic forms from transcripts of previous musical traditions, I critique the 'Song of Thyrsis' in the same way, looking for sound patterns favored by euphonist critics and typical of folksongs. I suggest that the 'Song of Thyrsis' presents a literary experiment by Theocritus in memory of this traditional oral genre, striking a nostalgic note for the Greek audience in Alexandria removed from the traditional "old world" culture of Greece and Sicily.[11] The *Idylls* overall incorporate several types of folksongs, including lullabies, wedding songs, laments, work songs, seasonal songs, superstitions, Adonis songs and Sicilian songs of unrequited love—all traditional types as recognized by Smyth.[12] Parallels to the thematic origins of bucolic poetry and popular song strongly suggest that elements of Theocritus' literary pastorals were conceived within a tradition of folksong.[13] This article further suggests that the inclusion of repetitive, sym-

9 Stanford (1967: 132). As Bing (1993: 190) states, Alexandrian poetry was "stripped of its musical and choreographic dimension," as they received poetry from archaic and classical periods in written form.

10 David (2006: 45); Prauscello (2006: 34–40). Prauscello (2006: 34) relates that Aristophanes of Byzantium (ca. 257–185 BCE) perhaps invented the prototype for the written accentual system: the acute, circumflex, and grave. These signs may signal the raising or lowering of pitch, when spoken, to accompany this notational theory. She (2006: 34 n. 100) quotes Pseudo-Arcadius who observed that Aristophanes' notational theory treats language like music with discussion of rhythmic, melodic, and instrumental qualities.

11 Zanker (1987: 19–25) claims that one reason for specifically Greek material in Alexandrian poetry is that the Greeks living in Alexandria felt distant from their native Greece or Magna Graecia, for example how Praxinoa and Gorgo displayed Syracusan pride in *Idyll* 15. Bulloch (1985) also argues that the preservation of Greek identity is a large aspect of Alexandrian poetry. Stephens (2003: 7) disagrees with Zanker's polarizing thesis. She does not see an "identity crisis," but a syncretism between Greek and Egyptian cultures. I agree with her in much of her argument, but it is more difficult for me to see much Egyptian infiltration in Theocritus' pastorals (except for the soldiers in *Idyll* 10, if we consider it pastoral).

12 Smyth (1963) surveys lyric poetry, and other genres of literary poetry, for evidence of the inclusion of traditional songs within the text.

13 See Aelian for a summary of Stesichorus' song to Daphnis (*VH* 10.18). Gutzwiller (1991: 134–157), however, provides multiple generic literary possibilities for the pastoral competition, such as found in Herodas' *Mimiambi*, Aristophanes' *Frogs*, Menander, Callimachus' *Aetia* and *Iambi*, etc. Besides these higher forms of literature, I see a stronger connection to a realistic contest between shepherds considering Theocritus' association with Sicily and Cos.

metrical structures and sonorous musical moments inclusive of folksong technique point to Theocritus' *awareness* of euphonist theory. I present my argument in three parts: 1) a note on the outside factors, which influenced the Alexandrian audience and poet, 2) a brief explanation of euphonist theory, and 3) an analysis of my case study, the 'Song of Thyrsis', as a euphonist text with comparison to euphonist treatises and poets of previous musical traditions.

Part 1: What Do I Mean by Outside Factors?

Written communication had overtaken oral forms in Ptolemaic Alexandria; but this transition was not overnight.[14] The past few centuries had shown a growing appreciation for book learning, and Ptolemy's kingdom was its Hellenistic culmination. Ptolemy funded education as well as the poets and intellectuals at the Library. Under the leadership of Ptolemy II Philadelphus (ruled 285–246 BCE), a larger population learned to write for itself to meet the increase in official documentation.[15] Education was no longer limited to the elite.[16] Government grants and private donations supported a flourishing educational system.[17] This effort was not entirely *pro bono*, however; student curriculum reflected Ptolemaic agenda. On top of Homeric and Euripidean studies, children would memorize speeches and contemporary works, such as Callimachus and Posidippus.[18] The Ptolemies sought a more literate population while at

14 From the eighth to fifth centuries, basic literary skills were limited to artisans, poets, and the elite (Harris 1989: 327–328). Fischer (2003: 50), likewise, breaks down the numbers for fifth-century Athens: Only about 15% of adults were semi-literate, and of this number, only 5% or so of Athenians, including women and slaves, were able to competently read.

15 Harris (1989: 119–120) states that the minister Apollonius and agent Zeno extended the paperwork needed in government work under Philadelphus; the growing use of documents affected the general population. See also Cribiore (2001: 163) and Harris (1989: 122).

16 Herodas (3.9–10) presents a mother, Metrotime, and her son, and explains that her refusal to pay the teacher's fees shows a family not of elite means (see Harris 1989: 135 and 140). Government aid and private donation employed teachers more and more, and from this, a whole curriculum originated.

17 Thompson's (2007) article on education in Hellenistic Egypt provides examples showing that the Ptolemaic government gave a salt tax exemption to teachers and athletic instructors within Alexandria and throughout the Egyptian countryside as an incentive to teach. On the salt tax at Lampsacus, see esp. Thompson (2007: 128) and Harris (1989: 132); see also Acosta-Hughes (2002: 261).

18 Thompson (2007: 133–135) shares the inclusion of the "fountain poem" written possibly by

the same time reclaiming their cultural heritage. Economic and propagandistic reasons thus drove Philadelphus' education initiative.

Although literacy was at a higher rate in Ptolemaic Alexandria than elsewhere in the Hellenistic world, it continued to be very much an oral society. The Greeks were still culturally trained to listen as much to the sound of language as to what was being said, as the euphonist Dionysius of Halicarnassus (ca. 60–7 BCE) expressed when critiquing the success of Plato and Pindar.[19] Traditional performance with musical accompaniment would continue in traveling troupes coming to Alexandria to perform Homer and also as a form of *paideia* to some degree.[20] Children would learn through repetition, and other such stylistic mnemonic devices of song, which was practiced either in open performance or in the classroom.[21] A culture of sound still permeated the pages of this newly educated populace. The audience was becoming like no other yet seen in the Greek world, and the poetry reflected such a Zeitgeist.

The literary aspect of Alexandrian performance poetry therefore was adapted to suit a uniquely developed poet and audience. Alexandrian scholars met poetry from the archaic and classical periods in the Library in writ-

---

Posidippus (316–215 BCE), who worked in Alexandria under Ptolemy II Philadelphus, to demonstrate what an Alexandrian classroom handbook entails; but it is also thought that the poem was written under Ptolemy IV Eupator and that he erected the celebrated fountain house for his own wife Arsinoë. The inclusion of this poem in the classroom handbook shows both the memorization of contemporary texts and also another way in which the curriculum reflected Ptolemaic agenda, as the poem extolled the architectural achievement of Alexandria under the Ptolemies. Thompson (2007: 133) cites Austin and Bastianini (2002: n. 113) as her source for Posidippus' fountain poem, and she uses the website Leuven Database of Ancient Books (http://www.trismegistos.org/ldab/index.php) as a source for Hellenistic papyri.

19 Dionysius (*Dem.* 26.1034.10–14) states: Πίνδαρος τοῦτο πεποίηκεν εἰς Ἀλέξανδρον τὸν Μακεδόνα, περὶ τὰ μέλη καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ τὴν λέξιν ἐσπουδακώς. Πλάτων δέ, ὃς ἐπαγγέλλεται σοφίαν, τρυφεροῖς καλλωπίζει καὶ περιέργοις σχήμασι τὴν φράσιν ("Pindar composed this for Alexander of Macedon, and he was concerned more with the music and rhythm of the word than with what it said. But Plato, who professes wisdom, adorns his speech with affected and exaggerated figures of speech"). This translation is by Usher (1985) with my modifications. All translations are my own, unless otherwise noted.

20 Thompson (2007: 124). Svenbro (1993: 5 and 183–186). Murray (2004: 385) argues, however, that musical accompaniment at least in the field of education drops, although memorization does not. This statement contributes to Murray's "literate" Muse.

21 Cribiore (2001: 174) explains that the classroom curriculum called for a slow pace and much repetition; students learned ancient Greek by a long process of building up "mnemonic and mechanical skills together with proper eye coordination."

ten form "stripped of its musical and choreographic dimension."[22] This new type of scholar-poet knew earlier compositions "both as poetry and as physical texts, texts that were collected, collated, edited, and preserved."[23] The Alexandrians were following the works of the fourth-century Sophists and philosophers, who, modeling their studies on Aristotle, paid more attention to language than music when discussing poetry; and since the Aristotelians catalogued the words separate from the music, the Alexandrians continued this method, developing verbal aspects of their poetry, not the instrumental.[24] Sappho's songs, for instance, were organized into books by meter probably some time before the Alexandrians, which would have been appealing to them aesthetically.[25] The loss of musical accompaniment was therefore *not* the fault of the Alexandrians, as Pfeiffer would say;[26] it continued to aid Alexandrian curriculum. Musical accompaniment merely lost the market it once held in archaic and classical Greece. Alexandria's performance aesthetic had a profound literary dimension.

Part 2: A Note on Euphonist Theory

Although the scholars of euphonist theory spanned several centuries, the first widespread wave of euphonist thought occurred in the third century BCE. This group of scholars had shared interests.[27] They critiqued compositions from Greece's earlier musical traditions, and they described the production of a successful performance piece using musical vocabulary; for instance, Dionysius, a scholar with an aesthetic argument similar to Pausimachus, illustrated the excellence of Pindar's text using the terms τὰ μέλη καὶ τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς ("music and rhythm," *Dem.* 26), highlighting its aural quality, not what it said. Demetrius of Phalerum (ca. 355–280 BCE)[28] likewise considered the aural quality of language

22 Pfeiffer (1968, 181).

23 Acosta-Hughes (2010: 10).

24 Pfeiffer (1968: 181).

25 Acosta-Hughes (2010: 13).

26 Pfeiffer (1968: 181) asserted that Alexandrian grammarians did nothing to save music, "but let it perish."

27 Aristoxenus (fl. 335 BCE) wrote the first extant musical treatise, *Harmonica*, in which he commented on the linguistic treatment among other harmonious aspects of music. Aristoxenus (*Harm.* 1.18) stated that there is a bit of song in everyday speech (λογῶδες τι μέλος).

28 Porter (2011: 281) agrees that the author of *De Elocutione* dates to the Hellenistic period,

when he wrote: ἔχει γάρ τινα ἡ λύσις καὶ ἡ σύγκρουσις οἷον ᾠδὴν ἐπιγινομένην ("for the resolution and combining [of vowels] have something like the occurrence of song," *Eloc.* 70).[29] These critics focused on the *sound* of texts; they focused on the origins of sounds, the meaning of sounds, the treatment of sounds, and how sound was produced in order to convey a desired effect. These critics examined oral compositions by detailing linguistic forms composed naturally in a society still very much taking part in a song culture.

As a major source for lost third-century euphonist criticism, Philodemus preferred an Epicurean, aesthetic approach, which thought that poetry should enthrall the audience.[30] A composition needed to sound euphonious and have meaningful content; as Gutzwiller summarizes: "The excellence of poetry thus lay in the conjunction of content with the aural features that were particular to poetry."[31] This union, although admittedly subjective, would lead to the most joyful, informative, and poignant experience. Studying sound patterns found in musical tradition is an objective way of critiquing aural quality; and although Philodemus was acutely aware of the possibility of becoming "reductively formalist," he judged the aesthetic value of poetry in grammatical terms.[32] I therefore apply this literary theory to my interpretation of Theocritus' *Idylls* in order to better understand what these theorists thought was a successful composition and how a contemporary audience might receive a Theocritean composition in performance. Since euphonist criticism relied on sense perception, my contribution to an euphonist conversation relies as well on sense perception. With the aid of ancient scholarship on language and music, I define this "musicality" by the continuous, structural use of formal stylistic features, such as alliteration, assonance, anaphora, *anadiplosis* ("reduplication"), meter, and dialect.[33]

---

but he has some doubt of his name. Gutzwiller (2007: 206) doubts this Demetrius to be the "Demetrius of Phalerum"; Gutzwiller suggests that the Peripatetic Demetrius wrote *De Elocutione* later in the first century BCE, although she still agrees that this work best displays "Hellenistic critical thinking about literary style."

29 See also Demetrius (*Eloc.* 74): Καὶ ἐν ᾠδαῖς δὲ τὰ μελίσματα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς γίνεται τοῦ αὐτοῦ μακροῦ γράμματος, οἷον ᾠδῶν ἐπεμβαλλομένων ᾠδαῖς, ὥστε ἡ τῶν ὁμοίων σύγκρουσις μικρὸν ἔσται τι ᾠδῆς μέρος καὶ μέλισμα ("Even in songs, tunes happen from the one same long letter, how when songs are placed upon other songs, so that a combining of similar letters may be some small part of the song and a tune").

30 Halliwell (2013: 316); for one example of poetic "enthrallment" (ψυχαγωγεῖ) in Philodemus, see *Po.* 1.151.5–8 Janko.

31 Gutzwiller (2007: 212); Halliwell (2013: 309).

32 Halliwell (2013: 307).

33 I use the terms "musicality" and "verbal lyricism" interchangeably to denote the sonority of

Alexandrian poets were becoming more aware of both their poetic experiments with past generic forms and also the new *literary* Muses that inspired them.[34] The *ecphrasis* in *Idyll* 1 detailing the goatherd's cup provides an example of the literary theory already practiced in royal courts by the beginning of the Hellenistic period, as well as this debate that transpired between poets and scholars. Gutzwiller has suggested that the third image of the boy weaving a cricket-cage is a programmatic statement, which reveals Theocritus' interest in crafting the ideal euphonist σύνθεσις ("composition"):[35]

> *αὐτὰρ ὅγ' ἀνθερίκοισι καλὰν* ***πλέκει*** *ἀκριδοθήραν*
> *σχοίνῳ* ***ἐφαρμόσδων·*** *μέλεται δέ οἱ οὔτε τι πήρας*
> *οὔτε φυτῶν τοσσῆνον ὅσον περὶ* ***πλέγματι*** *γαθεῖ*
> *Id.* 1.52–54

> Yet he ***plaits*** a lovely cricket-cage ***by fitting*** rush
> with flowering asphodel; and he cares neither a bit for his
> wallet nor the plants, since he rejoices so much ***in his plaiting***.[36]

As the young boy carefully weaves a cricket-cage that holds mellifluous sounds (i.e., crickets' chirruping), unaware of the foxes plundering his food and vines, the followers of euphonist theory paid close attention to the arrangement of their entire composition (the σύνθεσις) capturing, also, a beautiful sound.[37] Although the allusion to creating beautiful song through weaving reaches back

---

the language that poets created with well-arranged text and the repetition of grammatical figures of speech. Porter (2011: 278) also uses the term "musicality" to describe what the euphonists studied in literature: their appreciation "lies not in what poetry means but in the way it sounds."

34 Murray (2004: 373).

35 According to Gutzwiller (2010: 353–354), this allusion to the grasshopper points to euphonist discourse: "For knowledgeable ancient readers, then, the harmonious plaiting of rush and asphodel would emblematize good poetic composition, as the grasshopper who will occupy the 'lovely' cage would represent the sound that supervenes upon it."

36 I cite all Theocritus from Gow's authoritative text.

37 As Gutzwiller (2010: 353–354) notes, the grasshopper, like the cricket, was thought to have a pleasing sound by the ancients, and thus the fragile cage that holds the insect echoes the insect's pleasing reverberations. As the nightingale and cicada in the prologue of Callimachus' *Aetia* signify euphonist theory, so does the grasshopper. Similarly, Simichidas compares his skills to his poetic predecessors Philitas and Asclepiades, as a frog to a grasshopper (βάτραχος ... ποτ' ἀκρίδας ὥς τις, *Id.* 7.41). See also Vergil (*Ecl.* 10.70–71). Porter (2011: 277).

as early as Homer, Sappho, and Bacchylides, it would appear that Theocritus made variations on this trope adapting it to Hellenistic aesthetic.[38] The image of the boy plaiting the fragile cricket-cage invokes the "slender Muse" of Hellenistic poetry. As he plaits κατὰ λεπτόν ("on a small scale"), Theocritus weaves the perfect harmonious text.[39] This *ecphrasis* further invokes euphonist debate by using terminology suggestive of euphonist criticism to describe the structuring of an euphonist composition. For instance, Pausimachus and Dionysius described "weaving" the ideal euphonist text using terms that share the same stem as the words used in *Idyll* 1 (*πλοκή* and συμ*πλοκή*).[40] The Hellenistic euphonist Demetrius similarly analogized the construction of wooden objects, perhaps like Theocritus' cricket-cage, and well-constructed poetry (*Eloc.* 13–14).[41] Dionysius (*Comp.* 6) also illustrated how to craft a "(verbal) monument," as Porter terms it; he compared the putting together of parts of speech well (εὖ **συνθήσειν** τὰ τοῦ λόγου μόρια) with how to fit together (συντίθησι) the materials (ὕλην) of architectural projects.[42] The poet in these images is equivalent to the carpenter. Euphonist consideration of the musicality of oral compositions reaches back to imagery and performances of previous musical traditions.[43] Oral composition often consists of linguistic patterning in the form of repeated words and phrases that perform an aesthetic and utilitarian function.

38 For a discussion of the metaphorical uses of weaving and song in ancient texts, see Snyder (1981).

39 Gutzwiller (2007: 212) observes Theocritus' *Idylls* as a "small-scale poetic program" indicative of euphonist literary debate. See also, Gutzwiller (2010: 352).

40 See also Gutzwiller (2010: 353) for textual clarity: "The words πλέκει and πλέγματι evoke the technical usage of words from the same root, such as πλοκή and συμπλοκή, to refer to ordering of letters or words (as in Phld. *Po.* 1, 80.7 Janko; D.H. *Comp.* 2, 16)." Gutzwiller also sees, and I agree with her, that ἐ*φαρμόσδων* invokes the use of *ἁρμονία* for "melodious arrangement" in Philodemus (*Po.* 1.131.14–15 Janko) (my italicizing to accentuate the comparison).

41 For similar analogizing of an instrument (ὀρ[γ]άνωι) to the musical sound of a well-arranged composition, see also Pausimachus, preserved in Philodemus (*Po.* 93.8–24 Janko).

42 On creating a "(verbal) monument," see Porter (2011: 281–282). Porter (2010: 325) points out that Aristoxenus (*Harm.* 27.18–20), likewise, observed that the "nature of continuity in melody (ἐν τῇ μελῳδίᾳ) seems to be similar to that which in speech (ἐν τῇ λέξει) relates to the putting together of letters (περὶ τὴν τῶν γραμμάτων σύνθεσιν)."

43 As Porter (2011: 277) states, "the theory and practice of euphonism have a heritage that reaches back into the earlier musical tradition, then into the classical era with its strong oral component and (what is less well documented) its own tradition of poetic *sunthesis*."

This repetition sounds sonorous and aids memorization and composition-in-performance. A survey of folksongs shows this very mark of oral composition, and the *Idylls* of Theocritus demonstrate this same type of verbal patterning.

The careful placement of "building blocks" of language was the euphonist response to recapturing the aesthetic of musical performance. Alexandrian poetry shows an awareness of literary theory, and its audience likely would also have been aware of verbal cues associated with these performances—a residue from Greece's previous song culture and early learning practices. The sounds, words, and phrases making up the performance had begun to be scrutinized for their tonal worth by scholars. We are what Stanford has called "'eye-philologists,' not 'ear-philologists.'"[44] Modern scholars commonly study visual patterns in literature, but not always sound patterns, even though it is sound patterns by which the ancients first learned and recognized and experienced in performance. From this I suggest that, since writing originated in the need to express sound, modern scholars should study the total "live" performance of a text to understand more fully the composition in its original reception as an "aesthetic phenomenon" in antiquity.[45] When the criteria for good and bad poetry is decided by listening to whether the performance of the text "tickles" the ear, then the entertainment value reaches a wider audience and not just an "ivory tower" of intellectual elite.[46] These listeners tuned in with ears trained to pick up on the aural qualities of their language.

Part 3: Theocritus, a Case Study

To what extent does euphonist theory inform us about our understanding of the *Idylls* as "textual performances"? Gutzwiller's interpretation of a programmatic statement on euphony with the goatherd's cup lays the foundation for my own euphonist interpretation. Complementing trends introduced in the Hellenistic period by euphonist scholars, Theocritus composed with repetitive patterns inherent in folksongs, thereby invoking a past musical tradition and defining a new euphonic experience. Folksongs do not survive from the ancient world, since these were passed down orally; and yet it would be a mistake to overlook the ways in which the tradition has in fact been preserved:

44 Stanford (1967: 1).

45 I take the phrase "aesthetic phenomenon" from Porter (2010: 311).

46 Gutzwiller (2007: 212–213) explains how relying on our senses to judge good and bad poetry is an Epicurean belief; these critics introduced philosophy into literary theory.

that is, through intertexts and allusions in "literary" poetry. Smyth recognizes the incorporation of folksong elements in genres, such as lyric, epic, and comedy, that were written down and now preserved as "folk-lyric"; this literary evidence characterizes the lyrical quality of otherwise undocumented traditional songs.[47] The general character and form of these songs have been preserved, as Smyth says, "thanks to the love of the people for constant and fixed forms and melodies."[48] The folk poet did not produce all material *ex nihilo*, but worked from already established themes.[49] It would seem that Theocritus appropriated the themes and repeated patterns of this oral genre, while demonstrating an awareness of euphonist debate.

For the purposes of this article, I concentrate my study on one *Idyll* in order to demonstrate how Theocritus took the traditional form of folksong and shaped and updated it in accordance with contemporary taste. Theocritus' choices for poetic experimentation without doubt were meaningful. It is important to remember that Theocritus worked under the patronage of Ptolemy II Philadelphus and that his poetry was more than idle frolicking through a peaceful countryside—the *Idylls* were infused with Epicurean philosophy, traditional folk practices, along with unparalleled Hellenistic linguistic savvy. Philadelphus promoted an educated artistic presence in Alexandria, and, as clients, this guild would need to pander to his political agenda. I argue that the *Idylls* curried Ptolemaic favor by taking part in current literary debate and addressing feelings of displacement. Although Theocritus experimented with several oral genres throughout his *Idylls*, I focus on *Idyll* 1 and propose that the 'Song of Thyrsis' reinterprets the performance of a traditional folksong for the cosmopolitan Greek Alexandrian audience in two ways: 1) thematically, by invoking the form and function of traditional tales, and 2) musically, in the lyricism of the language which bears structural similarities to folksongs, thereby reimagining a previous performance quality in the spirit of contemporary Hellenistic euphonist debate.

---

47 See Smyth (1963: 488). There are several themes reflective of the over-arching genre of folksong, and the types that appear in Theocritus include lullabies (βαυκαλήματα), songs of field laborers (γεωργῶν ᾠδαί), reapers, songs of love, marriage songs (ὑμέναιοι), songs of lament (ὀλοφυρμοί), and Adonis songs (songs that take their name from mythical persons), pastorals (ποιμενικά καὶ βουκολιασμοί), and songs of superstition (ἐπῳδαί). These categories under "folk song" I take from the list created by Smyth (1963: 488–514).

48 Smyth (1963: 488). Lawson (1910: 28) contributes that Greek tradition and custom have remained so similar since Antiquity because of their culture and strong patriotism.

49 Smyth (1963: 489).

The 'Song of Thyrsis' reveals thematic elements in common with traditional tales. The fictional herdsman, Thyrsis, takes part in the entertainment of his friend by rendering the traditional tale of a familiar character of Sicilian folksong and lore, Daphnis, in euphonist tones.[50] The character's involvement with the tradition of another doomed lover of Aphrodite, Adonis, numbers him among a long list of vegetation gods, whose deaths the ancients performed in popular song as a reminder of the time of year and in the hope of a fruitful crop. Several of the *Idylls* (in fact, 1, 3, 6, 7, and 15) show an author very aware of the long folk tradition of youths overtaken by amorous goddesses before Daphnis, such as Adonis (*Id.* 1.109–110), Anchises (*Id.* 1.105–107), and the Near Eastern vegetation gods Tammuz and Dumuzi.[51] Since Theocritus included the royal sponsorship of an annual celebration of the Adonis festival at the palace in Alexandria in *Idyll* 15, we may safely assume that the Alexandrian audience also would have been aware of the connection between these youths and seasonal change.[52] Daphnis' ritual passing negatively affects nature until he would return again.[53] Verses 132–136 in the 'Song of Thyrsis' highlight this aspect of the youth's story, and nature responds despondently.

> νῦν ἴα μὲν φορέοιτε βάτοι, φορέοιτε δ' ἄκανθαι,
> ἁ δὲ καλὰ νάρκισσος ἐπ' ἀρκεύθοισι κομάσαι,
> πάντα δ' ἄναλλα γένοιτο, καὶ ἁ πίτυς ἄχνας ἐνείκαι,
> Δάφνις ἐπεὶ θνάσκει, καὶ τὰς κύνας ὥλαφος ἕλκοι,
> κὴξ ὀρέων τοὶ σκῶπες ἀηδόσι γαρύσαιντο
> *Id.* 1.132–136

50 As Segal (1975: 127) states, the Daphnis story, already sung by Stesichorus in the sixth century BCE (see Ael. *VH* 10.18), shows that "far back in the Mediterranean culture lay the ritual lament for a beautiful, beloved shepherd-king and singer whose death is intimately bound up with death and renewal in nature."

51 Halperin (1983b: 189). Halperin also finds parallel for Daphnis' rebuke against Aphrodite in the Sixth Tablet of the *Epic of Gilgamesh*, where Gilgamesh is invited by Ishtar to be her lover and he violently refuses her; just as Daphnis reproaches Aphrodite, Gilgamesh denies Ishtar since she is known for her insidious behavior in love. About the formation and continuity of traditional tales, see Burkert (1979: ch. 1). On the origins of pastoral in the Near East, see Halperin (1983a: 85–117).

52 Theocritus (*Id.* 15.143–144) states: ἵλαος, ὦ φίλ' Ἄδωνι, καὶ ἐς νέωτ'· εὐθυμεύσαις / καὶ νῦν ἦλθες, Ἄδωνι, καί, ***ὅκκ' ἀφίκῃ***, φίλος ἡξεῖς ("Oh dear Adonis, be gracious also for the next year; you have come to us now also in good cheer, Adonis, and, ***when you return***, you will come dear").

53 Segal (1975: 127).

> Now may the bramble-bush bear the violets, and the thorns too,
> and may the beautiful narcissus plume on the juniper bushes,
> may all things be different, and may the pine bear pears,
> since Daphnis dies, and let the stag weary the hounds,
> and from the mountains let the owls lament to the nightingales.

The series of *adynata*, these impossible occurrences, are made possible only when nature mourns the loss of Daphnis. As Dover points out, Daphnis of *Idyll* 1 embodies nature, while also having a direct effect on nature.[54] The characterization of Daphnis as a doomed lover is informed by numerous traditions, but the themes of love and premature death are particularly pronounced in folksongs and mythical tales. As Smyth observes of folksongs that originate from mythical personages: "Other forms of lament that are akin to the primitive dirge take their names from mythical persons whose early and undeserved death symbolizes the departure of the seasons and the mutability of human life."[55] The 'Song of Thyrsis', like that of Adonis, is a reminder of seasonal change as both nature and the gods lament Daphnis' passing. This comparison demonstrates how a story of common interest, passed down orally through popular song and ritual, is preserved in its form and function as folk lyric in literary poetry.

In what *musical* way, then, does Theocritus signal a "textual performance"? It would seem that Theocritus composed in language of interest to euphonist scholars, including a continual use of repetitive figures, pleasing sound effects, and onomatopoeia, in an attempt to mimic oral performance from a previous musical tradition. In this second part of my case study, I suggest that the mixing of sounds of nature with sounds of language help further Theocritus' conception of the 'Song of Thyrsis' as a literary interpretation of folksong. According to Dover's commentary on Theocritus, symmetrical repetition is a feature of oral composition and common to sub-literate forms of poetry, such as folksongs. He theorizes that Theocritus found original inspiration for his book not from higher genres of poetry, but from Sicilian folk practices.[56]

Instances of sound patterning, such as anaphora and other forms of repetition, disclose an author's attention to musical composition and also to dramatic emphasis; repetition adds to a sonorous sound, and correct placement created the desired musical effect. According to Demetrius, a grace and elegance comes

54 Dover (1971: 91–92).
55 Smyth (1963: 496).
56 Dover (1971: lxi).

from the arrangement of text (*Eloc.* [138]–139), and he regarded *anadiplosis* and anaphora as important signs of this elegance and skill in his treatise in sections 140–141.[57] Demetrius demonstrated this "elegance" with Sappho 114 (Voigt): ***παρθενία, παρθενία,*** ποῖ με λίποισ' ἀ⟨π⟩οίχῃ; / † ***οὐκέτι ἤξω*** πρὸς σέ, ***οὐκέτι ἤξω*** † ("***Maidenhood, maidenhood,*** to where are you going, leaving me? / ***I will no longer come*** to you, ***I will no longer come***").[58] The repetition of words and phrases illustrate an overall sonorous impression of her poetry and her skill at arranging composition—aspects in the creation of successful oral compositions of interest to euphonist scholars. Hunter suggests that the similar repetition of the term οὐκέτι in *Idyll* 1 invokes the language of epitaphs: χαίρεθ'· ὁ βουκόλος ὔμμιν ἐγὼ Δάφνις ***οὐκέτ'*** ἀν' ὕλαν, / ***οὐκέτ'*** ἀνὰ δρυμώς, οὐκ ἄλσεα. χαῖρ', Ἀρέθοισα ("Farewell. I the cowherd Daphnis am no longer in your forests, / no longer up through your woods, nor your groves. Farewell, Arethusa ...," vv. 116–117).[59] In this farewell address, Daphnis signals his impending destruction. The repetition of the term οὐκέτι underscores an essential aspect of the vegetation god's story: no longer will he frequent his old haunts.[60] The language urges the reader to envision the demise of Daphnis. Similar to the refrain in a song, each poet repeated words and phrases to add musical effect, and each poet intensified the character's bereavement through the language of death in lyrical structures.

The 'Song of Thyrsis' therefore is a song of lament akin to a folksong about a vegetation god or mythical person, but also of unrequited love. Daphnis does not reciprocate Aphrodite's affection, and thus Daphnis "wasted away" (ἐτάκετο) (*Id.* 1.66). I notice that there are many instances in Theocritus of repetition, along with specific instances of *anadiplosis* and anaphora, and these techniques often function to characterize a pastoral resident or to affect the mood at important moments in the text—the sound of these figures of speech helps to dramatize a storyline. *Idyll* 1.120–121 further characterizes Daphnis' solitude and heroic defiance:

---

57 Demetrius (*Eloc.* [138]–139) states: [χάριεν ... γλαφυρόν] ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τῆς τάξεως ... ("... [grace and elegance] exist from arrangement ...").

58 See Lardinois (2008: 70), Parker (1981: 161), and Rösler (1980) for the debate over whether Sappho composed orally, while a listener transcribed her poetry, or she originally composed through writing. On this question, see also Ford (2003: 23).

59 Hunter (1999: 99).

60 David (2006: 47), while discussing the importance of melody to meter, states that, "repetition is the principal way to create context and meaning. Living speech is a musical phenomenon." Hence, *anadiplosis* resounds a musical quality and adds vividness to the scene.

Δάφνις ἐγὼν ὅδε τῆνος ὁ τὰς βόας *ὧδε* νομεύσων,
Δάφνις ὁ τὼς ταύρως καὶ πόρτιας *ὧδε ποτίσδων*

I am that Daphnis who herded cows here,
I am Daphnis who watered bulls and heifers here.

Anaphora and an end of the line rhyme scheme create a lofty sonority, which Demetrius or Longinus would have categorized as graceful or magnificent, and the repetition of his own name at the beginning of each verse represents Daphnis as powerfully obstinate against Aphrodite.[61] Less than pleasing language, although still considered "musical" by definition, could also be used to dramatize the traditional tale of unrequited love. The euphonists Demetrius and Pausimachus commented on the dramatic possibilities of cacophonous language. For instance, Demetrius views the clashing of consonant letters as particularly unpleasant to hear: ἄλλως μὲν γὰρ ἴσως δυσήκοος ἡ τῶν γραμμάτων σύμπληξις ("Otherwise, the clashing of [consonant] letters is equally unpleasant," *Eloc.* 48).[62] *Idyll* 1.101 has been labeled by Hunter as one of the most cacophonic lines in all of Theocritus: ***Κύπρι*** νε/μεσσα/τά, ***Κύ/πρι θνα***/τοῖσιν α/πε*χθ*ής ("Awful Cypris, Cypris hateful to mortals"). To be clear, this cacophony does not undermine the sonority of the poem—it changes the melody and emotional impact. The irregular rhythm of *dsssd* only reinforces an unpleasant image.[63] In addition to the drawn out νε/μεσσα/τά, which almost forces the listener to visualize the contempt on Daphnis' face for the goddess Κύπρι (repeated twice) when spoken, the awkwardly pronounced double consonants of *θν*ατοῖσιν and απε*χθ*ής produce even more cacophonic language.[64] The fictional singer Thyr-

61 See Demetrius (*Eloc.* 180) and [Longinus] (*Subl.* 39.4).

62 Although in reference to onomatopoeia, of which the *Idylls* demonstrate many cases, Pausimachus (Phld. *Po.* 49.26–28 Janko) states, καὶ παραινεῖ / π]ειρᾶσθαι τοῦ [ν]ọουμένου / .... μι]μ[ήμ]ατ' ("and he advises them to try to [introduce] imitations of content"). Concerning this euphonist observation, Gutzwiller (2010: 350) states: "The more unattractive sounds also have, then, a poetic role in physically conveying to the reader certain types of subject matter, as he advises the poet to 'try to [produce] imitations of content' (49.26–28)." Janko (2000: 239 n. 9) comments that the "content" refers to onomatopoeia; on onomatopoeia, see also Philodemus (*Po.* 106.5–108.27 Janko), and on cacophony, see Philodemus (*Po.* 1.125.20–126.20 Janko).

63 Hunter (1999: 95).

64 Demetrius (*Eloc.* 94) states: Τὰ δὲ πεποιημένα ὀνόματα ὁρίζονται μὲν τὰ κατὰ μίμησιν ἐκφερόμενα πάθους ἢ πράγματος, οἷον ὡς τὸ σίζε καὶ τὸ λάπτοντες ("Our authorities define 'onomatopoeic' words as those which are uttered in imitation of an emotion or an action, as 'hissed' and 'lapping'"), and because of the important nature of this line, I use Roberts'

sis reinforces the ugliness Daphnis sees in Aphrodite with such unpleasant sound effects.[65] The critics of musical tradition appreciated pleasant sounding poetry, but also the unpleasant—and sometimes cacophony enhanced the wanted dramatic aesthetic.

There is no doubt that the lyricism of the *Idylls* provides sonorous ornamentation; repetitive structures stemming from previous musical tradition and the use of sounds documented by the Hellenistic euphonists to enchant the audience add to the overall musical essence of this book. As epithets are repeated in Homer as a way to aid rhapsodes in oral composition, the character of Thyrsis seems also to compose in such a way—he did, in fact, once sing in lyric contest with Chromis from Libya (*Id.* 1.24). *Idyll* 1.88 and 91 are examples of the sonority that the repetition of a whole phrase offers; these two verses are similar in meter and sound effects.

> *τάκεται ὀφθαλμὼς ὅτι οὐ* τράγος αὐτος ἔγεντο
>
> He melts in his eyes that he was not born a goat (*Id.* 1.88), and,
>
> *τάκεαι ὀφθαλὼς ὅτι οὐ* μετὰ ταῖσι χορεύεις
>
> You melt in your eyes that you do not dance with the girls (*Id.* 1.91).[66]

The two verses represent a stylistic tendency in Thyrsis' song to compose in repetitive patterns inherent in forms of oral composition, and also the euphonist interest in the combining of like-sounding vowels—to the critics, this produced a pleasing aesthetic. Demetrius observed this effect several times within

---

(2010: 117) translation. Likewise, Gutzwiller (2010: 350) comments on Pausimachus' interest in onomatopoeic terms: "[Pausimachus] attaches great importance to onomatopoeic words, such as Homer's ὑλακτεῖν and μυκᾶσθαι (perhaps also τρίζειν and σίζειν, as Janko conjectures, 106.6–10), which 'move the hearer' by reproducing through the physical sensation of 'tickling' the ears … the experience being described (49.5–10 Janko)." See Janko (2000: 314–315).

65 I compare this example to Demetrius, where he used an example from *Iliad* 23.116 (πολλὰ δ' ἄναντα κάταντα πάραντά τε δόχμιά τ' ἦλθον, *Eloc.* 219) to demonstrate how Homer dramatizes the action of the scene through meter and cacophony, showing the musical quality of onomatopoeia motioning up and down. I see a similar analysis of meter and vowel length to substantiate a mental picture from the text here in Theocritus.

66 Thyrsis also performs within a songlike structure of repeated refrains: refrain 1 repeats at verses 64, 70, 73, 76, 79, 84, 89, 94, 99, 104, 108, 111, 114, 119, 122, and refrain 2 repeats at verses 127, 131, 137, 142.

his own treatise (*Eloc.* 74).[67] Theocritus' use of euphony, however, can be misleading. Theocritus again mirrored oral poetry's tendency to repeat lines nearly verbatim as an effect of oral composition at *Idylls* 1.106–107 and 5.45–46: τηνεὶ (τουτεὶ) δρύες ἡδὲ (ὧδε) κύπειρος, / αἱ δὲ (ὧδε) καλὸν βομβεῦντι ποτὶ σμάνεσσι μέλισσαι ("Here are oaks and cypresses, / and the bees buzz pleasantly around the hives").[68] By the same oaks and cypresses, the herdsmen rest among the sweet buzzing of bees, but this pleasant setting is a façade: these most pleasing verses in *Idyll* 1 are set in the midst of a scene where Daphnis rebukes Aphrodite, and the verses clash with the scene of two former lovers quarreling in *Idyll* 5.[69] Although the shade of trees and the buzzing of bees usually represent a peaceful location, I suggest furthermore that the musicality of these verses in *Idyll* 1 taken with the preceding verse on Anchises demonstrates the power of sound in euphonist theory to project mood. Verses 1.105–106 depict an unsettling situation in which Daphnis charges Aphrodite to return to her former doomed lover, Anchises. Thyrsis uses anaphora to underscore Daphnis' desire for her to go away: ***ἕρπε*** ποτ' Ἴδαν, / ***ἕρπε*** ποτ' Ἀγχίσαν· ("***Crawl back*** to Ida, ***crawl back*** to Anchises ..."). While the repeated use of *sigma's* may suggest a restful *locus amoenus*, as has been pointed out with the "whispering" (ψιθύρι**σ**μα) pines of the opening three verses of *Idyll* 1, I suggest that the context provides an entirely different interpretation of this phoneme in verses 106–107 (δρύε**ς**, κύπειρο**ς**, **σ**μάνε**σσ**ι μέλι**σσ**αι).[70] Dionysius claimed that the sneering *sigma* is the most disagreeable letter, especially when overused, as it sounds like the hissing of a snake: ἄχαρι δὲ καὶ ἀηδὲς τὸ σ καὶ πλεονάσαν σφόδρα λυπεῖ· θηριώδους γὰρ καὶ

67 Demetrius (*Eloc.* 74) states: Καὶ ἐν ᾠδαῖς δὲ τὰ μελίσματα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς γίνεται τοῦ αὐτοῦ μακροῦ γράμματος, οἷον ᾠδῶν ἐπεμβαλλομένων ᾠδαῖς, ὥστε ἡ τῶν ὁμοίων σύγκρουσις μικρὸν ἔσται τι ᾠδῆς μέρος καὶ μέλισμα ("Even in songs, tunes happen from the one same long letter, how when songs are placed upon other songs, so that a combining of similar letters may be some small part of the song and a tune"). Demetrius (*Eloc.* 72) likewise finds euphony of this type in prose: ὡσαύτως καὶ τὸ "μὴ ἤπειρος εἶναι" τὸ Θουκυδίδειον. συγκρούονται καὶ δίφθογγοι διφθόγγοις· "ταύτην κατῴκησαν μὲν Κερκυραῖοι, οἰκιστὴς δὲ ἐγένετο ..." ("Likewise, there is what Thucydides wrote, 'not to be the mainland.' Diphthongs also may combine with diphthongs, 'the Corcyreans colonized the same place; but ... was the founder'."). See also Demetrius (*Eloc.* 70).

68 Compare also *Idylls* 1.106–107 and 5.45–46: τηνεὶ (τουτεὶ) δρύες ἡδὲ (ὧδε) κύπειρος, / αἱ δὲ (ὧδε) καλὸν βομβεῦντι ποτὶ σμάνεσσι μέλισσαι ("Here are oaks and cypresses, / and the bees buzz pleasantly around the hives").

69 Segal (1975: 118–119).

70 On the beauty of the grammar and syntax of *Idyll* 1.1–3, see Alpers (1979: 73), Hunter (1999: 70), and Segal (1975: 133).

ἀλόγου μᾶλλον ἢ λογικῆς ἐφάπτεσθαι δοκεῖ φωνῆς ὁ συριγμός (“The *sigma* is disagreeable and unpleasant, and it is exceedingly painful when used to excess; for a hissing seems to possess the voice more of an irrational wild beast than a rational creature,” *Comp.* 14.80.16–17). Upon closer inspection of the sound of the verses, the ambiguity in this analysis reveals a more complicated understanding of the use of sound in the *Idylls*. As a feature of oral composition, it would seem that Theocritus repeated words and phrases for musical and emotive effect.

The singer of the ‘Song of Thyrsis’ consequently sets up a *locus amoenus* where nature sympathizes with the character Daphnis to find harmony free from destructive Eros. Although the mountainous regions of Greece in themselves are unwelcoming, the mountains catalogued by Theocritus add to the verbal lyricism of the setting. The rhythmical balances of *Pêneiô … Pindô … Anapô*, the alliteration, anaphora and assonance, along with the resolution of similar sounding vowels, generate the musicality of the passage:[71]

> ***πᾷ ποκ’*** *ἄρ’* / ἦσθ’, ὅ*κ*α / Δάφνις ***ἐ/τάκετο***, / ***πᾷ ποκα***, / Νύμφαι;
> ***ἦ κατὰ*** / ***Π***ηνει/ῶ *κ*αλὰ / τέμπεα, / ***ἦ κατὰ*** / ***Π***ίνδω;
> ***οὐ*** γὰρ / δὴ ποτα/μοῖο μέ/γαν ῥόον / εἶχετ’ ***Ἀ***/νάπω,
> ***οὐδ’ Αἴ***τ/νας σ*κ*οπι/άν, ***οὐ/δ’ Ἄ***κιδος / ἱερὸν / ὕδωρ[72]
>
> *Id.* 1.66–69

> Where were you when Daphnis was melting, Nymphs, where were you?
> Either down through the beautiful glades and Peneius, or those of Pindus?
> For you indeed were not inhabiting the great stream of the river Anapus,
> Neither the height of Aetna, nor the holy water of Acis.

According to Segal, Theocritus disseminated the mythical Daphnis into the musical landscape together with sympathetic deities with the suggestive term for Daphnis’ weakened state, again, ἐτάκετο (“he was melting” or “he wasted away”).[73] The rolling hills of rural Greece, along with all its inhabitants, sympathize with Daphnis’ distress (that is, Aphrodite), and the singer “paints” the mood following principles of euphonist aesthetics.[74]

---

71 On the verbal sonority of this passage, see Rosenmeyer (2004: 233); see also Payne (2007: 40–41) and Segal (1975: 120–121).

72 I boldfaced further sound patterns besides what Segal marked in his 1975 (120–121) article.

73 Segal (1975: 121).

74 Rosenmeyer (2004: 153) labels this recurring feature “sound painting,” and its continuous

The singer's task therefore is to enliven nature's presence and sympathy through song. As Thyrsis sings, the character reveals nature's creatures lamenting Daphnis' passing. The structure of the poem, the carefully constructed language, creates a pastoral world, in which nature sympathizes with the character's distress. *Idyll* 1.71–72 depicts the mournful howl of animals exotic to Greece upon the death of the character Daphnis, who is highlighted by the anaphora of τῆνον: ***τῆνον*** / μὰν θῶ/ες, ***τῆ/νον*** λύ*κοι* / ***ὠρύ/σαντο***, / ***τῆνον*** / ***χὼκ*** δρυ/μοῖο λέ/*ων* *ἔκ/λαυσε* θα/*νόντα* ("The jackals lamented him, the wolves lamented him, / and from the woods the lion wept for the dying boy"). Their exoticism contributes to Daphnis' mythical status. As the structure of the language finds metrical perfection, the mind's eye of the listener imagines the animals circling Daphnis in rhythmic step. The slow meter and deep vowels of the language invoke a mournful longing. This meter adds to the emotional realism of the scene, as the long spondees mimic the slow procession of a dirge.[75] As Levi comments, the 'Song of Thyrsis' was adapted from "mourning music."[76] The entire pastoral landscape laments the fallen cowherd, as Daphnis fulfills his mythical tale and dies after his reunion with Aphrodite. Moreover, the anaphora of *pollai* and alliteration of percussive *pi's* express the multitude of lamenting animals as they fall to the ground onto their knees at vv. 74–75:

> ***πολλαί*** / οἱ ***πὰρ*** / ***ποσσὶ*** βό/ες, ***πολ/λοὶ*** δέ τε / ταῦροι,
> ***πολλαὶ*** / δὲ δαμά/λαι ***καὶ*** / ***πόρτιες*** / ὠρύ/σαντο

> Many cattle lamented him by his feet, and also many bulls,
> Many heifers and calves lamented him too.

Like the percussive *pi's* of the *locus uberrimus* of *Idyll* 7.144, the listener hears the animals drop to the ground like pears from a tree.[77] I suggest, in addition to

---

use is something unique to Theocritus; the image affects the mood of the poem and sketches an impressionistic vision in the mind of the listener between the sonorous sounds and words specifically chosen for their onomatopoeic and emotive force.

75 Although in relation to Vergil, Coleman (2003: 159) comments on the "grim finality" of "the succession of heavy syllables" in *Eclogue* 5.20–21, which is topped off by the spondee in *flebant*. Coleman (2003: 160) also compares "the slow sequence of heterodyne spondees" to the herdsmen and animals that lament Daphnis in *Idyll* 1.74–75 and 80–81. Plato's *Cratylus* (427c) discusses the onomatopoeic origins of letters, and in this section the weighty significance of lengthy letters, such as diphthongs, the long *alpha*, *eta*, *omicron*, and *omega*.

76 Levi (1993: 126).

77 Pöschl (1964: 47–48) expresses that pure joy can be found in the linguistic description of

this, that the anaphora of the adjective adds further sonority with the repeated consonant *lambda*. Both Demetrius (*Eloc.* 174) and Dionysius of Thrace (632.9) comment on the euphony of this feature. Demetrius observed: ἡδέως ... πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀκοὴν Καλλίστρατος, ἄν νοῶν. ἥ τε γὰρ τῶν λάμβδα σύγκρουσις ἠχῶδές τι ἔχει, καὶ ἡ τῶν νῦ γραμμάτων ("Pleasing ... in regards to sound are 'Callistratus' and 'Annoon,' where the combining of the letters 'l' and 'n' have a certain resonance"). The prosody of verse 115 likewise suggests that Daphnis responds to nature's music, however obstinate to nature's calling: ὦ λύκοι, / ὦ θῶες, / ὦ ἀν' / ὤρεα / φωλάδες / ἄρκτοι ("Oh wolves, oh jackals, oh bears lying in your caves up through the mountains"). The multiple *omega's* mimic the sound of a person lamenting.[78] Daphnis gives his farewell χαίρετε to nature's sympathy at vv. 116 and 117. The dirge-like quality of the meter and deep sounds express the sadness of a herdsman passing up the pastoral song to satisfy his mythical role as a vegetation god, as Thyrsis continues to sing his tale to perfection, highlighting the important moments of Daphnis' traditional tale with mournful, musical language.

In conclusion, for what reason do I suggest that the 'Song of Thyrsis' is a textual performance meant to reinterpret the performance quality of a folksong in euphonist terms? Folksongs are a ubiquitous aspect of Greek culture, sung and re-sung, keeping a rich tradition alive. I suggest that each time the 'Song of Thyrsis' was read aloud, either by a poet or scholar in court or by a private individual, listening for verbal cues in the language and storyline, the performance of a traditional folksong would be reenacted in Hellenistic aesthetics. As the character Daphnis gives away his pipe to Pan in the 'Song of Thyrsis' as a physical sign of his impending death and the passing on of song (vv. 128–130), *his death* implies that tradition of song, as the fictional herdsmen continue to sing his tale.[79] As part of Ptolemaic policy, the palace wanted to maintain ties with Greece in order to foster a strong Greek cultural identity separate from the Egyptian and Jewish populations in Alexandria. Theocritus' innovative interpretation of a performance of traditional Greek folksongs both reflects euphonist tenets,

---

a *locus amoenus*. While commenting on the acoustic element heard in the percussive *pi's* of *Idyll* 7.144, Pöschl demonstrates that the human senses are attracted by the description, including hearing and smell, and the music of the landscape completes the happiness, which music grants; see also Segal (1975).

78 See Hunter (1999: 98–99) who mentions that the rhetorical tricolon and prosody is expressive of the person's emotions.

79 Right after Daphnis passes off his shepherd's pipe, he passes away, and his song quite literally ceases within the frame of Thyrsis' song (λήγετε βουκολικᾶς, Μοῖσαι, ἴτε λήγετ' ἀοιδᾶς / "Cease, Muses, come cease the bucolic song").

including him in current literary debate at court, and also projects the cosmopolitan Greek audience to old world Greece working to soothe pervading attitudes of displacement. I therefore hope to have demonstrated that Theocritus, as a client of Philadelphus, may very well have capitalized on Ptolemaic agenda when experimenting with genres and performance styles from previous musical traditions, as the evidence strongly suggests that aspects the *Idylls* recall the oral performance of traditional songs.

Bibliography

Acosta-Hughes, Benjamin. 2002. *Polyeideia: The* Iambi *of Callimachus and the Archaic Iambic Tradition*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Acosta-Hughes, Benjamin. 2010. *Arion's Lyre: Archaic Lyric into Hellenistic Poetry*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Alpers, Paul. 1979. *The Singer of the Eclogues: A Study of Virgilian Pastoral*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Austin, C. and G. Bastianini. 2002. *Posidippi Pellaei quae supersunt omnia*. Milan: LED.

Bing, Peter. 1993. "Impersonation of Voice in Callimachus' *Hymn to Apollo*," *APA* 123: 181–198.

Bulloch, A.W. 1985. "Hellenistic Poetry" in P.E. Easterling and B.M. Knox, eds. *The Cambridge History of Classical Literature I*, 541–621. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Burkert, Walter. 1979. *Structure and History in Greek Mythology and Ritual*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Coleman, Robert, ed. 2003. Reprint. *Vergil, Eclogues*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Original edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

Cribiore, Raffaella. 2001. *Gymnastics of the Mind: Greek Education in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

David. A.P. 2006. *The Dance of the Muses: Choral Theory and Ancient Greek Poetics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dover, K.J., ed. 1971. *Theocritus: Select Poems*. Basingstoke and London: MacMillan Education, Ltd.

Fantuzzi, Marco and Richard Hunter. 2004. *Tradition and Innovation in Hellenistic Poetry*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fischer, Steven R. 2003. *A History of Reading*. London: Reaktion Books.

Ford, Andrew. 2003. "From Letters to Literature: Reading the 'Song Culture' of Classical Greece" in H. Yunis, ed. *Written Texts and the Rise of Literate Culture in Ancient Greece*, 15–37. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gow, A.S.F., ed. 2008. Reprint. *Theocritus*. Vol. 1. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Original edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952.

Gutzwiller, Kathryn. 1991. *Theocritus' Pastoral Analogies: The Formation of a Genre*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Gutzwiller, Kathryn. 2007. *A Guide to Hellenistic Literature*. Malden, MA. Blackwell Publishing.

Gutzwiller, Kathryn. 2010. "Literary Criticism" in J. Clauss and M. Cuypers, eds. *A Companion to Hellenistic Literature*, 337–365. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Halliwell, Stephen. 2013. Reprint. *Between Ecstasy and Truth: Interpretations of Greek Poetics from Homer to Longinus*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Halperin, David. 1983a. *Before Pastoral: Theocritus and the Ancient Tradition of Bucolic Poetry*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Halperin, David. 1983b. "The Forbears of Daphnis," *TAPA* 113: 183–200.

Harris, William V. 1989. *Ancient Literacy*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Hunter, Richard. 1996. *Theocritus and the Archaeology of Greek Poetry*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hunter, Richard, ed. 1999. *Theocritus: A Selection: Idylls 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 10, 11, and 13*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Janko, Richard. 2000. *Philodemus: On Poems, Book 1*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lardinois, André. 2008. "'Someone, I Say, Will Remember Us': Oral Memory in Sappho's Poetry" in A.E. MacKay, ed. *Orality, Literacy, Memory in the Ancient Greek and Roman World*, 79–96. Leiden: Brill.

Lawson, John Cuthbert. 1910. *Modern and Greek Folklore and Ancient Greek Religion: a Study in Survivals*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Levi, Peter. 1993. "People in a Landscape: Theokritos" in P. Green, ed. *Hellenistic History and Culture*, 111–137. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Murray, Penelope. 2004. "The Muses and their Arts" in P. Murray and P. Wilson, eds. *Music and the Muses: The Culture of 'Mousike' in the Classical Athenian City*, 365–381. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Parker, R.C.T. 1981. "The Audience and the Lyric Poets," Review of *Dichter und Gruppe. Eine Untersuchung zu den Bedingungen und zur historischen Funktion früher griechischer Lyrik am Beispiel Alkaios*, by Wolfgang Rösler, *CR* 31: 159–162.

Payne, Mark. 2007. *Theocritus and the Invention of Fiction*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pfeiffer, Rudolph. 1968. *History of Classical Scholarship: From the Beginnings to the End of the Hellenistic Age*. Oxford: The Clarendon Press.

Porter, James I. 2010. *The Origins of Aesthetic Thought in Ancient Greece: Matter, Sensation, and Experience*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Porter, James I. 2011. "Against ΛΕΠΤΟΤΗΣ: Rethinking Hellenistic Aesthetics" in A. Erskine and L. Llewellyn-Jones, eds. *Creating a Hellenistic World*, 271–312. Swansea: The Classical Press of Wales.

Pöschl, Viktor. 1964. *Die Hirtendichtung Virgils*. Heidelberg: C. Winter.

Prauscello, Lucia. 2006. *Singing Alexandria: Music between Practice and Textual Transmission*. Leiden: Brill.

Rosenmeyer, Thomas G. 2004. Reprint. *The Green Cabinet: Theocritus and the European Pastoral Lyric*. London: Bristol Classical Press. Original edition, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969.

Rösler, Wolfgang. 1980. *Dichter und Gruppe: eine Untersuchung zu den Bedingungen und zur historishen Funktion früher griechischer Lyrik am Beispiel Alkaios*. München: Wilhelm Fink.

Segal, Charles. 1975. "Landscape into Myth: Theocritus' Bucolic Poetry," *RAMUS* 4 (2): 115–139.

Smyth, Herbert Weir. 1963. *Greek Melic Poets*. New York: Biblio and Tannen.

Snyder, Jane McIntosh. 1981. "The Web of Song: Weaving Imagery in Homer and the Lyric Poets," *CJ* 76: 193–196.

Stanford, W.B. 1967. *The Sound of Greek: Studies in the Greek Theory and Practice of Euphony*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Stephens, Susan. 2003. *Seeing Double: Intercultural Poetics in Ptolemaic Alexandria*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Svenbro, Jesper. 1993. *Phrasikleia: An Anthropology of Reading in Ancient Greece*. Translated by Janet Lloyd. 2nd ed. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Thompson, Dorothy J. 2007. "Education and Culture in Hellenistic Egypt and Beyond" in José Antonio Fernández Delgado, Francisca Pordomingo, and Antonio Stramaglia, eds. *Escuela y Literatura en Grecia Antigua*, 121–140. Cassino: Università degli Studi di Cassino.

Usher, Stephen, ed. and trans. 1985. *Dionysius of Halicarnassus: Critical Essays in Two Volumes*. Vol. II. Loeb. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

West, M.L. 1992. *Ancient Greek Music*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Zanker, Graham. 1987. *Realism in Alexandrian Poetry: A Literature and its Audience*. London: Croom Helm.

PART 3

From Singing to Narrative Voice

CHAPTER 11

Towards a Grammar of Narrative Voice: From Homeric Pragmatics to Hellenistic Stylistics

Andreas Willi

1 Introduction*

At least since the publication of de Jong's seminal study on narrators and focalizers in Homeric epic on the one hand, and the first signs of interest in the *énonciation* of lyric texts on the other,[1] narratological approaches to Ancient Greek literature have often highlighted the complex nature of narrative voices in a wide variety of genres. In this context the potential relevance of linguistic observations has been duly noted here or there, but so far we do not have anything that could be described as a 'grammar of narrative voice' in Ancient Greek. The present contribution cannot of course fill this gap. All it intends to do is, firstly, to draw attention to the gap, and thus to serve as a reminder not to forget both possibilities and constraints of the *signifiant* when we are trying to decode the *signifié*, and, secondly, to illustrate with one particular example that there is really something to be gained, even for those whose heartbeat does not normally quicken at the mention of the word 'linguistics'.

The topic to be focused upon, the so-called 'historical present', is one that has been much debated in recent times by scholars interested in narrative 'modes' and the tense-aspect choices informing these modes.[2] Quite naturally, therefore, much of what will be said below is indebted to other scholars. However, the relevance of these earlier studies to the history of narrative 'voicing' has not, it seems, been fully appreciated so far.

* The ideas set out in this paper have been developed during a period of research leave generously funded by the Leverhulme Trust through its Major Research Fellowship programme. For helpful comments on an earlier version I am most grateful to Niall Slater as well as an anonymous referee for this volume.

1 Cf., respectively, de Jong (1987) and Calame (1983).

2 See especially the contributions in Lallot, Rijksbaron, Jacquinod, and Buijs (2011) (especially Allan 2011, Basset 2011, George 2011, Lallot 2011, Lambert 2011, Rademaker and Buijs 2011). Other important literature on the historical present in Ancient Greek, to be discussed below, includes Eriksson (1943), von Fritz (1949), Koller (1951), and Sicking and Stork (1997).

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2017 | DOI: 10.1163/9789004329737_012

Setting out from the observation that the historical present is virtually unknown to Homeric Greek, it will be argued that this curious absence is not to be explained as a purely stylistic phenomenon, but rather as linguistic in nature (Section 2): Homeric language could 'afford' to ignore the historical present, which presumably already existed at least during the later phases of oral poetry, because it possessed an alternative (older) grammatical tool that served the same narrative purpose (Sections 5–6). In order to demonstrate this equivalence, it will first be shown, with the help of a cognitive theoretical framework, that the historical present is as much tied to an 'oral' mode of presentation as its functional predecessor was (Sections 3–4). Moreover, it is this characteristic of the historical present which eventually turned it into a means of hinting at the oral voice of an author even when it was used in written texts belonging to much later, and profoundly literate, stages of Greek culture (Section 7).

2 Missing Historical Presents

Let us begin by formulating a straightforward but all the more pressing question regarding the attestation of the historical present. Scholars agree that no, or at any rate exceedingly few,[3] historical presents are found in Homer. The first truly reliable examples are διδοῖ, ποιεῦσιν, γίγνεται, etc. in the fragments of Pherecydes of Syros, a fascinating but elusive writer of early cosmogonical prose (mid-6th cent. BC):[4]

(1) Ζὰς μὲν καὶ Χρόνος ἦσαν ἀεὶ καὶ Χθονίη· Χθονίῃ δὲ ὄνομα ἐγένετο Γῆ, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῇ Ζὰς γῆν γέρας *διδοῖ.*

PHERECYD. SYR. 7B1 D.-K.

3 In *Od.* 7.104–107, with ἀλετρεύουσι, ὑφόωσι, στρωφῶσιν, ἀπολείβεται, "the present tenses [...] are descriptive" (Hainsworth in Heubeck, West, and Hainsworth 1988: 328, following Chantraine 1953: 191), and *Il.* 9.237 ἀστράπτει may be similarly dismissed (*pace* Lilja 1968: 102); closer to the later historical present are ἐξοίχεται and ἀφικάνει in *Il.* 6.348 and 6.388 (cf. Koller 1951: 93).

4 Cf. Sicking and Stork (1997: 133); on the frequent historical present in Pherecydes and other early prose writers see Lilja (1968: 101–119). Note also the historical presents τίκτει and τίκτετον in the parodic theogonies at Ar. *Av.* 695 and Cratinus fr. 258, 259, which imply the use of similar forms in post-Hesiodic ('Orphic' *vel sim.*) theogonies and thus jeopardize the view of Dunbar (1995: 437–438) that "Ar[istophanes]'s main model was clearly Hesiod; how far he may have known and used post-Hesiodic theogonies is very uncertain" (contrast Hes. *Theog.* 223, 346, 510 τίκτε).

Zas and Chronos were always, and also Chthonie: but Chthonie was called Ge, because Zas *gives* her the earth as a gift of honour.

(2) αὐ〉τῷ *ποιοῦσιν* τὰ οἰκία πολλά τε καὶ μεγάλα. ἐπεὶ δὲ ταῦτα ἐξετέλεσαν πάντα καὶ χρήματα καὶ θεράποντας καὶ θεραπαίνας καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα δεῖ πάντα, ἐπεὶ δὴ πάντα ἑτοῖμα *γίγνεται*, τὸν γάμον *ποιεῦσιν*. κἀπειδὴ τρίτη ἡμέρη *γίγνεται* τῷ γάμῳ, τότε Ζὰς *ποιεῖ* φᾶρος μέγα τε καὶ καλὸν καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ *ποικίλλει* Γῆν καὶ Ὠγηνὸν καὶ τὰ Ὠγηνοῦ δώματα …

PHERECYD. SYR. 7B2 D.-K.

They *make* many great houses for him. But when they had completed all this, the things and the servants and the maids and all the other things that are needed, when everything *is* ready, they *celebrate* the wedding. And when the third day of the wedding *comes*, Zas *makes* a big and beautiful cloak, and on it he *depicts* Ge and Ogenos and the palace of Ogenos …

If this is where the record really sets in, how can we explain the Homeric reticence? To answer this question, two main theories have been advanced. The first of these, which is stylistic in nature, directly relates to the issue of narrative voice. According to Albert Rijksbaron,

"[a]n explanation might be found in the nature of [the epic] genre; it tells of events from a *mythical* past, knowledge of which is granted to the poet solely by the favour of the Muses. In this context it would be inappropriate for the poet to assume the role of an eyewitness."[5]

In other words, the Homeric narrator would be inhibited by the fact that his voice is not truly *his* voice, but that of the Muse. But will this do? Firstly, even if we were to follow Rijksbaron in assigning an 'eyewitness value' to every historical present, no narrator *really* assumes an eyewitness role when he/she uses this tense. After all, Pherecydes too is concerned with a remote (mythical) past he could not decently claim to have witnessed himself. Secondly, what the

5 Rijksbaron (2002: 25); cf. already Schlegel ([1798] 1962: 50), to whom Homeric language seems "einzig gemacht, die stetige, sanft hingleitende Folge zu bezeichnen", so that "die Redefigur, wo die gegenwärtige Zeit statt der vergangenen gebraucht wird, die einem lebhaften Erzähler so natürlich ist, […] in der ganzen *Ilias* und *Odyssee* nicht ein einziges Mal vorkommt". Similar style-focused explanations are given by Stahl (1907: 91), Eriksson (1943: 21), Koller (1951: 88), and Lilja (1968: 103).

Muse (at least notionally) does is precisely to empower the poet to see past things before his mental eye in a way that is precluded to 'normal' people. So, if anything, the inspiration by the Muse should rather trigger the use of historical presents. And thirdly, most seriously, the narrator-poet's voice is of course not the only narrating voice in Homeric epic, so that Rijksbaron's hypothesis definitely fails no later than when a character like Odysseus in the ἀπόλογοι becomes a narrator (and, indeed, a narrator who has been a *real* eyewitness to the events he narrates).

The second theory, meanwhile, is more narrowly linguistic in nature. In an insightful article, Kurt von Fritz argued some sixty years ago that Homeric Greek was still governed by a strict precedence of aspect over tense. As a consequence, von Fritz suggested, it would have been impossible to refer with the aspectually imperfective present tense to a past eventuality that was closed off or complete(d). Only later, he adds, "the more paradoxical relation of the aspect of timelessness to the momentary present was discovered and used to produce striking effects in a historical narrative".[6]

Unfortunately, von Fritz's account too is open to challenges. Firstly, Pherecydes of Syros lived only some 150 years after the heyday of Homeric epic; but Pherecydes appears to have used the historical present as a matter of course, not like a novel 'experiment'. Of course, we cannot absolutely exclude the quick establishment of a linguistic fashion in a case like this. However, von Fritz's point is precisely that there must be more to it than that: if the appearance of the historical present were really the symptom of a fundamental overhaul of the grammatical system, we might well expect this to take (much) longer than just three or four generations to complete. Secondly, as Wackernagel observed,[7] Pindar—writing much later than Pherecydes—also refrains from using the historical present; so at that point in time the distribution *must* have something to do with generic usage (or avoidance) patterns, not just with the available grammatical system itself. Hence, what looks like a sudden explosion of historical presents in early prose might well have grown more naturally from small beginnings already *before* Homer. If that were true, Homer's avoidance, exactly like Pindar's, would nevertheless be stylistically conditioned—though probably not so much because Homer was afraid of hybris, but because epic language is inherently conservative *as long as it can afford to be*. In other words, Homer would *not* have avoided

6 Von Fritz (1949: esp. 193–197), who is not cited by Sicking and Stork (1997) or in Lallot, Rijksbaron, Jacquinod, and Buijs (2011), although both Sicking and Stork and George (2011: esp. 240) reiterate many of his ideas.

7 Wackernagel (1926: 163).

the historical present if it had been a true 'discovery' in von Fritz's sense, but only if an alternative, older, way of expressing similar things was already available.[8]

3 The Function of the Historical Present

Our next question therefore has to be this: what does the historical present achieve? The conventional view[9] that it always underscores dramatic turning

8 A similar reasoning makes Koller (1951: 94) claim that "Praesens historicum und erzählendes Imperfekt die einzigen Zeitformen sind, die untereinander vertauscht werden können"; according to him, Homer was thus able to avoid, for stylistic reasons (cf. fn. 5), the historical present by using the narrative imperfect instead. In direct contrast to von Fritz's view, Koller even states that "[d]as Praesens historicum ist also eigentlich ein Relikt, das nicht in eine Sprache mit vollausgebautem Tempussystem passt". Not only does this fly in the face of Homeric Greek being, if anything, *more* aspectual than Classical Greek (cf. e.g. Napoli 2006), but Koller's contention that the historical present consistently operates as "Ausdruck der inzeptiven Aktionsart" (p. 87; cf. Lilja 1968: esp. 118–119) is also hard to defend: there is nothing 'inceptive' about e.g. δίδωμι 'give'. It is true that both the narrative imperfect and the historical present *preferentially* feature telic verbs (cf. Brunel 1939: 270–274, Eriksson 1943: 15–17, Rijksbaron 2002: 24 and 2011a: 7, and George 2011: 228–234, but note e.g. βασιλεύει 'is (i.e. becomes) king' in the *Marmor Parium* (ex. (7) below), or the ambiguous telicity of ἐξελαύνει 'marches' in Xen. *Anab*. 1.2.5 etc. (ex. (5) below); according to Ruipérez 1982: 175–188, "la valeur aspectuelle du présent historique est neutre", and Sicking and Stork 1997: 166 find that "[t]here are no specific verbs or categories of *verbs* that are more prone to be used in the H[istorical] P[resent] than others. There are only categories of *events* […] that more often than others are part of what constitutes the main framework of a piece of (historical) narrative"). However, this preference merely results from atelic verbs being less at home in narrative progression, so that their presents/imperfects are bound to be read as durative by default. Unsurprisingly, Koller's hypothesis is thus primarily supported by 'text-structuring' rather than 'dramatic' historical presents (cf. Section 3), and it is difficult to believe that, say, Herodotus in 1.10.2 (ex. (3) below) could not have used an aorist instead of the historical present ἐπορᾷ; the pairing of ἀποτέμνει and ἀπέτεμεν in Xen. *Hell*. 3.4.25 ~ Xen. *Ages*. 1.35 certainly suggests otherwise (cf. Buijs 2007: 150–152).

9 Cf. e.g. Brugmann (1883: 169–170), cited by Eriksson (1943: 1): "Das sogenannte praesens historicum beruht nicht darauf, dass der Sprechende bei besonders lebhafter Erzählung das vergangene Ereigniss in die Zeit, in der er spricht, rückt, sondern eher umgekehrt: er tritt aus dem Rahmen der Zeit ganz heraus, drängt über dem Interesse an dem Ereignisse selbst die Vorstellung des zwischen dem Vorgang und der Erzählung des Vorganges bestehenden Zeitverhältnisses zurück und versetzt sich in Gedanken in die Zeit, als das Ereigniss sich eben abspielte, sodass er dasselbe wie in einem Drama oder wie auf einem Bilde vor sich sieht".

points in a narrative, by making the narrator and/or narratee their 'eyewitness', has long been undermined. Such a reading *may* work here or there, as with the classic example ἐπορᾷ in Herodotus' story of Gyges and the wife of Candaules (3), but von Fritz rightly pointed out that "where we find truly dramatic events in Xenophon's *Anabasis*, they are almost invariably told exclusively in the aorist without any intrusion of the historical present", and already Wackernagel had noted that the first sentence of the *Anabasis* hardly describes a spectacular event (4):[10]

(3) ὁ δὲ Κανδαύλης, ἐπεὶ ἐδόκεε ὥρη τῆς κοίτης εἶναι, ἤγαγε τὸν Γύγεα ἐς τὸ οἴκημα, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα αὐτίκα παρῆν καὶ ἡ γυνή· ἐσελθοῦσαν δὲ καὶ τιθεῖσαν τὰ εἵματα ἐθηεῖτο ὁ Γύγης. ὡς δὲ κατὰ νώτου ἐγένετο ἰούσης τῆς γυναικὸς ἐς τὴν κοίτην, ὑπεκδὺς ἐχώρεε ἔξω. καὶ ἡ γυνὴ *ἐπορᾷ* μιν ἐξιόντα. μαθοῦσα δὲ τὸ ποιηθὲν ἐκ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς οὔτε ἀνέβωσε αἰσχυνθεῖσα οὔτε ἔδοξε μαθεῖν, ἐν νόῳ ἔχουσα τείσασθαι τὸν Κανδαυλέα …

HDT. 1.10.1–2

But when it seemed to be time for bed, Candaules led Gyges into the room, and soon after the woman too arrived; as she went in and was putting down her clothes, Gyges was watching. But as soon as he came to be at the back of the woman, while she was going to bed, he secretly tried to go out. And the woman *catches sight* of him as he leaves. Realising what had been done by her husband, she did not cry out full of shame, nor did she seem to notice anything, because she was planning to take revenge on Candaules …

(4) Δαρείου καὶ Παρυσάτιδος *γίγνονται* παῖδες δύο, πρεσβύτερος μὲν Ἀρτοξέρξης, νεώτερος δὲ Κῦρος. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἠσθένει Δαρεῖος καὶ ὑπώπτευε τελευτὴν τοῦ βίου, ἐβούλετο τὼ παῖδε ἀμφοτέρω παρεῖναι.

XEN. *Anab.* 1.1.1

Darius and Parysatis *have* two children, the older Artaxerxes, the younger Cyrus. When Darius was ill, expecting the end of his life, he wanted both children to come to him.

10 Von Fritz (1949: 198), Wackernagel (1926: 164); cf. Koller (1951: 66–67), who adds: "Grosse Schwierigkeiten bereiten die *negierten* Praesentia historica: denn wie soll ein Ereignis, das nicht stattgefunden hat, lebhaft vergegenwärtigt werden?". Negated historical presents are, however, rare (Lallot 2011: 21, Rijksbaron 2011a: 8).

With reference to (frequent) occurrences like (5), again from the *Anabasis*, Rijksbaron therefore states that historical presents may also "'punctuate', as it were, the narrative, dividing it into narrative units":[11]

(5) Κῦρος δὲ ἔχων οὓς εἴρηκα ὡρμᾶτο ἀπὸ Σαρδέων· *καὶ ἐξελαύνει* διὰ τῆς Λυδίας σταθμοὺς τρεῖς παρασάγγας εἴκοσι καὶ δύο ἐπὶ τὸν Μαίανδρον ποταμόν.
XEN. *Anab.* 1.2.5

Cyrus left Sardis with the aforementioned men. And he *marches* through Lydia for three stations, 22 parasangs, up to the river Maeander.

This is in line with the findings of Sicking and Stork, who argue that the historical present is a text-structuring device. According to them, its primary function is "to lift out from their context those narrative assertions that are essential for what the speaker has stated to be his immediate concern", be it in forensic speeches or in longer narrative.[12] Moreover, their notion of 'lifting out' from the narrative context overlaps with von Fritz's analysis that "the main events are, so to speak, removed from the time coordinate", as they "unfold one after the other like the pictures in a picture book"[13]—so that, one may add, the historical present comes to function like the present tense in ekphrasis, for instance in Philostratus' Εἰκόνες (with the telling expression ἡ γραφή φησι 'the picture relates'):

(6) οἶσθά που τῆς Ἰλιάδος τὴν γνώμην, ἐν οἷς Ὅμηρος ἀνίστησι μὲν τὸν Ἀχιλλέα ἐπὶ τῷ Πατρόκλῳ, κινοῦνται δὲ οἱ θεοὶ πολεμεῖν ἀλλήλοις. τούτων οὖν τῶν περὶ

11 Rijksbaron (2002: 24); Rijksbaron (2011: 6) speaks of 'decisiveness' as "the basic function of the historical present", but the scope of this term remains vague (decisive for whom?, in what respect?).

12 Sicking and Stork (1997: 165), whose ideas are foreshadowed by Eriksson (1943: 8–13); compare now various contributions in Lallot, Rijksbaron, Jacquinod, and Buijs (2011) (esp. Mortier-Waldschmidt 2011, Jacquinod 2011, Basset 2011, Rademaker and Buijs 2011, Rijksbaron 2011b).

13 Von Fritz (1949: 199), with a precedent in Stahl (1907: 90–91) ("Indem [das historische Präsens] vergangene Ereignisse in die Gegenwart rückt, bringt es sie der Anschauung und Betrachtung näher und veranlasst dadurch eine besondere Beachtung derselben"); cf. now Duhoux (2000: 357). [Longin.] *De subl.* 25 speaks of a change from 'narrative' into 'drama' (ὅταν γε μὴν τὰ παρεληλυθότα τοῖς χρόνοις εἰσάγῃς ὡς γινόμενα καὶ παρόντα, οὐ διήγησιν ἔτι τὸν λόγον ἀλλ' ἐναγώνιον πρᾶγμα ποιήσεις 'when you present chronologically past things as things that are happening and are in the present, you no longer create a narrative, but a stage action'), whereas Aristid. 2.134 simply regards the historical present as a means of creating ἀφέλεια ('simplicity').

τοὺς θεοὺς ἡ γραφὴ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα οὐκ οἶδε, τὸν δὲ Ἥφαιστον ἐμπεσεῖν φησι τῷ Σκαμάνδρῳ πολὺν καὶ ἄκρατον. ὅρα δὴ πάλιν· πάντα ἐκεῖθεν. ὑψηλὴ μὲν αὕτη ἡ πόλις καὶ ταυτὶ τὰ κρήδεμνα τοῦ Ἰλίου, πεδίον δὲ τουτὶ μέγα καὶ ἀποχρῶν τὴν Ἀσίαν πρὸς τὴν Εὐρώπην ἀντιτάξαι, πῦρ δὲ τοῦτο πολὺ μὲν *πλημμυρεῖ* κατὰ τοῦ πεδίου, πολὺ δὲ περὶ τὰς ὄχθας *ἕρπει* τοῦ ποταμοῦ, ὡς μηκέτι αὐτῷ δένδρα εἶναι. τὸ δὲ ἀμφὶ τὸν Ἥφαιστον πῦρ *ἐπιρρεῖ* τῷ ὕδατι, καὶ ὁ ποταμὸς *ἀλγεῖ* καὶ *ἱκετεύει* τὸν Ἥφαιστον αὐτός.

PHILOSTR. *Imag.* 1.1.1–2

No doubt you know the plan of the *Iliad*, the passage in which Homer raises Achilles because of Patroclus, and the gods get ready to fight against each other. Of these events involving the gods the picture ignores all the rest and only relates how Hephaestus attacks Scamander, massively and intemperately. Look again: everything is taken from there. Steep is this city, and these are the battlements of Ilion, this plain is large, big enough to put Asia against Europe, and here the fire *rises* like the flood-tide over the plain and *crawls* in masses over the banks of the river, so that the river has no trees left. The fire around Hephaestus *flows* into the water, and the river in person *feels pain* and *beseeches* Hephaestus.

Even the 'narrative-punctuating' historical presents of the Κῦρος ἐξελαύνει type (ex. (5)) can be conceived of in such a way: like modern chapter titles ("Cyrus marches through Lydia", followed by the chapter's narrative of what happened in Lydia) they set the scene in a standstill picture, and this picture then turns into a 'movie' as the past-tense narrative follows.[14] Similarly, behind every Pherecydean historical present (exx. (1), (2)), a 'mini-story' of its own is hidden—the building of Zas' palace, the organisation of Zas' wedding, and so on—, just as behind the functionally comparable *praesens annalisticum* or *tabulare* in documents like the *Marmor Parium*:[15]

14 The syntactic findings of George (2011) point in the same direction: if anything, the historical present is even more 'punctual' than the aorist, undermining further the traditional 'eyewitness' or 'presence at the scene' interpretations (cf. fn. 9 or Allan 2007: esp. 107–109 and 2011: esp. 39, who refers to Thuc. 8.34 although few passages read less like an attempt "to draw the reader into the scene"; more generally, Allan would have the historical present correlate with a low degree of narratorial control when the opposite appears to be true: see Section 5 on the prominent *locuteur* in Benvenistian *discours*).

15 Cf. Brugmann (1903: 572), Wackernagel (1926: 164–165), Duhoux (2000: 356–357). Duhoux misleadingly says that "désireux de rendre les faits du passé de la manière la plus objective possible, avec le minimum d'intervention personnelle, l'auteur ne les transpose même pas

(7) ἀφ' οὗ Σιμωνίδης ὁ Σιμωνίδου †πάππος τοῦ ποιητοῦ, ποιητὴς ὢν καὶ αὐτός, ἐνίκησεν Ἀθήνησι, καὶ Δαρεῖος *τελευτᾶ*, Ξέρξης δὲ ὁ υἱὸς *βασιλεύει*, ἔτ[η ΗΗΔΔΠΙΙ, ἄρχοντος Ἀθήνησι Ἀριστείδου.

Marmor Parium 239A49 Jacoby

226 years since Simonides the grandfather of Simonides the poet, being a poet himself, won a victory in Athens, and Darius *dies* and Xerxes his son *becomes king*, in the archonship of Aristides in Athens.

4 A Cognitive Framework

To conceive of the Greek historical present in this way, as a 'timeless present' or a 'present lifting (past) events out of their natural narrative context', makes it possible to situate the phenomenon within a cognitive linguistic framework developed by Wallace Chafe.[16] The point of doing so is to objectify the claim, to be made shortly, that the historical present is a feature of 'oral' grammar, even when it occurs in a written text.

Focusing on the minds or 'consciousnesses' of speakers/narrators, Chafe has distinguished an 'immediate mode' from a 'displaced mode' of discourse. In the immediate mode, the narrator's 'extroverted' consciousness directly perceives, acts upon, and evaluates its environment (Figure 11.1). In the displaced mode, on the other hand, the narrator's 'introverted' consciousness merely remembers or imagines another, 'extroverted', consciousness—be it a past or a fictional one (Figure 11.2). But despite this difference, the displaced and the immediate mode share one important feature: the speaker/narrator's (present) consciousness is both 'representing' (i.e., it is the consciousness that produces the actual utterance) and 'represented' (i.e., its experiences are expressed by the utterance, and therefore inform the selection of deictics such as *now* or *then*).

By way of illustration, let us assume that John kisses Mary. This is a real-world event and as such (part of) the 'environment'. For a real-world event to be put into speech, however, it needs to be processed mentally. The kiss may for instance be felt (by Mary) or seen (by Jane). So Mary's or Jane's mind is the

dans la sphère du passé", although there is more, not less, auctorial intervention when an event that is objectively past is presented with a present tense. By contrast, Kieckers (1926: 19) denied any connection between the 'dramatic' and the 'tabular' present. Even in the *Marmor Parium*, the aorist is of course dominant.

16 Chafe (1994).



FIGURE 11.1 *Chafe's immediate mode of discourse*
CHAFE 1994: 197



FIGURE 11.2 *Chafe's displaced mode of discourse*
CHAFE 1994: 199

'extroverted consciousness' that perceives and/or evaluates the 'environment'. Next, Mary or Jane may decide to communicate to someone else their perception (e.g., *John is kissing me/Mary*) or evaluation (e.g., *John loves me/Mary*). Their mind thus has to form an utterance and thereby becomes a 'representing consciousness'. This moment of speechifying either may or may not (more or less) coincide with the moment of perception/evaluation—and therefore be

done by either the same or another (state of) 'consciousness'. If it does coincide, we are in 'immediate mode'—and Mary/Jane will naturally say things like 'John is kissing me/Mary', 'John loves me/Mary'. If it does not coincide, so that the utterance is produced in hindsight, by a later ('introverted') consciousness remembering the original ('extroverted') perception/evaluation, we are in 'displaced mode'; and what is actually being worded then is not so much the product of the initial perception/evaluation itself as the product of the subsequent remembrance process (making the 'introverted consciousness' also the 'represented' one[17])—Mary/Jane will now naturally say things like 'John kissed me/Mary', 'John loved me/Mary'.

Although the terminology is undoubtedly confusing, the value of Chafe's model lies in its ability to explain a number of cross-linguistically observable phenomena in the grammar of narration. In languages like English or French, for example, tense selection is intimately tied to discourse modality. The temporal disjunction between extroverted and introverted consciousness triggers the use of a simple preterite (in French: *passé simple*) in displaced mode (cf. 'John kissed me/Mary'). By contrast, the present tense is the hallmark of the immediate mode (cf. 'John is kissing me/Mary')—though not its *necessary* correlate: the English present perfect and the French *passé composé* equally belong to the immediate mode since they express the current relevance of a past eventuality for the represented consciousness (e.g., 'John has kissed me/Mary', if Mary/Jane put into words not their direct perception of a present kiss but their evaluation of a past kiss as an event of continuing significance).

In line with all this, by using the historical present instead of a simple preterite (or, in Greek, a narrative aorist) a speaker/narrator signals that his/her represented consciousness is not introverted (i.e., 'merely' remembering or imagining), but extroverted (i.e., itself perceiving, acting upon, and evaluating the environment). Thus, any gap between what is distal and what is proximal is obliterated. This *can* result in an eyewitness effect because the extroverted consciousness is the one in charge of *perceiving* the environment. However, this is by no means a necessary consequence. Since the extroverted consciousness is also tasked with *evaluating*, hence assigning contextual relevance to events, the historical present can also assume the less exciting summative and

17 At first sight, this specification may seem gratuitous, and for our purposes it is of limited significance; but situations are conceivable where the 'introverted consciousness' is only 'representing', whereas the 'extroverted consciousness' is 'represented'. In such cases (termed 'displaced immediate mode' by Chafe), the use of imperfective past tenses is observed ('John was kissing me/Mary').

text-structuring roles described in Section 3. A Xenophon who writes Κῦρος ἐξελαύνει διὰ τῆς Λυδίας (ex. (5)) does not pretend to be observing the march, but he does determine it to be a useful anchoring point for the narration of other historical events relating to it.

In the end, then, the essential point is this: whatever the discursive function of any given historical present, the use of such a form *always* transforms a text in 'displaced mode' into one in 'immediate mode'. And because the prototypical habitat of texts in immediate mode—the broad equivalent of what Émile Benveniste once called *discours* as opposed to *histoire* or *récit historique*[18]—is oral (direct), not written (indirect) communication, the appearance of historical presents can be termed a characteristic of 'oral grammar', however much the phenomenon may secondarily have become conventionalised in certain written genres too.

5 Homeric Immediacy

Having reached this point, and bearing in mind the undeniable oral background of early Greek epic, the absence of the historical present from Homer becomes, if anything, even more curious. To be sure, 'timeless presents' in a wider sense are not uncommon in Homer. As 'general' presents they refer to situations that always or *typically* occur, for instance, in similes like the one about the stubborn donkey (ex. (8)); but these presents do not make *specific* events, like the events in a past (historical/fictional) narrative, 'timeless' in von Fritz's sense.

(8) ὡς δ' ὅτ' ὄνος παρ' ἄρουραν ἰὼν ἐβιήσατο παῖδας
νωθής, ᾧ δὴ πολλὰ περὶ ῥόπαλ' ἀμφὶς ἐάγῃ,
κείρει τ' εἰσελθὼν βαθὺ λήϊον· οἳ δέ τε παῖδες
τύπτουσιν ῥοπάλοισι, βίη δέ τε νηπίη αὐτῶν,
σπουδῇ τ' ἐξήλασσαν, ἐπεί τ' ἐκορέσσατο φορβῆς
Il. 11.558–562

As when a donkey strolling over a field forces his will on some children, obstinately, one on whom many sticks are broken all around, and he enters and *ravages* the deep crop of corn: and the children *beat* him with sticks, but their strength is feeble, and only with difficulty they drive him out, after he has taken his fill of food …

18 Benveniste (1966: 241–242); see further Section 5.

At the same time, the donkey simile also illustrates the competition or (quasi-)equivalence of the general present (κείρει, τύπτουσιν) with the augmented aorist (ἐβιήσατο, ἐάγη, ἐξήλασσαν). The latter represents the so-called 'gnomic' aorist, which is *always* augmented and which is equally encountered outside similes, in truly gnomic environments:

(9) ἄλλῳ μὲν γὰρ **ἔδωκε** θεὸς πολεμήϊα ἔργα,
ἄλλῳ δ' ὀρχηστύν, ἑτέρῳ κίθαριν καὶ ἀοιδήν,
ἄλλῳ δ' ἐν στήθεσσι τιθεῖ νόον εὐρύοπα Ζεύς
ἐσθλόν, τοῦ δέ τε πολλοὶ ἐπαυρίσκοντ' ἄνθρωποι,
καί τε πολὺς **ἐσάωσε**, μάλιστα δὲ καὐτὸς **ἀνέγνω**.
Il. 13.730–734

To one person a god **gives** prowess of war, to a second dancing skills, to a third the gift of playing the kithara and singing, yet another far-seeing Zeus provides with a noble spirit in his breast, so that many people benefit from him and he often **acts as a saviour**, and **knows** about it himself very well.

In view of this functional overlap, Egbert Bakker has concluded, in a perceptive study of what he calls the Homeric 'language of immediacy', that both the "present tense and augmented aorists in the similes evoke, indeed presuppose, *presence*".[19] The same 'presence' or 'immediacy in time and space', he argues, is also seen with augmented forms elsewhere in Homer. In the following passage, for example, "[t]he escape of Diomedes' intended victim is a matter of the present", producing the Homeric 'resultative aorists' ἔφυγες, ἦλθε, and ἐρύσατο:

(10) δουρὶ δ' ἐπαΐσσων προσέφη κρατερὸς Διομήδης·
"ἐξ αὖ νῦν **ἔφυγες** θάνατον, κύον· ἦ τέ τοι ἄγχι
ἦλθε κακόν· νῦν αὖτέ σ' **ἐρύσατο** Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων ..."
Il. 11.361–363

Rushing after him with his spear, mighty Diomedes addressed him: "Now **you have escaped** death once again, you dog, and harm **has come** very close to you indeed; now again Phoebus Apollo **has saved** you ..."

19 Bakker (2001: 22) = (2006: 135); Bakker's use of the term 'immediacy' is rooted in the work of Chafe (1994) (Section 4), whereas other classicists have opted for 'mimetic' vs. 'diegetic' to express something very much like Chafe's 'immediate' vs. 'displaced' (Kroon 2002; cf. Allan 2007: 101–102).

Such forms fit in with the old observation that the use of the augment is much more widespread in Homeric speeches than in narrative proper;[20] and that observation in its turn had already been explained before Bakker by Louis Basset with reference to the Benvenistian *discours/histoire* distinction.[21] Exactly like the use of the present perfect in English, the Homeric use of augmented forms is by and large a feature of the 'immediate mode' (with Chafe), or of *discours* where, in Benveniste's words, "quelqu'un [...] s'énonce comme locuteur et organise ce qu'il dit dans la catégorie de la personne" (whereas in *histoire*, "les événements semblent se raconter eux-mêmes").

In addition to this, Bakker points out that augmentation tends to occur more often than not in 'staging formulae' of the type τὸν δ' αὖτε προσέειπε θεὰ γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη 'him in turn grey-eyed Athena addressed', τὸν δ' ἀπαμειβόμενος προσέφη πόδας ὠκὺς Ἀχιλλεύς 'replying to him, swift-footed Achilleus spoke', or καί μιν φωνήσας ἔπεα πτερόεντα προσηύδα 'and speaking winged words he addressed him'. According to Bakker, here too the augment has a 'deictic' value, "marking an event as 'near' with respect to the speaker's present and immediate situation";[22] but he fails to explain why such speaker-centred immediacy-marking should occur in speech *introductions* as much as in the speeches themselves. Within the epic texture, speech introductions are after all still part of *histoire* or 'displaced mode' rather than *discours* or 'immediate mode'.

And yet, when a direct speech is quoted within the framework of a historical narrative, this constitutes precisely the sort of narratorial intervention that *interrupts* the simple, unmarked flow of narrative events: the speech is 'staged', its contents are no longer simply narrated. As a consequence, whenever a direct speech is inserted, the narrator becomes visible—or audible—, just as he/she becomes visible/audible when, in later Greek, a historical present 'lifts

20 See Koch (1868), Platt (1891: 222–224), Drewitt (1912: 113–118), Chantraine (1958: 484), Bottin (1969: 71), Bakker (2001: 8, 12) = (2006: 121, 125). The tendency to omit the augment in sequences of Verb + δέ (e.g. νόησε δέ; Drewitt 1912: 104) can also be due to such sequences occurring mainly in narrative sections (Bottin 1969: 99–115), although syntactic 'conjunction reduction' may be at play too (Bakker 1999: 60–62, after Kiparsky 1968). Bakker (2001: 13) = (2006: 125–126) is of course right when he calls for a careful application of the *histoire/discours* dichotomy: not everything in a character's speech, for example, excludes *histoire*-like features (as already acknowledged by Basset 1989: 14–16).

21 Basset (1989), based on Benveniste (1966: 241–242); cf. Section 4.

22 Bakker (2001: 6, 15) = (2006: 119, 127); cf. Mumm (2004: 155). For statistics on the augment in speech introductions see Bakker (2001: 9–10) = (2006: 122) (45.01% of metrically required augments vs. 16.71% of metrically excluded augments; Bakker 1999: 60–61 explains regular exceptions of the type ἠγάσσατο φώνησέν τε).

out' of the narrative flow a particular scene. It is no coincidence if λέγειν and similar verbs also show a strong tendency to occur in the historical present in introductions of (especially memorable) direct speeches.[23] Compare for example (11), where the historical present is reserved for the introduction of the pivotal utterance in the entire conversation, or (12), where a series of speech-introducing historical presents follows a series of similar past tenses as soon as the 'narrative' turns into a 'drama' with little more than just stage directions:

(11) θεησάμενον δέ μιν τὰ πάντα καὶ σκεψάμενον, ὥς οἱ κατὰ καιρὸν ἦν, εἴρετο ὁ Κροῖσος τάδε· "ξεῖνε Ἀθηναῖε, παρ' ἡμέας γὰρ περὶ σέο λόγος ἀπῖκται πολλὸς καὶ σοφίης εἵνεκεν τῆς σῆς καὶ πλάνης, ὡς φιλοσοφέων γῆν πολλὴν θεωρίης εἵνεκεν ἐπελήλυθας· νῦν ὦν ἵμερος ἐπειρέσθαι μοι ἐπῆλθέ σε εἴ τινα ἤδη πάντων εἶδες ὀλβιώτατον." ὁ μὲν ἐλπίζων εἶναι ἀνθρώπων ὀλβιώτατος ταῦτα ἐπειρώτα, Σόλων δὲ οὐδὲν ὑποθωπεύσας, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐόντι χρησάμενος *λέγει*· "ὦ βασιλεῦ, Τέλλον Ἀθηναῖον." ἀποθωμάσας δὲ Κροῖσος τὸ λεχθὲν εἴρετο ἐπιστρεφέως· "κοίῃ δὴ κρίνεις Τέλλον εἶναι ὀλβιώτατον;" ὁ δὲ εἶπε ...

HDT. 1.30.2–3

After Solon had seen and looked at everything, at his own convenience, Croesus asked the following question: "Guest from Athens, we have heard much about you, both because of your wisdom and because of the journeys you are undertaking for research in order to study many countries; so I would now like to enquire if you have seen that anyone is the happiest person of all." He was asking this because he was expecting to be the happiest man; Solon, however, *answers* truthfully and without flattery: "Yes, King, Tellus the Athenian." Croesus was surprised by the answer and asked keenly: "So why do you find that Tellus is the happiest person?" And he replied ...

(12) [35] ἔχοντος δέ οἱ ἐν χερσὶ τοῦ παιδὸς τὸν γάμον ἀπικνέεται ἐς τὰς Σάρδις ἀνὴρ συμφορῇ ἐχόμενος καὶ οὐ καθαρὸς χεῖρας ... παρελθὼν δὲ οὗτος ἐς τὰ Κροίσου οἰκία κατὰ νόμους τοὺς ἐπιχωρίους καθαρσίου ἐδέετο ἐπικυρῆσαι, Κροῖσος δέ μιν ἐκάθηρε. ... ἐπείτε δὲ τὰ νομιζόμενα ἐποίησε ὁ Κροῖσος, ***ἐπυνθάνετο*** ὁκόθεν τε καὶ τίς εἴη, λέγων τάδε· "ὤνθρωπε, τίς τε ἐὼν καὶ κόθεν τῆς Φρυγίης ἥκων ἐπίστιός μοι ἐγένεο; ..." ὁ δὲ ***ἀμείβετο***· "ὦ βασιλεῦ, Γορδίεω μὲν τοῦ Μίδεω εἰμὶ παῖς, ὀνομάζομαι δὲ Ἄδρηστος ..." Κροῖσος δέ μιν ***ἀμείβετο*** τοισίδε· "ἀνδρῶν τε

23 Cf. Eriksson (1943: 16–17) and Koller (1951: 65, 73), who remarks: "Wird aber der Wortlaut nicht gegeben, so findet sich meines Wissens bei Herodot nie das Praesens historicum."

φίλων τυγχάνεις ἔκγονος ἐὼν …” [36] ὁ μὲν δὴ δίαιταν εἶχε ἐν Κροίσου, ἐν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ ἐν τῷ Μυσίῳ Ὀλύμπῳ ὑὸς χρῆμα γίνεται μέγα. τέλος δὲ ἀπικόμενοι παρὰ τὸν Κροῖσον τῶν Μυσῶν ἄγγελοι ***ἔλεγον*** τάδε· “ὦ βασιλεῦ, ὑὸς χρῆμα μέγιστον ἀνεφάνη ἡμῖν ἐν τῇ χώρῃ … νῦν ὦν προσδεόμεθά σευ τὸν παῖδα καὶ λογάδας νεηνίας καὶ κύνας συμπέμψαι ἡμῖν, ὡς ἄν μιν ἐξέλωμεν ἐκ τῆς χώρης.” οἱ μὲν δὴ τούτων ***ἐδέοντο***, Κροῖσος δὲ μνημονεύων τοῦ ὀνείρου τὰ ἔπεα ***ἔλεγέ*** σφι τάδε· “παιδὸς μὲν περὶ τοῦ ἐμοῦ μὴ μνησθῆτε ἔτι· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ὑμῖν συμπέμψαιμι …” [37] ταῦτα ***ἀμείψατο***. ἀποχρεωμένων δὲ τούτοισι τῶν Μυσῶν ἐπεσέρχεται ὁ τοῦ Κροίσου παῖς ἀκηκοὼς τῶν ἐδέοντο οἱ Μυσοί. οὐ φαμένου δὲ τοῦ Κροίσου τόν γε παῖδά σφι συμπέμψειν *λέγει* πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁ νεηνίης τάδε· “ὦ πάτερ, τὰ κάλλιστα πρότερόν κοτε καὶ γενναιότατα ἡμῖν ἦν ἔς τε πολέμους καὶ ἐς ἄγρας φοιτέοντας εὐδοκιμέειν. νῦν δὲ ἀμφοτέρων με τούτων ἀποκληίσας ἔχεις …” [38] *ἀμείβεται* Κροῖσος τοισίδε· “ὦ παῖ, οὔτε δειλίην οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἄχαρι παριδών τοι ποιέω ταῦτα …” [39] *ἀμείβεται* ὁ νεηνίης τοισίδε· “συγγνώμη μὲν ὦ πάτερ τοι, ἰδόντι γε ὄψιν τοιαύτην, περὶ ἐμὲ φυλακὴν ἔχειν …” [40] *ἀμείβεται* Κροῖσος· “ὦ παῖ, ἔστι τῇ με νικᾷς γνώμην ἀποφαίνων περὶ τοῦ ἐνυπνίου …” [41] εἴπας δὲ ταῦτα ὁ Κροῖσος μεταπέμπεται τὸν Φρύγα Ἄδρηστον, ἀπικομένῳ δέ οἱ *λέγει* τάδε· “Ἄδρηστε …” [42] *ἀμείβεται* ὁ Ἄδρηστος· “ὦ βασιλεῦ …” [43] τοιούτοισι ἐπείτε οὗτος ***ἀμείψατο*** Κροῖσον, ἤισαν μετὰ ταῦτα ἐξηρτύμενοι λογάσι τε νεηνίῃσι καὶ κυσί …

HDT. 1.34–43

[35] When [Croesus’] son was preparing his wedding, a man arrived in Sardes, who had suffered a misfortune and had blood on his hands … Going to the palace of Croesus he asked to be cleansed according to the local custom, and Croesus cleansed him. … When Croesus had performed the customary rites, he ***asked*** from where and who he was: “Stranger, who are you and from where in Phrygia have you come to my hearth? …” The other ***replied***: “King, I am a son of Gordias, son of Midas, and my name is Adrastus. …” Croesus then ***replied*** to him with the following words: “You happen to be the descendant of friends of mine …” [36] So Adrastus was staying at Croesus’ palace. But at the same time, a huge thing of a boar appeared on Mysian Mt. Olympus. … Finally, some messengers from the Mysians came to Croesus and ***spoke*** as follows: “King, a huge thing of a boar has turned up in our land. … So we are now asking you to send with us your son and select young men and dogs, so that we can chase the boar out of our land.” They ***were requesting*** this, but Croesus remembered his dream and ***gave*** the following ***answer***: “Forget about my son: I would never send him with you …” [37] This ***was his answer***. When the Mysians were already satisfied with that, Croesus’ son came in, who

had heard what the Mysians had asked for. Because Croesus had said that he was not going to send his son with them, the young man *addresses* him as follows: "Father, it used to be the best and noblest thing for me to go fighting or hunting and to make myself a name with it; but now you keep me away from both these things ..." [38] Croesus *gives* the following *answer*: "Son, I do not do this because I have noticed cowardice or any other negative feature in you ..." [39] The young man *replies* as follows: "It is understandable, father, that you keep watch over me after you have seen such a dream ..." [40] Croesus *replies*: "Son, somehow you convince me by your interpretation of the dream ..." [41] With these words, Croesus sends for the Phrygian Adrastus, and when the latter arrives *says* to him: "Adrastus, ..." [42] Adrastus *replies*: "King, ..." [43] After he ***had given*** this ***answer*** to Croesus, they went out, in the company of select young men and dogs.

6 Functional Augmentation and the Historical Present

Given these functional and distributional facts, a simple answer to our initial question suggests itself: Homeric Greek did not 'need' the new historical present, because it still possessed augmentation as a distinctive grammatical feature, with augmented past tenses still contrasting with unaugmanted ones.[24] Of course, this is not to say that every augmented form in Homer could be turned into a historical present in later Greek. For example, augmented 'resultative aorists', like the ones in (10), might rather turn into 'resultative perfects' in classical times. But where we do find historical presents in later Greek, an adequate Homeric equivalent would almost always be an augmented past tense.

To illustrate this, let us first look at the well-known passage relating the history of Agamemenon's sceptre in *Il.* 2.100–108:

(13) ... ἀνὰ δὲ κρείων Ἀγαμέμνων
ἔστη σκῆπτρον ἔχων· τὸ μὲν Ἥφαιστος κάμε τεύχων·

24 The functional equivalence of later historical presents and Homeric augmented verbs was already adumbrated by Bakker (1999: 51–52), but he failed to recognize the *structural* interdependence of post-Homeric compulsory augmentation and the birth of the historical present and therefore still had to explain stylistically the lack of historical presents in Homer (Bakker 1999: 62, "Using present tense would endow the epic event with a life that exceeds speech: the event named or described would extend beyond the present moment of utterance as a reality that is only partially controled by language").

Ἥφαιστος μὲν ***δῶκε*** Διὶ Κρονίωνι ἄνακτι,
αὐτὰρ ἄρα Ζεὺς ***δῶκε*** διακτόρῳ Ἀργειφόντῃ,
Ἑρμείας δὲ ἄναξ ***δῶκεν*** Πέλοπι πληξίππῳ,
αὐτὰρ ὃ αὖτε Πέλοψ ***δῶκ'*** Ἀτρέϊ ποιμένι λαῶν·
Ἀτρεὺς δὲ θνῄσκων **ἔλιπεν** πολύαρνι Θυέστῃ,
αὐτὰρ ὃ αὖτε Θυέστ' Ἀγαμέμνονι ***λεῖπε*** φορῆναι,
πολλῇσιν νήσοισι καὶ Ἄργεϊ παντὶ ἀνάσσειν.

Il. 2.100–108

… but Agamemnon the ruler stood up, holding his sceptre, which Hephaestus once produced with great care; Hephaestus ***gave*** it to Zeus son of Cronus the lord, and Zeus in turn ***gave*** it to the Argos-Slayer, the messenger, and lord Hermes ***gave*** it to Pelops the horse-whipper, and Pelops for his part ***gave*** it to Atreus the shepherd of people; when he was dying, Atreus **left (~ leaves)** it to Thyestes rich in sheep, and Thyestes in turn ***left*** it to Agamemnon to carry, to rule over many islands and all of Argos.

After a succession of unaugmented forms, which trace the sceptre's journey from one holder to the next, the augmented ἔλιπεν singles out from the timeline, just as a historical present λείπει might do it, the one crucial change in the transmission process: from Atreus onward, the sceptre is no longer *given*, but *left* upon the death of its previous holder. There is nothing 'resultative' about ἔλιπεν here, since the last but one recipient of the sceptre, Thyestes, has also died and left the sceptre (to Agamemnon) in the meantime. But this most recent change of possession is not in the same way meaningful as the one preceding it. Once the sceptre has become a hereditary object, Agamemnon's possessing it now is only to be expected—and hence with the final λεῖπε the text switches back to ordinary, unmarked and unaugmented, narrative mode.

Or to pick randomly a typical Iliadic battle scene, passage (14) starts with an unaugmented ῥῆξε, which describes *within* the timeline a normal narrative event; but this event is then interpreted, *outside* the narrative timeline, as the narrator comments that it 'brings light' to Ajax's comrades (φόως ἔθηκεν, with augment). And the same narratorial voice is still distinctly heard some lines later, in augmented ἔβαλε, although we return there to the battle events themselves: for ἔβαλε highlights Ajax's striking Acamas as a decisive next step in exactly the same way as a 'dramatic' historical present βάλλει might do it in later Greek—but in stark contrast to the following narratorially unconspicuous unaugmented verb forms, which just provide some more detail:

(14) Αἴας δὲ πρῶτος Τελαμώνιος, ἕρκος Ἀχαιῶν,
Τρώων ***ῥῆξε*** φάλαγγα, φόως δ' ἑτάροισιν **ἔθηκεν**,
ἄνδρα βαλὼν ὃς ἄριστος ἐνὶ Θρῄκεσσι τέτυκτο,
υἱὸν Ἐϋσσώρου Ἀκάμαντ', ἠΰν τε μέγαν τε.
τὸν ῥ' **ἔβαλε** πρῶτος κόρυθος φάλον ἱπποδασείης,
ἐν δὲ μετώπῳ ***πῆξε· πέρησε*** δ' ἄρ' ὀστέον εἴσω
αἰχμὴ χαλκείη, τὸν δὲ σκότος ὄσσε ***κάλυψεν***.
Il. 6.5–11

But Ajax son of Telamon, the fence of the Achaeans, ***was*** the first ***to break*** the battle-line of the Trojans and thus he **brought** (~ **brings**) light to his comrades, hitting the man who was best among the Thracians, noble and great Acamas the son of Eussorus. Him he **struck** (~ **strikes**) first, at the horn of his helmet bushy with horse-hair, and he ***pierced*** his forehead: the spear-tip of bronze ***went*** right into the bone, and darkness ***enwrapped*** his eyes.

We now begin to see more clearly how a generic/stylistic and a diachronic account for the absence of historical presents in Homer fit together. As long as epic language—and, as the irregular augmentation in e.g. Pindar suggests, probably early Greek poetic language more generally—retained as a register-conditioned archaism the possibility of using unaugmented forms in unmediated narrative sequences, but of preferring augmented ones wherever the default 'displaced mode' of narrative was meant to become 'immediate', there was no need for the historical present to replace the marked, augmented forms in this poetic register, however common the historical present already was outside poetry. The so-called epic 'optionality'[25] of the augment and the absence of the historical present in the same genre therefore turn out to be two sides of one and the same coin.

At some point, however, the feeling for the old semantic function of the augment was lost, so that it became either compulsory in all past tenses (in ordinary language and prose) or truly optional (in poetry); and it was at that stage that the historical present came to the fore as a replacement structure. In poetry, considerations of stylistic propriety and conservatism could then still prevent the use of the historical present, but the linguistic basis of the discrimination had changed. Since the use of the augment already in Homer does not *always*, but only *as a tendency* follow the functional rules outlined

25 Cf. e.g. Wackernagel (1943: 4) ("*beliebige* Auslassung des Augments", italics added).

before,[26] there are good reasons to believe that the mechanical extension of augmented forms to places where it did not 'originally' belong, i.e. to *all* sorts of verbs with past reference, had already started before the last formative stage of epic language. In that sense, Wackernagel's opinion that the omission of the augment constitutes a generically conditioned "Archaismus der dichterischen Praxis"[27] remains as correct as it is correct to argue with von Fritz that the absence of the historical present from Homer must be regarded as a linguistic 'archaism'.

7 Historical Presents and the Auctorial Voice in Later Greek Literature

And yet, despite the internal logic of the evolution, one apparent paradox remains. In Section 4 we have seen that the historical present, fitting into the cognitive frame of Chafe's 'immediate mode', is a grammatical feature that is as intrinsically 'oral' as its Homeric precursor, the augmented past. Nevertheless it first gains prominence, with Pherecydes and then Herodotus, when Greek culture becomes increasingly literate, as written prose emerges.

In reality, though, there is nothing surprising about this. We know that early prose was not just written, but also 'performed' in public lectures. Pherecydes' or Herodotus' use of the historical present can therefore be seen as the grammatical correlate to the transition from orality to literacy in general: it reflects the oral roots of the written ὑπόμνημα—and it is no doubt designed to do so. As long as the literary author still wants his or her own voice to be heard behind the dead letter, he or she has every reason to hint at 'oral grammar'. But to do so or not is a deliberate choice. The auctorial voice that wants to disappear behind the text will not opt for 'immediate-mode' tenses.

And that, we may suspect, is the reason for another well-known, but so far unexplained, distributional fact about the historical present: namely that

26 Other factors are undeniably at play too, such as the avoidance of overshort forms (Wackernagel 1906: 148–150, Strunk 1987), the preference for augmentation in compounds (Dottin 1894; cf. Bottin 1969: 70, 73–74, 87–89)—although this may be secondary since compounds with tmesis rather omit the augment (Drewitt 1912: 104–105)—, or certain metrical considerations (e.g., non-augmentation of amphibrachic forms like ἄκουσε, Drewitt 1912: 50–56; cf. also Bakker 2001: 6 n. 18 = 2006: 119 n. 23). All this means that an *exact* quantification is difficult, but the statistics provided by Platt (1891: esp. 217–222, 229–230) leave no doubt about the phenomenon as such.

27 Wackernagel (1943: 4); cf. Lazzeroni (1977: 29–30), Meier-Brügger (1992: 2.51).

Hellenistic historiography all but 'forgets' the historical present, although it had been such an eminent stylistic device in preclassical and classical times.[28] Of course the Hellenistic period too saw some crucial changes in the tense-aspect system of Greek,[29] but none of them was such as to obviate the 'need' for the historical present: no alternative way of 'lifting events out of their narrative timeframe' arose. So the apparent fall of the historical present, unlike its earlier rise, must have had *non*-linguistic reasons—as is confirmed by the observation that still later, in Roman times, the historical present is *not* exclusively used in classicistic, backward-looking prose, but continues to be a standard ingredient of popular writing as represented, for example, in the New Testament.[30]

Now let us recall the following programmatic statement of Polybius, the doyen and (for us) most eminent source of Hellenistic historiography:

(15) δεῖ τοιγαροῦν οὐκ ἐκπλήττειν τὸν συγγραφέα τερατευόμενον διὰ τῆς ἱστορίας τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας οὐδὲ τοὺς ἐνδεχομένους λόγους ζητεῖν καὶ τὰ παρεπόμενα τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις ἐξαριθμεῖσθαι, καθάπερ οἱ τραγῳδιογράφοι, τῶν δὲ πραχθέντων καὶ ῥηθέντων κατ' ἀλήθειαν αὐτῶν μνημονεύειν πάμπαν, κἂν πάνυ μέτρια τυγχάνωσιν ὄντα.

PLB. 2.56.10

Thus, the historian must not excite his audience by talking marvels in his work, nor look for utterances that are just plausible, or enumerate all the consequences of the matters related, in the manner of the tragedians—no: he must simply record the facts and words in an absolutely truthful way, even if they happen to be totally unremarkable.

Polybius is here contrasting his own scientific and 'truthful' way of writing history with the contemporary 'tragic' historiography of writers like Phylarchus. If it is the task of the Polybian historiographer to τῶν πραχθέντων καὶ ῥηθέντων κατ' ἀλήθειαν αὐτῶν μνημονεύειν πάμπαν, this role as a simple 'recorder' (μνήμων) of facts entails a far-reaching effacement of the author's voice and of his role as an *interpreter*. In texts that take to heart such an imperative, the historical

28 See Eriksson (1943).

29 For example the spread of the perfect, leading to its merger with, and eventually ousting by, the aorist (cf. Wackernagel 1904: 22–24, Chantraine 1927: 214–252, Duhoux 2000: 430–431).

30 Cf. Eriksson (1943: 26–27), Blass, Debrunner, and Rehkopf (1990: 265–266), and Fanning (1990: 226–239), to be held against Sicking and Stork (1997: 133); see also Mayser (1926: 131–132) on the language of the papyri.

present would be out of place, hindering the events from 'narrating themselves' (as in Benveniste's *histoire*), and instead giving unnecessary prominence to opinionated *discours*. If we had more of Hellenistic historiography, and less of a 'Polybian' bias in the extant remains, we might well discover that the historical present was not *universally* weakened at the time, but merely avoided by some writers and not others.[31] In fact, it is hardly a coincidence if we do come across at least one historical present, highlighting a crucial turning-point of the story, in the exceedingly meagre leftovers of Polybius' main target Phylarchus:[32]

(16) ἡ πάρεδρος τῆς Λαοδίκης Δανάη, πιστευομένη ὑπ' αὐτῆς τὰ πάντα, … Σώφρονος δὲ γεγονυῖα πρότερον ἐρωμένη, παρακολουθοῦσα διότι ἀποκτεῖναι βούλεται τὸν Σώφρονα ἡ Λαοδίκη *διανεύει* τῷ Σώφρονι μηνύουσα τὴν ἐπιβουλήν. ὁ δὲ συλλαβὼν καὶ προσποιηθεὶς συγχωρεῖν περὶ ὧν λέγει δύ' ἡμέρας παρῃτήσατο εἰς σκέψιν· καὶ συγχωρησάσης νυκτὸς ἔφυγεν εἰς Ἔφεσον …
PHYLARCHUS 81F24 Jacoby

31 Polybius himself seems to have progressively restricted the usage (Foucault 1972: 127). According to Lambert (2011: 199–200), in many cases where a historical present is found, it is preceded by a conjunct participle in the nominative (e.g. Plb. 1.21.6 ὁ δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγὸς Ἀννίβας, ἀκούσας ἐν τῷ Πανόρμῳ τὸ γεγονὸς ἐξαποστέλλει Βοώδη τῆς γερουσίας ὑπάρχοντα 'But when the Carthaginian Hannibal had heard in Panormus what had happened, he sends out Boodes, the leader of the elders' council'; cf. Plb. 1.11.7, 1.23.2, 1.48.3, 3.42.6, 3.69.6). Here, Lambert suggests, "[a]u moins dans les cas où un des personnages du récit correspond au sujet du verbe au présent historique, on peut interpréter les participes antéposés comme la trace d'une représentation du point de vue de ce personnage. Le présent historique s'interprèterait alors comme la conséquence logique du changement de point de vue, de celui du narrateur (l'historien) à celui du personnage témoin contemporain de l'événement". In other words, by using the historical present Polybius might be alerting the reader to a degree of 'subjectivity' in connecting two events whose connectedness is plausible, but not provable. Elsewhere, the historical present is occasionally found when a 'subjective' auctorial assessment is explicit anyway (Plb. 1.82.3 γίνεταί τις ὁλοσχερὴς καὶ παράδοξος … παλίρροια τῶν πραγμάτων 'a complete, and unexpected, reversal of the events takes place', 3.98.1 γίνεταί τις πραγμάτων περιπέτεια τοιάδε 'a change of events takes place as follows'), but overall Eriksson (1943: 29–38) detects little *functional* divergence between Polybius' historical presents and those of classical historiography (which may also have a certain focalizing effect: cf. Eriksson 1943: 1–16).

32 Few of the other preserved fragments would have allowed the use of historical presents. The situation in the fragments of Duris of Samos, another major representative of the tragic 'school', is similarly uninstructive: an argument-structuring historical present πέμπουσι occurs in Duris 76F24 Jacoby.

> The assistant of Laodike, Danae, trusted by her in everything, … who had earlier become the companion of Sophron and who was realising that Laodike was planning to kill Sophron, *gives a hint* to Sophron, indicating the plan. He took the hint, and acting as if he were conceding to what Laodike was saying, he requested two days to think about it; but when she granted this, he escaped at night to Ephesus …

The last thing this 'tragic' historiographer would have wanted to do is to silence his own voice, to distance his represented consciousness from the evaluating consciousness that reacts to the history and histories he tells of, and thus to do away with the oral roots of all communication. That even grammar was one of the weapons with which the ideological battle among historiographers was fought may not have been clear to the combatants themselves, but to the modern scholar this hardly matters. Here, as often, different voices did not just say different things, they also did so in different ways, and if we really want to listen to them, we must pay attention to the medium as much as to the message.

Bibliography

Allan, R.J. 2007. "Sense and sentence complexity: sentence structure, sentence connection, and tense-aspect as indicators of narrative mode in Thucydides' *Histories*" in R.J. Allan and M. Buijs, eds. *The Language of Literature: Linguistic Approaches to Classical Texts*, 93–121. Leiden: Brill.

———. 2011. "The historical present in Thucydides: Capturing the case of αἱρεῖ and λαμβάνει" in J. Lallot, A. Rijksbaron, B. Jacquinod, and M. Buijs, eds. *The Historical Present in Thucydides: Semantics and Narrative Function*, 37–63. Leiden and Boston: Brill.

Bakker, E.J. 1999. "Pointing to the past: verbal augment and temporal deixis in Homer" in J.N. Kazazis and A. Rengakos, eds. *Euphrosyne: Studies in Ancient Epic and its Legacy in Honor of Dimitris N. Maronitis*, 50–65. Stuttgart: Steiner.

———. 2001. "Similes, augment, and the language of immediacy" in J. Watson, ed. *Speaking Volumes: Orality and Literacy in the Greek and Roman World*, 1–23. Leiden, Boston, Cologne: Brill.

———. 2006. *Pointing at the Past: From Formula to Performance in Homeric Poetics*. Washington, D.C.: Center for Hellenic Studies.

Basset, L. 1989. "L'augment et la distinction discours/récit dans l'Iliade et l'Odyssée" in M. Casevitz, ed. *Études homériques*, 9–16. Lyon: Maison de l'Orient.

———. 2011. "Imparfait, aoriste et présent historique dans les récits des quatre

batailles navales de Syracuse (*Guerre du Péloponnèse*, livre 7)" in J. Lallot, A. Rijksbaron, B. Jacquinod, and M. Buijs, eds. *The Historical Present in Thucydides: Semantics and Narrative Function*, 159–175. Leiden and Boston: Brill.

Benveniste, É. 1966. *Problèmes de linguistique générale*, i. Paris: Gallimard.

Blass, F., A. Debrunner, and F. Rehkopf. 1990. *Grammatik des neutestamentlichen Griechisch* (17th edn.). Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht.

Bottin, L. 1969. "Studio dell'aumento in Omero". *Studi Micenei ed Egeo-Anatolici* 10: 69–145.

Brugmann, K. 1883. "Zur Syntax der indogermanischen Sprachen, besonders des Griechischen". *Berichte über die Verhandlungen der königlich sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften* (Phil.-hist. Classe) 35: 169–195.

———. 1903. *Kurze vergleichende Grammatik der indogermanischen Sprachen*. Strassburg: Trübner.

Brunel, J. 1939. *L'aspect verbal et l'emploi des préverbes en grec, particulièrement en attique*. Paris: Klincksieck.

Buijs, M. 2007. "Aspectual differences and narrative technique: Xenophon's *Hellenica & Agesilaus*" in R.J. Allan and M. Buijs, eds. *The Language of Literature: Linguistic Approaches to Classical Texts*, 122–153. Leiden: Brill.

Calame, C. 1983. "Entre oralité et écriture: Énonciation et énoncé dans la poésie grecque archaïque". *Semiotica* 43: 245–273.

Chafe, W. 1994. *Discourse, Consciousness, and Time: The Flow and Displacement of Conscious Experience in Speaking and Writing*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.

Chantraine, P. 1927. *Histoire du parfait grec*. Paris: Champion.

———. (1953). *Grammaire homérique*, ii. *Syntaxe*. Paris: Klincksieck.

———. (1958). *Grammaire homérique*, i. *Phonétique et morphologie* (2nd edn.). Paris: Klincksieck.

Dottin, G. 1894. *L'augment des verbes composés dans l'Odyssée et dans l'Iliade*. Rennes: Oberthür.

Drewitt, J.A.J. 1912. "The augment in Homer". *Classical Quarterly* 6: 44–59, 104–120.

Duhoux, Y. 2000. *Le verbe grec ancien: Éléments de morphologie et de syntaxe historiques* (2nd edn.). Louvain-la-Neuve: Peeters.

Dunbar, N. 1995. *Aristophanes: Birds*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Eriksson, K. 1943. *Das Präsens historicum in der nachklassischen griechischen Historiographie*. Lund: Ohlsson.

Fanning, B.M. 1990. *Verbal Aspect in New Testament Greek*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Foucault, J.-A. de. 1972. *Recherches sur la langue et le style de Polybe*. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.

Fritz, K. von. 1949. "The so-called historical present in early Greek". *Word* 5: 186–201.

George, C.H. 2011. "The temporal characteristics of the historical present in Thucydides" in J. Lallot, A. Rijksbaron, B. Jacquinod, and M. Buijs, eds. *The Historical Present in Thucydides: Semantics and Narrative Function*, 223–240. Leiden and Boston: Brill.

Heubeck, A., S. West, and J.B. Hainsworth. 1988. *A Commentary on Homer's Odyssey*, i. *Introduction and Books I–VIII*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jacquinod, B. 2011. "πείθω et le présent historique chez Thucydide" in J. Lallot, A. Rijksbaron, B. Jacquinod, and M. Buijs, eds. *The Historical Present in Thucydides: Semantics and Narrative Function*, 89–113. Leiden and Boston: Brill.

Jong, I.J.F. de. 1987. *Narrators and Focalizers: The Presentation of the Story in the "Iliad"*. Amsterdam: Grüner.

Kieckers, E. 1926. *Historische griechische Grammatik*, iv. *Syntax: Zweiter Teil. Lehre vom Verbum, von den Satzarten, den Partikeln und von der Wortstellung*. Berlin and Leipzig: de Gruyter.

Kiparsky, P. 1968. "Tense and mood in Indo-European syntax". *Foundations of Language* 4: 30–57.

Koch, K. 1868. *De augmento apud Homerum omisso*. Braunschweig: Meyer.

Koller, H. 1951. "Praesens historicum und erzählendes Imperfekt: Beitrag zur Aktionsart der Praesensstammzeiten im Lateinischen und Griechischen". *Museum Helveticum* 8: 63–99.

Kroon, C. 2002. "How to write a ghost story? A linguistic view on narrative modes in Pliny *EP*. 7.27" in L. Sawicki and D. Shalev, eds. *Donum Grammaticum: Studies in Latin and Celtic Linguistics in Honour of Hannah Rosén*, 189–200. Leuven: Peeters.

Lallot, J. 2011. "Vue cavalière sur les emplois du présent historique dans les *Histoires* de Thucydide" in J. Lallot, A. Rijksbaron, B. Jacquinod, and M. Buijs, eds. *The Historical Present in Thucydides: Semantics and Narrative Function*, 19–35. Leiden and Boston: Brill.

Lallot, J., A. Rijksbaron, B. Jacquinod, and M. Buijs, eds. 2011. *The Historical Present in Thucydides: Semantics and Narrative Function*. Leiden and Boston: Brill.

Lambert, F. 2011. "Présent historique et subjectivité: sur quelques exemples de Polybe et de Thucydide" in J. Lallot, A. Rijksbaron, B. Jacquinod, and M. Buijs, eds. *The Historical Present in Thucydides: Semantics and Narrative Function*, 195–221. Leiden and Boston: Brill.

Lazzeroni, R. 1977. "Fra glottogonia e storia: ingiuntivo, aumento e lingua poetica indoeuropea". *Studi e Saggi Linguistici* 17: 1–30.

Lilja, S. 1968. *On the Style of the Earliest Greek Prose*. Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum Humanarum Fennica.

Mayser, E. 1926. *Grammatik der griechischen Papyri aus der Ptolemäerzeit*, ii. *Satzlehre: Analytischer Teil, Erste Hälfte*. Berlin and Leipzig: de Gruyter.

Meier-Brügger, M. 1992. *Griechische Sprachwissenschaft* (2 vols.). Berlin and New York: de Gruyter.

Mortier-Waldschmidt, O. 2011. “τρέπειν au présent historique chez Thucydide” in J. Lallot, A. Rijksbaron, B. Jacquinod, and M. Buijs, eds. *The Historical Present in Thucydides: Semantics and Narrative Function*, 65–87. Leiden and Boston: Brill.

Mumm, P.-A. 2004. “Zur Funktion des homerischen Augments” in T. Krisch, ed. *Analecta homini universali dicata: Arbeiten zur Indogermanistik, Linguistik, Philologie, Politik, Musik und Dichtung. Festschrift für Oswald Panagl zum 65. Geburtstag*, 1.148–158. Stuttgart: Heinz.

Napoli, M. 2006. *Aspect and Actionality in Homeric Greek: A Contrastive Analysis*. Milano: Angeli.

Platt, A. 1891. “The augment in Homer”. *Journal of Philology* 19: 211–237.

Rademaker, A., and M. Buijs. 2011. “A tale of two involuntary encounters: linguistics and the persuasive function of the historical present in two Thucydidean battle scenes (1.45–51 & 1.56–66)” in J. Lallot, A. Rijksbaron, B. Jacquinod, and M. Buijs, eds. *The Historical Present in Thucydides: Semantics and Narrative Function*, 115–157. Leiden and Boston: Brill.

Rijksbaron, A. 2002. *The Syntax and Semantics of the Verb in Classical Greek* (3rd edn.). Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.

———. 2011a. “Introduction” in J. Lallot, A. Rijksbaron, B. Jacquinod, and M. Buijs, eds. *The Historical Present in Thucydides: Semantics and Narrative Function*, 1–17. Leiden and Boston: Brill.

———. 2011b. “The profanation of the Mysteries and the mutilation of the Hermae. Two variations on two themes” in J. Lallot, A. Rijksbaron, B. Jacquinod, and M. Buijs, eds. *The Historical Present in Thucydides: Semantics and Narrative Function*, 177–194. Leiden and Boston: Brill.

Ruipérez, M.S. 1982. *Structure du système des aspects et des temps du verbe en grec ancien* (trans. M. Plénat and P. Serça). Paris: Les Belles Lettres.

Schlegel, A.W. [1798] 1962. “Goethes Hermann und Dorothea” in A.W. Schlegel, *Kritische Schriften und Briefe*, i. *Sprache und Poetik* (ed. E. Lohner), 42–66. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.

Sicking, C.M.J., and P. Stork. 1997. “The grammar of the so-called historical present in Ancient Greek” in E.J. Bakker, ed. *Grammar as Interpretation: Greek Literature in its Linguistic Contexts*, 131–168. Leiden, New York, Cologne: Brill.

Stahl, F. 1907. *Kritisch-historische Syntax des griechischen Verbums der klassischen Zeit*. Heidelberg: Winter.

Strunk, K. 1987. “Ergänzende Beobachtungen zu ‘Wortumfang und Wortform’”. *Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Sprachforschung* 100: 323–338.

Wackernagel, J. 1904. “Studien zum griechischen Perfectum”. *Programm zur akademischen Preisverteilung*, Göttingen, 3–24.

———. 1906. “Wortumfang und Wortform”. *Nachrichten der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen*, 147–184.

———. 1926. *Vorlesungen über Syntax mit besonderer Berücksichtigung von Griechisch, Lateinisch und Deutsch: Erste Reihe* (2nd edn.). Basel: Birkhäuser.

———. 1943. "Indogermanische Dichtersprache". *Philologus* 95: 1–19.

CHAPTER 12

The Voice of Aeschylus in Plato's *Republic*

Geoffrey W. Bakewell

This paper addresses a paradox in Plato's *Republic*: the prominent role of Aeschylus in a dialogue hostile to poetry. In Books 2 and 3, Socrates launches an assault on epic and tragedy that culminates in a ban on traditional poetry in the city in speech (398a1–b4).[1] This anti-poetic strain of the *Republic* constitutes its dominant, "prosaic" voice. Yet the dialogue simultaneously contains within itself other, competing voices. Despite Socrates' distrust of the "sweet Muse" (ἡδυσμένην Μοῦσαν, 607a5),[2] he and his interlocutors repeatedly refer to or quote from numerous poets. In Books 1 and 2 alone, Archilochus, Bias, Hesiod, Homer, Pindar, Pittacus, Simonides, and Sophocles all put in appearances.[3] But pride of place goes to Aeschylus, whose works are cited at least seven times in the *Republic*.[4] Why does the acknowledged tragedian *par excellence*[5] loom so large in a work that calls for his kind to be silenced and dismissed from the polis (398a)?

One possible, preliminary explanation might lie in the revolutionary nature of Socrates' proposal. Poetry had long been the mainstay of ancient Greek education, and any attempt to eradicate it would likely have involved a certain amount of definition and unavoidable recourse to tragic texts. It is difficult to ban something without specifying what it is, and to overturn long-standing

1 The prohibition flows in part from Socrates' assertion that there is "a certain ancient dispute between philosophy and poetry" (παλαιὰ μέν τις διαφορὰ φιλοσοφίᾳ τε καὶ ποιητικῇ, 607b6–7). Yet as Nightingale (1996: 67) notes, Socrates' claim is a tendentious one meant "to differentiate philosophy from poetry. For if the poet is explicitly defined as ignorant of truth, as imitating appearances, as gratifying the multitude, as fostering the inferior part of the soul, then the philosopher is implicitly defined as the diametrical opposite."

2 Greek quotations from the *Republic* are drawn from Slings (2003); all translations are my own.

3 Archilochus (365c4–6), Bias (335e9), Hesiod (e.g. 363a8–b4, 364c8–d3), Homer (e.g. 363b6–c2, 364d6–e2), Pindar (331a2–3), Pittacus (335e9), Simonides (331d5–332c), Sophocles (329b6–c4).

4 See Tarrant (1955: 82).

5 On the reperfomance of Aeschylus' works after his death, see Ar. *Acharnians* 9–12 and the scholion to line 10. Although *Acharnians* was presented at the Lenaea in 425, Hutchinson (1985: xlii) argues that Aeschylean reperformance did not begin prior to 386. On Dionysus' putative preference for Aeschylus over Euripides, see Ar. *Frogs* 1471–1473.

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2017 | DOI: 10.1163/9789004329737_013

precedent without detailed argument. Nevertheless, this attempt at explanation falls short. To see why, we must briefly review the *Republic*'s objections to tragedy, and then consider its uses of Aeschylus. For at the heart of the dialogue we find Socrates enthusiastically quoting problematic passages verbatim, in ways that threaten harm to himself and his interlocutors. Yet if he truly believes that tragedy harms souls, and we take him at his word, he should not say what he does, in the manner he does.

This chapter argues that there is a more compelling explanation for Aeschylus' presence in the *Republic*, one that saves Socrates from the charge of saying one thing and doing another. In Book 10 the philosopher returns to the topic of traditional poetry to modify his earlier, sweeping ban. At 607a2–4 he permits specific exceptions for hymnody and *encomia* of good people (ὅσον μόνον ὕμνους θεοῖς καὶ ἐγκώμια τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ποιήσεως παραδεκτέον εἰς πόλιν). And shortly afterwards (607c4–7), he cracks open the door to readmitting tragedy: "if the imitative poetry that provides pleasure could offer some argument that it has a necessary role in a well-governed city, we at any rate would gladly welcome it back, since we know full well its charms" (ἡμεῖς γε, εἴ τινα ἔχοι λόγον εἰπεῖν ἡ πρὸς ἡδονὴν ποιητικὴ καὶ ἡ μίμησις, ὡς χρὴ αὐτὴν εἶναι ἐν πόλει εὐνομουμένῃ, ἄσμενοι ἂν καταδεχοίμεθα, ὡς σύνισμέν γε ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς κηλουμένοις ὑπ' αὐτῆς). The quotations of Aeschylus in The *Republic* are best understood as a particular demonstration of how tragedy may be redeemed.[6] As Socrates and his interlocutors move in an arc from the *Seven Against Thebes* to *Niobe*, the *Wool Carders*, and a work involving Thetis, and then double back to the *Seven*, they trace a circuit of plays involving the deaths of noble young men. Socrates uses them to emphasize the importance of bravery and patriotism unto death. The *Seven Against Thebes* in particular serves as a demonstration of how emotion can properly be subordinated to reason, and an undesirable sort of song replaced by a better one. Read in this light, the *Republic*'s quotations of Aeschylus provide a palinodic example of how tragedy as a genre might be reinvested with civic purpose and readmitted to the city.

6 This approach is contrary to that of Naddaff (2002: 2), who claims that Socrates' objections only strengthen as the dialogue progresses: "in books 2–3 … Plato insists only on the necessity of supervising epic and dramatic poetry by censoring its form and content … Revised along specific guidelines, poetry can be used in the emergent *kallipolis* as an integral part of the ideal educational program that will shape the ethos of future guardians … By book 10, however, … Plato seems to have changed his mind … condemn[ing] all mimetic poetry to exile." Her claim is driven in large part by her attempt to cast the Myth of Er as Plato's own antagonistic, "poetic" creation.

The *Republic*'s primary complaints against tragedy are three. First, the genre often presents unacceptable content: the gods are shown doing evil actions, like fighting and plotting against one another, abusing their families, and so forth (378a–c). In addition to their own misdeeds, the gods are also said to cause evil indirectly, by prompting the immoral actions of others (379d–380b).[7] Second, Socrates' misgivings about tragedy extend from its substance to its form: its reliance on imitation (*mimesis*) is profoundly objectionable. This is partly because "imitative poetry is realistic poetry: it copies things as they appear, not as they are."[8] It therefore "caters to the appearance-responsive, non-rational" sort of soul that ordinarily predominates in cities.[9] But imitation is also intrinsic to tragedy in another way. By serving as actors and choruses, men publicly assume roles incompatible with their stations in life and their souls: the genre requires them to act as someone other than themselves.[10] For their part, the spectators are led to contemplate situations and to sympathize with sufferings that call into question the values of the *polis*.[11] Put differently, the audience is encouraged to suspend its own civic identity when watching performances in the theater of Dionysus.[12] And third, the variegated meters of tragedy are suspect,[13] largely because of music's

7 Ferrari (1989: 111) notes that "what Socrates imagines traditional poetry to encourage, and what he warns against, is not so much the spectacular violence or exotic sexuality that is the fodder of modern censorship—behaviour more likely to be entertained in fantasy than enacted—as certain weaknesses of character to which we are all prone, and which are, so to speak, only a movement of the soul away."

8 Moss (2007: 437).

9 Moss (2007: 442).

10 See Ferrari (1989: 109). Winkler (1990: 57) argues that the chorus consisted of ephebes who were "disciplined in the exacting demands of unison movement, subordinated to the more prominent actors, and characterized as social dependents (women, slaves, old men)."

11 According to Goldhill (1987: 74), "tragedy investigates and undercuts the secure meanings of key words in the discourse of social order—σωφρονεῖν, σοφός, δίκη, κράτος etc.—and depicts tensions and ambiguities in their sense and usage ... Rather than simply reflecting the cultural values of a fifth-century audience, then, rather than offering simple didactic messages from the city's poets to the citizens, tragedy seems deliberately to problematize, to make difficult the assumption of the values of the civic discourse."

12 According to Herodotus (6.21.2), the Athenians fined Phrynichus for "reminding them of their own evils" (ὡς ἀναμνήσαντα οἰκήια κακά) with his *Sack of Miletus*. Roisman (1988: 18) argues that these "*oikeia kaka* are patently contrasted with what may be termed as *allotria kaka*. The *kaka*, then, are one's own as opposed to the *kaka* of others."

13 See 399e7–400a4. On meter as an essential part of poetry see 393c7.

ability to evade the control of τὸ λογίστικον and appeal directly to other parts of the soul.

Despite Socrates' antipathy to tragic matter, *mimesis*, and meter, Aeschylus appears on the *Republic*'s stage early and often. Glaucon first invokes him in Book 2. After describing the truly unjust man, he says "let us in turn place alongside him in our argument the just man, a man simple and noble, one (according to Aeschylus) wanting not to seem but to be good" (τοῦτον δὲ τοιοῦτον θέντες τὸν δίκαιον αὖ παρ' αὐτὸν ἱστῶμεν τῷ λόγῳ, ἄνδρα ἁπλοῦν καὶ γενναῖον, κατ' Αἰσχύλον οὐ δοκεῖν ἀλλ' εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἐθέλοντα, 361b5–8). His explicit mention of the poet and the infinitive construction οὐ δοκεῖν ἀλλ' εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἐθέλοντα clearly point to the *Seven Against Thebes*. There the Argive challenger Amphiareus is described as "desir[ing] not to seem but to be best" (οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν ἄριστος ἀλλ' εἶναι θέλει, 592).[14] Several features of this Aeschylean allusion are noteworthy. First of all, Glaucon does not quote directly, but uses indirect statement to paraphrase without meter. He also makes a substitution, replacing the original superlative ἄριστος with the positive degree of the adjective, ἀγαθόν. Moreover, neither the context nor the content of the *Seven* passage is objectionable from a Socratic standpoint. The man thus described is a pious seer who rejects the other challengers' blasphemy: his primary mistake is keeping bad company. In addition, the distinction the poet draws between seeming (δοκεῖν) and being (εἶναι) is congruent with epistemological and metaphysical issues raised elsewhere in the *Republic*.[15] Finally, it is Glaucon who introduces Aeschylus into the discussion. At the time of the dialogue,[16] this young man is only eighteen or so, not far removed from his own military *aristeia* at Megara;[17] viewed in light of the *Republic*'s categories, he is a spirited warrior whom further philosophical education might fit for a leading role in a just city.[18] Glaucon's allusion to Amphiareus is thus apt. Moreover, it occurs *before* Socrates has stated his objections to tragedy, and sparks the discussion that follows. For all these reasons, Glaucon's Aeschy-

14 Greek quotes from Aeschylus' *Seven Against Thebes* are drawn from West (1990).

15 E.g., the figure of the divided line (509d–511e).

16 It is extraordinarily difficult to separate and date the several stages of the *Republic*'s composition. See Nails (1998: 395): "if Plato wrote a proto-*Republic* before the Academy was established, then its existence militates against the possibility of determining a single dramatic date for the dialogue. And if the *Republic* was stitched together from a separate Book 1, a proto-*Republic*, and new material, and revised late into an almost seamless whole, then a single firm dramatic date seems even more implausible."

17 On Glaucon's age and precise dates, see Nails (2002: 155–156).

18 On Plato's characterization of Glaucon, see O'Connor (2007: 64).

lean adversion could easily be overlooked or excused, were it a lone example. But it is not.

A second, more troubling reference to Aeschylus comes several paragraphs later, at 362a8–b1. Here Glaucon alludes to the same *Seven* passage he did before, this time standing it on its head. Discussing the truly *un*just man, Glaucon says that such a person would also rather be than seem. And he likens him to a skilled farmer "harvesting his deep-plowed mind/ from which sprout reliable plans" (βαθεῖαν ἄλοκα διὰ φρενὸς καρπούμενος,/ ἐξ ἧς τὰ κεδνὰ βλαστάνει βουλεύματα, 593–594). While the agricultural comparison is unobjectionable, the use to which it is put is not: the pious poet with a reputation for lofty theodicy[19] is invoked to support the claim that injustice pays after all. Moreover, Glaucon quotes Aeschylus precisely, enlisting his metaphor and iambic trimeter in the service of evil. Perhaps the best that can be said of Glaucon's second Aeschylean reference is that it too occurs before Socrates formally states his objections to tragedy.

Not to be outdone by his younger brother, Adeimantus then deepens the terms of the discussion, pressing Socrates to demonstrate the superiority of justice to injustice with regard to the souls of the young (365a6–7). Put simply, he challenges the philosopher to prove that justice helps them, while injustice harms them. Socrates responds by suggesting that they first consider what makes a city just. In the process they delineate the sort of education appropriate for a guardian of this ideal city, a καλὸς κ'ἀγαθός … φύλαξ πόλεως (376c5). Socrates here attacks poetry's status as the cornerstone of traditional education.[20] Moreover, he aims high, claiming that even celebrated passages of so great a poet as Homer[21] can be grievously misguided. Socrates then trains his sights on a prominent tragedy, Aeschylus' *Niobe*, faulting its statement (380a3–4) that "god plants the blame in humans/ whenever he desires to ruin a house entirely" (θεὸς μὲν αἰτίαν φύει βροτοῖς,/ ὅταν κακῶσαι δῶμα παμπήδην θέλῃ, Radt F154a15–16). And he extends his condemnation to the raw material of the genre in general, e.g. stories about Troy and the Pelopidae (380a7). On his view, poets should uphold divine actions as good and just; any suffering the gods cause must redound to the benefit of those chastised (380b1–2). This quotation from *Niobe* marks the emergence of our paradox in full. Why does Socrates, having

19 E.g. Lloyd-Jones (1971: 85): "certainly Zeus in Aeschylus determines the general course of events; certainly Zeus as the protector of the law of justice has a special importance in this author."

20 Nussbaum (1986: 124): "in the fifth and early fourth centuries, it was the poets who were regarded as the most important ethical teachers."

21 379d–e.

already stated his objections to tragedy, quote here a sentiment from a tragic work that is *prima facie* impious? If he needed to discuss *Niobe*'s claim, he could surely have done so in a more oblique and less attractive fashion.[22] As it is, he quotes the lines in their alluring iambic trimeter, in the presence of impressionable young citizens.

One might object that Plato intended Kallipolis and its educational program as intellectual exercise rather than practical project. After all, he set the *Republic*'s conversation in a private house in the Piraeus, far removed from the *asty*'s power spaces of agora, Pnyx, and theater. Socrates' interlocutors are few, and include metics and foreigners, people ordinarily at the margins of Athenian political life.[23] While Glaucon and Adeimantus are citizens, they may already be damaged beyond repair according to the standards of Kallipolis. Not born from a eugenically engineered union, they have also missed out on the crucial early stages of the education that Socrates proposes. And their familiarity with Aeschylus suggests that they have not only attended tragic productions themselves, but subsequently sought out texts of the performances.[24] Given all these considerations, Socrates' quotation from *Niobe* might be forgiven as an *exemplum negativum*, a hypothetical argument unable to do further harm. But Gifford rightly reminds us of Plato's penchant for presenting to his readers gaps between characters' words and actions, and inviting them to draw inferences. This type of "tragic irony"[25] is prominent in the *Republic*, and seldom benign.[26] Socrates has argued that it is dangerous for citizens even to watch tragedy, never mind speak its lines themselves. And so when we observe him doing what he seeks to forbid, we should pay particular attention.

---

22 At 393a–394a, for instance, Socrates models the practice of narration without imitation.

23 See Monoson (2000: 213). On the importance of Cephalus and Polemarchus' metic status see Gifford (2001: 52–58). The fact that Thrasymachus is visiting from Chalcedon is likewise significant: see White (1995).

24 On the availability of tragic texts as early as 405 see Aristophanes *Frogs* 52–54. On the widespread availability of books see *Frogs* 1113–1114.

25 As Gifford (2001: 41) puts it, "having entered the theatre with th[e] background knowledge about the life and death of a figure set on stage before them, the spectators at a Greek tragedy were able to view the dramatic proceedings from a more revealing vantage-point than was available to (most, if not all, of) the characters operating within the world of the drama."

26 See Gifford (2001: 47–48): "Plato could set directly and vividly before the minds of his readers the practical implications which certain mistaken ethical beliefs can and perhaps actually did have for the quality of a person's life."

Closer inspection reveals that Socrates' use of the *Niobe* is troubling in an additional way. Given the fragmentary state of the play, it is unclear who speaks the offending lines about a god wishing to destroy mortals. Candidates proposed thus far include Niobe, her arch-nemesis Leto, her mother-in-law Antiope, her own mother, her servant, and the children's nurse.[27] Each of these scenarios will have required a male actor to take on a female role with inappropriate associations.[28] It is also possible that these lines belonged to the chorus.[29] If so, choreuts drawn from the ranks of the *kaloi k'agathoi* will have spoken them. In either case, the *Niobe* will have required potential guardians like our interlocutors to step into the life of someone unlike them. And they will have had to utter before their peers blasphemous words.

Socrates proceeds to describe other sorts of stories he objects to, using other exempla. Among the tales he faults are those of gods assuming disguises to interact with mortals. At 381d4–8 he says, for instance, "let no one introduce, either in tragedies or in other poems, Hera in altered form, as a priestess taking up a collection 'for the life-giving children of the Argive river Inachos'" (μηδείς, μηδ' ἐν τραγῳδίαις μηδ' ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιήμασιν εἰσαγέτω Ἥραν ἠλλοιωμένην, ὡς ἱέρειαν ἀγείρουσαν 'Ἰνάχου Ἀργείου ποταμοῦ παισὶν βιοδώροις,') The last five words here are a direct quote (Radt F168 l. 17) from Aeschylus' *Wool Carders* (*Xantriae*), a tragedy about the death of Pentheus.[30] While the plot and the dramatic context are obscure, the dactylic hexameter is evident. Socrates' disapproval of tragedy is once again expressed in an unnecessarily direct way, with a metrical quote from the genre.

At 383b2–9 Socrates doubles down on his already dangerous use of Aeschylus, denying that the gods go about in disguise, and that they lie. Which play he seeks to discredit here is not clear.[31] In it Thetis recounts a prophecy Apollo gave her on the occasion of her marriage to Peleus. She accuses him of lying to her, and actively working to break his promise. As she puts it,

> νόσων τ' ἀπείρους καὶ μακραίωνας βίους,
> ξύμπαντά τ' εἰπὼν θεοφιλεῖς ἐμὰς τύχας
> παιῶν' ἐπηυφήμησεν, εὐθυμῶν ἐμέ.
> κἀγὼ τὸ Φοίβου θεῖον ἀψευδὲς στόμα
> ἤλπιζον εἶναι, μαντικῇ βρύον τέχνῃ·

27 Radt (1985: 267).
28 395d5–7, e4.
29 Radt (1985: 267).
30 Sommerstein (1996: 58).
31 See Gantz (1981: 21–22).

ὁ δ', αὐτὸς ὑμνῶν, αὐτὸς ἐν θοίνῃ παρών,
αὐτὸς τάδ' εἰπών, αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ κτανὼν
τὸν παῖδα τὸν ἐμόν.
RADT F350

After saying that their lives would be free from sickness
and long, and my fortunes entirely blessed,
[Apollo] pronounced the paean, encouraging me.
And I expected the divine mouth of Phoebos
to tell the truth, brimming with its prophetic art.
But the same one who sang the hymn, who himself
attended the feast, who himself spoke these things:
he is the one who killed my son.

This passage blames Apollo for the death of Achilles, and represents an unholy trifecta. In speaking these lines, Socrates assumes the role and perspective of a mother and deity. With his own lips he utters mimetic, metrical blasphemy, calling the son of Zeus not only a liar, but a killer. Had he wished, Socrates could clearly have paraphrased her remarks in non-metrical, indirect speech, as he did earlier with his treatment of Chryses and Achilles in *Iliad* Book 1.[32] Instead, his decision to recite from the play shows tragedy at its worst, and threatens unnecessary harm to his own soul and those of his listeners.

The dialogue contains another three instances where Socrates and his interlocutors quote Aeschylus. But the danger has receded: in each case there is little to fault apart from the use of meter. Later on in Book 3, for instance, Socrates uses another quote drawn from the *Niobe* as an apparent periphrasis for demigods. At 391e6–9 he refers to

οἱ θεῶν ἀγχίσποροι,
⟨οἱ⟩ Ζηνὸς ἐγγύς, ὧν κατ' Ἰδαῖον πάγον
Διὸς πατρῴου βωμός ἐστ' ἐν αἰθέρι,
κοὔ πώ σφιν ἐξίτηλον αἷμα δαιμόνων.
RADT F162

those closely sprung from the gods,
the ones near to Zeus, those whose open-air altar
of Zeus Patroos lies on the slope of Mt. Ida:
from them the blood of *daimones* is not yet gone.

32 393d–394a.

Although the suggestion that the blood of *daimones* could ever vanish might conceivably be provocative, it is tame stuff compared to Thetis' attack on Apollo.[33]

Aeschylus does not resurface until five books later, and in attenuated form. In Book 8, Socrates and Adeimantus have been exploring the correspondences between various types of constitution and various types of men, and how each comes about. At 550c1 they have just concluded their discussion of timocracy and the timocratic man and are considering where to turn. Socrates then asks (550c4–5) "shall we therefore next, like Aeschylus, speak of 'another man drawn up before another city,' or should we instead consider the city first, according to our plan?" (οὐκοῦν μετὰ τοῦτο, τὸ τοῦ Αἰσχύλου, λέγωμεν, "ἄλλον ἄλλῃ πρὸς πόλει τεταγμένον," μᾶλλον δὲ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν προτέραν τὴν πόλιν;). Given the polyptoton ἄλλον ἄλλῃ, the participle τεταγμένον, and the earlier references to the *Seven Against Thebes*, this passage is almost certainly a pastiche combining elements of lines 451 and 570–571 from that play. In the first instance, Eteocles urges the scout to "speak of another [attacker] assigned to another gate" (λέγ' ἄλλον ἄλλαις ἐν πύλαις εἰληχότα). In the second, the scout reports back to him particulars about the challenger Amphiareus: "posted at the Homoloid gates/ he shouts many reproaches at Tydeus" (Ὁμολωίσιν δὲ πρὸς πύλαις τεταγμένος/ κακοῖσι βάζει πολλὰ Τυδέως βίαν). Allusion to the *Seven* would be apt here: like Eteocles, Socrates is in the midst of stationing representative champions at the gates of his cities. And it is no coincidence that he borrows from a passage in which the sole righteous Argive challenger rebukes his most impious peer. Although Socrates is once again invoking tragedy, he now goes about it differently, speaking unmetrically and with reduced *mimesis*. The words he paraphrases are those of the scout, a male citizen with military experience, a patriot equipped with keen eyes: in other words, someone like himself and his listeners. Finally, the content is inoffensive. Amphiareus' rebuke of Tydeus upholds conventional piety in a way consistent with Socrates' educational program.

The *Republic*'s final Aeschylean quotation comes slightly later in book 8, and is anticlimactic. At 563c1–2 Adeimantus reverts to trotting out the tragedian as conversational fillip, much as Cephalus did with Pindar and Sophocles at the start of Book 1. He asks, "shall we not speak, like Aeschylus, 'what was just now on the tip of our tongue?'" (Οὐκοῦν κατ' Αἰσχύλον, ἔφη, ερουμεν ὅτι νῦν ἦλθ' ἐπὶ στόμα; Radt F351). Nothing is known of the play involved or the dramatic context; the only item of significance is the poet's name.

33 According to Adam (1965: 142), these lines "present a stately picture of the sons of the gods, which is the only reason why they are cited here."

How then should we explain this paradox of a *Republic* that is simultaneously hostile and yet deeply indebted to Aeschylus? We might begin by observing that references to and quotations from tragedy are different from, and likely less harmful than, full-scale performances.[34] Yet Socrates has argued that music alone, without any accompanying spectacle, can still have lasting effects on the soul. Even epic poetry, which was performed with greater restraint and in a more exclusively auditory fashion than tragedy, was censored in Kallipolis. Quoting the plays of Aeschylus may be less dangerous than watching them in the theater, but according to Socrates, both phenomena are still bad for you.

Another tack might be to argue that the conversation in the Piraeus takes place far from the public gaze, among a small and select group of potential guardians. Under these circumstances, greater liberties may be permitted. In Kallipolis, for instance, rulers who know better are allowed to engage in other practices forbidden to the many, such as lying.[35] Put differently, what happens in the house of Cephalus, stays in the house of Cephalus. At 378a4–6, Socrates likens those able to listen safely to dangerous poetry to a group of religious initiates. But this explanation does not convince either. For one thing, Socrates' allusion to the mysteries at a small, oligarchically tinged house party carries an explosive charge. As we know from Thucydides and Andocides, similar gatherings in the past had been seen as profanation rather than initiation, and deemed harmful to the participants and city alike. Moreover, Socrates' interlocutors in the *Republic* are not limited to Glaucon and Adeimantus, but include others (like Thrasymachus) apparently under the sway of inferior parts of the soul.[36] Finally, we must remember that the *Republic* is itself mimetic: it does not record the actual conversation that took place that night following the Bendis festival in the Piraeus, but is a narration thereof to an unknown audience. In committing his account to writing, Plato was giving up control over whom its arguments might eventually reach.[37] And by having Socrates recall how he and his friends quoted Aeschylus, he is in essence reproducing

---

34 According to Ferrari (1989: 145), "there was that about [Plato's dialogues] which would render their realisation quite distinct from a performance of conventional drama or even the recitation of epic: namely, that whereas these latter are an imitation of people's actions, of which the activity of talk is only a part, in a Platonic dialogue the talk *is* the action, the whole of it."

35 Schofield (2007: 141) observes that "lying and falsehood are seen as pervasive necessities in the politics and culture of the good city, and in this regard there is an asymmetry between rulers and ruled."

36 See e.g. the description of Thrasymachus as a predatory beast at 336b5–6.

37 On the limitations of books in this regard, see *Phaedrus* 275d7–e6.

tragic lines and increasing their circulation among many readers of many different sorts.[38]

A more promising approach to our paradox is rooted in the particulars of Plato's life, especially his early literary training. According to one source, he had been an aspiring writer of tragedies before coming into contact with Socrates.[39] As a result, his works display a dramatic flair lacking in other philosophers.[40] Appropriation and parody are important components of Plato's attempt to knock tragedy off its paedagogic pedestal. In the *Gorgias*, for instance, he cleverly reworked Euripides' *Antiope*[41] "to set his own new hero [the philosopher] in opposition to the tragic hero ... [J]ust as Socrates is juxtaposed with the "hero" of the *Antiope*, so also is true philosophy contrasted with the genre of tragedy as a whole."[42] While Nightingale's reading of the *Gorgias* is persuasive, she has surprisingly little to say about the *Republic* in this regard. But her approach offers a clear path forward: any attempt to explain the latter dialogue's relationship to Aeschylus should be rooted in the particulars of the works it cites.

Plato of course had full freedom to draw on whatever tragedies he wished. And in the *Republic* Socrates explicitly assumes the role of the eponymous archon,[43] deciding what poetry should be produced in the city. At 377c1–3, for instance, he tells Adeimantus that "their first task [in educating the guardians] should be to watch over the *mythopoioi*, accepting whatever they do well and rejecting whatever they do poorly" (πρῶτον δὴ ἡμῖν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπιστατητέον τοῖς μυθοποιοῖς, καὶ ὃν μὲν ἂν καλὸν ποιήσωσιν, ἐγκριτέον, ὃν δ' ἂν μή, ἀποκριτέον). And at 383c1–3 he states that if anyone seeks to present anything like (τοιαῦτα) Thetis' impious charge against Apollo, "we will become angry and refuse him a chorus and not permit the teachers to use [it] for teaching the young" (χαλεπανοῦμέν τε καὶ χορὸν οὐ δώσομεν, οὐδὲ τοὺς διδασκάλους ἐάσομεν ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ

38 See Blondell (2002: 28).

39 Diogenes Laertius 3.5.

40 Nussbaum (1986: 133) terms the middle-period dialogues in particular "anti-tragic theater," i.e. "theater purged and purified of theater's characteristic appeal to powerful emotion, a pure crystalline theater of the intellect." On possible performances of dialogues in various contexts see Blondell (2002: 23–25). Monoson (2000: 212–223) discusses ways in which the *Republic* appropriates theatrical images and terminology for philosophical use.

41 Nightingale (1996: 73): "not only does [Zethus and Amphion's] debate and its conclusion inform the *agon* between Socrates and Callicles, but the *deus ex machina* that brings the *Antiope* to a close provides a structural model for the eschatalogical myth at the end of the *Gorgias*."

42 Nightingale (1996: 72).

43 Csapo and Slater (1994: 143) note that the archon's responsibilities in this regard were transferred to the tribal organizations no later than 348/7.

χρῆσθαι τῶν νέων). We must therefore assume that Plato chose his Aeschylean allusions carefully. Now debate remains about textual particulars of the *Seven Against Thebes*,[44] especially the vexed question of whether lines 1005–1078 are authentic.[45] More controversy surrounds the plot and important details of the *Niobe*.[46] The evidence about the *Wool Carders* is scantier still.[47] And we do not even know the title of the play in which Thetis appeared.[48] All this is to say that speculation is hazardous. Even so, the plays quoted in the *Republic* seem to have in common the deaths of *kaloi k'agathoi*, brilliant young men like the aptly named Glaucon and Adeimantus. This would comport with Socrates' insistence that the guardians of Kallipolis be trained from an early age not to fear death. Perhaps Plato intended his Aeschylean references to remind interlocutor (and reader) of the looming encounter with mortality. Scholars have long noted the importance of the dialogue's first word, κατέβην ("I went down," 327a1), with some arguing that the entire dialogue forms a descent to the underworld and subsequent ascent.[49] Indeed, Socrates himself invokes the famous *katabasis* of Odysseus in *Odyssey* 11. But he does so to argue that the shade of Achilles must not be allowed to assert that the meanest sort of life is preferable to the most glorious death.[50] On the contrary, any poetry in Kallipolis should teach the young citizens *dulce et decorum est/ pro patria mori*.

The *Seven Against Thebes* fits this bill.[51] At the time of the *Republic*'s composition it had possessed for at least a generation a reputation for encouraging martial valor and civic virtue.[52] Significantly, it provides the basis for many of the dialogue's Aeschylean moments. Even more importantly, it features a ruler who attempts to ban certain kinds of song and replace them with others, in the interest of protecting the *polis*. The play's parodos (lines 78–181) begins in astrophic, asyndetic fashion, with the chorus of Theban women entering out of

44 Hutchinson (1985: 40): "as we ponder the play closely, we encounter a great many places where it is open to dispute what Aeschylus actually wrote."

45 See Hutchinson (1985: 209–211).

46 E.g. Keuls (1978), Radt (1979, 1985: 267).

47 Sommerstein (1996: 58).

48 Gantz (1981: 21–22).

49 E.g. Howland (1993: 43–45).

50 386c6–d2.

51 Lattmann (2013) demonstrates the relevance of the *Seven Against Thebes* to the Athenian institution of the *ephebeia*, which (256) "in zentralen Zügen schon kurz nach den Perserkriegen gerade in der aus dem späten vierten Jahrhundert v. Chr. bezeugten Form bestanden haben dürfte."

52 Aristophanes' *Frogs* was performed in 405.

formation[53] and offering a sort of proleptic city lament.[54] At lines 90–94 they use impassioned dochmiacs to describe the terror of the impending assault and beseech the gods for salvation.[55] The women intensify their suit by grasping the divine statues on the city's acropolis and invoking their aid.[56] Eteocles then reenters to rebuke the chorus and condemn their supplication as impious. He terms their speech "unendurable dirges" (θρέμματ' οὐκ ἀνασχετά, 182) and "shouting and screaming, anathema to the right-thinking" (αὔειν, λακάζειν, σωφρόνων μισήματα, 186). He commands them to relinquish the statues, return indoors, and change their tune (267–270):

> κἀμῶν ἀκούσασ' εὐγμάτων ἔπειτα σὺ
> ὀλολυγμὸν ἱερὸν εὐμενῆ παιώνισον,
> Ἑλληνικὸν νόμισμα θυστάδος βοῆς,
> θάρσος φίλοις, λύουσα πολέμιον φόβον.
>
> Listen to my prayers, and raise
> the holy, kindly yell of triumph,
> the standard Greek sacrificial cry,
> encouraging our side and dissolving fear of the enemy.

Eteocles wants them to heed his pious prayers. Rather than lament, the women should sing a paean for victory,[57] or utter a collective triumphal shout, the *ololugmos*.[58] In so doing they will act as victors and not vanquished, sacrificers

53 Taplin (1977: 142): "a scattered entry … would make a striking end of the prologue, the disorganized terror of the women in contrast to the silent bravery and discipline of the citizens at the beginning. In particular, Eteocles' calm exit after a solemn prayer would be directly juxtaposed with the wild flight of the women away from the scene of danger."

54 Bachvarova (2008: 27).

55 Rosenmeyer et al. (1963: 51) note that dochmiacs were particularly "suitable for the expression of violent emotions, especially fear and despair … [and] can be associated with a particular mood or sentiment … [They are] the only lyric meter of which it can be said that it is calculated to evoke a specific emotional response."

56 The women's words at lines 169–172 recount their gestures. As Torrance (2007: 39) observes, "it is tempting to suppose that … there were seven statues on display representing each of the seven gods who receive a physical appeal."

57 According to Rutherford (1993: 78), "the minimal form that the παιάν took was the παιάν-cry, an exclamatory cry of the form ἰὴ παιάν, most commonly used to express joy, and often uttered by groups of men."

58 The semantic ranges of the paean and the *ololugmos* run together here, as do the gender associations: see Hutchinson (1985: 87).

rather than victims. The play thus offers an example of how a ruler may cause one sort of song to be replaced by another. In his emphasis on the need for song to inspire piety and bravery unto death, and his subordination of emotion to reason, Eteocles resembles τὸ λογίστικον.[59] Though he ultimately falls in battle, he receives a hero's burial and saves his city. From Socrates' point of view, then, the *Seven Against Thebes* is far from objectionable; on the contrary, it possesses civic merit.

There is one final, ambitious explanation we might offer for the paradox, a third wave as it were. Paying tribute to Plato's literary ability, Lebeck claimed that another dialogue, the *Phaedrus*, actually "is what it discusses, exemplifies what it advocates."[60] The mention of this dialogue is a propos here. For it too presents central Platonic doctrines (e.g., the immortality of πᾶσα ψυχή, 245c–e) and methods (e.g., collection and division, 265d–e) within another vivid dramatic setting. In *Phaedrus*, a walk along the Ilissus outside the city walls provides space for philosophy and friendship; in *Republic*, the house of Cephalus in the Piraeus performs a similar function. And in Phaedrus, Socrates finds another promising young interlocutor fond of quoting recognized authorities.[61] Their extended discussion in the first half of the *Phaedrus* stems from the young man's attempt to quote from a manuscript of Lysias. And it concludes with a mention of Lysias' brother Polemarchus, who is said to have turned to philosophy (257b2–3).

The *Phaedrus*' reference to one of the *Republic*'s main interlocutors comes on the heels of its famous palinode, where Socrates retracts his earlier criticism of erotic love. At 257a3–6 the philosopher defends the nature of his reversal, saying that he had tailored his remarks to his audience:

> Αὕτη σοι, ὦ φίλε Ἔρως, εἰς ἡμετέραν δύναμιν ὅτι καλλίστη καὶ ἀρίστη δέδοταί τε καὶ ἐκτέτεισται παλινῳδία, τά τε ἄλλα καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἠναγκασμένη ποιητικοῖς τισιν διὰ Φαῖδρον εἰρῆσθαι.
>
> This palinode, dear Eros, was the most beautiful and best I could give, both in other respects and because it had to be spoken with poetic words for Phaedrus.

59 Only in his irrational eagerness to take on his brother Polyneices does Eteocles depart from the high moral standards of the guardians of Kallipolis. On the tension between martial valor and abandoning oneself to wildness common in spirited folk see Ferrari (2007: 184).

60 Lebeck (1972: 267).

61 On the complex interaction between Phaedrus and Socrates see Bakewell (2003).

Might there be a similar, palinodic dimension to the *Republic*'s use of Aeschylus? We have already seen that Glaucon and Adeimantus are young men fond of poetry. Perhaps in his eagerness to engage them, Socrates is driven to do something he inwardly disapproves of, namely respond to their tragic allusions with his own. His go-along, get-along approach, although intended to serve philosophy, nevertheless culminates in a mimetic, metrical rehearsal of Thetis' impious lines. And while the *Republic* contains no explicit moment at which Socrates disavows his earlier tragic quotations, he clearly reverses course following the end of book 3. Thereafter he cites Aeschylus but sparingly, and in the service of good. His final allusion is no quotation at all, but a pastiche from an unobjectionable play, the *Seven Against Thebes*. Here Socrates forswears meter and minimizes *mimesis* while recounting a seer's justified reproaches against an impious man. Lebeck's words seem to apply here as well: like *Phaedrus*, *Republic* also "is what it discusses, exemplifies what it advocates." By paring down drama and restricting it to that for which it is most fitted and does best (τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν, 433b4) Socrates may not be doing what is best for drama, or for its actors, *choreuts*, and audiences. But he is benefiting the city as a whole. Used carefully, parts of some Aeschylean works can help turn promising young men into guardians ready to die for their city. As excerpted and reworked by Socrates, the *Seven Against Thebes* ceases to be a tragedy per se: it becomes instead a pleasing ὕμνος to the city-saving gods and an ἐγκώμιον τῷ ἀγαθῷ Eteocles. As such, it deserves a place in Kallipolis and in the *Republic*.

Bibliography

Adam, J. 1965. *The* Republic *of Plato*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bachvarova, M. 2008. "Sumerian gala priests and eastern Mediterranean returning gods: tragic lamentation in cross-cultural perspective" in A. Suter, ed. *Lament: Studies in the Ancient Mediterranean and Beyond*, 18–52. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bakewell, G. 2003. "Ποῖ δὴ καὶ πόθεν; Self-Motion in Plato's *Phaedrus*" in G. Bakewell and J. Sickinger, eds. *Gestures: Essays in Ancient History, Literature and Philosophy Presented to Alan L. Boegehold*, 16–26. Oxford: Oxbow Books.

Blondell, R. 2002. *The Play of Character in Plato's Dialogues*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Csapo, E., and W. Slater. 1994. *The Context of Ancient Drama*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Ferrari, G. 2007. "The Three-Part Soul" in G. Ferrari, ed. *The Cambridge Companion to Plato's* Republic, 165–201. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 1989. "Plato and Poetry" in G. Kennedy, ed. *The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism Vol. I Classical Criticism*, 92–148. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gantz, T. 1981. "Divine Guilt in Aeschylus." *Classical Quarterly* 31: 18–32.

Gifford, M. 2001. "Dramatic Dialectic in *Republic* Book 1" in D. Sedley, ed. *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy Vol. XX*, 35–106. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Goldhill, S. 1987. "The Great Dionysia and Civic Ideology." *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 107: 58–76.

Howland, J. 1993. *The* Republic*: The* Odyssey *of Philosophy*. New York: Twayne.

Hutchinson, G. 1985. *Aeschylus* Seven Against Thebes. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Keuls, E. 1978. "Aeschylus' Niobe and Apulian Funerary Symbolism." *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 30: 41–68.

Lattmann, C. 2013. "Kindergarten und Altersheim: Anmerkungen zu Aischylos, Sieben Gegen Theben 10–16 und zur Ephebie in Athen." *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* 156: 235–256.

Lebeck, A. 1972. "The Central Myth of Plato's *Phaedrus*." *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 13: 267–290.

Lloyd-Jones, H. 1971. *The Justice of Zeus*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Monoson, S. 2000. *Plato's Democratic Entanglements: Athenian Politics and the Practice of Philosophy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Moss, J. 2007. "What is Imitative Poetry and Why Is It Bad?" in G. Ferrari, ed. *The Cambridge Companion to Plato's* Republic, 415–444. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Naddaff, R. 2002. *Exiling the Poets: The Production of Censorship in Plato's* Republic. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Nails, D. 2002. *The People of Plato: A Prosopography of Plato and Other Socratics*. Indianapolis: Hackett.

———. 1998. "The Dramatic Date of Plato's *Republic*." *Classical Journal* 93: 383–396.

Nightingale, A. 1995. *Genres in Dialogue: Plato and the Construct of Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nussbaum, M. 1986. *The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

O'Connor, D. 2007. "Rewriting the Poets in Plato's Characters" in G. Ferrari, ed. *The Cambridge Companion to Plato's* Republic, 55–89. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Radt, S. 1985. *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta. Vol. 3 Aeschylus*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

———. 1979. "Aischylos, Niobe fr. 162 N.^{2} (278 M.)." *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 33: 33–34.

Roisman, J. 1988. "On Phrynichos' *Sack of Miletos* and *Phoinissai*." *Eranos* 86: 15–23.

Rosenmeyer, T., M. Ostwald, and J. Halporn. 1963. *The Meters of Greek and Latin Poetry*. Indianapolis: Hackett.

Rutherford, I. 1993. "Paeanic ambiguity: a study of the παιάν in Greek literature." *Quaderni urbinati di cultura classica* 44: 77–92.

Schofield, M. 2007. "The Noble Lie" in G. Ferrari, ed. *The Cambridge Companion to Plato's* Republic, 138–164. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Slings, S. 2003. *Platonis* Rempublicam. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sommerstein, A. 1996. *Aeschylean Tragedy*. Bari: Levante Editori.

Taplin, O. 1977. *The Stagecraft of Aeschylus: The Dramatic Use of Exits and Entrances in Greek Tragedy*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Tarrant, D. 1955. "Plato as Dramatist." *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 75: 82–89.

Torrance, I. 2007. *Aeschylus:* Seven Against Thebes. London: Duckworth.

West, M. 1990. *Aeschyli tragoediae cum incerti poetae* Prometheo. Stuttgart and Leipzig: Teubner.

White, S. 1995. "Thrasymachus the Diplomat." *Classical Philology* 90: 307–327.

Winkler, J. 1990. "The Ephebes' Song: *Tragōidia* and *Polis*" in J. Winkler and F. Zeitlin, eds. *Nothing to Do with Dionysos?*, 20–62. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

CHAPTER 13

Character in Narrative Depictions of Composing Oral Epics and Reading Historiographies

Raymond F. Person, Jr.

Scholars of oral traditions have noted a connection between traditional performers and communal identity—that is, performers give voice to the community's tradition as preserved in its collective memory as they compose or recite narratives about significant past events for audiences that are familiar with the stories.[1] This paper explores the narrative portrayal of what might be understood as two types of performers—those who compose oral epics and those who read aloud historiographies in public performances—from both Hellenistic literature and the Hebrew Bible. For the composers of oral epic I will specifically look at the portrayal of Demodokos in the *Odyssey*, Moses in Exodus and Deuteronomy, and Deborah in Judges. For those who read aloud historiographies, I will specifically refer to various characters in Greek inscriptional evidence, Luke-Acts, the Deuteronomic History, the Book of Chronicles, and Ezra-Nehemiah.[2] Despite the differences of historical period, geography, genre, and the use of (or lack of) writing, all of the examples examined from the Hellenistic sources (including Luke-Acts) and the Hebrew Bible share the portrayal of both types of performers as leaders who are admirable characters who represent what the community's self-identification promotes as virtuous. In fact, the similarities between these two types of performers and the observation that Moses as a character spans the two types raises the question about whether or not this distinction itself is consistently valid from the perspective of the ancients who lived in societies in which there was an interplay between the oral and the written. That is, based on our modern presuppositions we too

1 An early study that has been widely influential is Foley (1977).

2 Although I accept that there were some generic distinctions in the ancient world, I nevertheless think that too often modern scholars draw much too sharp distinctions, especially between "epic" and "history," which were both ways of interpreting the past for providing meaning in the present. Thus, although I continue the distinction here between "epic" and "history," my argument nevertheless emphasizes the similarities between them. For further discussion concerning these generic distinctions, see Person (2016), which draws significantly from Foley (2010).

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2017 | DOI: 10.1163/9789004329737_014

often assume that a performer who is making use of a written text is bound by that text in ways that inhibits the performer's ability to expound upon that text as a way of interpreting the text for the immediate audience. We will see that this modern presupposition does not necessarily apply to these performers, thereby opening up the possibility that performers, even when reading from texts, have an important performative role as leaders who have been granted a degree of authority to interpret the tradition.

Demodokos as a Performer of Oral Epic in the *Odyssey*

Demodokos is a professional poet, who sings three songs in the narrative of the *Odyssey*, and has been understood as representative of the traditional portrayal of Greek bards.[3] Although other characters in the *Odyssey* also sing epics (for example, Phemius, another professional poet), Demodokos sings three songs, which are "the longest and most detailed songs presented in the poem."[4] The narrator introduces him as follows prior to his first song.[5]

> Κῆρθξ δ' ἐγγύθεν ἦλθεν ἄγων ἐρίηρον ἀοιδόν,
> τόν πέρι Μοῦσ' ἐφίλησε, δίδου δ' ἀγαθόν τε κακόν τε·
> ὀφθαλμῶν μὲν ἄμερσε, δίδου δ' ἡδεῖαν ἀοιδήν,
> 8.62–64

> The herald soon came, leading the faithful bard
> whom the Muse loved; she gave him both good and evil—
> for she took his sight, but gave him the knowledge of song.

The first song concerns a conflict between Odysseus and Achilles, which brings tears to Odysseus' eyes so that, when he realizes this, Alkinoös ends the singing and calls for athletic competition (8.83–110). The games end with an angry challenge by Odysseus (8.201–233) followed by Alkinoös's observation that no one would accept Odysseus's challenge, because he was surely superior

3 Beck also made an excellent argument that Demodokos, more than any other character, represents the traditional portrayal of a poet as the closest analogue to the main narrator of the *Odyssey* (2005: 226; 2012: 50).

4 Beck (2012: 36).

5 Quotations from Homer are from *Odyssey*, ed. T.W. Allen (Oxford 1967). All English translations are my own unless otherwise noted and I have consistently followed the English forms for names as given in translations by Lattimore (1967).

in the areas of the challenge (8.235–255), and then Alkinoös's calling back Demodokos for another song (8.256–265). Demodokos's second song (8.266–366) concerns Ares' love of Aphrodite. Odysseus enjoys the song so much that he later asks for Demodokos to sing again (8.469–498). In his request, Odysseus proclaims the high position poets hold as follows:

> πᾶσι γὰρ ἀνθρώποισιν ἐπιχθονίοισιν ἀοιδοὶ
> τιμῆς ἔμμοροί εἰσι καὶ αἰδοῦς, οὕνεκ' ἄρα σφεάς
> οἴμας Μοῦσ' ἐδίδαξε, φίλησε δὲ θυμῷ.
> 8.479–481

> Among all who walk the earth, bards
> deserve honor and respect, since the Muse
> has taught them their ways, and loved them dearly.

Deomodokos's third song, as requested by Odysseus, concerns the Trojan Horse (8.499–520). Once again Odysseus is moved to tears (8.521–532). Once again with concern for Odysseus Alkinoös ends the singing (8.533–545) and then begins preparations for Odysseus's homeward journey (8.546–563). Alkinoös then requests to hear Odysseus's story (8.564–586), thereby preparing the way for Odysseus's tale (Books 9–12). Thus, Demodokos as the representative poet, who composes traditional epic, is portrayed as one who, because of divine inspiration, knows the ways of life, both good and evil, and has the divine gift of sharing these values by giving voice to the community's tradition through his performance.

Moses as a Performer of Oral Epic in Exodus and Deuteronomy

Although he is best known as the one who wrote down God's law,[6] Moses is also portrayed as a performer of epic poetry in the Book of Exodus and the Book of Deuteronomy.

In Exodus 15:1–18 Moses leads the Israelites in singing a song of victory over the Egyptian army, which begins as follows:

> אָשִׁירָה לַיהוָה כִּי־גָאֹה גָּאָה סוּס וְרֹכְבוֹ רָמָה בַיָּם
> Exod 15:1

6 For a recent and innovative discussion of Moses as lawgiver, see Römer (2013).

> I will sing to the LORD, for he has triumphed gloriously; the horse and his rider he has thrown into the sea.

Moses is portrayed as composing an epic concerning the crossing of the sea shortly after the event itself. Immediately after Moses' song, his sister, Miriam, leads the Israelite women in singing the same song (Exod 15:21 = 15:1).[7]

The Book of Deuteronomy is in the form of a long speech by Moses to the people of Israel in the wilderness, including his recitation of their history (1–11), his proclamation of the law (12–26), and his closing admonitions to be obedient to the law (27–33). In Deut 32:1–43, Moses contrasts Israel's disobedience with God's faithfulness by recalling in song some of Israel's history, including God giving Jacob the land (32:9) and his place of honor (32:13–15), how Jacob's descendants forgot God so that the jealous God spurned his children in Egypt (32:18–19), and how Moses' own generation was perverse and crooked (32:5) so as to suffer the punishment of wandering in the wilderness. Moses proclaims that God will vindicate his people (32:36) by keeping his promises and therefore is worthy of praise (32:43).[8] In Deut 33:1–29, Moses again recounts in song Israel's history from the giving of the law at Sinai to the present time of the narrative and then sings blessings on the Israelite tribes as he prepares for his death and as they prepare to enter the Promised Land.

Thus, as prophet and lawgiver, Moses clearly has divine inspiration, which results in his composition of epic poetry that recalls Israel's history of being blessed by the LORD, which holds the promise of the future blessings of Israel as long as they stay true to the traditional law given to him.

Deborah as a Performer of Oral Epic in Judges

In her study "Mother to Muse" Carol Meyers reviewed the biblical portrayal of women composing victory songs accompanied by the hand drum as well as archaeological evidence, both iconographic images of women singers and examples of actual musical instruments. She concluded:[9]

---

7 Although this study is a synchronic reading of the texts, I should note that the singing of victory songs in the biblical text tends to be something led by women. See Meyers (1999). Because of this, various scholars have argued from a diachronic perspective that here the tradition has been changed so that a song originally assigned to Miriam has been applied to Moses. For example, see Janzen (1992).

8 For recent studies of Deut 32:1–43, see Thiessen (2004) and Leuchter (2007).

9 Meyers (1999: 72).

> Not only do they [women] perform but also they probably compose words to fit the specifics of the occasion, while perhaps also using stock chants. The biblical and artifactual materials taken together suggest a genre of women's performance that responded specifically to military victories and for which the drum was the chief musical instrument.

One of Meyers' examples is the victory song sung by Deborah the prophet and judge (Jdgs 5:1–31), which begins as follows:

> בִּפְרֹ֤עַ פְּרָעוֹת֙ בְּיִשְׂרָאֵ֔ל בְּהִתְנַדֵּ֖ב עָ֑ם בָּרְכ֖וּ יְהוָֽה
> שִׁמְע֣וּ מְלָכִ֔ים הַאֲזִ֖ינוּ רֹזְנִ֑ים אָנֹכִ֗י לַֽיהוָה֙ אָנֹכִ֣י אָשִׁ֔ירָה אֲזַמֵּ֕ר לַיהוָ֖ה אֱלֹהֵ֥י יִשְׂרָאֵֽל
> יְהוָ֗ה בְּצֵאתְךָ֤ מִשֵּׂעִיר֙ בְּצַעְדְּךָ֙ מִשְּׂדֵ֣ה אֱד֔וֹם אֶ֣רֶץ רָעָ֔שָׁה גַּם־שָׁמַ֖יִם נָטָ֑פוּ גַּם־עָבִ֖ים נָ֥טְפוּ
> מָֽיִם
> הָרִ֥ים נָזְל֖וּ מִפְּנֵ֣י יְהוָ֑ה זֶ֣ה סִינַ֔י מִפְּנֵ֕י יְהוָ֖ה אֱלֹהֵ֥י יִשְׂרָאֵֽל
> בִּימֵ֞י שַׁמְגַּ֤ר בֶּן־עֲנָת֙ בִּימֵ֣י יָעֵ֔ל חָדְל֖וּ אֳרָח֑וֹת וְהֹלְכֵ֣י נְתִיב֔וֹת יֵלְכ֕וּ אֳרָח֖וֹת עֲקַלְקַלּֽוֹת
> חָדְל֧וּ פְרָז֛וֹן בְּיִשְׂרָאֵ֖ל חָדֵ֑לּוּ עַ֤ד שַׁקַּ֙מְתִּי֙ דְּבוֹרָ֔ה שַׁקַּ֥מְתִּי אֵ֖ם בְּיִשְׂרָאֵֽל
>
> Jdgs 5:2–7

> When locks [of hair] flow freely in Israel, when the people willingly offer themselves—bless the Lord!
> Hear, O kings; give ear, O potentates; to the Lord I will sing, I will make music to the Lord, the God of Israel.
> O Lord, when you came out from Seir, when you marched from the field of Edom, the earth shook, and even the heavens dropped, the clouds indeed dropped water.
> The mountains quaked before the Lord, this One of Sinai, before the Lord, the God of Israel.
> In the days of Shamgar son of Anath, in the days of Jael, caravans ceased and those who walked the paths walked the crooked byways.
> The ways of life in the unwalled towns came to a halt. In Israel they came to a halt. Until I, Deborah, arose; until I, a mother in Israel, arose.[10]

The song itself retells the story of the Israelite defeat of Sisera, the Canaanite commander, who was killed by Jael, the wife of Heber the Kenite, when she drove a tent peg through his head. Although this story had been told in prose in

10 My translation of Jdgs 5:2–7 is significantly influenced by the translation in the excellent commentary by Niditch (2008), especially 5:7.

Judges 4, Deborah herself (with Barak) is portrayed as singing the story in epic poetry in the following chapter. Thus, Deborah the prophet, who was essential to the victory over the Canaanites, sings an inspired song about Israel's defeat of the Canaanites, reminding the Israelites of their history, especially how the LORD is truly the cause of their victories.

Performers of Oral Epic: A Summary

Demodokos, Moses, and Deborah all perform epic poetry on behalf of their communities. The topic of their epics are similar as well, in that they all concern the activity of the gods or heroic acts by those who have divine favor on their side. In other words, their epics concern characters, divine and human, who are foundational to the community's tradition, thereby interpreting for their audience these past acts as a way of strengthening their communal identity. Of course, the portrayal of these oral poets as characters occurs in literature that may have had its origins among oral poets, literature that interprets the cultural heritage for the purpose of building communal identity.

Greek Inscriptional Evidence of Historians as Performers

In her essay "Look and Listen: History Performed and Inscribed," Rachel Zelnick-Abramovitz concluded that Greek historians' primary way of distributing their written works was through public readings and that "in Hellenistic and Roman times most people still preferred listening to the recitation of historical works to reading them with their eyes," even if they were literate.[11] Her evidence for this conclusion comes from a variety of both literary sources and numerous inscriptions. I will simply provide one of each type. The following example is from one of Plato's early dialogues concerning Hippias's public readings:[12]

> Σωκράτης: ἀλλὰ τί μὴν ἔστιν ἃ ἡδέως σου ἀκροῶνται καὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν; αὐτός μοι εἰπέ, ἐπειδὴ ἐγὼ οὐχ εὑρίσκω.
> Ἱππίας: περὶ τῶν γενῶν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν τε ἡρώων καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ τῶν κατοικίσεων, ὡς τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἐκτίσθησαν αἱ πόλεις, καὶ συλ-

11 Zelnick-Abramovitz (2014: 183).
12 Zelnick-Abramovitz (2014: 177–178); translation hers.

> λήβδην πάσης τῆς ἀρχαιολογίας ἥδιστα ἀκροῶνται, ὥστ᾽ ἔγωγε δι᾽ αὐτοὺς ἠνάγκασμαι ἐκμεμαθηκέναι τε καὶ ἐκμεμελετηκέναι πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα.
> *Hippias Maior* 285d–e

Socrates: But about what things do they enjoy *listening* to you and which do they applaud? Tell me yourself, for I cannot find out.
Hippias: They listen with the greatest enjoyment to tales about the *genealogies of heroes and men*, Socrates, *and the foundations*, how in ancient times cities were built, and in short about ancient events in general, so that for their sake I have been compelled to learn all such things thoroughly and practice them.

In this dialogue, Hippias answers Socrates' question by referring to his public performance of a sub-genre of ancient historiography—that is, the founding of cities—and the popularity of this sub-genre with his audiences. An example from inscriptional evidence concerns a historian from Troizen who is honored in Delphi for his public readings:[13]

> ἐπειδὴ Ἀριστόθεος Ν̣ικ̣οθέου [Τρο]ζάνιος ἱστοριαγράφος παραγενόμενος [ἐ]ν τὰν / πόλιν τάν τε ἀναστροφὰν ἐπ[οιή]σατο ἀξίως τοῦ τε ἱεροῦ καὶ τᾶς ἰδίας πατρίδος, ἐποιήσατο δὲ καὶ ἀκροάσεις ἐπ[ὶ π]λείονας ἁμέρας τῶν πεπραγματευμένων / αὐτῶι, παρανέγνω [δὲ καὶ] ἐν̣[κώ]μια εἰς Ῥωμαίους τοὺς κοινοὺς τῶν Ἑλλάνων̣ / εὐεργέτας, δεδόσθαι παρὰ τᾶ[ς] πόλιος προξενίαν αὐτῶι καὶ ἐκγόνοις, …
>
> Whereas Aristotheos son of Nikotheos of Troizen, the historiographer, when he stayed in the polis [Delphi], conducted himself in a way worthy of the temple and his fatherland, and made *public readings* (*akroaseis*) of his writings over several days, and also *read in public* (*paranegnō*) acclamations for the Romans, the common benefactors of the Greeks, he and his descendents shall be granted by the polis *proxenia* [here follows a list of more privileges].

Zelnick-Abramovitz has provided numerous similar examples from both literary sources and inscriptions and therefore has made an excellent argument for the case of Hellenistic historians who are honored for performing their works publicly by reading them aloud.

---

13 *FD* III 3:124, lines 2–7; Zelnick-Abramovitz (2014: 180); translation hers.

Readers of Scripture in Luke-Acts as Performers

In Luke-Acts, the Jewish scriptures—including law and prophecy—are narratives about the past that continue to inform their present by their performance within the community, which includes not only their being read aloud, but also their interpretation.[14] Let me provide three brief illustrations.

In Luke 4:16–30, Jesus enters a synagogue and reads the following passage from the Isaiah scroll:

> πνεῦμα κυρίου ἐπ' ἐμὲ
> οὗ εἵνεκεν ἔχρισέν με
> εὐαγγελίσασθαι πτωχοῖς,
> ἀπέσταλκέν με,
> κηρύξαι αἰχμαλώτοις ἄφεσιν
> καὶ τυφλοῖς ἀνάβλεψιν,
> ἀποστεῖλαι τεθραυσμένους ἐν ἀφέσει,
> κηρύξαι ἐνιαυτὸν κυρίου δεκτόν.
> Lk 4:18–19; quoting Isa 61:1

> The Spirit of the Lord is upon me,
> because he has anointed me
> to bring good news to the poor.
> He has sent me to proclaim to the captives release
> and to the blind recovery of sight,
> to send the oppressed away in freedom,
> to proclaim the year of the Lord's favor.

He then states, "Today this scripture has been fulfilled in your hearing" (σήμερον πεπλήρωται ἡ γραφὴ αὕτη ἐν τοῖς ὠσὶν ὑμῶν; Lk 4:21) and interprets the passage's meaning for the community, an interpretation that includes further references to the Jewish scriptures, especially concerning the prophets Elijah and Elisha (Lk 4:24–27).

In Lk 10:25–28, we have the story of the lawyer who publicly tests Jesus. Jesus has been teaching his disciples (10:23–24), when the lawyer interrupts him, asking "what must I do to inherit eternal life?" (τί ποιήσας ζωὴν αἰώνιον κληρονομήσω; Lk 10:25). Jesus' response is to question the lawyer himself, asking "In the law what is written? How do you read it?" (ἐν τῷ νόμῳ τί γέγραπται; πῶς

14 Weaver (2008).

ἀναγινώσκεις; Lk 10:26). The lawyer answers by quoting the Mosaic law from memory, "You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your strength, and with all your mind; and your neighbor as yourself" (ἀγαπήσεις κύριον τὸν θεόν σου ἐξ ὅλης [τῆς] καρδίας σου καὶ ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ σου καὶ ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ ἰσχύϊ σου καὶ ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ σου, καὶ τὸν πλησίον σου ὡς σεαυτόν; Lk 10:27; quoting Deut 6:4–5; Lev 19:18). Jesus responds that he has answered correctly (Lk 10:28).

In Acts 8:26–40, the disciple Philip was traveling from Jerusalem to Gaza and overhears an Ethiopian eunuch reading the scroll of Isaiah. Philip joins the eunuch and asks him if he understands what he is reading and he answers that he does not. Then Philip interprets the Isaiah passage as concerning the recent events of Jesus. In response, the eunuch requests baptism and Philip agrees.

All three of these passages in Luke-Acts are representative of how the reading of the Jewish scriptures is understood as having meaning for the present and that this meaning requires not only the reading aloud or reciting of the scripture but also its interpretation by an authoritative character. Interestingly, the author of Luke-Acts probably understood his own literary work in much the same way; at least, this is suggested in the rhetorical device of the "we"-passages (Acts 16:10–17; 20:5–15; 21:1–18, 27:1–29; 28:1–16). In his study of the "we"-passages, Samuel Byrskog concluded that the "we"-passages are a rhetorical device designed to provide "a conceptual bridge between the *now* of the narrator and the *then* of Paul."[15] That is, whenever Luke-Acts is read, these passages include those hearing the performed work as a part of the narrative itself, as a part of the "we" character. The first "we"-passage occurs in Acts 16:10–17, which begins as follows:

> ὡς δὲ τὸ ὅραμα εἶδεν, εὐθέως ἐζητήσαμεν ἐξελθεῖν εἰς Μακεδονίαν συμβιβάζοντες ὅτι προσκέκληται ἡμᾶς ὁ θεὸς εὐαγγελίσασθαι αὐτούς.
>
> Acts 16:10

> When we had seen the vision, immediately we tried to cross over to Macedonia, concluding that God had called us to bring the good news to them.

The "we"-passages occur in the later part of the narrative, the time closest to the original audience that hears it read aloud in worship, thereby bringing the hearers into the narrative world so that they too know that they are being called

15 Byrskog (2003: 263).

"to bring the good news," to share the stories of the past about Jesus and his disciples as a story that continues into the present in their own lives. Thus, the public reading of both the Jewish scriptures and Luke-Acts itself gives meaning to the community in which these texts are performed and interpreted by those who have received authority from their own communities that are shaped by these same readings.[16]

Moses, Joshua, and Josiah as Reading Performers in the Deuteronomic History and the Book of Chronicles

Consistently within narratives in the Hebrew Bible, the reading of the *torah*, תרה—typically translated as "law," but also means "teaching," "story," or "history"—is a public oral performance that includes interpretation—that is, the reading of the *torah* is never portrayed as a solitary, private event. In this section I briefly review the portrayals of Moses, Joshua, and Josiah in the Deuteronomic History (Deuteronomy, Joshua, Judges, 1–2 Samuel, and 1–2 Kings) and, when available, in the Book of Chronicles.[17]

The Book of Deuteronomy is imagined as Moses' farewell speech to the Israelites in the wilderness, just prior to his death and the Israelites' entry into the Promised Land (1:1; 32:45). Deuteronomy contains not only his recitation of the written law (12–26) but also his recounting of their recent history and his exhortations not to repeat their past disobedient ways (1–11; 27–33). At the end of the book, Moses is clearly portrayed as the one who wrote down the laws contained in chapters 12–26 for the first time: "Moses wrote down this law and gave it to the priests" (וַיִּכְתֹּ֣ב מֹשֶׁה אֶת־הַתּוֹרָ֣ה הַזֹּאת֒ וַֽיִּתְּנָהּ אֶל־הַכֹּהֲנִים; 31:9; see also 31:24). Moreover, the written text itself is portrayed as necessary to provide guidance to future generations of leaders. Moses commanded the priests as follows: "Take this scroll of the law and set it beside the ark of the covenant of the LORD your God; let it be there against you as a witness" (לָקֹחַ אֵת סֵפֶר הַתּוֹרָה֙ הַזֶּה וְשַׂמְתֶּם אֹתוֹ מִצַּד אֲרוֹן בְּרִית־יְהוָה אֱלֹהֵיכֶם וְהָיָה־שָׁם בְּךָ לְעֵד; 31:26). However, despite such clear references to Moses producing a written text and its importance, the narrative never explicitly states that Moses himself read these laws from a physical text and, since the section of the law is

16 See similarly, Shiell (2004). Shiell made an excellent case for the performance of Acts in the early church, even though some of his specific reconstructions of such performances (for example, accompanying gestures) may be far-fetched.

17 For my fuller discussion of the literary relationship between Samuel-Kings and Chronicles that takes seriously recent discussions of orality and literacy, see Person (2010).

bracketed by the speeches of Moses and these explicit references to Moses's writing the law down occur at the end of the book, it seems as if his recitation of the law occurs without his needing to read the text itself, probably because of the proximity Moses had to God and the written law. Furthermore, the law in chapters 12–26 is bracketed by sections (1–11, 27–34) in which Moses uses the law as a lens to interpret Israel's history and future as a way of emphasizing how the law should be understood within the present community.

God commands Moses to choose Joshua as his successor (Deut 1:38; 3:28; 31:1–23; 34:9), so the portrayal of Moses establishes the pattern by which Joshua is portrayed. In chapter 1, Joshua instructs the people as follows:

> רַק֩ חֲזַ֨ק וֶֽאֱמַ֜ץ מְאֹ֗ד לִשְׁמֹ֤ר לַעֲשׂוֹת֙ כְּכָל־הַתּוֹרָ֔ה אֲשֶׁ֤ר צִוְּךָ֙ מֹשֶׁ֣ה עַבְדִּ֔י אַל־תָּס֥וּר מִמֶּ֖נּוּ
> יָמִ֣ין וּשְׂמֹ֑אול לְמַ֣עַן תַּשְׂכִּ֔יל בְּכֹ֖ל אֲשֶׁ֥ר תֵּלֵֽךְ׃ לֹֽא־יָמ֡וּשׁ סֵ֩פֶר֩ הַתּוֹרָ֨ה הַזֶּ֜ה מִפִּ֗יךָ וְהָגִ֣יתָ בּוֹ֮
> יוֹמָ֣ם וָלַ֒יְלָה֒ לְמַ֙עַן֙ תִּשְׁמֹ֣ר לַעֲשׂ֔וֹת כְּכָל־הַכָּת֖וּב בּ֑וֹ
>
> Josh 1:7–8

> Only be strong and very courageous, being careful to do according to all the law that Moses, my servant, commanded you; do not turn aside from it to the right hand or to the left, so that you may be wise wherever you go. Do not let this scroll of the law depart from your mouth; mediate on it day and night, so that you may be careful to do according to all that is written in it.

This passage could be misinterpreted as assuming widespread literacy among the Israelites, who mediate on their individual written copies of the law day and night; however, given that literacy was low in ancient Israel,[18] this portrayal is either extremely anachronistic or more likely assumes that the Israelites have internalized the text in their collective memory from repeated public performances of the text.[19] This internalization too may be an exaggeration, but it certainly makes more sense given the low level of literacy. Later Joshua copies the text onto stones and recites it to the people.

> וַיִּכְתָּב־שָׁ֖ם עַל־הָאֲבָנִ֑ים אֵ֗ת מִשְׁנֵה֙ תּוֹרַ֣ת מֹשֶׁ֔ה אֲשֶׁ֣ר כָּתַ֔ב לִפְנֵ֖י בְּנֵ֥י יִשְׂרָאֵֽל׃
> …
> וְאַֽחֲרֵי־כֵ֗ן קָרָא֙ אֶת־כָּל־דִּבְרֵ֣י הַתּוֹרָ֔ה הַבְּרָכָ֖ה וְהַקְּלָלָ֑ה כְּכָל־הַכָּת֖וּב בְּסֵ֥פֶר הַתּוֹרָֽה׃

18 See especially Rollston (2010).

19 See further, Person (2011).

לֹֽא־הָיָ֣ה דָבָ֔ר מִכֹּ֖ל אֲשֶׁר־צִוָּ֣ה מֹשֶׁ֑ה אֲשֶׁ֨ר לֹֽא־קָרָ֜א יְהוֹשֻׁ֗עַ נֶ֚גֶד כָּל־קְהַ֣ל יִשְׂרָאֵ֔ל וְהַנָּשִׁ֣ים
וְהַטַּ֔ף וְהַגֵּ֖ר הַהֹלֵ֥ךְ בְּקִרְבָּֽם׃

Josh 8:32, 34–35

And he wrote there on the stones a copy of the law of Moses, which he had written before the Israelites. … And afterward he called out all the words of the law, blessings and curses, according to all that is written in the scroll of the law. There was not a word of all that Moses commanded that Joshua did not call out in front of all the assembly of Israel, including the women, the little ones, and the aliens who go among them.

In contrast to the portrayal of Moses, the portrayal of Joshua is more explicit in that a written text is physically present. However, even here Joshua's calling out may denote recitation with interpretation. The Hebrew word I have translated here as "called out" (קרא) is often translated "read" here and in similar contexts with the understanding that the text is being read aloud to an audience; however, that is not the only possible interpretation of Joshua's relationship to the physical written text. It is possible that the more literal translation "call out" is suggested—that is, despite a physical text being present, Joshua recites the law from memory, thereby continuing the model begun by Moses that all Israelites should be able to do as they meditate on the law continuously, the vast majority of whom must do so without a written text.[20] That is, the law should be internalized in ways that easily facilitates its interpretive application to their present reality.

In the synoptic texts of 2 Kings 22–23 and 2 Chronicles 34–35, the portrayal of King Josiah's reading of the law is far less ambiguous concerning how closely his reading follows the physical text, but the circumstances demand it.[21] The narratives in both 2 Kings and 2 Chronicles agree that the law scroll (presumably some early form of the law as given in Deuteronomy) had been lost and was rediscovered; therefore, it was unfamiliar to Josiah and the other characters. However, once Shaphan the secretary reads the law scroll aloud to him, Josiah immediately understands its significance, especially since the preceding kings were especially disobedient to the law, and Josiah knows that he too falls far below the law's expectations. Josiah, following the example of Moses

20 For a discussion of how the textual plurality of extant biblical texts suggests that the ancient scribes copied their texts in ways that includes multiformity—a characteristic found in oral traditions—see Person (1998) and Person (2015).

21 For the discussion of the apparent differences between 2 Kings 22–23 and 2 Chronicles 34–35, see Person (2010: 121–125).

and Joshua before him, then reads the law aloud to the people and then begins significant cultic reforms based on his interpretation of the law for the present moment. As one of the few kings who are portrayed as good in God's sight (2 Kgs 22:2), Josiah authoritatively interprets the law for his time in ways that bring divine favor upon him (2 Kgs 22:20).

Moses, Joshua, and Josiah are all portrayed as publicly performing the text of the law to the people of Israel, whether the performance is based on their recitation of the text by memory or by reading aloud the physical text. In all three portrayals, Moses, Joshua, and Josiah have God's favor so that they can authoritatively interpret the text for their own time and place.

Ezra as a Reading Performer in Ezra-Nehemiah

Ezra is described as "a scribe skilled in the law of Moses" (סֹפֵ֤ר מָהִיר֙ בְּתוֹרַ֣ת מֹשֶׁ֔ה; Ezra 7:6), "a scribe of the words of the commandments of the Lord and his statutes for Israel" (סֹפֵ֞ר דִּבְרֵ֧י מִצְוֹת־יְהוָ֛ה וְחֻקָּ֖יו עַל־יִשְׂרָאֵֽל; Ezra 7:11), and "the scribe of the law of the God of heaven" (סָפַ֨ר דָּתָ֜א דִּֽי־אֱלָ֤הּ שְׁמַיָּא֙; Ezra 7:12, 21). As such, the Persian emperor, Artaxerxes, appoints Ezra to return to Jerusalem to reintroduce the law of Moses there, so that it will also become the imperial law (Ezra 7). When Ezra returns to Jerusalem, he then presents the law scroll to the people of Jerusalem, reads it aloud, and with the help of the Levites interprets it for the people.

> וַיִּפְתַּ֨ח עֶזְרָ֤א הַסֵּ֙פֶר֙ לְעֵינֵ֣י כָל־הָעָ֔ם כִּֽי־מֵעַ֥ל כָּל־הָעָ֖ם הָיָ֑ה וּכְפִתְח֖וֹ עָֽמְד֥וּ כָל־הָעָֽם׃
> ... וְהַלְוִיִּ֛ם מְבִינִ֥ים אֶת־הָעָ֖ם לַתּוֹרָ֑ה וְהָעָ֖ם עַל־עָמְדָֽם׃
> וַֽיִּקְרְא֥וּ בַסֵּ֛פֶר בְּתוֹרַ֥ת הָאֱלֹהִ֖ים מְפֹרָ֑שׁ וְשׂ֣וֹם שֶׂ֔כֶל וַיָּבִ֖ינוּ בַּמִּקְרָֽא׃
>
> Neh 8:5, 7–8

> And Ezra opened the scroll in the sight of all the people, for he was above all the people; and when he opened it, all the people stood up. ... and the Levites helped the people understand the teaching, while the people stood before them. So they called out from the scroll, from the law of God, with interpretation to give the sense, so that they understood what had been called out.

Here as before I have translated the word קרא as "called out" rather than the more common translation of "read." Here I certainly think that the translation "read" is accurate, because the phrase is "called out from the scroll"—that is, the physical written text is explicitly mentioned as being used for the "calling out"

rather than simply present as in the earlier texts concerning Moses and Joshua. In fact, this phrase "called out from the scroll" itself may suggest that קרא is best translated "called out," especially when it is not followed by "from the scroll" or something equivalent. What is clear is that the portrayal of Ezra has more in common with Josiah than with Moses and Joshua, in that the physical written text is emphasized in the portrayals of Ezra and Josiah. However, we must remember that the phrase "*they* called out from the scroll"—that is, Ezra and the Levites together—cannot possibly suggest that all of the Levites had their own personal copies of identical scrolls for reference. Thus, even the phrase "called out from the scroll" must refer to the text as a mimetic aid for at least some of its "readers," despite the explicit reference to the physical scroll.

Readers of Historiography as Performers: A Summary

We have seen that even those performers who are depicted as reading aloud texts in the Hellenistic sources and in the Hebrew Bible are portrayed in ways that demonstrate that oral performance with interpretation was the standard. That is, even when someone is reading aloud a text in a public performance, the performance itself is not bound strictly by what is in the physical text, thereby strongly suggesting multiformity as a characteristic of these types of performances.[22] Although this is not as explicit in Zelnick-Abramovitz's discussion of Greek inscriptional evidence, she nevertheless concluded that "[n]o text is conceived as authoritative while still performed orally" and that the local historians performed their histories responding to various needs of the audiences in ways somewhat analogous to today's digital texts.[23] In the New Testament, Jesus reads and then interprets a passage in Isaiah when he preaches in the synagogue (Luke 4:16–30) and Philip interprets the text even for the literate Ethiopian eunuch, who without Philip's interpretation does not understand what he is reading. In the Hebrew Bible, Moses, Joshua, Josiah, and Ezra are all depicted as performers of the written law to the people, which requires instruction and interpretation beyond the simple recitation or reading aloud of the text. Their interpretations likewise are based on their historical circumstances and that they as authoritative leaders understand what the people need to hear in order to be obedient to God—that is, to

22 See similarly Person (1998) and Person (2015).
23 Zelnick-Abramovitz (2014: 193).

form a communal identity shaped by divine standards. Thus, the portrayal of how these historiographical texts are read strongly suggests that performers who read aloud texts are used as authoritative representatives of the tradition, whose virtue allows them to adapt their readings within the frames of their own interpretations as is required for creating and preserving the traditional communal identity of the people in a specific time and place.

Performers as Virtuous Characters Regardless of the Medium of Their Performance

Above I have surveyed representative characters from Hellenistic sources and the Hebrew Bible: Demodokos, Moses, and Deborah, who compose oral epics, and others such as Aristotheos, Jesus, Moses, and Ezra, who publicly perform written texts. Despite the different modes in which these characters are portrayed—that is, composing oral epic without reference to texts and performing written texts—all of these characters share the role of giving voice to the community's tradition as preserved in its collective memory about significant past events for their audiences that are typically familiar with the stories.[24] That is, despite the differences in historical period, geography, genre, and the use of (or lack of) writing, all of these characters are admirable leaders who represent what the community's self-identification promotes as virtuous and thereby promote the development of and the strengthening of communal identity with their teaching.

Postscript: Moses and Integrative Fuzziness

In a recent essay on Moses, Ehud Ben Zvi used the term "integrative fuzziness" to describe how the character of Moses transcended various boundaries. After discussing the portrayal of Moses as both royal lawgiver and prophet, Ben Zvi concluded as follows:[25]

> The figure of Moses served to (partially) integrate all these voices, images, and ideas in one person. By doing so, Moses served as a site of memory

24 For a discussion of the complex relationship between epic and history, see Foley (2010). For my extension of Foley's arguments to biblical historiography, see Person (2016).

25 Ben Zvi (2013: 363).

> that made boundaries among the voices fuzzy. As they remember him, they cannot but imagine a world in which, among other things, *torah* is prophecy and prophecy is *torah*, a book is prophetic but is also part of a historiographic collection, a man speaks with multiple voices and conveys multiple messages (and to some extent, worldviews) ....

Ben Zvi then described the social function of integrative fuzziness as follows:[26]

> such a tendency to accept fuzziness contributed to the formation of an integrative discourse and thus, to social cohesion within the community (or at least among the *literati*).

Although Ben Zvi was describing the integrative fuzziness between Moses the lawgiver and Moses the prophet, we have seen how integrative fuzziness occurs between Moses the bard and Moses the reader of the law. That is, the social memory of Moses combines his role as epic singer and public reader of texts so much so that the distinction between these two roles becomes somewhat artificial. Moses himself, no matter what medium he chooses to use, speaks authoritatively for God and for and to the community, often drawing from stories of the past to give voice to traditional values, whether in epic song, law scroll, or historiographic text. As such, Moses can serve as an exemplar for the conclusion reached in this paper—that is, both those characters portrayed as composers of oral epic and those characters portrayed as performing written texts by reciting them or reading them aloud give voice to the community's traditional values by recounting significant past events.

Bibliography

Beck, D. 2005. "Odysseus: Narrator, Storyteller, Poet?" *Classical Philology* 100: 213–227.

Beck, D. 2012. "The Presentation of Song in Homer's *Odyssey*." in *Orality, Literacy and Performance in the Ancient World: Orality and Literacy in the Ancient World, vol. 9*. E. Minchin, ed. Mnemosyne Supplements 335: 25–53. Leiden: Brill.

Ben Zvi, E. 2013. "Exploring the Memory of Moses 'The Prophet' in Late Persian/Early Hellenistic Yehud/Judah." in *Remembering Biblical Figures in the Late Persian and Early Hellenistic Periods: Social Memory and Imagination*. Diana V. Edelman and Ehud Ben Zvi, eds.: 335–364. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

26 Ben Zvi (2013: 364).

Byrskog, S. 2003. "History or Story in Acts—A Middle Way? The 'We' Passages, Historical Intertexture, and Oral History." in *Contextualizing Acts: Lukan Narrative and Greco-Roman Discourse*. T. Penner and C.W. Stichele, eds. Symposium 20: 257–283. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

Foley, J.M. 1977. "Traditional Oral Audience." *Balkan Studies* 18: 145–153.

Foley, J.M. 2010. "Traditional History in South Slavic Oral Epic." in *Epic and History*. D. Konstan and K. Raaflaub, eds.: 347–361. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.

Janzen, J.G. 1992. "Song of Moses, Song of Miriam: Who is Seconding Whom?" *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 54: 211–220.

Lattimore, Richard, trans. 1967. *The Odyssey of Homer*. New York: Harper & Row.

Leuchter, M. 2007. "Why Is The Song of Moses in the Book of Deuteronomy?" *Vetus Testamentum* 57: 295–317.

Meyers, C. 1999. "Mother to Muse: An Archaeomusicological Study of Women's Performance in Ancient Israel." In *Recycling Biblical Figures: Papers Read at a Noster Colloquim in Amsterdam 12–13 May 1997*. A. Brenner and J.W. Van Henten, eds. Studies in Theology and Religion 1: 50–77. Leiden: Deo.

Niditch, S. 2008. *Judges: A Commentary*. Louisville: Westminster John Knox.

Person, R.F., Jr. 1998. "The Ancient Israelite Scribe as Performer." *Journal of Biblical Literature* 117: 601–609.

Person, R.F., Jr. 2010. *The Deuteronomic History and the Book of Chronicles: Scribal Works in an Oral World*. Ancient Israel and Its Literature 6. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

Person, R.F., Jr. 2011. "The Role of Memory in the Tradition Represented by the Deuteronomic History and the Book of Chronicles." *Oral Tradition* 26: 537–550.

Person, R.F., Jr. 2015. "Text Criticism as a Lens for Understanding the Transmission of Ancient Texts in Their Oral Environments." in *Contextualizing Israel's Sacred Writings: Ancient Literacy, Orality, and Literary Production*. B. Schmidt, ed.: 197–215. Atlanta: SBL Press.

Person, R.F., Jr. 2016. "Biblical Historiography As Traditional History." in *Oxford Handbook of Biblical Narrative*. D. Fewell, ed.: 73–83. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rollston, C.A. 2010. *Writing and Literacy in the World of Ancient Israel: Epigraphic Evidence from the Iron Age*. Archaeology and Biblical Studies 11. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

Römer, T.C. 2013. "Moses, the Royal Lawgiver." in *Remembering Biblical Figures in the Late Persian and Early Hellenistic Periods: Social Memory and Imagination*. D.V. Edelman and E. Ben Zvi, eds.: 81–94. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Shiell, W.D. 2004. *Reading Acts: The Lector and the Early Christian Audience*. Biblical Interpretation 70. Boston: Brill.

Thiessen, M. 2004. "The Form and Function of the Song of Moses (Deuteronomy 32:1–43)." *Journal of Biblical Literature* 123: 401–424.

Weaver, J.B. 2008. "Narratives of Reading in Luke-Acts." *Theological Librarianship* 1: 22–37

Zelnick-Abramovitz, R. 2014. "Look and Listen: History Performed and Inscribed." in *Between Orality and Literacy: Communication and Adaptation in Antiquity: Orality and Literacy in the Ancient World, vol. 10*. R. Scodel, ed.: 175–196. Leiden: Brill.

PART 4

Voices of Prose

CHAPTER 14

Written Record and Membership in Persian Period Judah and Classical Athens*

Aubrey E. Buster

In both the biblical books of Ezra and Nehemiah and extant records from Classical Athens, we witness a drama of identity negotiation. Ezra and Nehemiah record the return of the exiled Judeans to the Persian province of Judah. As the Judeans seek to rebuild their community post-exile, anxiety about land rights and the potential defilement of the "holy seed" by the people who already inhabit the land leads to drastic measures, including strict prohibitions on intermarriage, and the expulsion of foreign wives. Who will have a "share," a "right," a "claim" (cf. Neh 2:20) to the newly refounded Jerusalem? The question of "who is in" and "who is out" brings with it the corresponding question of authority: by what means are such boundaries determined? Who (or what) is responsible to create and maintain the distinction between insider and outsider? In Ezra-Nehemiah, as I will demonstrate below, textual records play a significant role in this negotiation, both in determining initial membership, and in the continual maintenance of the purity of the in-group.

Athens also underwent a reconsideration of its membership from the 6th to the 4th centuries BCE, roughly contemporaneously with Ezra and Nehemiah's missions.[1] A series of civic reforms increased the stringency of citizenship requirements and installed prohibitions against intermarriage. Extant records of several 4th-century "trials of identity," in which the validity of a person's right to citizenship was challenged, provide us with dramatic accounts of the evaluation of related evidence. An individual's ability to produce societally endorsed proof of their membership determined whether they were permitted to remain within the community. As proof of membership was required of the

* I would like to thank Jacob Wright, Raymond Person, and Brett Maiden for their insightful comments and detailed feedback. Thanks are also due to Johannes Kleiner, Stephen Germany, Harry Huberty, Ji-Yun Kim, and Justin Walker, and the attendees of the Orality and Literacy in the Ancient World XI conference for their invaluable help in the development of this paper.

1 See in particular Lape (2010a); Lape (2010b); Halpern (2004); Fried (2009).

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2017 | DOI: 10.1163/9789004329737_015

returnees to Jerusalem, so also the ability to prove one's membership in the Athenian deme resulted in the maintenance or destruction of one's citizenship rights.

In both societies, we witness the explicit negotiation of communal boundaries. In both societies, the ability to maintain one's place in the community rests on the ability to present proof. What we will come to see, however, is that authoritative proof of who is in and who is out is adjudicated very differently in Athens and Jerusalem. Several scholars have noted the similarity of the Athenian and Judean restrictions on intermarriages, focusing particularly on the initial decrees and their sociological implications.[2] Yet, another negotiation emerges: that of the technology of cultural memory. In Ezra-Nehemiah, as I will demonstrate, textual records play a significant role in negotiating social boundaries, in determining initial membership, maintaining the purity of the in-group, and in the rhetorical presentation of that group as pure. In Athens, the force of textual witness is much more ambiguous. Records of citizenship appear to have been kept in the demes,[3] but not correspondingly used when a person was suspected of citizenship fraud. Public opinion gives preference instead to witnesses' oral testimony regarding the defendant's participation in the *polis*.

The respective use (or lack thereof) of written records as proof of membership in the Athenian and Judean communities sheds light on the continuing discussion surrounding the relative "textuality" of each society. Both of these cultures stand as historical representatives of the written word: In Ezra-Nehemiah, we see the continuing transformation of the Judean returnees into a text-centered community, the "people of the book,"[4] where the unifying authority of the written word becomes central; Classical Athens not only produced a remarkable number of texts, but also produced many of the literary achievements that form the canon of Western civilization.[5] Yet, attending to the use of texts in carefully defined sectors of each of these communities' social life, in this case, the task of determining membership, brings to clarity certain social forces that facilitate a reliance on writing vs. oral testimony. The mere presence of written documents does not prove their corresponding use. Writing provides a means for preserving large amounts of information, yet its very efficiency results in the associated risk of hoarding data that will not be regularly accessed

2 Fried (2009); Halpern (2004); Oswald (2012); Eskenazi (2006).

3 See Whitehead (1986: 98–102); Lape (2010b: 192–198); Rhodes (1981: 497); Sickinger (1999: 55, 82, 135).

4 For recent discussion on the development of Judaism as a "people of the book" see Assmann (2006); Halbertal (1997).

5 Thomas (1992: 3, 134).

by the members of a community. Written records can easily be consigned to the "storage memory" of a culture, an archive that is never or rarely accessed.[6] It is the perception of and relative social value assigned to these writing technologies that determines their use. What *counts* in any given societal arena is a very different question than what is available. So our question is: what *counted* when proving membership within the Athenian or Judean communities?

Use of Texts in Ezra-Nehemiah

Ezra-Nehemiah clearly emphasizes texts and their authority.[7] This is seen in the creation and use of lists and genealogical records, particularly in four events: the listing of returnees to the land in Ezra 2, Nehemiah's use of that list to determine the boundaries of the community in Nehemiah 7, the possible use of a list to "weed out" the foreign wives of the Judeans in Ezra 10, and the final genealogy of those chosen by lot to inhabit Jerusalem in Nehemiah 11.

Ezra 2

Ezra 2 presents an extended list containing the names of those who returned to Jerusalem along with the Jewish leader Zerubbabel.[8] This list functions both for community definition and defense, serving to identify the returned exiles as the rightful members of Judah.[9] The list comprises two kinds of names, both names of families and of settlements. Its validity is supported through the reference to documentation, the *kĕtābām mityaḥśîm*, "written records of genealogy," which further ties the list of current returnees to pre-exilic Israel. In Ezra 2:59–63, a subtle stratification of the returnees emerges, based on forms of genealogical proof. Following the listing of the number of the men of the people of Israel by their fathers' households, as well as the priests, the Levites, the temple servants, and the sons of Solomon's servants, there is a separate listing of those who come up from Tel-melah, Tel-harsha, Cherub, Addan, and Immer. They are differentiated from those listed before them by their inability to prove their father's houses or descent, "whether they belonged to Israel." Their family names are

---

6 See the distinction Aleida Assmann so brilliantly makes between *ars*, "storage memory," and *vis*, "functional memory," in Assmann (2011: 17 ff.).

7 See Eskenazi (1988); Howard (2010); Wright (2008); cf. Fishbane (1988: esp. 231–277).

8 For a discussion of the origin and authenticity of these lists see Becking (2006); Redditt (2012). The origin of the list remains debated. The text is most likely compiled due to the shift in categories between people being listed by town or by family. See Myers (1974: 14–15).

9 Japhet (2006); Becking (2006).

recorded separately. The importance of genealogical proof becomes even more serious for those who claim to be priests: the priests who are not able to find their registration among those enrolled in the genealogies are excluded from the priesthood as unclean (Ezra 2:62). The written nature of acceptable proof for a priestly lineage is emphasized through the terminology used: the term for genealogical enrollment, *mityaḥśîm*, from the root *yḥś*, occurs only in the books of Chronicles and Ezra-Nehemiah.[10] The root *yḥś* "to enroll in a genealogy," differs from the more common genealogical term in the Hebrew Bible, *tôlĕdôt* (cf. Gen 5:1, etc.). Cameron Howard in her analysis of terms for genealogy concludes that while the latter "implies a general style or manner of ordering by ancestral lineage, every indication says that *yḥś* denotes a specific written genre."[11] The use of the root *yḥś* in Ezra-Nehemiah confirms this analysis. In Ezra 2:62, the term is placed in apposition to *kĕtābām* "written documents," thus explicitly designating the documents of their genealogical enrollment. This specific reference to a document follows the more general reference to the lay people who sought to "prove their fathers' houses or their descent" (Ezra 2:59–60), though the means are unspecified.[12] In Ezra 2:62, the *kĕtābām mityaḥśîm* refers most directly to a purported genealogy of the priesthood.[13]

The extent of the authority afforded to these records is further confirmed by their rhetorical relation to the cultic divinatory apparatus, the *Urim* and the *Thummim*. The governor strictly defends the boundaries of the priesthood according to written record until one arises who is able to consult these enigmatic devices.[14] The *Urim* and *Thummim* were most likely used in divination to determine the will of God. The close rhetorical relation to cultic divination only confirms the extent of the authority given to records. While previously one would turn to divination to assess the deity's will in this matter, now one turns to a text. A transfer of executive power has taken place, however provisional it is. Written documents partially replace other means of cultic authority. Documented genealogies (and not the cultic apparatus) will maintain the purity of the priesthood in the post-exilic Judean community until further revelation shall arise.[15]

---

10 The root *yḥś* used in the *hithpael* to describe genealogical enrollment appears twenty-one times in the Hebrew Bible: Ezra 2:62; 8:1, 3; Neh 7:5, 64; 1 Chron 4:33; 5:1, 7, 17; 7:5, 7, 9, 40; 9:1, 22; 2 Chron 12:15; 31:16, 17, 18, 19.

11 Howard (2010: 91).

12 Galling (1951: 152).

13 Fensham (1982: 55).

14 For a fuller discussion of this divinatory device see Van Dam (1997).

15 The relative strictness of the requirement for the priesthood also appears in the Athenian

The verbal clusters applied to these written texts further underscore Ezra's description of the act of interpretation. The returning Judeans and their leaders *seek* (*bqš*) and try to *find* (*mṣ'*) their names in written texts. Both Michael Fishbane and more recently Jacob Wright have analyzed the theme of "seeking and finding" in Ezra-Nehemiah.[16] Ezra 2:62 describes undocumented priests "searching" (*biqšû*) for their names in the written documents of enrollment, but not "finding" (*nimṣā'*) their records. Wright notes that *bqš* as well as the related root *drš*, which we will come to in our discussion of Ezra 10, undergo a semantic shift in later biblical literature from primarily referring to an act of divination, whereby one inquires of the Lord (see Gen 25:22–23), to referring specifically to the study of the written word.[17] Wright connects this shift to the demise of the state along with its cultic and divinatory institutions: while *YHWH* could no longer be "sought" and "found" through divination (Hos 5:6), the divine word remained.[18] The recognition of this shift in the case of Ezra 2 is strengthened by the analogy drawn between the *absence* of the *Urim* and *Thummim*, tools of divination, and the substituted authority of genealogical lists, a shift from ritual to textual authority. A common text replaces a common cultic event.

Ezra's own genealogy (Ezra 7:1–5) subtly reinforces this shift in authority. His genealogy qualifies him for the high priesthood: he stands in the direct lineage of Aaron, continuing the line of the pre-exilic priesthood.[19] This social function, however, is immediately subsumed underneath Ezra's scribal function. He is introduced as Ezra *hakkōhēn hassōpēr, sōpēr dibrê miṣôt-YHWH* (Ezra 7:11), the priest yet doubly scribe who "came to Jerusalem in the fifth month … *for Ezra had set his heart to study the law of the Lord and to teach his statutes and rules in Israel.*"[20] Eskenazi notes that this is the "first and only *occasion* in the Hebrew Bible where the two functions [of priest and scribe] are explicitly combined or rather fused."[21] Ezra demonstrates his scribal role by conducting an abbreviated

---

materials. While it was possible on occasion for foreigners to become naturalized, they were ineligible for the priesthood: a higher level of stringency was required in order to maintain the purity of hereditary priestly lines. See, for example, Dem. 57.46–48; 59.92, 104–106. This record keeping within the priestly clans is also referenced in Neh 12:12–23, a list which purports to "bring the roster of 'the heads of the fathers' houses' up to date soon after the return." Johnson (1969: 43).

16 Wright (2008); Fishbane (1988: 231–277).

17 Wright (2008: 277).

18 Wright (2008: 278).

19 Blenkinsopp (1988: 136).

20 Italics are mine.

21 Eskenazi (1988: 75).

hityaḥśām, "an enrollment in a genealogy" in 8:1, and enacting a documentary search in 10:16, when he sits with the heads of the fathers' households and "examines the matter" concerning the men who had married foreign women (see further discussion below). As Howard concludes: "In this new, highly textual era, the work of reader and writer is made as valid and important as the work of a high priest."[22] The role of the scribe increases in authority, as documents begin to bear the burden of maintaining the boundaries of the post-exilic Judean community. As noted above in the discussion of the *Urim* and *Thummim*, power to determine community boundaries has now shifted to those who possess these documents and are qualified to engage in textual study. Ezra's genealogical credentials reinforce his privileged position: he possesses both qualifications for priesthood and for the role of the educated scribe, wielding the texts that can now determine people's fate within the Judean community.

Nehemiah 7

Nehemiah 7 further confirms this reliance on textual authority, particularly in questions of community definition. In this chapter, Nehemiah finds the list of returnees that was recorded in Ezra 2.[23] Nehemiah demonstrates, once again, the use of a written record as the community's boundary marker. Not only is a specifically written record referenced: *wāʾěmṣāʾ sēper hayyaḥaś … wāʾěmṣāʾ kātûb bô* ("and I found the book of the genealogical enrollment … and I found written therein") (Neh 7:5), but he proceeds to quote the written material extensively, thus emphasizing both the content and the form of the written message.[24] This attention to the content of the written word contrasts with the rhetorical use of written works as *representative* or *symbolic*, an intermediate stage in the development of the use of texts in a society.[25] It furthermore deci-

22 Howard (2010: 152).

23 Many have noted the slight differences between the two lists and have suggested several possible reasons for these discrepancies. It is widely suggested that the differences in family names and numbers between Ezra 2:3–58 and Neh 7:7–60 are due to accidents of transmission. See Redditt (2012: 15); Myers (1974: 15–22; 146–148). For the differences between Ezra 2:60 and Neh 7:62 see Lipschits (2002: 432 n. 38). A similar list (though most likely an independent list and not based on Ezra 2 and Neh 7; cf. Fensham [1982: 111]) appears in Ezra 8, but its idealistic arrangement as well as a lack of reference to the use of a list in the definition of boundaries suggests a different rhetorical function than the one being outlined here. Cf. Wright (2008: 289 n. 48).

24 Nehemiah 7 does not quote Ezra 2 exactly, but with several discrepancies. For a discussion of these differences see Fensham (1982: 48–49); Michaeli (1967: 256–261); Allrick (1954).

25 Thomas (1989: 30–34). Cf. Walton and Sandy (2013: 17–29).

sively marks the movement from the mere storage of data, to which Ezra's original list might have been relegated, to its active recovery by later contingents of the community.[26] The documents are used as a reference and the later text gains its credence by claiming to be a copy of the former.[27]

The re-use of a former list also emphasizes the importance of continuity as established by texts. Eskenazi has insightfully noted that the two lists contained in Ezra 2 and Nehemiah 7, respectively, form a textual bracket.[28] By citing the previous list in Ezra 2, Nehemiah creates continuity between the present generation and the original group of returnees, grounding their communal identity in the past by means of a referenced written word. The emphasis on an authoritative textual record proves to be a structuring theme of Ezra-Nehemiah.[29] Nehemiah compiles the *ʾămānâ* in Neh 10:1, a binding document which is sealed with yet another list of names. This document serves as the record of the community's adherence to a list of reforms, including the prohibition of trade on the Sabbath day, the separation of themselves from the people of the land, and the implementation of a temple gift.[30] This document also becomes a record of self-condemnation, as in Nehemiah 13 the community is found to have broken its agreement: Nehemiah's resulting wrath is thus undergirded by a textual authority that can now be referenced by the reader. His reforms are not viewed as novelties, but are firmly rooted in an authoritative text.[31] Thus the community that has defined itself through lists continues this redefinition with recourse to sealed records. As Eskenazi notes concerning the continued structural force of the written word in Ezra-Nehemiah: "they demonstrate the power or propriety

26 See Assmann's categories of *ars* and *vis* in Assmann (2011: 17–22). Cf. M.T. Clanchy's (1979: 125) taxonomy of the development in the use of documents: 1) making documents for administrative use; 2) keeping them as records, and 3) using them again for reference are "three distinct stages of development which did not automatically and immediately follow from one another."

27 It should be noted that the *accuracy* of the numbers and names on the list is not the concern. There are discrepancies between the lists, and between the numbers within the lists and the final tally. On the demography of Persian period Yehud in comparison to these lists, see, for instance Knauf (2006: 291–349). What is essential to recognize is the rhetorical function of these lists: the importance of documentation in determining community membership is continually emphasized through the reference to lists.

28 Eskenazi (1988: 88–95).

29 As has been demonstrated thoroughly in Eskenazi (1988). See also Fried (2012), who argues that the lists are included to "prove the veracity of the narrative" (20).

30 Niditch (1996: 90) notes the contrast between this emphasis on a legal, written agreement and Exod 19:8, in which the people agree to the covenant stipulations orally.

31 Jacob Wright, class session, fall 2012.

of documents as causative principles and significant forces in human events … in Ezra-Nehemiah the *written text* comes to be fulfilled."[32] The documents of Ezra-Nehemiah do not just prove to be the latent storage of the Judean cultural memory. They play a formative function in determining both the constitution and the actions of the burgeoning Judean community.

Ezra 10

In Ezra 10, we witness the possible use of texts to *defend* the communal boundaries in the final scandal of the foreign wives. Following Shecaniah's exposure of the "outsiders" in their midst, Ezra and the leaders of the community set out to solve the problem "according to Torah" (Ezra 10:3). They sit together to "examine the matter" (*lĕdaryôš haddābār*; Ezra 10:16) until they come to the end of those who had married foreign women. The narrative admittedly remains reticent as to their full process, but Jacob Wright has recently suggested, based on the vocabulary (that of "seeking," *drš*, elsewhere a mode of textual study) and methods used elsewhere in the text (Neh 7:64; Ezra 2:62) that they are searching in a text similar to the records of genealogical enrollments.[33] It is notable that no matter what the process was, the legal process is presented using vocabulary drawn from the realm of textual study. The names of those found guilty of intermarriage are then compiled into yet another list (Ezra 10:18–44), one that is preserved in the textual record that becomes canonized as the book of Ezra.

Nehemiah 11

Finally, in Nehemiah 11, we find a list of the 10 percent of the population chosen by lot to live in the underpopulated city of Jerusalem. Here the author preserves several "mini-genealogies." As Lipschits notes, "the attention to the genealogy of the residents of Jerusalem is evidence of the importance the author/editor of ch. 11 attached to the purity and legitimacy of the inhabitants of the holy city, as the attention to the genealogy of the priests in the temple is evidence of concern for their legitimacy."[34] Jerusalem is called the "holy city" twice in this chapter, the only place where it bears this name in Ezra-Nehemiah. A holy city requires a carefully documented people.

---

32 Eskenazi (1988: 41–42).

33 Wright (2008: 288–289).

34 Lipschits (2002: 434).

Use of Texts in Athens

This consistent reference to past textual records in order to validate membership in Ezra-Nehemiah is cast into stark relief when compared to the use of texts during the Athenian citizen trials in the 4th century BCE. There is little doubt that Athens produced a great number of texts.[35] The question that concerns us here, however, is not the literacy rates or the textual production of a culture, but how the culture *used* texts in its active formation of a functional cultural memory. In Judah, texts are explicitly presented as an authoritative repository to be consulted in the process of community (re)construction: documents provide key evidence in determining who is "in" and who is "out." Contemporaneously with the missions of Ezra and Nehemiah, Athens implemented a series of citizenship reforms between the 6th and 4th centuries. As J.K. Davies describes the situation: "'Who is to be, and who is not to be, in the Athenian community, and why?' were continually being posed by pressures from within and without; … the process of finding answers, and of justifying them, was a very important component of Athenian public and intellectual life."[36] As it was in Judah, the question of who was a member of the community was openly and actively debated. While Ezra-Nehemiah gives texts a key role in this debate, do we see a similar use of written records in Classical Athens?

Athenian Citizenship

The arbitration of Athenian citizenship underwent several transformations in the period stretching between Solon's legal reforms in 594 BCE, Cleisthenes' democratic reforms in 508/7, and Pericles' proposal in 451.[37] Each of these legal reforms resulted in increasingly stringent citizenship requirements, and the accompanying re-evaluation of those who claimed to be citizens.

In 594 BCE, the legislator Solon revised the previously existing law code of Draco in Athens. According to the accounts that we have (primarily Aristotle's *Ath. Pol.* and Plutarch), Solon's revisions were largely inspired by civic strife based on economic disparity between the nobles and the common people: "the many were enslaved to the few" (*Ath. Pol.* 5.1).[38] He established legal protections

35 See, for instance, Thomas (1992: 134).

36 Davies (1977: 106).

37 A more complete description of these events can be found in several sources, including Lape (2010b). For a description of these reforms and a comparison to the situation in Ezra-Nehemiah see Fried (2009).

38 Cf. Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 6, 9; 12.4; Plutarch, *Solon* 5, 15.

for citizens, abolishing the enslavement of citizens for debt.[39] While this served to ameliorate the economic disparity, it strengthened the division between citizen and non-citizen.[40] Solon does not appear to have explicitly defined the conditions for citizen status, but as Patterson points out, "early—indeed the earliest—Athenian citizenship law thus focuses not on who the citizen is but rather what the citizen does and how he or she should be treated."[41] These reforms had a radical effect on societal cohesion that had previously been divided along economic lines: economic differences were mediated by the possession of a common political status from which non-citizens were excluded.[42] As citizen status was afforded greater privilege, so also it eventually necessitated greater protection.

The democratic reforms of 508/7 BCE usually attributed to Cleisthenes developed new structures for the establishment and verification of citizenship. The territory of Attica was subdivided into separate territories called *demes*, grouped into thirty "trittyes," and then into ten "phylai," each named after an Athenian hero. This re-organization of Athenian society served, according to *Ath. Pol.* to allow more to "share in the politeia" (21.2), theoretically giving equal footing to all in the deme. This new basis for membership is underlined by the new naming system: from this point, all citizens identified themselves by their deme name, *x* of deme *y*, along with their patronymic[43]; this "*demotic*" was bestowed upon the new citizen at the point of his formal recognition of membership.[44] Citizens were now identified by their membership within the deme. It is likely that, at the point of the establishment of the deme system, the citizen body was enlarged with some who were previously not considered Athenians:[45] as Aristotle asserts in the *Politics*, Cleisthenes "enrolled in the tribes many foreigners and slaves" (1275b34–39).

According to *Ath. Pol.* 26.4, the Periclean citizenship law of 451/0 BCE further defined requirements for citizenship: only those born of two *astoi* could now

39 Solon also established *telē*, a four-part division of the citizenry based on economic worth. Each category was endowed with particular duties and privileges. While this did maintain economic divisions, it also formalized the status of *all* Athenians and guaranteed even the *thētes*, the lowest economic strata, a share in the assembly and in the law courts. See Manville (1990: 144 ff.); Forrest (1966: 161–174).

40 Manville (1990: 91). Cf. Patterson (1981: 14); Patterson (2005).

41 Patterson (2005: 273).

42 Lape (2010b: 44); Patterson (1990: 55).

43 Lape (2010b: 16); Wright (2012), shared with author.

44 On naming practices in Athens see Golden (1990: 23–25).

45 Patterson (2005: 276–277).

"share in the city" ("*metechein tēs poleōs*").[46] Based on the use of this term in citizenship disputes, J. Blok argues that *astos* effectively signified "belonging by descent."[47] While before this, some scholars assume that it was only the citizenship of the father that mattered,[48] Cynthia Patterson argues that it is possible that Pericles *began* official supervision of the citizenship registries of Athens: "his law provided the first standard Athenian criterion for entry into the demes and phratries, who prior to this time had managed their membership on traditional but not necessarily uniform procedures."[49] This revolution in the definition of a citizen lasted throughout the history of democratic Athens,[50] with the exception of a temporary measure passed c. 413 BCE after the defeat in Sicily.[51] Due to a shortage of citizen men, the Athenians were permitted to marry one Athenian woman and produce heirs with another woman (Diogenes Laertius 2.26). Shortly thereafter, however, the Periclean citizenship law was reinstated.[52]

As the legal definition of citizenship increased in stringency, methods of kinship verification grew in importance. The demes served as the local centers of government and held the primary responsibility for the maintenance of citizenship boundaries.[53] Thus one of the most crucial roles of the deme became ensuring the purity of the state citizenry through the examination

46 Cf. Plutarch, *Pericles* 37.2–5; cf. Aelian, *Varia Historia* 6.10; 13.24. Before this, many scholars assume that it was only the citizenship of the father that mattered. See Lacey (1968: 100); Hignett (1952: 343); Davies (1977: 118).

47 Blok (2005: 18, 20); see also discussion of the term in Patterson (1990: 40–73). She argues that the basic meaning of *astos/ē* seems to be "'native member of the community,' and as such the term is typically contrasted with *xenos*, the foreigner or nonmember."

48 Lacey (1968); Davies (1977). The decisive nature of Pericles' decree is questioned by Sealey (1976: 299). He asserts that "the law of 451/0 may mark growing pride in Athenian citizenship, but it is not easy to say how great a change it made, since the immediately preceding conditions are not known … conceivably even before 451/0 assemblies of demesmen may have insisted, commonly or increasingly, that both parents of a candidate must be citizens before they would accept him." For a brief discussion and bibliography of the connection between legitimacy and citizen status, see Lape (2004: 6–8).

49 Patterson (2005: 283). Cf. Patterson (1981).

50 Lape (2010a: 192).

51 Manville (1990: 24); Osborne (1983: 152, 184); Sinclair (1988: 24–25).

52 Lape (2010a: 192).

53 Previously to the establishment of the demes, the important task of handling membership most likely fell to the phratries. From the "Demotionidai Decree" (*IG* ii^2 1237), it appears that, in at least one phratry, the procedure for introducing new members was not unlike the later process enacted in the demes. According to Patterson (1981: 12, 28), it consisted of "(1) the *diadikasia* (debate, discussion), (2) the vote of the phratry and (3) possible appeal

and registration of its members.[54] Deme assemblies met annually to assess the credentials of the eligible sons of the demesmen and to vote on their enrollment in the membership register.[55] None of these registers have been found, an unsurprising fact, as the enrollment records would most likely not have been inscribed in stone. Their presence, however, can be inferred from other sources.[56]

Aristotle describes the process of registration in his *Athenian Constitution*:[57]

> Men have a share in the rights of citizenship if they are born of citizen parentage on both sides, and if they are enrolled among the demesmen at the age of eighteen. When they are enrolled, the members of the deme cast their vote on oath, first, whether they appear to be of the age according to the law (if they do not appear so, they are sent back to the children), and secondly whether he is free born and born according to the law. Then if they vote that he is not a free man, he appeals to the law-courts, and the members of the deme appoint five from among them to act as accusers; if the court decides that he has no right to be enrolled, he is sold by the state as a slave, but if he wins his case he must be enrolled by the members of the deme.[58]

---

against an adverse vote to the Demotionidai, apparently a *genos* within the phratry." Cf. Patterson (2005: 279–280). Walters (1983: esp. 317). As to whether the demes *replaced* the phratries, see Hansen (1986: 73–74).

54 Whitehead (1986: 97). They are attested in an inscription of the third quarter of the fifth century (*IG* i^3 138, line 6). Our information on the regular process of scrutiny and registration in the fifth century comes from Lysias 21.1 in which the speaker uses his passing of the *dokimasia* as a validation of his following record, as well as the crass reference in Aristophanes in which Philokleon describes his pleasure in gazing at the genitals of the youth passing through the inspection of the deme (*Wasps* 576–590). Also see Lape (2010b: 186–188).

55 See Whitehead (1986: 27–30); Lape (2010b: 15); Manville (1990: 205–206). The temporal relationship of the establishment of the annual deme assembly to Cleisthenes' initial reforms is debated. Whitehead (1986: 98) argues that these assemblies were established directly through Cleisthenes' reforms while Patterson claims a date following the stricter citizenship requirements of Pericles c. 451/0 (1981: 28).

56 See, for example: *IG* i^3 138.6; *SEG* 2.7, 20; Dem. 44.35, 37; 57.26, 46, 55, 60–62; Isaeus 7.1, 27; Lycurgus 76. See also Whitehead (1986: 99–109); Bakewell (2007) discusses the use of lists for military purposes.

57 See also Dem. 57.46, 55, 61; 59.60.

58 Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 42.1. All translations are my own.

This quotation from Aristotle demonstrates three things: firstly, the high stakes of proving one's citizenship. The alternative was slavery under the charge of a false claim to citizenship. Secondly, it refers to the enrollment of the eligible demesmen. Finally, the necessity of witnesses assured that any new demesman will have already had a place among the citizenry, for only then can he call witnesses in the enrollment to confirm his membership.[59]

Trials of Identity

A citizen's initial enrollment in the deme did not exempt him from periodic retrials. Citizens regularly underwent a *dokimasia* before their election to office. As Lape points out in her discussion of Athenian identity, "that citizenship was established by trials, no one of which ever offered a final verdict, leads to an emphasis on citizen identity as an ongoing process rather than as a fixed legal status."[60] There were several instances in which the validity of a demesman's membership might be challenged. Aristotle reports an evaluation of the citizenry as early as 510/9 BCE as there were "many sharing in the rights of citizenship for whom it was not appropriate" (*Ath. Pol.* 13.5).[61] This civic scrutiny or *diapsēphismos* is the first attested in the Athenian polis, though there is very little evidence to determine its process or final effects.[62] There is slightly more known about the two later citizen trials of 445/4 and 346/5 BCE. In these two major cleansings of the Athenian demes, the state conducted a large-scale evaluation of the citizenry. In 445/4, this "cleansing" of the deme membership occurred in conjunction with the gift of Egyptian grain.[63] Plutarch states that, closely following the establishment of Pericles' citizenship law, the Egyptian pharaoh's gift led to the expulsion of almost 5000 people from the demes.[64] The impetus for this massive citizen review is clear; those who had a legitimate claim to citizenship in Athens also had a claim to the benefits of such a membership, including a share in the city's gifts. This brought to the fore both the material benefits of citizenship and the necessity of stringent restrictions on who was permitted to make such a claim.

---

59 Scafuro (1994: 158).

60 Lape (2010b: 188).

61 Davies (1977: 115–116); Hignett (1952: 132–133); Manville (1990: 173–185); Ogden (1996: 44–45); Lape (2010b: 199–200).

62 Manville (1990: 173–175).

63 See Hignett (1952: 345); Patterson (1981: 123); Whitehead (1986: 99–109).

64 Plut. *Per.* 37.4; Lape (2010b: 201). For a discussion of the relationship between Pericles' citizenship law and the scrutiny of the Athenian citizenry in 445/4 see Patterson (1981: 122–123).

The second citizen-wide scrutiny in 346/5 BCE appears to have had little to do with economic gain, but rather with a fear of the effect of fraudulent citizens on the Athenian *polis*.[65] Aeschines captures the sentiment in his speech on the counterfeit citizen:

> But now men who have been illegally registered as citizens, always attaching to themselves whatever element in the city is corrupt, and making constant war the government policy, in peace prophesying danger, and so provoking ambitious and over-excitable minds, yet when war comes never engaging themselves … men who father children with mistresses … these men are bringing the state into extreme danger.[66]

In this case, the Athenians had recently experienced a series of embarrassing martial failures and were perhaps seeking a scapegoat for their misfortunes.[67] This led to the fear evidenced in Aeschines' speech that the Athenian superiority had been undermined by the presence of false citizens.[68] Isocrates, a contemporary of Aeschines, explains the perceived weakness of the city in similar terms, as due to the influx of outsiders: "We must not consider happy the city which collects large numbers of citizens from all peoples at random, but rather the city which more than all others maintains the stock of those who originally founded it."[69] Isocrates blames the imperial efforts of Athens for causing the death of true citizens and filling up the "deme-registers with people who had nothing to do with the city."[70]

The increasing strictness in the requirements for citizenship, as well as the particular scrutinies in 445/4 and 346/5 BCE resulted in an emphasis on validating one's position within the deme. The citizenship trials of the 4th century thus provide a valuable window into determining the function and authority of written record in community membership. While we see a focus on the use of text as arbiter in Ezra-Nehemiah, do we see a corresponding use of textual evidence within the Athenian citizen trials?

---

65 Dem. 57; Aes. 1.77–78, 86, 114, 2.182; Isaeus 12.

66 Aes. 2.177.

67 The Athenian expedition on Euboea in 349/8 and the attempt to aide the besieged city of Olynthus against Philip of Macedon in 348 both ended in Athenian disgrace. See Lape (2010b: 215).

68 Lape (2010b: 253).

69 Isoc. 8.89.

70 Isoc. 8.88; cf. Davidson (1990: 35).

Use of Records?

The speeches that survive from 4th-century citizenship trials provide a valuable window into the use of citizenship lists. The establishment of the deme registry marks the potential power of writing to determine community boundaries.[71] The registration list compiled by the demes purportedly contained the names of every adult male who was a member of the deme and thus was eligible for appointment to office.[72] An individual's membership in the community depended occasionally on his ability to definitively identify himself as the offspring of two Athenian parents. In these cases, the use of the deme records would supposedly have been an invaluable resource. If it was indeed maintained as it appears in our sources, it would be a veritable archive of ancestry, containing the names of both the figure under trial, as well as (at least) his father's and grandfather's names since the establishment of the demes. But it does not appear to have functioned in this way. To the contrary, what we observe is a marked preference for live witnesses above textual records.

Demosthenes' *Against Eubulides* provides insight into one trial that took place at this time. *Against Eubulides* is a speech in which Euxitheus appeals his expulsion from deme membership. Eubulides had accused both Euxitheus' parents of illegitimate status, and thus by extension his own right to hereditary citizenship. In his appeal, Euxitheus identifies his parents and their tombs, and invokes witnesses to corroborate his statements (Dem. 57.46–56). He focuses his defense on explaining why the vote of the demesmen went against him in the first place, claiming that Eubulides fixed the vote against him and referencing past bribes that had been accepted by the deme's members (Dem. 57.10, 13, 58–59). His mention of the deme register is brief and included in a list of other actions befitting an active participation in Athenian life: "in all

---

71 See, for instance, Pébarthe (2006: 182).

72 MacDowell (1978: 69); Cohen (2003: 80): "In the democracy of classical Athens in which a privileged minority of adult male citizens governed a city where the vast majority of the inhabitants were strictly excluded from political participation, perhaps no issue was more fundamental than that of establishing claims to citizenship status. The basic mechanism for doing so was the enrollment of new members in the written register of their deme when they attained the age of eighteen. At that time they could be presented by their fathers to the demesmen, who had to certify their claims to citizenship. As Aristotle recounted the procedure (*Ath. Pol.* 42.1–2), the name of a new citizen would be added to the deme register when the deme members had voted an oath in favor of the young man both having attained the age of eighteen and having met the requirement of birth from citizen parents as specified by the statute."

previous times," he states, "all those who now accuse me acknowledged me as a citizen" (Dem. 57.47). His defense appears to have functioned under the assumption that a true citizen would be able to validate their identity by reference to a common knowledge among their peers, rather than recourse to the deme registry records. The benefit of the registry lies in the communally witnessed registration event, in which a person's membership was decided by deme vote. Euxitheus thus appeals to his kinsmen's memory above all else:[73]

> Let each one of you consider, men of Athens, in what other way he could prove that people are his kinsmen than in the way in which I have proved it—by having them give testimony under oath and showing that they have *always been my kinsmen from the beginning*.[74]

In fact, the registry itself is placed under scrutiny. Euxitheus accuses Antiphilus, the father of Eubulides of pretending to lose the register in response to a bribe, thereby inducing the Halimusians to falsely revise the list (Dem. 57.60). Such an accusation evinces a suspicion of written means of verification by asserting its ready falsification. The processes of enrolling in the deme register serve more as communal events of verification in order to establish public standing than as the means of creating written material evidence for membership in the deme. As Patterson notes, Euxitheus argues that since "we have acted as citizens therefore we are citizens."[75]

So also, Aeschines, in *Against Timarchus* (1.77–78), notes the relative sway of collective informal knowledge. In the course of his argument, he draws an analogy with the contemporary revision of the citizen lists of the demes. He complains that in the course of these proceedings:

> Whenever I am in the courts listening to the pleas, I see that the same argument always prevails with you. When the prosecutor says, "Men of the jury, the men of the deme have, under oath, voted against this man based on their own collective knowledge, even though no one accused him or testified against him," you immediately applaud, assuming that the man you are judging has no claim to citizenship. For I suppose you are of the

73 Lape (2010b: 210); Kapparis (2005).
74 Dem. 57.56. Italics mine.
75 Patterson (2005: 287).

> opinion that, when one knows a thing perfectly of his own knowledge, he does not need argument or testimony in addition.

As Aeschines challenges the collective opinion of the deme, there is no appeal to the written registers, which have themselves (once again) been called into question as potentially fraudulent, and subjected to a vote. It is "collective knowledge" against "argument or testimony,"[76] both arguably oral categories.

Several scholars have noted this surprising lack of reference to a deme registry as an authoritative resource. As Lape points out, "We might be tempted to think that [the deme register] served as a proof of citizenship, since the names of the new recruits were recorded on the deme register. In practice, however, deme registration was not used for this purpose."[77] The initial registration was just the first in several retrials that a citizen could expect if he ever ran for official office or his citizenship was disputed. Adele Scafuro also criticizes the registration process for its failure to serve as proof of citizenship. She demonstrates the number of false witnessing suits that occurred over the citizenship criteria, without recourse to the use of archival documents as conclusive evidence.[78] Instead, it was expected that a foreigner would not be able to provide the evidence that was required: the witnesses to their participation in the community, the existence of their tomb monuments and the locations of their shrines.[79] It was, in fact, the citizen rolls that were put on trial![80] The fear of strangers who had succeeded in getting their names on the lists was countered with a belief that the force of public witness could rectify this error. The list was no protection in this atmosphere of distrust. Instead, the registration should be understood as an occasion furnishing communal witness to the person's entry into the deme. As Stephen Todd argues, the continuous need for retrials transforms the initial "registration into something of a charade," noting that this supports the "Athenian preference for oral over written methods of proof."[81]

76 Cohen (2003: 83–84); Lentz (1983).

77 Lape (2010b: 193).

78 Scafuro (1994: 172).

79 Lape (2010b: 197). The existence of a family tomb frequently appeared as evidence of citizenship in a trial: see Isoc. 6.65; Dem. 57.28, 40.

80 See, for instance, Demosthenes' criticism of using the deme registry to "cheat the system" in Dem. *Against Leochares* 44.41. So too, in Apollodorus' speech *Against Neaira*, the prosecutor accuses Stephanos of *falsely* registering Neaira's sons Proxenos and Ariston (Dem. 59.38). Cf. Hamell (2003: 52–54).

81 Todd (1990: 181).

The enrollment process itself supports this interpretation. The weight of the ceremony rested on the communal gathering as a unifying yearly ritual. Whitehead observes that, "it was this solemn act of communal admission and recognition by his fellow demesmen that a man would invoke if ever, subsequently, his status was called into question (Dem. 57.60–62)."[82]

The careful inspection of each of the deme's new members primarily served as his official recognition by members of the community; this public exposure was more important than the creation of a written record that could be referenced in the future.

It is important to note again that the picture could be painted slightly differently if one observed the developing use of texts within a different sector of Athenian society. It appears that both economic and military use of these written lists occurred much earlier.[83] In terms of defining community boundaries, however, the evidence suggests that written records did not play the decisive role within the citizenship trials of the 4th century; oral witnesses were required to both examine and to purge the citizenship registers, which were deemed suspect in confirming a person's identity.[84] Records were not trusted to determine contested membership within Athenian society.[85]

The distinction between the Athenian citizenship trials and the narrative recorded in Ezra-Nehemiah provides insight into the respective social roles of written records. The preference for witnesses over written documents in Athens confirms a particular social structure, one which rewards participation in communal gatherings and public knowledge of one's identity.[86] Citizenship in Athens is not primarily "on paper," so to speak, but is created through public participation that could be acknowledged by the community if called into question. There was certainly a *burgeoning* "document-oriented understanding of civic identity" as David Cohen notes, but it is in tension with a "much more powerful oral culture of informal knowledge, social networks, and ultimately, social control of the other."[87]

There is one interesting counterexample preserved in Demosthenes' orations that will serve as a helpful bridge back to the use of records in Ezra-

82 Whitehead (1986: 103).
83 See, for example Bakewell (2007) who discusses the use of lists for military purposes and Pringsheim (1961) who discusses the rise of documentation in the economic sphere.
84 Cohen (2003: 82).
85 See Todd (1990) who discusses the continued weight given to oral witnesses in court proceedings, even as documents began to be used more frequently.
86 Scafuro (1994).
87 Cohen (2003: 82).

Nehemiah. In *Against Neaera*, Apollodorus refers to a stele inscribed with a grant of citizenship to the Plataeans (Dem. 59.105). The Plataeans' citizenship was an entirely new construction, and thus required the *creation* of a communal memory, not unlike Cleisthenes' initial creation of deme registration. The presence of the stele can be understood to function in much the same way as the deme ceremonies and family tombs: it was a public monument set in a place where it would be become part of the local daily life.[88] It is not a "document" to be cited, but an aspect of the communal memory, in which those who had not previously participated in the Athenian social life created a public presence for themselves, one that could be attested to in a court of law.

Re-Evaluating Records in Ezra-Nehemiah

This provides a helpful transition to re-evaluating the relative weighting of written lists in the narratives of Ezra-Nehemiah. As in the example of the grant of citizenship to the Plataeans (Dem. 59.105), the *lack* of living and established communal practice can cause written records to increase in importance. This is the case for the *golah*, the exiles returning to the province of Judah following their dispersion into the Babylonian provinces. In an attempt to re-establish communal boundaries following this dispersion, it is necessary to have recourse to external arbiters of community membership. The texts effectively play the role of living communal memory. In the absence of family monuments and carefully orchestrated social landmarks that can occur in a landed and relatively stable society, the texts serve as an agreed upon reference point for the newly re-constituted province of Judah: a starting point to rebuild a Judean identity. This is not to say that the returnees to the land established a fully "literate" society after their return from the exile. Indeed, analysis shows considerable evidence for a continued "oral mindset" in the re-established Judean community.[89] But it does suggest that certain social forces (such as the need to establish a communally acknowledged authoritative basis for membership in lieu of living memory) can serve as one motivation for further reliance on texts in a community.

88 It is possible that one phratry also practiced the inscription and posting of the name of a son with his patronymic and demotic at a common meeting place. See *IG* ii^2 1237, 117–125; cf. Scafuro (1994: 162).

89 See Person (2010).

Conclusion

To return to the question posed in our introduction, "what *counted* when proving your membership within the Athenian or Judean communities?" we see that both the Judeans and the demes of Classical Athens claim to maintain written records related to membership, but that the evidence demanded by their respective "identity trials" differs significantly. In Athens, the ability to summon the testimony of fellow demesmen and to reference physical memorials is what bears most weight in determining one's membership in the group. In Judah, on the other hand, the act of remembering coincides with the act of interpretation. One must find one's name within the textual records of the community in order to establish membership. The respective defenses offered for citizenship reveal the respective emphases in community membership: as Aristotle so famously points out when asking "Who is a citizen?" in Athens, the emphasis rests on those who participate in the state and its processes (*Politics*, 1275b19–21). Thus in Athens, communal assent to this active participation constitutes the most effective defense. What of the *golah*, the returned exiles to the land, in Ezra-Nehemiah? Ezra-Nehemiah effects a re-definition of the body of Judah: those who have a claim on the city are the *golah*, the returnees formerly exiled in Babylon.[90] And this is a textually constituted body: the validity of their claim is measured in genealogical records and census lists, written to confirm the *golah's* continuity with pre-exilic Judah. These case studies offer a valuable perspective into the modes of cultural memory. Both Athens and Judah made use of the technology of writing within their definition of group boundaries. What we have seen, however, is that this technology functioned in very different ways within these two cultures.

Bibliography

Allrick, H.L. 1954. "The Lists of Zerubbabel (Nehemiah 7 and Ezra 2) and the Hebrew Numeral Notation," *Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research* 136: 21–27.

Assmann, Aleida. 2011. *Cultural Memory and Western Civilization: Functions, Media, Archives* (= *Erinnerungsräume: Formen und Wandlungen des kulterellen Gedächtnisses*, München, 1999). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Assmann, Jan. 2006. "Introduction: What is Cultural Memory?" in *Religion and Cultural*

90 See the excellent discussion in Japhet (2006: 108–116).

Memory: Ten Studies, trans. Rodney Livingstone, 1–30. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Bakewell, Geoffrey. 2007. "Written Lists of Military Personnel in Classical Athens" in Craig Cooper, ed. *Politics of Orality*, 89–102. Orality and Literacy in Ancient Greece. Leiden: Brill.

Becking, Bob. 2006. "'We All Returned as One!' Critical Notes on the Myth of Mass Return" in Oded Lipschits and Manfred Oeming, eds. *Judah and the Judeans in the Persian Period*, 3–18. Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns.

Blenkinsopp, Joseph. 1988. *Ezra-Nehemiah: A Commentary*. Old Testament Library. Philadelphia: Westminster Press.

Blok, J. 2005. "Becoming Citizens: Some Notes on the Semantics of 'Citizen' in Archaic Greece and Classical Athens," *Klio* 97: 7–40.

Clanchy, M.T. 1979. *From Memory to Written Record: England 1066–1307*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Cohen, David. 2003. "Writing, Law, and Legal Practice in the Athenian Courts" in Harvey Yunis, ed. *Written Texts and the Rise of Literate Culture in Ancient Greece*, 78–96. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Davidson, James. 1990. "Isocrates Against Imperialism: An Analysis of *De Pace*," *Historia* 39: 20–36.

Davies, J.K. 1977. "Athenian Citizenship: The Descent Group and Its Alternatives," *Classical Journal* 73: 105–121.

Eskenazi, Tamara Cohn. 1988. *In an Age of Prose: A Literary Approach to Ezra-Nehemiah*. Atlanta: Scholars Press.

———. 2006. "The Missions of Ezra-Nehemiah" in Oded Lipschits and Manfred Oeming, eds. *Judah and the Judeans in the Persian Period*, 509–529. Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns.

Fensham, Charles F. 1982. *The Books of Ezra and Nehemiah*. Word Biblical Commentary. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans.

Fishbane, Michael. 1988. *Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Forrest, William G.G. 1966. *The Emergence of Greek Democracy: The Character of Greek Politics, 800–400 B.C.* London: Weidenfield & Nicolson.

Fried, Lisbeth. 2009. "The Concept of 'Impure Birth' in 5th Century Athens and Judea" in Steven Holloway, JoAnn Scurlock and Richard Beal, eds. *In the Wake of Tikva Frymer-Kensky*, 121–141. Piscataway: Gorgias Press.

———. 2012. "Ezra's Use of Documents in the Context of Hellenistic Rules of Rhetoric" in Isaac Kalimi, ed. *New Perspectives on Ezra-Nehemiah*, 11–26. Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns.

Galling, Kurt. 1951. "The 'Gōlā-List' According to Ezra 2//Nehemiah 7," *Journal of Biblical Literature* 70: 149–158.

Golden, Mark. 1990. *Children and Childhood in Classical Athens*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Halbertal, Moshe. 1997. *People of the Book: Canon, Meaning, and Authority*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Halpern, Baruch. 2004. "Ezra's Reforms and Bilateral Citizenship in Athens and the Mediterranean World" in Gary N. Knoppers and Antoine Hirsch, eds. *Egypt, Israel, and the Ancient Mediterranean World: Studies in Honor of Donald B. Redford*, 439–453. Boston: Brill.

Hamell, Debra. 2003. *Trying Neaira: The True Story of a Courtesan's Scandalous Life in Ancient Greece*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Hansen, M.H. 1986. *Demography and Democracy: The Number of Athenian Citizens in the Fourth Century B.C.* Herning, Denmark: Systime.

Hignett, Charles. 1952. *A History of the Athenian Constitution to the End of the Fifth Century BC*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Howard, Cameron. 2010. "Writing Yehud: Textuality and Power under Persian Rule." Ph.D. Diss., Emory University.

Japhet, Sara. 2006. "People and Land in the Restoration Period" in *From the Rivers of Babylon to the Highlands of Judah*, 96–116. Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns.

Johnson, Marshall D. 1969. *The Purpose of the Biblical Genealogies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kapparis, K. 2005. "Immigration and Citizenship Procedures in Athenian Law," *Revue Internationale des Droits de l'antiquite* 40: 71–113.

Knauf, Ernst Axel. 2006. "Bethel: The Israelite Impact on Judean Language and Literature" in Oded Lipschits and Manfred Oeming, eds. *Judah and the Judeans in the Persian Period*, 291–349. Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns.

Lacey, W.K. 1968. *The Family in Classical Greece*. London: Camelot Press.

Lape, Susan. 2004. *Reproducing Athens: Menander's Comedy, Democratic Culture, and the Hellenistic City*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

———. 2010a. "Before Race: Theorizing Athenian Citizen Identity" in Karen Bassi and J. Peter Euben, eds. *When Worlds Elide: Classics, Politics, Culture*, 185–228. Lanham: Lexington Books.

———. 2010b. *Race and Citizen Identity in the Classical Athenian Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lentz, Tony M. 1983. "Spoken versus Written Inartistic Proof in Athenian Courts," *Philosophy & Rhetoric* 16: 242–261.

Lipschits, Oded. 2002. "Literary and Ideological Aspects of Nehemiah 11," *Journal of Biblical Literature* 121: 423–440.

MacDowell, Douglas M. 1978. *The Law in Classical Athens*. London: Thames and Hudson Ltd.

Manville, Philip Brook. 1990. *The Origins of Citizenship in Ancient Athens*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Michaeli, Frank. 1967. *Les Livres des Chroniques, d'Esdras et de Néhémie*. Neuchâtel: Delachaux & Niestlé.

Myers, Jacob M. 1974. *Ezra-Nehemiah*. Anchor Yale Bible. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Niditch, Susan. 1996. *Oral World and Written Word*. Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press.

Ogden, D. 1996. *Greek Bastardy in the Classical and Hellenistic Periods*. Oxford Classical Monographs. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Osborne, M. 1983. *Naturalization in Athens*. Vols. 3–4. Verhandelingen van de Koninklijke Academie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone Kunsten van België, Klasse der Letteren. Brussels: Paleis der Academiën.

Oswald, Wolfgang. 2012. "Foreign Marriages and Citizenship in Persian Period Judah," *Journal of Hebrew Scriptures* 12: 1–18.

Patterson, Cynthia. 1981. *Pericles' Citizenship Law of 451–50 BC*. New York: Arno Press.

———. 1990. "Those Athenian Bastards," *Classical Antiquity* 9: 40–73.

———. 2005. "Athenian Citizenship Law" in Michael Gagarin and David Cohen, eds. *The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Greek Law*, 167–189. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Pébarthe, Christophe. 2006. *Cité, Démocratie et Écriture: Histoire de l'alphabétisation d'Atheènes à l'Époque Classique*. Paris: De Boccard.

Person, Raymond F. 2010. *The Deuteronomic History and the Book of Chronicles*. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

Pringsheim, Fritz. 1961. "The Transition from Witnesses to Written Transactions in Athens" in Fritz Pringsheim, ed. *Gesammelte Abhandlungen*, 410–420. Heidelberg: Carl Winter.

Redditt, Paul. 2012. "The Census List in Ezra 2 and Nehemiah 7: A Suggestion" in Isaac Kalimi, ed. *New Perspectives on Ezra-Nehemiah: History and Historiography, Text, Literature, and Interpretation*, 223–240. Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns.

Rhodes, P.J. 1981. *A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenian Politeia*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Scafuro, Adele. 1994. "Witnessing and False Witnessing: Proving Citizenship and Kin Identity in Fourth Century Athens" in Alan L. Boegehold and Adele C. Scafuro, eds. *Athenian Identity and Civic Ideology*, 156–198. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Sealey, R. 1976. *A History of the Greek City States, ca. 700–338 B.C.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Sinclair, R.K. 1988. *Democracy and Participation in Athens*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sickinger, J. 1999. *Public Records and Archives in Classical Athens*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Thomas, Rosalind. 1989. *Oral Tradition and Written Record in Classical Athens*. Cambridge Series in Oral and Literate Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 1992. *Literacy and Orality in Ancient Greece*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Todd, Stephen. 1990. "The Purpose of Evidence in Athenian Courts" in Paul Millet, Paul Cartledge, and Stephen Todd, eds. *Nomos: Essays in Athenian Law, Politics, and Society*, 19–39. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 1993. *The Shape of Athenian Law*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Walters, K.R. 1983. "Perikles' Citizenship Law," *Classical Antiquity* 2: 314–336.

Walton, John H. and D. Brent Sandy. 2013. *Lost World of Scripture*. Downers Grove: Intervarsity Press.

Whitehead, David. 1986. *The Demes of Attica*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Wright, Jacob L. 2008. "Seeking, Finding and Writing in Ezra-Nehemiah" in Mark J. Boda and Paul L. Redditt, eds. *Unity and Disunity in Ezra-Nehemiah: Redaction, Rhetoric, and Reader*, 277–304. Hebrew Bible Monographs. Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press.

———. 2012. "The Citizen-Soldier in Ancient Greece." Unpublished Manuscript.

Van Dam, Cornelius. 1997. *The Urim and Thummim: A Means of Revelation in Ancient Israel*. Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns.

CHAPTER 15

Voiced Mathematics: Orality and Numeracy

Tazuko Angela van Berkel

Oral history has it that a famous physicist once claimed that for every mathematical equation one puts into a talk, one will lose half of the audience.[1] Processing a mathematical equation and performing a piece of "mental arithmetic" is hard work. How many of us can mentally compute 113–37 in less than two seconds?[2]

Cognitive science has been successful in explaining why mental arithmetic poses such severe problems for the human brain. Human beings are simply not wired to conduct such calculations. Although we do have an innate "number sense", a sense of approximation,[3] it takes alternative circuits, such as the uniquely human ability to devise symbolic numeration systems and to use *number words*, for us to be able to parse the world with linguistic symbols into discrete categories and to discriminate 12 from 11.[4] We were not born to do arithmetic: performing exact symbolic calculation takes a heavy toll on our working memory,[5] demanding our utmost concentration and causing us to lose speed[6] and our ability to multitask. Hence, to alleviate the demand on our

1 The anecdote is attributed to a variety of scholars. One famous version occurs in the preface of Stephen Hawking's *A Brief History of Time*: "Someone told me that each equation I included in the book would halve the sales. I therefore resolved not to have any equations at all. In the end, however, I *did* put in one equation, Einstein's famous equation, $E = mc^2$." I would like to express my gratitude to Niall Slater and the anonymous reviewer for their many suggestions, ideas and comments on content and style.

2 Dehaene (1997: 104): "Nothing ever prepared [our brain] for the task of memorizing dozens of intermingled multiplication facts, or of flawlessly executing the ten or fifteen steps of a two-digit subtraction."

3 Dehaene (1997). Just as is the case with animals such as rats, our genetic make-up facilitates that we can enumerate items up to 3 without counting, and beyond 3 we have an approximating sense of "about 10", "about 100", "a gazillion".

4 Such symbolic numeration may be "oral": imposing a one-to-one-correspondence with body parts (e.g. counting with fingers) is already a symbolic move, because it abstracts the number from the item counted.

5 Memory plays a central part in mental arithmetic: the dominant strategy for adults in solving addition and multiplication problems is not actual counting or computing but retrieving results from memorized tables. Ashcraft & Battaglia (1978).

6 Because most arithmetic tasks are performed on the basis of memorized tables, number size

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2017 | DOI: 10.1163/9789004329737_016

working memory, we prefer to take recourse to writing: to fix our variables and our intermediate steps that would otherwise clog our memory, and to record the results.

Greek oratory, however, abounds in oral arithmetic: cases in which the audience was expected to follow, track and check extensive calculations *in situ* without the aid of writing. The complex and laborious nature of these calculations leads one to wonder not only whether the audience was actually capable of following the numerical argumentation, but also whether the audience was really expected to do so. Implicit in such scepticism is the idea that complex calculations are more in place in an "offline" written medium than in a "live" public context of oral delivery and mental processing on site.

This chapter will explore the particular features of oral arithmetic in 5th- and 4th-century forensic rhetoric by analyzing the ways in which calculations were expected to work and of the roles and values that were attributed to numbers and calculations. Thus it also seeks to address the question to what extent such calculations were understood as essentially "written". In traditional accounts of writing, numbers are regarded as secondary derivatives from glottic writing.[7] In historical perspective this is misguided: in early cultures, the record and manipulation of numerical symbols precede and predominate over the record of verbal symbols.[8] Moreover, as to the origin of writing itself, Denise Schmandt-Besserat has argued that writing emerged in Mesopotamia from previous tools of numerical record.[9] People start to write because they need to record and manipulate numbers.[10]

has a direct effect on memory retrieval: additions and multiplications with larger numbers are memorized at a later age and less thoroughly memorized; moreover, the accuracy of mental representation diminishes with increase of number size. Moreover, we frequently make errors. Dehaene (1997: 104–105, 110–111).

7 Also noted by Harris (1995: 134); Netz (2002: 323).

8 Netz (2002: 323).

9 Schmandt-Besserat (1996); cf. Nissen, Damerow & Englund (1993). The development of numerical techniques is historically closely related with the emergence of administrative problems that arose through the concentration of economic goods and services in the governmental centers of early state organization. Høyrup (1994).

10 See Netz (1999) for an argument that Greek mathematics, as a formal discipline, was essentially a literate phenomenon. Cf. Asper (2009) on the "two cultures" of mathematics in Ancient Greece: the practical knowledge of calculating areas and volumes and performing pebble arithmetic was orally transmitted through guild-like social structures and fundamentally distinct from the textual tradition of theoretical mathematics that is preoccupied with *proving* theorems and with abstract properties of general geometrical entities that are thus not assigned any numerical value.

Interestingly, neither of the two systems for numerical notation that were current in the classical Greek world, the alphabetic[11] and the acrophonic system,[12] lends itself particularly well to *conduct calculations*. Modern arithmetic, as we practice with pen and paper, is heavily dependent upon a specific notational system (the system of Hindu-Arabic numerals)[13] that offers unique possibilities to conduct calculations by spatially configuring numerals in ordered columns (allowing us to make, for instance, a long division)—algorithms that are impossible with the notational systems of the ancient Greek world. Archaeological evidence suggests that the prime medium in Classical Athens for the

11 The alphabetic system was the dominant system in the Greek-speaking world outside Athens. The system uses letters for numbers, assigning numerical value to letters according to their sequential position in the alphabet. The alphabetic numerical notation uses a base of 10 and is ciphered (i.e. each numeral from 0 to 9 has a distinct symbol). Chrisomalis (2010: 134–147). See the scholarship on *IG* I^2 760 for (the not so exceptional) examples of Ionic alphabetic numerals in Attic epigraphy and Lang (1956) for examples of alphabetic numerals in commercial contexts in Attica.

12 The Greek acrophonic system follows the Greek lexical numerals in using a base of 10 and a subbase of 5. The system is "cumulative-additive": to express numerosity, signs are simply repeated ("HHH" is three times H (*hεκατόν*), three hundred) and the total value of a numeral-phrase is the sum of the constituent's values: the phrase TTTXXX𐅅HHHHΔΔ⊢⊢ stands for three talents (TTT) and three thousand nine hundred (the compendium 𐅅 stands for five (Π) hundred (H)) twenty-two drachmas. Acrophonic numeral-phrases are often much longer than Hindu-Arabic ones and the relation between the different power bases is not immediately transparent. See Chrisomalis (2010: 11). The use of acrophonic numerals was limited to cardinal numbers (ordinal numbers are always expressed with lexical numerals); they were not used for fractions (except for monetary amounts where there are special signs for ½, ¼ and 1/8 obols), nor for dates, ages and numbers of persons. See Threatte (1980: 112 ff.) for examples. Restrictions such as these may shed light on the underlying conception of numbers: as acrophonic numerals are predominantly used for amounts of money, the separation of the notion of numerosity from the item counted seems to be incomplete (i.e. numerals were felt not to refer to abstract numbers, but rather to specific objects). This coheres with the fact that well into the 4th century the noun ἀριθμός predominantly refers to the "number *of* X" (cf. Germ. *Anzahl*) rather than to the "number X" (Germ. *Zahl*) in a meta-representational sense. Cf. Klein (1968); Olson (2001). In addition, there seem to have been some generic restrictions in the use of acrophonic numerals: they are rarely found in reports in connected prose.

13 The Hindu-Arabic system provides a unique combination of (i) a "positional" system with a single and uniform power base (10), and (ii) a "ciphered" system, with distinct symbols for numerals from 0 to 9, and (iii) the placeholder zero, makes it possible to record numbers in an unambiguous, economical and transparent way: to express a number like "543" we only need three symbols and the relationship between the 5, 4 and 3 is immediately transparent to us.

manipulation of numbers was not writing but the use of the pebble-board abacus:[14] rows of scratches on slabs of stone, roof tiles or simply on the ground, on which pebbles or other counters can be arranged and moved—providing the place-value system (lacking in the numerical notation system) that allows for more immediate transparency of numerical operations. Several smaller specimens are found on roof tiles fragments and potsherds—their size and format suggesting private or at least informal use;[15] the dimensions of the well-known Salamis Tablet (150×75×4.5 cm),[16] on the other hand, suggest public performances of calculations, presumably in contexts of commerce or audit, with onlookers standing around the board keeping track of every move.[17] The spatial organization of the abacus makes it possible to keep track of the *process* of counting and calculating, thus providing a medium for *manipulating* numbers—distinct from writing (acrophonic or lexical numerals) that provides only a medium for *recording* numbers.[18]

There are, however, also different contexts where numbers, calculations and quantitative reasoning must have played a substantial role: forensic cases and symbouleutic situations of decision-making. In neither context do we have evidence for the use of the abacus; instead, these calculations are conducted orally by a public speaker with exclusively verbal means and processed mentally by a listening audience. Such oral calculations obviously put a heavy strain on the audience's cognitive capabilities and may leave us wondering whether the audience was capable of actually following the complex calculations—although similar questions may be asked for rhetorical argumentation in general. Hence, it is often assumed that oral calculations are simply a means to overwhelm and impress the audience (comparable to "death by PowerPoint" in modern academic contexts) without genuinely involving the audience in the process of calculation itself.[19]

---

14 See Lang (1968), Netz (2002). Cf. Lang (1964) and (1965).

15 E.g. P 12317, a late 5th century roof tile fragment. Lang (1968).

16 Lang (1964), (1965).

17 Lang (1964), (1965). For an example of public counting and weighing in front of the Boule, see the First Kallias Decree (*IG* I^3 52A), ll. 20–21 (ἀπαριθμεσάσθον καὶ ἀποστεσάσθον τὰ χρέματα ἐναντίον τε̃ς βολε̃ς ἐμ πόλει).

18 Netz (2002). Moreover, evidence from school exercises seems to suggest that in Greek antiquity there was a greater reliance on memorized multiplication tables than in modern times. See Friedlein (1869), Cribiore (2001).

19 E.g. Papageorgiou (2004), 530, about Demosthenes' *Against Aphobus 1* (and Aristophanes' *Wasps*): "Undoubtedly, Demosthenes, like Bdelycleon, is rather loose and vague in his calculations; the jurors would not be able to remember the figures the speaker produces."

Some cases suggest that oral calculations will have been experienced as rhetorical ruses. The detailed but blatantly nonsensical calculation of Bdelycleon in Aristophanes' *Wasps*[20] is an obvious parody of contemporary rhetoric that tended to invest "live arithmetic" with democratic values (citizens were enabled to keep track of a calculation)[21] and that served to construct the orators' authority as instructors of the polis.[22] The play presents an implicit critique of what must have been experienced as a growing distance between experts in finance and administration on the one hand and the ordinary Athenian who had difficulty understanding such calculations on the other; by making Bdelycleon "out-accounting the accountants"[23] the play problematizes the use of arithmetic in public and oral contexts and its claim to democratic inclusion, transparency and accountability where in reality it was perceived to serve as a mechanism of exclusion, mystification and deceit.

Rhetorical theory, on the other hand, is largely silent on the topic of numbers. Although the relevance and use of numbers may be implied in the questions of policy that *symbouloi* are expected to master (ways and means, war and peace, the defense of the country, import and exports, legislation),[24] the fact that rhetorical theory does not identify arithmetic or quantitative reasoning as rhetorical tools in their own right suggests an instrumentalist view on numbers according to which numbers are mainly informative and rhetorically "inert".

The following analysis will explore the use and meanings of numbers in 5th- and 4th-century rhetorical practice, i.e. in a context of mass communication and oral delivery. It shall be argued that between the utilitarian view that simply assumes that numbers unproblematically convey numerical information, and the comical view that exposes the oral use of numbers as sheer rhetorical bluff, a variegated landscape exists in which numbers, numerical information and calculations acquire meanings beyond the strictly instrumental and serve a variety of communicative functions.[25]

---

20 Ar. *Vesp*. 655–722.

21 Cuomo (2001: 18) reads the passage as a "comically distorted version of the inscriptions (*sc. the tribute lists*). It sends up a situation where your average citizen read through the inscription, rehearsed the calculations in his head or on his fingers, and had the enlightening and very democratic experience of finding out where the money was going."

22 Papageorgiou (2004); cf. Kallet-Marx (1994).

23 Papageorgiou (2004: 528).

24 Ar. *Rhet*. 1.4.7–13 (1359b–1360a).

25 An example of a view on forensic arithmetic that is too uniformly negative can be found in Papageorgiou's remark in n. 19 above.

The argument will focus on the particular features of oral arithmetic in forensic rhetoric, i.e. calculation as a means of reconstructing a state of affairs—as distinct from the symbouleutic use of calculation as a means of, or model for, decision-making.[26] A comparison of two seemingly similar speeches, Lysias 32 and Demosthenes 27, will make clear that arithmetic can serve a variety of rhetorical purposes and appeal to different values. Different contexts require different ways to involve an audience in a calculation, different degrees of arithmetical accuracy and, in short, different rhetorical uses of calculations.

Orality and Numeracy

Extensive lists of amounts of money occur frequently in fourth-century forensic speeches. Most of them are enumerations, that are obviously demanding for one's working memory, but that do not directly involve a form of public reasoning with numbers.[27] Only a handful of forensic speeches involve "public reckoning", i.e. cases which not only mention numbers[28] but also involve the performance of basic operations of arithmetic:[29] most frequently additions (e.g. totaling up expenditures or items of property), sometimes multiplications (e.g. calculation of interest), incidentally subtractions.

Occasionally the arithmetic seems gratuitously laborious. A case in point is the lack of conversions where we would expect them. Although at times there seems to be a preference to reckon in thousands of drachmas instead of tens of minas (1 Athenian mina being 100 drachmas), which makes calculation *easier*,[30] the corpus abounds in instances where a speaker seems to miss the opportunity to simplify calculations by converting amounts to a more uniform

26 Examples of symbouleutic speeches that feature extensive calculations and quantitative reasoning are Demosthenes 14 and 20.

27 For a useful and thoughtful discussion of the question to what extent "lists" require literacy, see Hannah (2001). For the (problematic) view that lists are characteristic of early writing, see Goody (1977: 80–111); on the characteristics of lists and catalogues in oral contexts, see Minchin (1996).

28 The numbers concerned are mostly sums of money, sometimes quantities of other materials, but always *cardinal* numbers.

29 The cases I have identified are: Demosthenes 20, 27, 34; Lysias 19, 21, 32; Isaeus 11. Of these, Demosthenes 27 is the only speech where the author speaks *in propria persona*.

30 E.g. Dem. 27.10: ὧν γίγνεται τοῦ μὲν ἀρχαίου κεφάλαιον *τέτταρα τάλαντα καὶ πεντακισχίλιαι* (sc. *drachmas*), τὸ δ' ἔργον αὐτῶν πεντήκοντα μναῖ τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ ἑκάστου.

standard: reckoning in hemitalents[31] is not particularly helpful and at time speakers seem to miss an opportunity to make a numerical argument more transparent.[32]

Sometimes, however, there are good reasons to refrain from converting denominations. At the beginning of *Against Diogeiton*, the speaker narrates how his father Diodotus takes precautions before enrolling into infantry service by summoning his family to share his will with them. Among the items listed is an amount of twenty minas and thirty Cyzicene staters handed over directly by Diodotus to his wife (Lys. 32.6). The exact stater/drachma exchange rate in the second half of the fourth century remains controversial;[33] it may even be argued that Lysias' mentioning this unconverted amount makes a calculation of overall values impossible, showing that Lysias' interests here lie not so much with precise calculation, but rather with conveying the general impression that the estate must have been large.[34]

However, it is instructive to see how different orators handle this "conversion problem" differently. Whereas the speaker in Demosthenes' *Against Phormio* takes care to explain (μανθάνειν) to his audience how much a Cyzicene stater was worth,[35] within the narrative of Diodotus' son the unconverted amount of "twenty minas and thirty staters" has a clear function because it recurs years later—not as the inheritance of Diodotus' wife, but as the total inheritance of the son:

(1) Lysias, *Against Diogeiton* 9:

> ὀγδόῳ δ' ἔτει δοκιμασθέντος μετὰ ταῦτα τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου τοῖν μειρακίοιν, καλέσας αὐτοὺς εἶπε Διογείτων, ὅτι καταλίποι αὐτοῖς ὁ πατὴρ *εἴκοσι μνᾶς ἀργυρίου καὶ τριάκοντα στατῆρας*.
>
> In the eighth year after this, the elder of the two young men came of age. Diogeiton summoned him and told him that their father had left them twenty minas of silver and thirty staters.[36]

31 E.g. Is. 11.41: *συνέβη δὲ Στρακλεῖ πρὸς τοῖς ὑπάρχουσι πλέον ἢ πένθ' ἡμιταλάντων οὐσίαν λαβεῖν·*

32 E.g. in Dem. 34.40–41, where the rhetorical point hinges on the comparison between 39 minas and 2600 drachmas, one would expect the comparison to be more compelling when the 39 minas are converted into 3900 drachmas.

33 See Cohen (1997: 117 n. 28, 149) for the details of the debate.

34 Gagarin (2014: 89).

35 28 Attic drachmas, according to the speaker (Dem. 34.23–24). See Carey (1989: ad loc.).

36 Unless otherwise indicated, all translations of Lysias' *Against Diogeiton* are by Todd (2000).

The audience immediately knows that Diogeiton must be lying, because the same twenty minas and thirty staters that were left to Diodotus' wife are now presented as the son's inheritance.[37] By not converting the sum into a homogenous lump sum, the odd amount remains ear-marked and traceable for the audience. Therefore, it remains speculative to establish what kind of orally performed calculations would have been "easy to follow" for an audience in an Athenian court.

Let us now move on from the question whether or not the audience was *actually* capable and willing to follow a calculation to the question to what extent the audience was *expected* to do so and to what end. How are the calculations presented by the speaker and how do they fit in into the overall strategies of the forensic cases involved? What role is assigned to the audience? What relationship between speaker and audience is presupposed in these calculations? And what values and status are attributed to the calculations?

In what follows, two extreme examples will be compared: *Against Diogeiton* (Lys. 32) and *Against Aphobus 1* (Dem. 27). On the face of it, both speeches have many similarities: both are private inheritance speeches against guardians who are alleged to have mismanaged the property; both cases involve complex financial transactions (estate leases, maritime loans) that needed to be presented and explained to a jury of ordinary citizens.[38] However, there are some striking differences in overall strategy and tone that serve as a salutary reminder that there is no one universal "meaning of arithmetic" that can be taken for granted and that even a phenomenon such as mathematics can have different meanings and values attributed to it.

Lysias' Moral Arithmetic

Against Diogeiton is exemplary for Lysias' qualities in forensic speech-writing: the narrative is lucid and restrained, rousing emotion by the vivid portrayal of the duped family (most notably the victim's mother, who is quoted in direct

37 This is made explicit later in the narrative where Diodotus' wife is quoted in direct discourse: 'ἔπειτα σὺ ἐτόλμησας' ἔφη 'εἰπεῖν, ἔχων τοσαῦτα χρήματα, *ὡς δισχιλίας δραχμὰς ὁ τούτων πατὴρ κατέλιπε καὶ τριάκοντα στατῆρας*, ἅπερ ἐμοὶ καταλειφθέντα ἐκείνου τελευτήσαντος ἐγώ σοι ἔδωκα; (…)' (Lys. 32.15).

38 Because of this similarity in subject matter the cases against Diogeiton and Aphobus are often compared in scholarship. E.g. Lamb (2000: 657), on Lys. 32. For a general comparison of argumentative strategies in Demosthenes 27 and Lysias 32 see Gagarin (2014).

speech) and of the cold-blooded avarice and dishonesty of Diogeiton.[39] In what survives from the proof section,[40] where most of the arithmetic occurs, Lysias explicitly[41] avoids the dry and potentially confusing details inherent to property cases. Instead he selectively picks on a number of specific items that characterize Diogeiton's maladministration:

(2) Lysias, *Against Diogeiton* 20:

> καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ἦλθεν *ἀναισχυντίας*, ὥστε οὐκ ἔχων ὅποι τρέψειε τὰ χρήματα, εἰς ὄψον μὲν δυοῖν παιδίοιν καὶ ἀδελφῇ *πέντε ὀβολοὺς* τῆς ἡμέρας ἐλογίζετο, εἰς ὑποδήματα δὲ καὶ εἰς γναφεῖον {ἱμάτια} καὶ εἰς κουρέως *κατὰ μῆνα οὐκ ἦν αὐτῷ οὐδὲ κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν γεγραμμένα*, συλλήβδην δὲ παντὸς τοῦ χρόνου *πλέον ἢ τάλαντον ἀργυρίου*.
>
> He has become so shameless that when he ran out of expenses to claim, he recorded the sum of five obols per day for food for two little boys and their sister. Instead of a monthly or yearly figure for shoes or laundry or haircuts, he recorded as a lump sum over the whole period more than a talent of silver.

The morally charged context (ἀναισχυντίας) strongly suggests that the jurors were meant to see the figure of five obols as a "gross overestimate".[42] Moreover, Diogeiton's calculation of the total amount of money spend on shoes, laundry and haircuts, is described as irresponsibly impressionistic: having kept no records at all (κατὰ μῆνα οὐκ ἦν αὐτῷ οὐδὲ κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν γεγραμμένα) he arrives at the preposterous grand total of more than a talent of silver.

As Carey points out,[43] this comes down to an average cost over eight years of two drachmas per day, "clearly a wildly exaggerated figure". What is remarkable, however, is that this calculation, that would allow the average citizen to compare the figure with their own living expenses, is not made explicit by Lysias. The speech-writer expects the grand total of "more than one talent", a monetary amount that scarcely anyone will have had any mental representation of

39 Lys. 32 has not come down to us in the direct tradition of Lysias' speeches, but is quoted by Dionysius of Halicarnassus in his essay on Lysias as a prime example of his extraordinary skills in forensic speechwriting (Dion. Hal. *De Ant. Or.* 1.23 ff.).

40 Dionysius' citation breaks off at 32.29.

41 Lys. 32.26: καθ' ἕκαστον (…) πολὺ ἂν ἔργον εἴη πρὸς ὑμᾶς λογίζεσθαι.

42 Carey (1989: 200).

43 Carey (1989: 200).

(compare our "billion dollars"), to do its work, i.e. to convey the general impression of a large estate squandered by large and irresponsible spendings. Adding insult to injury, Diogeiton's maladministration extends even to the Diodotus' tomb and to communal religious obligations:

(3) Lysias, *Against Diogeiton* 21:

εἰς δὲ τὸ μνῆμα τοῦ πατρὸς οὐκ ἀναλώσας *πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι μνᾶς ἐκ πεντακισχιλίων δραχμῶν*, τὸ μὲν ἥμισυ αὐτῷ τίθησι, ⟨τὸ δὲ⟩ τούτοις λελόγισται. εἰς Διονύσια τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, (οὐκ ἄτοπον γάρ μοι δοκεῖ καὶ περὶ τούτου μνησθῆναι) *ἑκκαίδεκα δραχμῶν* ἀπέφηνεν ἐωνημένον ἀρνίον, καὶ τούτων τὰς ὀκτὼ δραχμὰς ἐλογίζετο τοῖς παισίν· ἐφ' ᾧ ἡμεῖς οὐχ ἥκιστα *ὠργίσθημεν*. οὕτως, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἐν ταῖς μεγάλαις ζημίαις ἐνίοτε οὐχ ἧττον τὰ μικρὰ *λυπεῖ* τοὺς ἀδικουμένους· λίαν γὰρ φανερὰν τὴν *πονηρίαν* τῶν ἀδικούντων ἐπιδείκνυσιν.

On the tomb of their father, he spent no more than twenty-five minas out of the five thousand drachmas he claimed, but he charged half this sum to himself and the rest to their account. And I think you deserve to hear another story as well. He claims, gentlemen of the jury, to have spent sixteen drachmas buying a lamb for the feast of the Dionysia, and of this sum he charged eight drachmas to the boys' account. We were particularly angry about this: it is in this way, gentlemen, that the small things in great crimes sometimes hurt the victims more than the large ones, because they make the wickedness of the perpetrators so terribly clear.

Again the argumentative force depends not so much on the quality of the calculations but on the immediately evident implausibility of Diogeiton's accounts. The figures do not invite the audience to meticulously go over the calculations again; they appeal to common sense and everyday experience. Twenty-five minas are enough to keep a family alive for over two years[44] and sixteen drachmas for a sacrificial lamb is outrageous. People do not need to calculate this; people *know*.

In both cases, Diogeiton's accounts cannot be refuted with decisive evidence. Whereas in §§26–27 the speaker can actually prove Diogeiton's mismanagement of a trierarchy, Diogeiton's account of the costs and expenditures of providing for the children is harder to refute. Hence, the speaker resorts to a variety of strategies to incriminate Diogeiton:

44 Carey (1989: 220). Again not a calculation made explicit by Lysias himself.

- there is no need for accounts when the figures are so evidently nonsensical (T2 and 3);
- it is suspicious that detailed accounts are *lacking* (T2);
- on the other hand, *overmuch* eagerness for bookkeeping is equally inappropriate when one ought to just take care of one's family (T4):

(4) Lysias, *Against Diogeiton* 22:

εἰς τοίνυν τὰς ἄλλας ἑορτὰς καὶ θυσίας ἐλογίσατο αὐτοῖς πλέον ἢ τετρακισχιλίας δραχμὰς ἀνηλωμένας, *ἕτερά τε παμπληθῆ, ἃ πρὸς τὸ κεφάλαιον συνελογίζετο,* ὥσπερ διὰ τοῦτο ἐπίτροπος τῶν παιδίων καταλειφθείς, *ἵνα γράμματ' αὐτοῖς ἀντὶ τῶν χρημάτων ἀποδείξειεν* καὶ πενεστάτους ἀντὶ πλουσίων ἀποφήνειε, καὶ ἵνα, εἰ μέν τις αὐτοῖς πατρικὸς ἐχθρὸς ἦν, ἐκείνου μὲν ἐπιλάθωνται, τῷ δ' ἐπιτρόπῳ τῶν πατρῴων ἀπεστερημένοι *πολεμῶσι.*

As for the other festivals and sacrifices, he charged to the boys an expenditure of more than four thousand drachmas, and there were all sorts of other things he reckoned up together as a lump sum. It was as if he had been left as guardian for the boys so that he could show them paper instead of money, so that he could make them paupers instead of rich men, and so that they could forget about the enemies (if any) that they had inherited, and should instead fight with their guardian for depriving them of their inheritance.

Whereas in T2 the lack of detail in Diogeiton's bookkeeping is a source of reproach and suspicion, here it is the mishmash of items (ἕτερά τε παμπληθῆ) that are kept track of that is used against him: it is as if to Diogeiton, petty and mean, being a guardian of his kin means showing them accounts (γράμματα) instead of money (χρήματα)—essentially hostile behavior (implied to be worse than any potentially inherited personal enemy (τις πατρικὸς ἐχθρός)) of the person who ought to have been a φίλος to them.[45]

Whenever the speaker calls attention to the details of a calculation (the λογισμός), he does so to provoke moral indignation and to arouse moral emotions: Diogeiton's accounts demonstrate his shamelessness (T2: ἀναισχυντία, T3: πονηρία) and they understandably incite anger (T3: ὀργίζω) and distress (T3: λυπέω). Similarly:

45 Athenian households seem to have used written documents and accounts solely for external transactions. Johnstone (2011: 65). Cf. Foxhall (1998) for the illuminating notion of "limits of trust".

(5) Lysias, *Against Diogeiton* 19:

ἀξιῶ τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, *τῷ λογισμῷ* προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, *ἵνα* τοὺς μὲν νεανίσκους διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῶν συμφορῶν *ἐλεήσητε*, τοῦτον δ' ἅπασι τοῖς πολίταις *ἄξιον ὀργῆς ἡγήσησθε*.

I ask you, gentlemen of the jury, to pay close attention to the statement of accounts, so that you may pity the young men because of the scale of what they have suffered, and may realize that my opponent deserves the anger of every citizen.

The explicit aim of drawing attention to the calculation (τῷ λογισμῷ) is to provoke pity (ἵνα ἐλεήσητε) and anger (ἄξιον ὀργῆς ἡγήσησθε)—an emotional and moral aim that we will see is diametrically opposed to the self-presentation of Demosthenes as an accurate expert and a precise calculator.

Demosthenes and *Akribeia*

In his first speech against his own guardian Aphobus, Demosthenes' overt concern lies with presenting detailed and complete information. His self-presentation revolves around gaining credibility as an expert, as an instructor before an audience that lacks accurate knowledge[46] and that must be informed and taught by Demosthenes.[47] Although indirect evidence has already been provided unwittingly by the opponents themselves (they had registered Demosthenes in the highest tax bracket,[48] thereby admitting the size of his property), Demosthenes insists that the judges gain a more detailed (καθ' ἕκαστον)[49] insight in the precise property holdings so that they may gain "accurate" (ἀκριβῶς) or "more accurate" (ἀκριβέστερον) knowledge.[50]

46 Dem. 27.1: ὑμᾶς τοὺς οὐδὲν τῶν ἡμετέρων *ἀκριβῶς ἐπισταμένους*.

47 Dem. 27:3 ὅθεν οὖν ῥᾷστα *μαθήσεσθε* περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐντεῦθεν ὑμᾶς καὶ ἐγὼ πρῶτον πειράσομαι *διδάσκειν*.

48 Dem. 27.7. Cf. 28.4.

49 Dem. 27.7.

50 Dem. 27.7: ταῦτα γὰρ *μαθόντες ἀκριβῶς εἴσεσθε* (…); 27.9: ἔτι δ' *ἀκριβέστερον εἴσεσθε* τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτὴν ἀκούσαντες. But there is a limit to the extent of accuracy that can be attained in Demosthenes' argumentation: the jury "would have had still more exact knowledge" (ἀκριβέστερον ἔγνωτ' ἄν) if the opponents would have been willing to hand over the will of Demosthenes' father (27.40).

David Mirhady argues that Demosthenes' insistence on detailed communication and accurate knowledge[51] in *Against Aphobus* serves not only to recover his legacy, but also to advertise his mastery of the technical aspects of law and finance[52]—i.e. to advertise his skills as a speech-writer in a time that was markedly different from the late fifth century when Lysias was active. In the late 370s, when Demosthenes' career took off with his dispute against his guardians, the written word and the authority of law had gained importance within the Athenian judicial framework.[53] Forensic oratory had become more "technical" in the (paradoxical) sense that the type of proof that Aristotle would later call the *atechnoi pisteis*,[54] the "artless proofs" dealing with various forms of documentary evidence (laws, witness testimonies, contracts and accounts), gained more weight.[55]

The *atechnoi pisteis* are the domain of ἀκρίβεια, commitment to detail, as opposed to *entechnoi pisteis*, i.e. arguments based on probability and character-crafting (Lysias' forte), that are never characterized as ἀκριβής in fourth-century oratory.[56] This contrast may help us describe the differences in strategy between Lysias and Demosthenes: Lysias' calculations are either integrated in a vivid narration or in an emotional outburst designed to incite moral indignation; Demosthenes' long, detailed and sustained calculations are self-referential, i.e. they serve to characterize the speaker by highlighting his skill, objectivity and commitment to detail. Lysias aims at character-assassination of the opponent, Demosthenes at constructing the persona of a legal and financial expert.

51 A similar "cognitive" preoccupation with accuracy can be found in Isaeus' *On the Estate of Hagnias* where *akribeia* and cognates occur three times in collocation with a form of μανθάνω. Is. 11.3, 11.15, 11.38. The lexical appendix in Kurz (1970) shows that the majority of collocations of ἀρκιβῶς with cognitive verbs (μανθάνω, οἶδα, ἐπίσταμαι) occurs in Demosthenes' oeuvre.

52 Mirhady (2000).

53 Ostwald (1986); Harris (1994).

54 Mirhady (2000: 183).

55 Mirhady (2000: 181–186). Cf. Rydberg-Cox (2002). An analogous process (but decades earlier, i.e. in the 430s) is described by Lisa Kallet-Marx in the realm of political oratory, where fiscal and financial expertise have become central to political leadership and where orators start to function as instructors in financial affairs, filtering financial information for their audience and shaping public economic thought. Kallet-Marx (1994). It is in this context that we find the symbouleutic calculation of Pericles (Thuc. 2.13) and its parody in Aristoph. *Wasps*. Cf. Papageorgiou (2004).

56 Kurz (1970: 20–21).

Appropriating the value ἀκρίβεια for his long and potentially tedious calculations, Demosthenes shapes an ideology of rhetorical craftsmanship, where exactness evokes its origin in the realm of *technê*,[57] where commitment to detail is an antidote against emotional pleading by opponents,[58] where exactness is a norm in court,[59] where exact knowledge is indisputable[60] and complete,[61] but where absolute exactness can only be obtained by measuring, weighing and counting.[62]

Although it does seem almost self-evident that accuracy and precision are necessary conditions for lawful procedure, the ideal of ἀκριβεία does not always sit easily with the overtly oral context of forensic oratory. Overmuch attention to detail raises the suspicion of writtenness, overpreparedness, and hence of non- or anti-democratic sentiments. Hence, in rhetorical theory the ideal of precision is a distinctive feature of *written* communication:[63] valued positively in works that are meant to be read, such as Thucydides' history,[64] but discour-

---

57 Kurz (1970) hypothesizes that the original field of application of the adjective ἀκριβής and the adverb ἀκριβῶς was the domain of craftsmanship. It is presumed that the lexemes originally occurred in collocation with ἁρμόττω, indicating a sense of "fitting seamlessly" (1–12). In the fourth century too ἀκρίβεια and τέχνη remained tightly connected.

58 E.g., Is. 11.38 where the speaker points out that his opponent is attempting to arouse prejudice (φθόνος) against him and pity (ἔλεος) in favor of his children and that *therefore* (implied in οὔκουν) it is crucial that the jury learns the exact truth (ἀρκιβῶς καὶ ταῦτα μαθεῖν).

59 Speakers in court promise to render everything exactly (Lyc. 31, Dem. 8.38, 18.21, 29.57, 52.3, 59.17), claim to have a witness with exact knowledge (Dem. 30.27, 36.14, 55.3, 59.121), claim to have more exact knowledge than their opponents (Isoc. 4.53, 12.36, 12.85, Dem. 3.2, 19.257), flatter the jury for having exact knowledge (Isoc. 16.22, Dem. 6.35, 10.75, 12.13, 58.45, Din. 2.2, 2.11), oblige the opponent to live up to the norm of accuracy (Isoc. 15.173, Is. 4.11, Dem. 41.17), and apologize for the lack of exact knowledge (Isoc. 5.29, 6.24, 8.80, 9.73, 14.50; Aesch. 1.40, 2.118; Dem. 23.148, 45.3, 61.10). See Kurz (1970: 14–22).

60 ἀκριβής knowledge is contrasted with words of the roots δοκ-, πιστ-, εἰκ-; e.g. Gorg. *Pal.* 22; Soph. *Trach.* 229.

61 ἀκρίβεια is contrasted with knowledge that is communicated τύπῳ, βραχέως or συντόμως. See Kurz (1970: chapter 2).

62 Hipp. *VM* I.588.13–15, Vict. A. VI. 470.13–17, 592.1–3; Pl. *Men.* 83E, *Phlb.* 56B–61D. Cf. Aristotle's reminder that τὸ ἀκριβές should not be sought in the same way in all fields of inquiry (*EN* 1094b12–14). Cf. Kurz (1970: 62–87).

63 Cf. Aristotle's distinction between the written style (λέξις γραφική) that is characterized as "most precise" (ἀκριβεστατή) and the debating style (λέξις ἀγωνιστική) that is "most performative" (ὑποκριτικωτάτη) (*Rhet.* 3.12). See on this: Gagarin (1999); Gagarin (2002: 27).

64 E.g., the methodological remarks in Thuc. 1.22 on the difficulty of remembering the precise

aged by Alcidamas for purposes of court speeches.[65] Although documentary evidence did become more prominent in 4th-century oratory, public oratory itself remained a "visibly textless sphere":[66] laws and testimonies, the material of the *atechnoi pisteis*, were read out by a public servant, but the actual delivery of the speech was thoroughly "oral" in the sense that no manuscripts were used.[67] Writtenness and overmuch preparation evoked distrust and the suspicion of manipulation.[68]

This is precisely what Demosthenes is blamed for in later tradition:[69] his arguments were said to "smell of lamp wicks"[70] and he was alleged to be incapable of improvisation (speaking ἐπὶ καιροῦ).[71] As a response, Demosthenes allegedly admitted that his speeches were "neither altogether unwritten, nor yet fully written out" (οὔτε γράψας οὔτ' ἄγραφα κομιδῇ λέγειν),[72] claiming moreover that "the man who prepares what he says is democratic"[73] whereas indifference towards the multitude "marks a man of oligarchical spirit, one who relies on force rather than on persuasion".[74] Demosthenes' paradoxical relation to writing and preparation in later tradition seems to suggest at least that his speaking style, including his self-professed ἀκρίβεια, has features of written communication to an extent that Demosthenes' could be imagined defending his allegedly "undemocratic" level of preparation.

---

wording (τὴν ἀκρίβειαν αὐτὴν) of speeches and on the objective to report events (ἔργα) with as much precision as possible (ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀκριβείᾳ). On Thucydides' ideal of ἀκριβεία and its use to establish the authority of his written text, see Crane (1996: 27–74).

65 Alcidamas, *On the Sophists* 13. Cf. Cole (1991: 71–94), in particular 74. A similar negative attitude to ἀκρίβεια in a forensic context can be found in the apology of the defendant in Antiphon's Second Tetralogy that his speech may seem ἀκριβέστερον than the audience is used to. Ant. 3.2.1–2. Cf. Gagarin (2002: 27).

66 Schloemann (2002: 137).

67 Schloemann (2002: 136).

68 Schloemann (2002).

69 On Demosthenes' image in later Greek and Roman rhetorical theory, philosophy and biography, see Cooper (2000).

70 Plut. *Dem.* 8.4.

71 Plut. *Dem.* 8.1–7.

72 Plut. *Dem.* 8.6.

73 Plut. *Dem.* 8.6: καὶ μέντοι δημοτικὸν ἀπέφαινεν ἄνδρα τὸν λέγειν μελετῶντα.

74 Plut. *Dem.* 8.6–7: τὸ δ' ὅπως ἕξουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ πρὸς τὸν λόγον ἀφροντιστεῖν ὀλιγαρχικοῦ καὶ βίᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ πειθοῖ προσέχοντος.

Demosthenes' Live Arithmetic

In this light, it becomes understandable that Demosthenes takes care to construct ἀκρίβεια as a *democratic*, or communicative, value, inextricably bound up with transparency of procedure. This construction of arithmetical ἀκρίβεια as an oratorical feature that aims to include and empower the non-specialist audience presupposes an implicit "theory of arithmetic":

– calculations are conceived of and presented as **timeless**: they may have taken place before the speech (by Demosthenes or by the guardians in preparing their respective cases), but they can be re-enacted, and hence checked and corrected, any time.
– arithmetic **levels the argumentative playing field**: once all participants have the same basic information at their disposal, each and every one of them can autonomously apply the same inferential rules and arrive at the same conclusion.
– The arithmetic *procedure* is understood as self-evident and **mechanical**: there is no room for disagreement or doubt about the arithmetic itself. The speaker may feel the need to account for his premises (the basic information, i.e. what do we know about the various resources of the estate and how can we be reasonably sure about these?) and to explain the procedure (how does one go about in calculating interest?), but the procedure itself is beyond negotiation.

The timeless and repeatable nature of calculations comes to the fore in Demosthenes' keenness to present his calculations as taking place "live" in court, on the spot, open for everyone to follow and to participate in:

(6) Demosthenes, *Against Aphobus 1* 9–10:

> ὁ γὰρ πατήρ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, κατέλιπεν δύ' ἐργαστήρια, τέχνης οὐ μικρᾶς ἑκάτερον, μαχαιροποιοὺς μὲν τριάκοντα καὶ δύ' ἢ τρεῖς, ἀνὰ πέντε μνᾶς καὶ ἕξ, τοὺς δ' οὐκ ἐλάττονος ἢ τριῶν μνῶν ἀξίους, ἀφ' ὧν τριάκοντα μνᾶς ἀτελεῖς ἐλάμβανεν τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ τὴν πρόσοδον, κλινοποιοὺς δ' εἴκοσι τὸν ἀριθμόν, τετταράκοντα μνῶν ὑποκειμένους, οἳ δώδεκα μνᾶς ἀτελεῖς αὐτῷ προσέφερον, ἀργυρίου δ' εἰς τάλαντον ἐπὶ δραχμῇ δεδανεισμένου, οὗ τόκος *ἐγίγνετο* τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ ἑκάστου πλεῖν ἢ ἑπτὰ μναῖ. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἐνεργὰ κατέλιπεν, ὡς καὶ αὐτοὶ οὗτοι ὁμολογήσουσιν· ὧν *γίγνεται* τοῦ μὲν ἀρχαίου κεφάλαιον τέτταρα τάλαντα καὶ πεντακισχίλιαι, τὸ δ' ἔργον αὐτῶν πεντήκοντα μναῖ τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ ἑκάστου.

> My father, men of the jury, left two workshops, each engaged in a not unimportant craft: one with thirty-two or thirty-three knife-makers, worth 5 or 6 minas each, or in some cases at least 3 minas, from whom he was getting a net income of 30 minas a year; the other with twenty bed-makers, who were security for a loan of 40 minas and who brought him a net income of 12 minas; also about a talent of silver, lent at a drachma, on which the interest amounted to more than 7 minas every year. Those were the income-producing assets he left, as these men themselves will agree. Their total capital value amounts to 4 talents 5,000 drachmas, and the income from them to 50 minas a year.[75]

The inventory of Demosthenes' father's property is still part of the narrative: the indicative verbs have narrative past tenses (*κατέλιπεν*; ἐλάμβανεν). One of the items on the inventory is money on loan[76] with interest of one drachma[77] attached to it; the interest is elaborated upon (it amounts to "more than seven minas per year"[78]), in a relative subordinate clause, but still presented as part of the narrative (ἐγίγνετο)—although strictly speaking the interest involves a calculation, here it is treated as an unproblematic.

The "live" calculation starts in the next sentence, after a brief restatement (*καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἐνεργὰ κατέλιπεν*) closes off the narrative section, preparing a discourse switch to an argumentative mode.[79] The relevant point of the inventory is its total: the entries amount to (γίγνεται, present tense) a principal of four talents and five thousand drachmas[80] and the proceeds to fifty minas per year.[81] The present tense of γίγνεται opens up the argument for the audience, creating an impression of an audience doing their own arithmetic on the spot *with* Demosthenes, of accuracy being communicated and secured by

---

75 Translation MacDowell adapted. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations of Demosthenes' *Against Aphobus* are by MacDowell (2004). On the financial particularities of Demosthenes' property, see Cohen (1997: 121ff.); Johnstone (2011: 137–141).

76 "Up to" a talent, the preposition εἱς gives an upper-limit. Rubincam (1979).

77 I.e. one drachma per mina per month, which is 1% per month.

78 12% per annum. 12% of 6000 drachmas is 720 drachmas.

79 On discourse modes, see Carlotta Smith's standard work (2003); see Allan (2009) for an exemplary application in the field of Greek text linguistics.

80 Pearson and North (1972), 115 on the implausibility of the number.

81 Cf. Dem. 34.24: *τὸ δὲ σύμπαν κεφάλαιον* *γίγνεται* *τόσον καὶ τόσον*. Something similar we see in Isaeus' *Estate of Hagnias* 11.42: Ἐδάφη μὲν ταῦτα, ἀφ' ὧν ἡ μίσθωσις τοῦ μὲν ἀγροῦ δώδεκα μναῖ, τῶν δὲ οἰκιῶν τρεῖς, αἳ πεντεκαίδεκα μναῖ συναμφότερα *γίγνονται* · χρέα δ' ἐπὶ τόκοις ὀφειλόμενα περὶ τετρακισχιλίας, ὧν τὸ ἔργον ἐπ' ἐννέα ὀβολοῖς ἑπτακόσιαι καὶ εἴκοσι δραχμαὶ *γίγνονται* τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ ἑκάστου.

the re-enactment of the process of calculation.[82] By presenting his calculations in the present tense, Demosthenes makes his forensic arithmetic a collective endeavor, explicitly inviting the jury to do their own math:[83]

(7) Demosthenes, *Against Aphobus 1* 35:

λαβεῖν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἐμῶν ὁμολογοῦσιν οὗτος μὲν ὀκτὼ καὶ ἑκατὸν μνᾶς, χωρὶς ὧν ἔχοντ' αὐτὸν ἐγὼ ἐπιδείξω νῦν, Θηριππίδης δὲ δύο τάλαντα, Δημοφῶν δ' ἑπτὰ καὶ ὀγδοήκοντα μνᾶς. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ πέντε τάλαντα καὶ πεντεκαίδεκα μναῖ. τούτου τοίνυν ὃ μὲν οὐχ ἄθρουν ἐλήφθη, σχεδόν εἰσιν ἑβδομήκοντα μναῖ καὶ ἑπτά, ἡ πρόσοδος ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνδραπόδων, ὃ δ' εὐθὺς ἔλαβον οὗτοι, μικροῦ δέοντα τέτταρα τάλαντα· οἷς τὸ ἔργον *ἂν προσθῆτ'* ἐπὶ δραχμῇ μόνον τῶν δέκ' ἐτῶν, ὀκτὼ τάλανθ' *εὑρήσετε* σὺν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις καὶ χιλίας γιγνομένας.

The amounts of my money which they acknowledge receiving are: Aphobus, 108 minas apart from what I shall now prove he has kept; Therippides, 2 talents; Demophon, 87 minas. That makes 5 talents 15 minas. Of this, the amount which was not received all at once—the income from the slaves—is nearly 77 minas, and the amount they received immediately is a little less than 4 talents. If you add to that the ten years' interest at a rate of only a drachma, you'll find that with the principal it comes to 8 talents 1,000 drachmas.

---

82 Although this "timeless" use of calculations may seem self-evident and trivial, it is instructive to note that this is by no means the only way of presenting calculations in contexts of mass communications. A case in point is the use of calculations of interests in *paradosis*-inscriptions, e.g. *IG* I[3] 369, lines 12–14: [*h*έκτε δόσις ἐπὶ τε̑ς Ἐρε[χθεΐδος πρυταν]- || [είας] δεκάτες πρυτανευόσε[ς, ἐσελελ]υθυίας *h*επτὰ ἐμέρας τε̑ς πρυτανείας, Δ̣𐅈Τ[ΤΤΧΧΧ· τόκος τού]- || [τοις] *ἐγένετο* ΧΧΧΧΗ𐅄ΔΔ⊢⊢⟨⊢⟩[ΙΙΙΙ. ("The sixth instalment under the prytany of Erechtheis being the prytany for the tenth time, the prytany had been in function for seven days, 18 talents and 3000 drachmas; the interest on these *produced* 4173 drachmas and 4 obols."). The temporal orientation is to the past: the inscription is to be read as a report of an accountability procedure that has taken place in the past. The fact that the arithmetic function word ἐγένετο is a past tense conveys that audit has taken place (the formula with the aorist ἐγένετο recurs in lines 5 (restored), 20, 29, 32, 39 (restored), 41, 44, 53, 101, 113 (restored), 115 (restored)). To be sure, the calculation *can* be "re-enacted" (all the relevant data are made available), but is not imagined to actually take place on the spot. The procedure is closed and the inscription memorializes the fact that the democratic ritual of accountability has taken place, monumentalizing the event of accountability without specifically *inviting* re-enactment of the calculation. On the financial details, see Meritt (1932).

83 Cf. 27.11: εὑρήσετε; 27.37: ἂν ἀφέλητε.

Using second person verb forms (ἂν προσθῆτ', εὑρήσετε) Demosthenes voluntarily offers his calculation to the scrutiny of the jury who are invited to participate in the arithmetic and to re-enact the calculation.[84] The only elements that Demosthenes needs to account for are his basic premises: whereas results of calculations are imagined to be products of necessity yielding inevitable consensus, the premises are objects of choice. Demosthenes systematically motivates these choices, for instance when he chooses the rhetorically stronger position of taking the data provided by his *opponents* as the basis of this calculations:

(8) Demosthenes, *Against Aphobus 1* 17:

> Τὴν μὲν τοίνυν προῖκα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἔχει λαβών. μὴ γήμαντος δ' αὐτοῦ τὴν μητέρα τὴν ἐμήν, ὁ μὲν νόμος κελεύει τὴν προῖκ' ὀφείλειν ἐπ' ἐννέ' ὀβολοῖς, *ἐγὼ* δ' ἐπὶ δραχμῇ μόνον *τίθημι. γίγνεται δ', ἐάν τις συντιθῇ* τό τ' ἀρχαῖον καὶ τὸ ἔργον τῶν δέκ' ἐτῶν, *μάλιστα* τρία τάλαντα.
>
> So in this way he received the dowry and has kept it. But if he didn't marry my mother, the law requires him to owe interest on the dowry at the rate of 9 obols; but I'll reckon it at only a drachma. If you add together the principal and the income for ten years, it comes to about 3 talents.[85]

Here Demosthenes presents himself ostentatiously as more lenient than the law, by magnanimously agreeing to reckon at the lower rate of a drachma interest on the dowry (per mina per month) instead of 9 obols. The procedure is emphatically made explicit and accounted for in the first-person ἐγὼ … τίθημι. This type of maneuver, the "charitable interpretation" of Aphobus' behavior (by methodologically overestimating his spending), recurs several times throughout the speech.[86]

---

84 This way of constructing calculation as a collective performance, with explicit second person invitations to the jury to participate, seems unique to Demosthenes. Admittedly in Lys. 32.25 we find a praeteritio (πολὺ ἂν ἔργον εἴη πρὸς ὑμᾶς λογίζεσθαι) that implies a second person that is following the arithmetic. But there, the point seems to be to dissuade the audience from doing the math.

85 MacDowell (2004: 26 n. 26): "Interest of 9 obols per mina per month = 18 percent per annum; 1 drachma per mina per month = 12 percent per annum. At this rate, the total of principal and interest for ten years comes to 2 talents 56 minas."

86 E.g. in 127.34, Demosthenes, for the sake of argument, announces to proceed the calculation on the basis of his *opponents*' accounts (παρὰ τὸν λόγον ὃν ἀποφέρουσιν)—but with a

The objective behind this methodological overestimation of Aphobus' spendings, is to demonstrate that even on this extremely charitable calculation, Aphobus embezzled a substantial amount of money: as Demosthenes makes explicit later on,[87] taking the opponents' figures (that are clear overestimations) as a point of departure guarantees that there is no room left "to dispute" (ἀντειπεῖν) the outcomes, for even on this charitable calculation the guardians *must necessarily* (ἐστὶν ἀναγκαῖον), on the basis of their own acknowledgements (ἐξ ὧν αὐτοὶ λαβεῖν ὁμολογοῦσιν), have the seven talents that were supposed to be left. The premises of calculation are chosen and elaborately motivated; the outcome is a product of logical necessity, the result of mechanically following an impersonal procedure:

(9) Demosthenes, *Against Aphobus 1* 36:

τὴν μὲν τοίνυν τροφὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἑβδομήκοντα μνῶν καὶ ἑπτὰ *λογιστέον* τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐργαστηρίου γενομένων. Θηριππίδης γὰρ ἑπτὰ μνᾶς ἐδίδου καθ' ἕκαστον τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν εἰς ταῦτα, καὶ ἡμεῖς τοῦτο λαβεῖν ὁμολογοῦμεν. *ὥσθ'* ἑβδομήκοντα μνῶν ἐν τοῖς δέκ' ἔτεσιν τροφὴν τούτων ἡμῖν ἀνηλωκότων, τὸ περιὸν τὰς ἑπτακοσίας *προστίθημ'* αὐτοῖς, καὶ τούτων πλείω εἰμὶ τεθηκώς. ὃ δ' ἐμοὶ δοκιμασθέντι παρέδοσαν καὶ ὅσον εἰς τὴν πόλιν εἰσενηνόχασιν, τοῦτ' ἀπὸ τῶν ὀκτὼ ταλάντων καὶ τοῦ προσόντος *ἀφαιρετέον* ἐστίν.

The cost of maintenance is to be reckoned against the 77 minas coming from the workshop. Theripiddes paid 7 minas each year for this purpose, and I acknowledge receiving it. So, since they expended 70 minas on my maintenance in ten years, I am giving them additional credit for the extra 700 drachmas, reckoning the expenditure at a higher rate than they do. What they handed over to me when I was passed as an adult and the sum they contributed as *eisphora* to the city has to be deducted from the amount of more than 8 talents.

---

higher degree of precision (he will calculate the spendings separately, χωρίς), and, again for the sake of argument, at a higher rate than his opponents do. Here again, the procedure is laid out emphatically and ostentatiously, announced with first person futures (ἐπιδείξω) with conjunct participles explaining the procedure (πλείω τιθείς, ἀφαιρῶν).

87 Dem. 27 36–37: *ἐγὼ δ' ὑπερβαλὼν τοῦτο ποιήσω* τριάκοντα μνᾶς, *ἵνα πρὸς ταῦτα μηδ' ἀντειπεῖν ἔχωσιν*. οὐκοῦν ἂν ἀφέλητε τὸ τάλαντον ἀπὸ τῶν ὀκτὼ ταλάντων, ἑπτὰ τὰ λειπόμεν' ἐστί, καὶ ταῦτα, *ἐξ ὧν αὐτοὶ λαβεῖν ὁμολογοῦσι*, τούτους ἔχειν *ἐστὶν ἀναγκαῖον*. τοῦτο τοίνυν, εἰ καὶ τἄλλα πάντ' ἀποστεροῦσιν ἀρνούμενοι μὴ ἔχειν, ἀποδοῦναι προσῆκεν, ὁμολογοῦντάς γε λαβεῖν ταῦτ' ἐκ τῶν ἐμῶν.

Once the premises are accounted for (cf. the first person προστίθημι and the participle τεθηκώς), there is no overt agency in the calculation anymore, only a self-evident procedure, here marked with two verbal adjectives (λογιστέον, ἀφαιρετέον)—a linguistic feature that, as Andreas Willi argues, expresses "universal deontic statements" of "generalizing and didactic value",[88] and that Demosthenes uses to indicate that speaker and audience are subjected to the same procedure. It is not his idea to conduct the calculations this way; he is merely fulfilling an obligation, submitting himself to an impersonal procedure of how such calculations work.[89]

This is Demosthenes' self-professed ἀκρίβεια at work.[90] Whereas Lysias seems to be concealing the technical aspects of calculation, or "humanizing" them by embedding them in narratives that provoke empathy and moral indignation, Demosthenes is keen on demonstrating the technical aspects and on presenting his *persona* not only as meticulously in control over the evidence, but also as detached and adhering to standards;[91] not only instructing his audience but also presenting calculations that are fair, charitable towards his opponents, transparent and subject to the procedural necessity.

Orality and Imprecision

Given the value that Demosthenes attaches to the standard of ἀκρίβεια, it is striking that in *Against Aphobus* there is virtually no number mentioned that is

88 Willi (2003: 148).

89 Cf. Willi (2003: 145 n. 66): "The verbal adjectives in -τέος express obligation rather than necessity."

90 Willi (2003: 145–148) shows that although no writer uses verbal adjectives on -τεος so profusely as Plato, among the orators the verbal adjective is most frequently used by Demosthenes (97 times against 5 times in Lysias—although one will have to correct for the size of their respective preserved oeuvres). According to Willi, verbal adjectives are colloquial in origin and tend to occur more often in genres with linguistic features close to spoken Attic (such as comedy) or mimicking colloquial speech (Plato).

91 Cf. Crane (1996). This procedural approach seems to be in line with Markus Asper's description of mathematical instructions on papyri that represent a tradition of mathematics that has never been integrated into mathematical literature. In these texts there is a highly stylized procedure: the method is given as a series of steps, but never explained, proved or motivated. It reminds the modern reader of recipes. There is no notion of definition, proof or even argument—only a sense of procedure that *ought* to be followed.

not in a sense "qualified".[92] A numeral qualifier, as defined by Catherine Rubincam,[93] is a verbal "expression (consisting of one or more words) attached to a figure to indicate that that figure is something other than the precise figure which applied (or applies, or will apply) to any one actual case of the phenomenon described." Rubincam distinguishes three main types of qualifiers: "approximating" qualifiers that name a figure as being in the neighborhood of the precise actual figure (e.g. περί, "approximately"); "comparative" qualifiers that specify that the figure mentioned lies above or below the precise actual figure (e.g. πλείους, "more than"); and "emphatic" expressions that emphasize how large or small the stated figure is (e.g. μόνος, "only").[94]

Here again it is instructive to compare Demosthenes to Lysias. When Lysias uses numeral qualifiers, he predominantly uses comparative expressions. The choice for these expressions is not always exclusively motivated by lack of precision in the available data. In T2 and T4, for instances, the prosecutor is quoting from the accounts of his opponents (T2 γεγραμμένα, T4 ἐλογίσατο); here, his use of the comparative qualifier πλέον ἤ, "more than", is to be explained not in epistemological terms, but as a rhetorical device with the capacity to steer the audience's interpretation of figures:

- the qualifier signals that the speaker chooses not to quote an exact figure but one presented as a **conservative rounding off** (the *real* figure is higher);
- the qualifier sets a **standard**: "more than four thousand drachmas" implies that the real figure is at least of the same **order of magnitude**;[95]
- the qualifier implies **judgment** or evaluation of the quantity under discussion; it signals whether the audience is supposed to understand the figure as large or small. "More than a talent of silver" prompts the inference that one talent is *already quite a lot*.[96]

Comparative qualifiers are therefore to be seen as part of the rhetorical and argumentative toolbox that an orator has at his disposal. Numbers and figures

92 Lysias uses qualifiers significantly more sparingly. Qualifiers are almost absent in Lys. 21.1–5, whereas Lys. 32.4–8 contains no qualifiers at all.

93 Rubincam (1979: 329).

94 Rubincam (2003: 451).

95 This is related to the so-called "anchoring effect" described in cognitive psychology according to which people's judgments of a quantity X are influenced by a previously given but unrelated value (the "anchor"). Kahneman (2011: 119–128).

96 On this type of "rhetorical inference", see Oswald Ducrot's work on argumentative semantics. E.g. Ducrot (1996: lecture V).

may seem to be speaking for themselves, but in reality, qualifiers are steering the audience's interpretation of them and the inferences based on these.

Whereas Lysias has a preference for comparative qualifiers, Demosthenes' rhetoric abounds in approximating qualifiers—qualifiers whose efficacy is not so much based on imprecision, but rather on self-consciousness about uncertainty.[97] Approximating qualifiers, such as "roughly", "almost", "something around", can be used to flag awareness of problems of epistemology, i.e. signaling awareness that absolute accuracy, although it is a norm to be agreed upon, is often impossible to attain.[98] By voluntarily admitting a degree of approximation a speaker may add credence to his figures and gain trustworthiness by accounting for everything that he does not and cannot know:

(10) Demosthenes, *Against Aphobus 1* 10:

> χωρὶς δὲ τούτων ἐλέφαντα μὲν καὶ σίδηρον, ὃν κατηργάζοντο, καὶ ξύλα κλίνει' *εἰς* ὀγδοήκοντα μνᾶς ἄξια, κηκῖδα δὲ καὶ χαλκὸν ἑβδομήκοντα μνῶν ἐωνημένα, ἔτι δ' οἰκίαν τρισχιλίων, ἔπιπλα δὲ καὶ ἐκπώματα καὶ χρυσία καὶ ἱμάτια, τὸν κόσμον τῆς μητρός, ἄξια σύμπαντα ταῦτ' *εἰς* μυρίας δραχμάς, ἀργυρίου δ' ἔνδον ὀγδοήκοντα μνᾶς.
>
> Besides those, he left ivory and iron used in the manufacturing and wood for beds worth about 80 minas, and dye and copper purchased for 70 minas; also a house worth 3,000 drachmas, and furniture, cups, gold jewelry, and clothes, my mother's trousseau, all those together worth 10,000 drachmas, and 80 minas in silver in the house.

Here, the flagging of uncertainty is in place: the value of the dye and copper are knowns (they are purchased (ἐωνημένα) for a specific amount of money which has actually been spent), the other items are not specifically marked as objects of purchase and thus have vaguer estimates of value[99]—a vagueness accounted for by the use of εἰς (twice).[100]

97 On the difference between imprecise numbers and uncertain numbers see also Rubincam (1979).

98 On the "rhetorical spin" in Thucycides' use of numeral qualifiers, see Rubincam (1979), (1991).

99 See Johnstone (2011: 47) on ancient price formation: unlike modern ones, ancient prices are not a product of fungibility (objective qualitative equilibrium that allows for interchangeability) but always outcomes of particular cases of negotiation, bargaining and haggling.

100 Similarly, in the inventory of the non-productive assets in 27.11, there is a systematic dis-

However, not all uses of approximating qualifiers can be understood as strategical disavowals of exact knowledge; some figures are qualified while they *are* known by Demosthenes, or even established and chosen by Demosthenes himself, as is the case in T8, where the total of three talents is qualified with μάλιστα, "about". None of the variables is uncertain: earlier in the speech (27.5) the dowry of Demosthenes' mother's dowry was established as 80 minas and the interest rate is (hypothetically and charitably) even made up by Demosthenes himself. Hence the approximation does not genuinely serve an epistemic function nor can it be explained away as an authority-building device. Rather the use of the qualifier is motivated by the context of oral, and hence live and joint, calculation. The arithmetic is imagined to be performed on the spot (ἐάν τις συντιθῇ), which requires alleviating the strain on the audience that is asked to do mental arithmetic: the qualifier serves to reassure the audience that it is not the precise amount that matters; it is the order of magnitude that counts.

Despite his self-proclaimed standard of ἀκρίβεια, the design of Demosthenes' calculations reveals systematic concessions to the oral context in which they are to be performed. This is corroborated by the use of rounded numbers where there is no epistemological need to. Demosthenes occasionally adapts the premises of his calculations in order to gear with the audience's capabilities and the limitations of an oral context. In T7 for instance, the qualifier μικροῦ δέοντα, "a little less", serves to qualify the 4 talents that are left once 77 minas are deducted from 5 talents and 15 minas.[101] In a strict and literal sense, 3 tal-

tinction between maritime assets that can be precisely accounted for because of the existence of contracts and amounts that cannot be established with absolute certainty: the smaller informal *eranos* loans (διακεχρημένον) and their totals, marked with the qualifier ὁμοῦ τι, "about (a talent)". Precision and certainty are transitive here: the qualified components add up to a κεφάλαιον that has a comparative qualifier (πλέον ἤ) and a grand total (συμπάντων) that can only be expressed by approximation (εἰς). On the distinction between maritime and informal loans: Millett (1991: 189, 212, 259–160); on contracts in maritime loans: Cohen (1992: 42, 52–57, 146–147, 165–166, 178–179). I differ with Cohen (1992: 121 n. 43) in his interpretation of κατὰ διακοσίας καὶ τριακοσίας not as amounts of money on loan but as interest rates (which would make the loan in view a maritime one). It is true that κατά is often used to express a ratio "κατά plus a drachma amount" (e.g. Dem. 28.4). However, it does not seem to make sense to mention *two* interest rates for the same (expressly vague) amount of one talent. Moreover, the verb χράομαι is typically used in the context of *eranos*-loans and other forms of informal credit. See Millett (1991: 29). Cf. Korver (1934: 74–80). On *eranos*-loans in Dem. 27, see Millett (1991: 44, 157, 168–170).

101 The use of the emphatic qualifier μόνον is straightforward: an interest rate of "only" one

ents and 58 minas are, indeed, “a little less than” 4 talents. Epistemologically speaking, however, the qualifier is redundant: all the data required to make the deduction are given; neither uncertainty nor imprecision is in place here.[102] The only motivation for the rounding off is the fact that the audience is asked to work with this same figure themselves to subsequently calculate and add an interest to it (ἂν προσθῆτ’ … εὑρήσετε)—on the spot, by means of mental arithmetic. The rounding off serves to reduce the cognitive strain on the working memory of the audience who is included in the task of performing the calculation.

Oddly enough, the total result, 8 talents and 1000 drachmas, is *not* qualified—although the numbers used to arrive at this result were. Significantly, when this subtotal recurs a couple of paragraphs later (see T9), it is even more rounded off, to simply τῶν ὀκτὼ ταλάντων, “the eight talents”. The article (*τῶν ὀκτὼ ταλάντων*) signposts that the figure is mentioned earlier and recurring here—which is the case, but the additional 1000 drachmas have dropped off, most plausibly because here again, the audience is asked to conduct a calculation on the basis of this figure (ἀφαιρετέον).

It is the interactive oral context that sets a limit to the amount of detail that an audience can be expected to process. Therefore, the judgment that Demosthenes “is rather loose and vague in his calculations” and that “the jurors would not be able to remember the figures the speaker produces”[103] seems too uncharitable: the looseness and vagueness is either explicitly accounted for by Demosthenes or designed for the very purpose of making the calculation easier to follow for the audience that is asked to participate in it. The design of his calculations reveals that this amounts to more than merely paying lip-service to the importance of transparency: the calculations seem to be genuinely adapted to an oral context and geared with the cognitive needs of an audience that is asked to do mental arithmetic.

Lysias uses qualifiers not to mark imprecision, but to make precision irrelevant: qualifying expressions such as “more than” serve to mark that a figure is, indeed, a large number *and* at the same time a conservative estimate (reality is even *worse*). This use of qualifiers is more geared towards evoking moral indignation than to establish the precise details of bookkeeping.

---

drachma is a conservative estimate, but *even* on this low rate, the opponents’ fortune resulting from the property ought to have been 8 talents and 1000 drachmas.

102 The rounding off cannot be entirely explained by the use of σχεδόν that qualifies the 77 minas: “roughly speaking” 77 minas deducted from 5 talents and 15 minas produces “roughly speaking” 4 talents, not “a little less than 4 talents.”

103 Papageorgiou (2004: 530).

Demosthenes' use of qualifiers, on the other hand, seems to be motivated by different considerations that stem from a self-consciousness about the norm of ἀκρίβεια: qualifiers demonstrate an awareness of high standards of ἀκρίβεια and serve to enhance the orator's trustworthiness by signposting transparency about epistemological problems. At the same time, Demosthenes' use of qualifiers and round approximated figures when precise figures *are* available reveals also a different principle at work in his numerical rhetoric: the foregrounding of the oral and live nature of the calculation. Rounded numbers are typical for oral discourse as they are more fit for live mental processing. Approximating qualifiers serve to guide the audience in determining the degree of precision that is relevant and to reassure them that it is only the order of magnitude that counts.

Together, rounded numbers and approximating qualifiers help to convey the idea that the calculation at hand is "live", involving data that are not unilaterally prepared by a speaker and mechanically transmitted to a fact-absorbing audience, but a form of knowledge that is produced in the courtroom setting itself in a joint endeavor. This presentation of calculations as an interactive and collective endeavor neutralizes the potentially negative and "undemocratic" connotations of Demosthenes' norm of ἀκρίβεια and the asymmetrical distribution of information that is presupposed by his didactic stance—i.e. the suspicion of overmuch writtenness.

Concluding Remarks

Analysis of the use of arithmetic in two seemingly similar speeches shows us that there is not a uniform answer to the question whether an audience was expected to mentally follow a calculation in court. Nor is there any one established meaning or use of arithmetic in a forensic context. Rather, speakers in court make strategic decisions about the role they wish to attribute to calculations within the overall structure of their argument.

In his *Against Diogeiton*, Lysias' approach to forensic arithmetic may be best characterized as anti-technical: he actively dissuades the audience to engage in detailed calculation[104] and occasionally accuses his opponents of overmuch precision in bookkeeping. Whenever the speaker does embark on calculations, the argumentative force rarely derives from the mathematical quality of the calculation itself, but rather on its appeal to common sense and everyday experience. Moreover, the rhetorical aims of the calculations lie not

104 32.26: καθ' ἕκαστον λογίζεσθαι.

primarily in establishing a detailed account of the truth, but rather in the moral characterization of the opponents—an aim that also explains the rhetorically steering use of numerical qualifiers.

By contrast, in Demosthenes' *Against Aphobus* it is crucial that the audience is aware of the figures καθ' ἕκαστον.[105] From the outset, the audience is drawn into the calculations, by an orator who accounts for every step in the procedure and who presents himself as detached and as submitting himself to an objective procedure for conducting calculations and attaining ἀκρίβεια. Demosthenes' balancing act between his self-presentation as an accurate expert firmly in control over the numerical data and his construction of calculations as interactive endeavors taking place on the spot reveals that the value of numerical accuracy itself is subject to negotiation: it can be constructed both as democratic transparency levelling the argumentative playing field and as a tell-tale sign of undemocratic overpreparation and writtenness.

Bibliography

Allan, R.J. 2009. "Towards a Typology of the Narrative Modes in Ancient Greek: Text types and narrative structure in Euripidean messenger speeches," in: S.J. Bakker and G.C. Wakker, eds. *Discourse Cohesion in Greek*, 171–203. Leiden: Brill.

Ashcraft, M.H. and J. Battaglia. 1978. "Cognitive arithmetic: evidence for retrieval and decision processes in mental addition," *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory* 4: 527–538.

Asper, M. 2009. "The two cultures of mathematics in ancient Greece," in: Eleanor Robson and Jackie Stedall, eds. *Oxford Handbook of the History of Mathematics*, 107–132. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Carey, C. 1989. *Lysias. Selected Speeches*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chrisomalis, S. 2010. *Numerical Notation. A Comparative History*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cohen, E.E. 1997. *Athenian Economy and Society. A Banking Perspective*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Cole, T. 1991. *The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece*, Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press

Cooper, C. 2002. "Philosophers, politics, academics. Demosthenes' rhetorical reputation in antiquity," in: I. Worthington, ed. *Demosthenes. Statesman and Orator*, 224–245, London: Routledge.

105 27.7.

Cribiore, R. 2001. *Gymnastics of the Mind: Greek Education in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Cuomo, S. 2012. "Exploring Greek and Roman Numeracy," *British Society for the History of Mathematics Bulletin* 27.1: 1–12.

Crane, G. 1996. *The Blinded Eye. Thucydides and the New Written Word*, Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Davies, J.K. 1971. *Athenian Propertied Families*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dehaene, S. 2011. *The Number Sense. How the Mind Creates Mathematics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ducrot, O. 1996. *Slovenian Lectures. Argumentative Semantics*, Ljubljana: ISH Inštitut za humnistične študije (translated by S. McEvoy).

Edwards, M. (trans.). 2007. *Isaeus. The Oratory of Classical Greece, vol. 11*, Austin: University of Texas Press.

Foxhall, L. 1998. "The politics of affection: emotional attachments in Athenian society", in: P. Cartledge, P.C. Millett and S. von Reden, eds. *Kosmos: Essays in Order, Conflict and Community in Classical Athens*, 52–67. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Friedlein, G. 1869. *Zahlzeichen und das elementare Rechnen der Griechen und Römer und des christlichen Abendlandes*, Erlangen: Deichert.

Gagarin, M. 2014. "Methods of argument in Lysias and Demosthenes: a comparison," in: L. Calboli Montefusco and M. Silvana Celentano, eds. *Papers on Rhetoric XII*, Perugia: Pliniana.

Gagarin, M. 2002. *Antiphon the Athenian. Oratory, Law, and Justice in the Age of the Sophists*, Texas: University of Texas Press.

Gagarin, M. 1999. "The orality of Greek oratory," in: E. Anne Mackay, ed. *Signs of Orality. The Oral Tradition and its Influence in the Greek and Roman World*, 163–180. Leidon: Brill

Goody, J. 1977. *The Domestication of the Savage Mind*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hannah, R. 2001. "From orality to literacy? The case of the parapegma," in: J. Watson, ed., *Speaking Volumes: Orality and Literacy in the Greek and Roman World*, 139–160. Leiden: Brill.

Harris, R. 1995. *Signs of Writing*, London & New York: Routledge.

Harris, E.M. 1994. "Law and oratory," in: I. Worthington, ed. *Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action*, 130–152. London: Blackwell.

Harris, E.M. (trans.). 2008. *Demosthenes, Speeches 20–22. The Oratory of Classical Greece, vol. 12*, Austin: University of Texas Press.

Høyrup, J. 1994. *In Measure, Number, and Weight: Studies in Mathematics and Culture*, Albany NY: State University of New York Press.

Johnstone, S. 2011. *A History of Trust in Ancient Greece*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kahneman, D. 2011. *Thinking Fast and Slow*. London: MacMillan.

Kallet-Marx, L. 1994. "Money talks: rhetor, demos, and the resources of the Athenian empire", in: R. Osborne and S. Hornblower, eds. *Ritual, Finance, Politics*, 227–251. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Klein, J. 1968. *Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra*, Cambridge MA: MIT Press (transl. by E. Brann).

Korver, J. 1934. *De Terminologie van het Crediet-wezen en het Grieksch*, Amsterdam: Paris.

Kurz, D. 1970. *AKRIBEIA. Das Ideal der Exaktheit bei den Griechen bis Aristoteles*, Göppingen: Kümmerle.

Lamb, W.R.M. (trans.). 2000. *Lysias*, Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press.

Lang, M. 1956. "Numerical notation on Greek vases," *Hesperia* 25.1: 1–24.

Lang, M. 1964. "The abacus and the calendar," *Hesperia* 33.2: 146–167.

Lang, M. 1965. "The abacus and the calendar, II," *Hesperia* 34.3: 224–247.

Lang, M. 1968. "Abaci from the Athenian agora," *Hesperia* 37.2: 241–243.

MacDowell, D.M. (trans.). 2004. *Demosthenes, Speeches 27–38. The Oratory of Classical Greece, vol. 8*, Austin: University of Texas Press.

Meritt, B.D. 1932. *Athenian Financial Documents of the Fifth Century*, Ann Arbor MI: University of Michigan Press.

Millett, P. 1991. *Lending and Borrowing in Ancient Athens*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Minchin, E. 1996. "The performance of lists and catalogues in the Homeric epics," in: I. Worthington, ed., *Voice into Text: Orality and Literacy in Ancient Greece*, 3–20. Leiden: Brill.

Mirhady, D.C. 2000. "Demosthenes as advocate: The private speeches," in: I. Worthington, ed. *Demosthenes. Statesman and Orator*, London: Routledge.

Netz, R. 1999. *The Shaping of Deduction in Greek Mathematics. A Study in Cognitive History*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Netz, R. 2002. "Counter Culture: Towards a history of Greek numeracy," *History of Science* 40: 321–352.

Nissen, H.J., P. Damerow and R.K. Englund. 1993. *Archaic Bookkeeping*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Olson, D.R. 2001. "Writing Systems, Psychology of," in: N.J. Smelser et.al., ed. *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, 16640–16643. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Ostwald, M. 1986. *From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law, Berkeley*, CA: University of California Press.

Papageorgiou, N. 2004. "Rhetoric and arithmetic in Aristophanes' *Wasps*," *Maia* 56.3: 525–535.

Pearson, L. and H.F. North. 1972. *Demosthenes. Six Private Speeches*, Norman: University of Oaklahoma Press.

Rubincam, C. 1979. "Thucydides 1.74.1 and the use of ἐς with numerals," *Classical Philology* 74.4: 327–337.

Rubincam, C. 1979. "Qualification of numerals in the *Constitution of Athens*," *Phoenix* 33.4: 293–307.

Rubincam, C. 1991. "Casualty figures in the battle descriptions of Thucydides," *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 121: 181–198.

Rubincam, C. 2003. "Numbers in Greek poetry and historiography. Quantifying Fehling," *Classical Quarterly* n.s. 53.2: 448–463.

Rydberg-Cox, J.A. 2002. "Oral and written sources in Athenian forensic rhetoric," *Mnemosyne* 56.6: 652–664.

Schmandt-Besserat, D. 1996. *How Writing Came About*, Austin: University of Texas Press.

Schloemann, J. 2002. "Entertainment and democratic distrust: The audience's attitude towards oral and written oratory in Classical Athens," in: I. Worthington and J.M. Foley, eds. *Epea and Grammata. Oral and Written Communication in Ancient Greece*, 133–146. Leiden: Brill.

Smith, C. 2003. *Modes of Discourse. The Local Structure of Texts*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Thomas, R. 1992. *Literacy and Orality in Ancient Greece*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Threatte, L. 1980. *The Grammar of Attic Inscriptions. Vol. 1: Phonology*, Berlin: De Gruyter.

Todd. S.C. (trans.). 2000. *Lysias. The Oratory of Classical Greece, vol. 2*, Austin: University of Texas Press.

Willi, A. 2003. *The Languages of Aristophanes. Aspects of Linguistic Variation in Classical Attic Greek*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

CHAPTER 16

Cicero's Representation of an Oral Community in *De Oratore*

Joanna Kenty

Introduction

When a modern reader takes Cicero's orations off the shelf in a library or a bookstore, or finds translations online, he or she encounters words on a page to be read, as we read the poems of Catullus or the histories of Livy. Like those texts in other genres, the orations of Cicero reward close, slow reading and re-reading, which allow the reader to discover turns of phrase, rhetorical figures, and subtleties of diction, style, and syntax, not to mention creative uses of character or emotion for persuasion. A book may also offer added editorial commentary or footnotes, to clue the reader in to useful historical or cultural data to enrich the reading, and to make the action easier to follow. These distinctly literary qualities and paratexts, however, represent only one of several dimensions of the orations. In *Cicero as Evidence*, Andrew Lintott began by redefining the speeches: "they were themselves events in history with causes and effects," and furthermore, "When a speech is published some time after delivery, this is an event in itself."[1] In other words, when we form our mental timelines of elections, assassinations, battles, trials, births, and deaths, we can and should include orations—both their delivery and their publication—as well. To go a step further, the orations are not just texts and events; they are also oral performances, or, at least, they represent oral performances.[2] It is easy for today's reader to interpret the text as words alone, but as a performance, an oration is augmented by gestures, variety in intonation, body language, and interactions with a live audience.[3]

1 Lintott (2008: 3–4).

2 Regarding the relationship between what Cicero said and what he later wrote and published as a version of the spoken oration, Humbert's influential monograph (1925) argued for dissimilarity, on the grounds that an advocate would not have delivered a continuous oration of the sort that Cicero published; this argument has been taken as more or less refuted by Stroh (1975: 31–54).

3 Cf. Vasaly (1993: 9–11); Hall (2014).

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2017 | DOI: 10.1163/9789004329737_017

Cicero himself, of course, as a master practitioner of oral and written communication, recognized the differences between oration as performance and as published text. He would not have published his orations in written form if they had not offered some value added to the oral performances.[4] Faced with a violent backlash against his actions as consul in 63 BCE, Cicero embarked on a project of published works to disseminate his own version of what had happened. This project spanned multiple genres in both Greek and Latin, including speeches, autobiographical accounts in prose,[5] and his notorious poem *De consulatu suo*. In 60 BCE, he sent a prose account in Greek (ὑπόμνημα) to Atticus, asking him to circulate it at Athens if he approved of it (*si tibi placuerit*), "for it seems possible for it to shed some light on our affairs (*aliquid nostris rebus lucis adferre*)" (*Att.* 2.1.2).[6] Along with this prose narrative, he writes to Atticus, he is enclosing written versions of twelve speeches which he intended to publish as a collection of his consular orations, a collection to rival the *Philippics* which had made Demosthenes famous (2.1.3). He explains: "I will ensure that you have this whole corpus (σῶμα); since not only my writings (*scripta*) but my actions (*res*) please you (*delectant*), you will see in the same books both what I accomplished and what I said (*et quae gesserim et quae dixerim*)" (2.1.3). Cicero playfully confounds distinctions between action, speech, and text (*res, scripta; gesserim, dixerim*): both his actions and his words are transmitted in written texts, and both his words and his actions are subject to Atticus' evaluative judgment.[7] His concern for Atticus' approval implies that he considered the aesthetic appeal of his works to be a prerequisite of publication, but form did not entirely supersede function. His writing also served to shine a light on real events, especially for those who had not been present in Rome to experience the events firsthand, and likewise to elucidate Cicero's role as a participant in those events, for those who had not witnessed his live performances. This

4 While his particular motives for publication have long been the subject of debate, the general principle that his published orations were one of his many instruments of self-promotion seems uncontroversial. See Achard (1987: 324–326, 328); Achard (2000: 88) on *De Oratore* in particular. See Butler (2002: 73) for further bibliography on Cicero's published works in general.

5 One of which, known as *De temporibus suis*, he seems to have been composing concurrently with *De Oratore* (*Q. fr.* 2.8(7).1, 3.1.24).

6 Atticus had also written a *commentarium consulatus* [*Ciceronis*] *scriptum Graece* (2.1.1), which Cicero happily says he did not receive before writing his own, so that he cannot be accused of plagiarism; Cicero also explains that he had tried unsuccessfully to convince Posidonius to write *ornatius de isdem rebus*.

7 Cf. Narducci (1997: 156–176).

included contemporary as well as future readers: Cicero says that he composed these written versions for posterity, "motivated by the enthusiasm of young people (*adulescentulorum studiis excitati*)" (2.1.3).

In 55 BCE, Cicero extended these multimedia experiments in the transmission of the spoken word into a new genre, and composed his first written dialogue, *De Oratore*. He frames the dialogue as a discussion of what makes the perfect orator, or more precisely, what kinds of education and preparation produce one. Cicero sent this dialogue (along with several speeches) to his friend Lentulus Spinther in 54 BCE, and suggested that it not only contained a pedagogical theory of eloquence, but also offered pedagogical value itself:

> me iam ab orationibus diiungo fere referoque ad mansuetiores Musas, quae me maxime sicut iam a prima adulescentia delectarunt—scripsi igitur Aristotelio more, quem admodum quidem volui, tris libros in disputatione ac dialogo 'de Oratore', quos arbitror Lentulo tuo fore non inutilis. abhorrent enim a communibus praeceptis atque omnem antiquorum et Aristoteliam et Isocratiam rationem oratoriam complectuntur.
>
> *Fam.* 1.9.23

> Now I've nearly separated myself from orations and returned to the milder Muses who delighted me at an early age, just as they do now. I have therefore written three books in the Aristotelian style (at least I intended to) of a dispute and conversation "On the Orator," which I think will be of some use to your son Lentulus. They shy away from the usual instructions and include the entire oratorical art: that of the ancients, the Aristotelian, and the Isocratean.

Cicero's didactic intent is patent here in his expression of hope that his dialogue will be useful (*non inutilis*) to Lentulus' son, just as he was earlier "motivated by the enthusiasm of young people" (see above). His use of a Greek genre and style to present Greek ideas (*Aristotelio more, omnem antiquorum et Aristoteliam et Isocratiam rationem*)[8] is essential to the dialogue's larger pedagogical design as well. Cicero wrote the dialogue at a turning point in the history of Roman

8 A combination of authors on rhetoric apparently well known to Cicero: in the letter to Atticus discussed above, Cicero also writes that his account of his affairs in Greek "emptied the whole perfume box of Isocrates and all his students' fragrances, and some of Aristotle's colors too (*totum Isocrati myrothecium atque omnis eius discipulorum arculas ac non nihil etiam Aristotelia pigmenta consumpsit*)" (2.1.1). On orality and literacy in Isocrates and Plato, see Usener (1994). On Cicero's engagement with Aristotle's corpus, see Barnes (1997:

education, when Greek innovations were changing and to some extent displacing Roman traditions. Traditionally, the aspiring Roman orator would go to the forum as a teenager to watch the great speakers of the previous generation arguing their cases or addressing the people in *contiones*, before entering the fray himself and emulating those orators, learning on the job. This was known as the *tirocinium fori*, an apprenticeship in the forum. On the other hand, during the second and first centuries BCE, Hellenistic Greek rhetorical theory came to play an increasingly prominent role in the preparation of these aspiring orators. The Roman method was practical, experiential, and oral, while the Greek method was theoretical, abstract, and, to some degree, textual; Cicero and his contemporaries studied rhetoric with schoolmasters like Molon of Rhodes (cf. *Brut.* 309–316), but they also learned from written treatises by Hermogenes and other Hellenistic theoreticians, the intellectual heirs of the sophists of the classical period and of Aristotle's work on rhetoric.[9]

Cicero's own written work could augment or perhaps supplant these other textual sources in the education of young Romans, but it was not a direct equivalent: he chose the medium of the philosophical dialogue, rather than writing a straightforward treatise. His portraits of his interlocutors and his communication of a variety of perspectives on oratory, which embrace some but not all aspects of Greek rhetoric, add up to a comprehensive but complicated vision for the ideal education of the orator. A written handbook threatened (allegedly) to reveal the secrets of the psychagogic art of rhetoric to anyone, secrets which could be used anywhere to win any case (see e.g. *De Orat.* 1.102–103, 3.54). The art of rhetoric and sophistry induced considerable anxiety at Rome,[10] as illustrated by the apocryphal story of Cato the Elder's crackdown on the philosopher Carneades and his ilk (Cic. *De Orat.* 2.155, *Rep.* 3.9 ff.). In composing his own work on the proper education of the orator, I argue, Cicero turned to the philosophical dialogue as a medium ideally suited for exploring the art of rhetoric while simultaneously expressing such ambivalence and anxiety, and for partially alleviating that anxiety in order to reconcile rhetoric with Roman values.[11] While Hellenistic treatises might treat skill at speaking as a monolithic

---

44–54); Fantham (2004: 17–18, 69, 161–185). On specific elements of Ciceronian dialogues which are taken from Aristotle rather than Plato; Schofield (2009: 75–76). On dialectic, orality, and literacy in Aristotle, see Dirlmeier (1962: 6–24); Beriger (1989: 12–13); Rehn (2000: 26–31); Graff (2001); Föllinger (2015: 52–56).

9 Kennedy (1972); Long (2006: 299–301); Walker (2011).

10 As did the degree to which education was institutionalized and professionalized by this model: Connolly (2007: 105).

11 The ambivalence about Hellenic culture is thus, I argue, deliberately introduced and

art, Cicero used the form and content of his dialogue to portray eloquence as a subject of conversation and debate, celebrating the polymorphic and, so to speak, interdisciplinary nature of eloquence.

After exploring the contours of the model of education which the dialogue endorses, I consider another aspect of Cicero's choice of the dialogue form, on a more macroscopic level: the dialogue itself *as* a kind of education—"a textual exercise in the private education of the inexperienced young," as Stroup puts it.[12] I argue that *De Oratore* offers a mimetic recreation of the traditional, oral learning community of orators and their apprentices at Rome, and thus perpetuates the values and benefits of that style of education, even as it makes room for the incorporation of new techniques. If the aspiring late Republican orator could no longer access the *tirocinium fori*, he could get a generally analogous experience by reading Cicero's dialogue, which offers a sort of diorama or reenactment of learning eloquence in the early first century BCE. Finally, I hope to reevaluate the significance of the dialogue in Cicero's corpus. *De Oratore* has often been read as a rerouting of Cicero's political self-promotion into the written word, when the "first triumvirate" gave him a choice between putting his eloquence in their service or being exiled again, and he "knew he had lost his freedom of speech."[13] In short, he is supposed to have written because he could not speak freely. In arguing that *De Oratore* and the written dialogue offer Cicero a mode of expression ideally suited to his material on two levels, and thus a chance to preserve the oral aspects of the orator's education at Rome which he so valued, I also hope to suggest incidentally that the dialogue does not necessarily reflect the repression or constriction of Cicero's contributing to the intellectual life of his community, but instead facilitates it.

---

nuanced by Cicero, and not a reflection of a failure to generate a purely Roman approach to rhetoric (as Vasaly suggests (1993: 3)).

12 Stroup (2010: 150). Stroup discusses *De Oratore* as mirroring the *tirocinium fori* also (and the homoerotic overtones of both the practice and the dialogue), as does Narducci (1997: 32), but not as a substitute consciously designed to capture and preserve it, as I characterize it here.

13 Fantham (2004: 9); cf. Stroup (2010): 145; Zarecki (2014: 64–65) on *De Oratore* as a product of Cicero's 'depression'. Cf. Steel (2005: 81): it is "highly suggestive that a work which reflects upon the role of oratory in public life should open with a formulation of its composition which makes its written, as opposed to spoken, words, the product of the busy public man."

De Oratore on the Orator's Education

Cicero establishes the link between the dialogue form and the dialogic nature of his theory of eloquence and education in the prologue to the first book of *De Oratore*, when he frames his motivation for writing as threefold:

> Ac mihi repetenda est veteris cuiusdam memoriae non sane satis explicata recordatio, sed, ut arbitror, apta ad id, quod requiris, ut cognoscas quae viri omnium eloquentissimi clarissimique senserint de omni ratione dicendi. Vis enim, ut mihi saepe dixisti, quoniam, quae pueris aut adulescentulis nobis ex commentariolis nostris incohata ac rudia exciderunt, vix ⟨sunt⟩ hac aetate digna et hoc usu, quem ex causis, quas diximus, tot tantisque consecuti sumus, aliquid eisdem de rebus politius a nobis perfectiusque proferri; solesque non numquam hac de re a me in disputationibus nostris dissentire, quod ego eruditissimorum hominum artibus eloquentiam contineri statuam, tu autem illam ab elegantia doctrinae segregandam putes et in quodam ingeni atque exercitationis genere ponendam.
>
> 1.4–5

> I must revisit my recollection of a certain old memory, not really very well-defined, but, I think, relevant to your request to know what opinions the most eloquent and prominent men of all had about the whole art of speaking. For it is your wish (as you have often told me) that, since the work which fell unfinished and unpolished from my notebook when I was a boy or a young man is scarcely worthy of my age and the experience I have gained from so many and such important cases which I have argued, something more polished and complete on the same topic ought to be produced by me. Also, you have a habit of disagreeing with me in our discussions on this subject not infrequently, because I declare that the eloquence of the most educated men is contained in technical expertise, while you think that it should be divorced from refinements of education and attributed to a certain type of talent and practice.

The content of the dialogue, as Cicero describes, will be historical: a *recordatio*, as opposed to his own opinions or theory, since Quintus had asked about the opinions (*quae senserint*) of Cicero's predecessors. Cicero identifies his second stimulus to write *De Oratore* as an attempt to replace or displace *De Inventione*, a treatise written around thirty years earlier, with a more polished and mature work on the subject of eloquence, as a better reflection on Cicero's

reputation as an orator by the 50s. The work, then, is also presented from the start as Cicero's reflections on the skills which had led to his success as an orator, set up in relation to other well-known, respected opinions on the art. Third, the dialogue will represent a continuation of an ongoing debate between the two brothers about whether eloquence is dependent on learned techniques and theory (Cicero's view), or on natural talent and practice, and so will investigate where eloquence comes from and how it can be produced or augmented.

This threefold purpose is important. If *De Oratore* were simply intended to replace *De Inventione* and to articulate Cicero's opinions, the natural form for Cicero's reflections would be a second treatise in the same style. This might have provided a useful complement to his published speeches: a rhetorical handbook (*ars rhetorica*) offers clear, practical, systematized precepts to would-be orators, who might not be able to distill those principles from the published speeches alone, or to translate them successfully into eloquence of their own. A handbook or treatise, however, typically presents the author's own opinions on eloquence, while Cicero expressly sets out to represent and address diverse opinions—through his interlocutors, but also through references to past theoreticians, including Isocrates and Aristotle, who as Fantham notes had widely divergent approaches to rhetoric themselves[14]—, and also to explore a fundamental difference of opinion between himself and his brother.[15] The dialogue allows him to better communicate this polyphony.[16] As it happens, this also dramatizes the method of dialectic associated (at least by Cicero) with Academic and Peripatetic philosophers,[17] of considering a question *in utramque partem* and testing various approaches and arguments in order to produce the most plausible answer (see e.g. *De Orat.* 1.263, 3.80, 3.107; *Tusc.* 2.9).[18] This

14 Fantham (2004: 17).

15 "It's no accident that Cicero dedicates *de Oratore* to his brother Quintus, thus invoking the Romans' ambivalent associations with fraternal relations, where brothers are always at once partners and rivals," according to Connolly (2015: 159), because Cicero acknowledges the inherently conflicted and dissonant nature of the orator, who must represent and perform the beliefs of (some of) his audience, and whose self is often divided, fragmented, or falsified as a result (160–168).

16 Ideally, at least; as Dugan points out, "the dialogue's fate has been to be read as a textbook of rhetoric, a reading that both its form and content repeatedly resist;" Dugan (2005: 75).

17 Gill (2002: 146).

18 Which, as many have noted, Cicero does with more consideration for alternative viewpoints than Plato does; Douglas (1962: 46); Schofield (2009: 63).

reflects Cicero's self-identification as an Academic,[19] but it is also no coincidence that the courtroom advocate, too, must see a case from all possible angles and suspend judgment, assessing the plausibility of various approaches before deciding on the most advantageous argument, and compensating for the strengths of any opposing arguments. His process of *inventio* mirrors the philosopher's process of *skepsis*, and both can be represented and spelled out through a dialogue.[20]

Cicero therefore does not explicitly disavow any of the opinions (even Quintus') in his dialogue as wrong, although he seems in his other works to have less in common with Scaevola's old-fashioned severity, for instance, nor does he simply align himself with a single character, although he has much in common with Crassus.[21] On the contrary, as Dugan argues, "Cicero uses the dialogue's various *personae* to articulate different aspects of his own persona" and is thus "able to articulate an aesthetic that is distinctly Ciceronian"[22] via the voices of others. His written dialogue thus functions as a sort of extended application of the orator's technique of prosopopoeia, speaking in another person's voice. The most famous example of this technique in Cicero's corpus occurs in his speech *Pro Caelio*, when he calls up Appius Claudius Caecus from the dead to chastise his descendants, Clodius and Clodia (33–35). Caecus' name and famed *auctoritas* demanded reverence, especially in ultra-conservative Rome, which Cicero appropriates and exploits to serve his own argument.[23] Antiquity—even the recent past—offers its own patina of influential *gravitas*.

Crassus, like Caecus, had served as censor and held a certain degree of political *auctoritas*, and in the particular field of oratory, Crassus and Antonius held powerful exemplary force. Indeed, as Fantham notes, "it can be said of both that it was their oratory, rather than any political or military skills, which earned them the glory of high office" and so rendered them models for Cicero. Antonius, famed for his versatility in developing suitable arguments, makes an especially authoritative speaker on the subject of the orator's technical skills.[24] By "cloaking his thoughts in the mantle of his distinguished teachers,"[25] Cicero reinforces the authority of his own writing.[26] Crassus and Antonius, while they

19 cf. Long (2006).
20 Cf. Hall (1994: 223); Schofield (2009: 66–70).
21 As Quintilian notes (10.3.1). Achard (1987: 323).
22 Dugan (2005: 81).
23 Gaillard (1978: 30–31).
24 Fantham (2004: 84).
25 Dugan (2005: 76); cf. van der Blom (2010: 332).
26 Cf. *De Amicitia* 4: "This kind of conversation, set in the context of the authority of ancient

do voice opinions shared by Cicero and articulated by him in other works, bring a persuasive authority to those opinions which Cicero himself lacks.

Moreover, such characters can say things which Cicero cannot. The persuasive force of arguments depends in large part on the speaker's *persona*: accordingly, Cicero shapes his *persona* to suit the argument he intends to make in a given oration. He variously presents himself as a champion of the people or a servant of the senatorial establishment, a conciliatory pragmatist or a crusading ideologue, a devoted student of Greek poetry or an ignorant cataloguer of Greek sculpture[27]—whatever a trial called for, Cicero found a personality to suit it. In *Pro Caelio*, his defense rested on the principle that "boys will be boys," and that Caelius' youthful foibles hardly deserved the severity of the allegations and invective against him (see e.g. 28–30, 39–43). Such an argument required a pragmatic, calm, permissive sort of advocate. The introduction of Appius Claudius Caecus allowed Cicero to air a severely moralizing interpretation of certain events (especially of Clodia's behavior) without compromising the consistency of his own *persona*; thus, Cicero could get away with certain statements in Appius' voice which he could not have said *in propria persona*. The same principle applies to Crassus and Antonius in *De Oratore*, because they belong to a generation which had different standards of education. In the 90s BCE, when the dialogue is set, it was not yet the norm for practicing orators to acquire such knowledge as a matter of course; the recommendation and indeed demanding of that knowledge in a dialogue set at that early date is, therefore, all the more significant.

Cicero, as he himself admits in his *Orator* (145–146), could not hope to dissimulate his knowledge of rhetorical theory or Greek literature, which was evident in every word he said. In contrast, Crassus and Antonius were particularly admired for having achieved new heights in eloquence without the benefit of *doctrina* (or perhaps *paideia*): "the prevailing opinion was that L. Crassus attained no more erudition (*doctrinae*) than he could have in that first boyhood schooling (*prima illa puerili institutione*), and that M. Antonius was entirely untrained in and ignorant of any sort of higher learning (*omnino omnis eruditionis expertem atque ignarum*)" (*De Orat.* 2.1). They can represent a Roman traditionalist perspective more plausibly than Cicero himself can. Crassus in

---

men (and illustrious ones), seems somehow to have more *gravitas* (*genus hoc sermonum positum in hominum veterum auctoritate, et eorum inlustrium, plus nescio quo pacto videtur habere gravitatis*)."

27 *Leg. Man.* vs. *Leg. Agr.*; *Prov. Cons.* or *Balb.* vs. *Sest.* or the *Philippics*; *Arch.* vs. *Verr.* 2.4. See May (1988) for the classic discussion of Cicero's use of character for persuasion.

particular is emphatically old-fashioned, an exemplar of a purely Roman eloquence. When he endorses certain aspects of Greek rhetoric, it is not because he values Greek learning *per se*, but (Cicero implies) because those principles are sound, and consistent with Roman ideas of eloquence. In *De Oratore*, Cicero makes Crassus the particular embodiment of the ancient Roman institution of the *tirocinium fori*, augmented but not displaced by rhetorical theory:

> Ego enim sum is, qui … non possim dicere me haec, quae nunc complector, perinde, ut dicam discenda esse, didicisse; quippe qui omnium maturrime ad publicas causas accesserim annosque natus unum et viginti nobilissimum hominem et eloquentissimum in iudicium vocarim; cui disciplina fuerit forum, magister usus et leges et instituta populi Romani mosque maiorum.
>
> 3.74

> I am the sort of man who … cannot say that I learned then what I now understand, as thoroughly as I claim it should be learned; who, in fact, embarked on public trials earlier than anyone and called a supremely high-status and eloquent man to court at the age of 21; whose classroom was the forum, whose teacher was convention and the laws and the customs of the Roman people and the ways of our ancestors.

Although Crassus advocates a wide-ranging education in history, law, and philosophy in the dialogue, it is not because he himself learned these things as an adolescent, but because—at least according to the dialogue—he did not. Instead, he sought them out as an adult and found out for himself that they enhanced the natural talents he had already demonstrated (3.75).

Likewise, Antonius was known to have been totally without formal education (cf. *Brut.* 214–215), and in *De Oratore*, he initially professes ignorance (*sum ignarus atque insolens*, 1.207; *sum de arte dicturus, quam numquam didici*; *nescirem*, 1.208) and demands that his companions not expect a polished oration (*ornata oratio*, 1.207). Yet as the dialogue proceeds, he converses knowledgeably about rhetoric and philosophy and offers some defense of their usefulness to the orator, although he is less radical in demanding them of the orator. Antonius describes the effect of a liberal arts education with a metaphor as relevant to students today as to aspiring Roman orators, which indicates a casual but unexpectedly extensive engagement with philosophy in particular: "As it naturally happens that I get a tan when I walk in the sun, even if I'm walking for a different purpose, so, [after reading books on philosophy], I notice that my speaking is tinted (so to speak) by contact with them (*illorum tactu*

orationem meam quasi colorari)" (*De Orat.* 2.60, cf. 1.62). He even describes a lengthy debate he had in Athens with a group of philosophers and rhetoricians on the relationship between philosophy and oratory (1.82–95).

Antonius' arguments are surprising by design, and thus demand a kind of reconsideration from a conservative reader which the same arguments, if made by Cicero, might not earn. Cicero calls the reader's attention to this apparent discrepancy between Antonius' reputation and his erudition in the dialogue: having heard the first of Antonius' speeches in Book 2, Caesar Strabo exclaims "'what's this, Catulus? Where are those people who deny that Antonius knows anything in Greek? How many personages he named! And how knowledgeably (*quam scienter*), in what detail (*quam proprie*) he spoke about each and every one!'" (2.59, cf. 2.152–153). By calling attention himself to the unexpectedness of Antonius' erudition in the voices of other interlocutors, Cicero anticipates his readers' objections and mirrors their surprise in the text itself, easing them into this reappraisal of Crassus and Antonius. His characterization is not patently or ludicrously implausible.[28] Even Dugan, whose main argument is that Cicero "fashions the ancestors who fashioned him" and "presents these interlocutors as prefigurations of his own rhetorical self and constructs his own ancestry" as a *novus homo*, adds the caveat that Cicero's portraits were constrained by historicity.[29] The care Cicero takes in grounding his representation of Crassus and Antonius in first-hand observation and the testimony of eyewitnesses suggests considerable effort at verisimilitude (*De Orat.* 2.3, cf. *Att.* 4.16.2). In a letter to his brother, Cicero reports that his friend Sallustius objected to the dramatic date of Cicero's *De Republica* because the interlocutors of *De Republica* were so ancient that Cicero could not have known them personally, making any pretended report of their conversation seem patently fictional. By contrast,

28 Achard (1987: 319); Fantham (2004: 26–48, 80–81). *Contra* Leeman, Pinkster, and Nelson (1985, vol. II); Stull (2011).

29 Dugan (2005: 93). Asmis offers a middle ground between historical accuracy and fictionalized fantasy which may be useful here, by describing Cicero's portrayal of the past—Scipio's portrait of Romulus in *De Republica*, in her study—as a kind of "myth-making." Scipio "creates a new myth, one that has much in common with Barthes' conception of modern-day myth, or 'myth to-day.' What distinguishes this type of myth is the selective use of facts as a sign of its 'essence' or 'nature.' … Scipio's story, I propose, is a myth in this modern sense. There is, however, a crucial difference. For Barthes, the 'essence' is an ideological construct, masquerading as factual truth. Cicero, by contrast, views the meaning of Scipio's myth as a moral truth, having normative value as a guide to action. In place of factual truth, the myth puts forward a model of wisdom, to serve as a standard of conduct for all Romans:" Asmis (2014: 24); cf. Rawson (1972); Hanchey (2014).

as Cicero reports Sallustius' assessment, "in that book of ours about the art of speaking (*in illis nostris libris, qui esset de ratione dicendi*), [he said that] I had done nicely in having removed the conversation of the orators from myself, and transferring it to men whom I had seen myself" (*Q. fr.* 3.5.1).[30] *De Oratore* was historically plausible, as (to one reader, at least) *De Republica* was not.

Thus, although they discuss Greek rhetoric and theoretical concepts, Crassus and Antonius do not wholeheartedly or simply endorse an education such as Cicero had, nor do they pretend to have received that education themselves. Rather, they have had some contact with it (well-traveled men of letters that they are, in the dialogue) and have formed some opinions about it. They also distinguish a generally Hellenizing model of education from the pedagogy offered by teachers of rhetoric. Crassus is embarrassed even to address the question of whether there is an "art" of speaking or not, lest he seem to engage "like some shiftless and long-winded Greek, learned and knowledgeable though he may be (*tamquam alicui Graeculo otioso et loquaci et fortasse docto atque erudito*)" (1.102) in abstract navel-gazing (cf. *Rhet. ad Her.* 1.1). This seems to evoke Plato's *Gorgias*, and Callicles' comparison of excessive engagement with philosophy to a speech impediment: suitable and even enjoyable in children, but offensive and unmanly in an adult, and unbefitting of Socrates (485a–486d). Scaevola only induces Crassus to continue—and authorizes the dialogue's existence—by reassuring Crassus that his young interlocutors "are not looking for the mundane prattle of a Greek without experience (*usu*), or for a routine from the schoolrooms, but … the sort of man who is a leader (*princeps*) not in books but in the most important cases and … by virtue of his wisdom and his tongue (*consilio linguaque*)" (1.105).[31] The ideal authority on eloquence here is a political leader (*princeps*, *consilio*) and a practicing advocate.

Antonius, before embarking on his explication of his own method as an orator, again also parodies these schoolroom experts: "hearken, hearken, for now you shall hear a man educated also in Greek letters, in the schoolroom and by a professor (*de schola atque a magistro et Graecis litteris eruditum*) … I will teach you, students, what I did not learn: what I think about the whole field of speaking" (2.28). The pedagogy of the rhetoricians stands condemned of lacking practical wisdom: the *rhetores* teach what they never learned, i.e. the proper application of rhetorical techniques to the occasions on which real speeches must be delivered.[32] By contrast, Crassus and Antonius talk about their expe-

30 Cf. Dugan (2005: 87–88).

31 Cf. Hall (1996: 98–103).

32 Zetzel (2003).

riences and reminisce about their most spectacular successes, revealing in the process what kind of study allowed them to achieve those successes, and providing a roadmap of sorts to their apprentices. This rejection of rhetoric (or at least of rhetoricians) sometimes sounds jingoistic or anti-Greek, but the first voice to reject the teachings of rhetoricians in the text is himself a Greek Academic philosopher, Charmadas (1.84–91). Antonius later points out that although many Greeks studied rhetoric exclusively, the polymath Aristotle best understood the art as a whole and surpassed their narrowly technical perspective (2.160). Finally, Crassus condemns the Latin *rhetores* whom he expelled from Rome as censor as the worst offenders on this count (3.94).

This suspicion of rhetoric, presented in dialogue form, hearkens back particularly to Plato's *Phaedrus*, which the interlocutors of *De Oratore* specifically recall in the dialogue's opening *mise-en-scène* (1.28), and to the *Gorgias*.[33] The interlocutors themselves undermine the *Gorgias*' critique of rhetoric by framing it as a demonstration not of Gorgias' failings but of Plato's mastery of rhetoric (1.47, 3.129), as Dugan notes.[34] They also embody the ideal proposed in the *Phaedrus*. In the *Phaedrus*, Socrates proposed that a true master of rhetoric knows every type of soul and the methods of persuasion most likely to affect each type, as well as the techniques of speechmaking (271d–274b). That education is presented as a potentially impossibly ambitious goal by Socrates, but Cicero suggests that the greatest Roman orators—i.e. Antonius and Crassus—have already achieved it to some degree,[35] and in *De Oratore*, he brings them to life as exemplars for imitation. They are as critical as Socrates is of rhetoricians who ignore the true nature of eloquence, and who focus too much on composing practice speeches according to their theoretical model, which bears no relation to the real world of forensic and deliberative oratory.[36]

Crassus' and Antonius' resistance to such teachers' presentation of the theory of speaking is not only included for the sake of verisimilitude: the point that theory is and must be secondary to practice in the orator's education is central to the dialogue and recurs throughout it. Practice and experience are valorized, presented as naturally and traditionally Roman,[37] as opposed to

33 For the relationship between Cicero's dialogue and its Platonic antecedents, see Görler (1988); Narducci (1997: 28–34); Fantham (2004: 49–77). On Platonism in the other dialogues, see Lévy (1992).

34 Dugan (2005: 84–85).

35 Cf. Gildenhard (2013: 232–237).

36 See 1.52, 1.114, 1.146, 1.147, 1.157, 1.208, 2.74–76, 2.162.

37 Cf. Connolly (2007: 104–113) on the naturalization of rhetoric, especially by Antonius, in *De Oratore*.

frivolous abstract theorizing. Cicero's ideal orator learns his craft by practicing it in the real world and learning from role models, who teach him not only how to argue a case, but how to speak in a broader sense—not only technical knowledge but "social wisdom."[38] At the start of Book 2, the interlocutors confront Crassus' professed reluctance to discuss rhetoric again, and Caesar Strabo apologizes if his exhortations make him seem *ineptus*. Crassus responds with a revealing meditation on the word *ineptus*, which he takes to mean not *aptus*, not appropriate or well-fitted:

> nam qui aut tempus quid postulet non videt aut plura loquitur aut se ostentat aut eorum, quibuscum est, vel dignitatis vel commodi rationem non habet aut denique in aliquo genere aut inconcinnus aut multus est, is ineptus esse dicitur. Hoc vitio cumulata est eruditissima illa Graecorum natio; ... Omnium autem ineptiarum, quae sunt innumerabiles, haud sciam an nulla sit maior quam, ut illi solent, quocumque in loco, quoscumque inter homines visum est, de rebus aut difficillimis aut non necessariis argutissime disputare.
>
> 2.17–18

> For whoever does not see the opportunity he has asked for, or talks too much, or shows off, or has no regard either for his companions' status or for their comfort, or, finally, is either awkward or too much—that man is said to be *ineptus*. This is the vice with which that entire hyperliterate nation of Greeks is inundated; ... of all the instances of *ineptia*, which are innumerable, I think there may be none greater than doing what they often do: in whatever place, and in whatever company, arguing most precisely about either very abstruse or inconsequential issues.

Someone who is *ineptus* does not recognize the proper time or place for what he says or does, and indeed does not seem to recognize that such things have a proper time or place at all; the Greeks, Crassus claims, do not even have a word for this quality and thus have no idea of its existence as a vice (2.18).[39] Judgment and tact are not part of the typical rhetorical handbook or schoolroom pedagogy, but in the *Orator*, Cicero writes that the orator's wisdom or judgment is the foundation of eloquence, for "in life as in oratory, nothing is more difficult than knowing what is appropriate (*deceat*) to say"

38 Zetzel (2003: 131).

39 Cf. Stroup (2010: 153–154).

(70, cf. *De Orat.* 3.210–212), i.e. *decorum*.[40] A lack of such judgment potentially damages one's dignity, one's relationships, and one's character in general, in the forum and elsewhere. *De Oratore* itself is constantly in danger of *ineptia*, if the discussion becomes overly pedantic, specific, technical, or erudite, and can only be rescued by the interlocutors' adherence to the rules of *decorum*, including their interventions to impose limits on each other as needed.

The dialogue form of *De Oratore* thus allows Cicero a way of addressing and of modeling the importance of *decorum* for the orator: the social graces of his interlocutors are as relevant as their mastery of technique to their success as orators, and in the dialogue they manifest both as they interact with one another and debate the nature of eloquence.[41] Jon Hall has demonstrated the value of reading *De Oratore* as a document of Roman cultural history depicting an idealized aristocratic culture. In this reading, the interruptions and transitions between speeches by Crassus and Antonius are just as revealing as the speeches themselves, since they encapsulate the values of urbanity, politeness, self-effacing, and wit by which Republican elite *humanitas* was characterized.[42] *De Oratore* models elite culture and literary erudition through its characters, while also constructing a model of eloquence in which knowledge of rhetorical techniques must be combined with natural talent, general intellectual rigor, common sense, and experience to produce a truly accomplished orator. As Dugan puts it, "The living oral tradition of the Roman elite supplants the rote aridity of a systematic textbook,"[43] and the *ethos* of each speaker has didactic value, just as the content of his speech does.

Differences in *ethos* among these idealized interlocutors also reflect the element of subjectivity in the assessment of eloquence. Crassus and Antonius did not have identical speaking styles or methods of preparation, and Cicero sets out to preserve that difference: "I have tried to represent the style (*genere orationis*) with which we had associated each orator, in their manner of speech (*sermone*)" (3.16). Again, Cicero uses a minor interlocutor, Catulus, to draw more attention to this point; addressing Crassus and Antonius, he says: "'I often marvel especially at this quality in the two of you: that although you are entirely dissimilar (*dissimillimi*) to each other in speaking, each of you never-

40 Cf. Connolly (2007: 161–173) on Cicero's concept of *decorum*.

41 See David (2011) on the elitism inherent in this correlating of eloquence with aristocratic manners.

42 Hall (1996); Stroup (2010: 155–161) on the convivial atmosphere of the dialogue. Fantham adds that this polite but respectful and hierarchical dynamic is a very Roman variation on the dynamics of the Socratic *elenchus* in Plato; Fantham (2004: 53, cf. 71–76).

43 Dugan (2005: 83).

theless speaks in such a way that nothing is either withheld by nature, or not conferred by education (*nihil neque a natura denegatum neque a doctrina non delatum*)'" (2.126; cf. 2.96–97, 3.19–36). While the two are both exemplars of eloquence, they are not interchangeable or identical; the model of eloquence advanced in *De Oratore* allows for differences in style and *persona* among individual orators, as well as among individual speech occasions. Crassus himself cites Isocrates' different approaches to training Ephorus and Theopompus as a precedent for training each orator to achieve whatever species of excellence suited his abilities (3.36).[44] For Cicero, giving each interlocutor a different style within the dialogue preserves the characters' historicity, but also demonstrates that eloquence is a highly personal quality which can manifest itself in a wide variety of ways and can reflect different combinations of many different skills.

Within the dialogue, Cicero thus constructs characters who communicate his ideal of eloquence in two ways: they describe the ideal content and method for educating accomplished orators, even as they embody excellence themselves merely by speaking.[45] The rhetorical handbook typically constructed an idea of eloquence which was systematized, universalizing, monolithic, and almost exclusively technical.[46] In writing a mature work on rhetoric, Cicero therefore turned not to the handbook but to the dialogue as the genre which provided the most appropriate vehicle for his concept of the ideal orator. The dialogue form allows him to take a wider view of eloquence, including both subjective and universal aspects of the concept, and to include character, interpersonal interaction, and casual demonstrations of erudition as no less essential than the mastery of rhetoric and argumentation to the art. Dugan takes the view that "this text does not provide a straightforward explication of methods to achieve the ideal orator, but idealizes and mystifies him, and even discourages its readers from any hopes of attaining this status. This mystification through idealization contributed to Cicero's own prestige."[47] While I do think Cicero meant his dialogue to be constructive and didactic rather than discouraging, I agree that Cicero means to imply that eloquence cannot be reduced to the rules of rhetoric. The living, practical, sometimes mysterious elements of it cannot

44 Fantham (2004: 241).

45 Cf. Dugan's comparison of the interlocutors to *imagines*, theatrical masks, in a mnemonic system such as Antonius describes in Book 2: Dugan (2005: 99–103).

46 Fantham notes that Cicero's emphasis on *ethos* and *pathos* revived a feature of Aristotle's approach to rhetoric which had not been recognized by writers on rhetoric since: Fantham (2004: 168).

47 Dugan (2005: 80).

always be systematized or produced artificially, and are not universal, but are contingent on situations and personality in ways that a handbook or a theory cannot address.

Thus, the form and content of *De Oratore* both argue that an eloquent speech is more than the sum of its technical parts. Different orators have different methods of speech-writing and different styles and *personae* to deploy in delivering those speeches, but the plurality of voices and opinions in the dialogue validates those differences as all potentially participating in eloquence nonetheless. Rhetorical theory could supplement eloquence and could contribute terms for the discussion and analysis of it, but was not itself sufficient to generate it because it could not comprehend or impose order on all of these contingent aspects. Jon Hall argues that the design of *De Oratore* itself is persuasive: after advancing the argument in his own voice that *doctrina* is essential to eloquence in the prologue, Cicero engineers a debate among his interlocutors which leads to precisely that conclusion.[48] To this I would add that the dialogue's structure also leads the reader to the conclusion that *doctrina* alone is still not sufficient to create eloquence: the practical experience, *decorum*, and civility which the characters all showcase and advocate in the course of the dialogue are equally essential. Indeed, the characters would not have been persuasive—as real historical orators, or as advocates of Cicero's concept of eloquence in the dialogue—without winning over their listeners by means of those personal qualities.

Dugan suggests that this dialogue represents Cicero's assertion of the "cultural importance of the orator" to serve his own, rapidly evaporating political *auctoritas* in the mid-50s BCE.[49] In the following section, I suggest that Cicero is also intervening in the history of oratory in a less directly political, less self-promoting sense, articulating the cultural importance and authority of the orator (including but not limited to himself) as an intellectual authority and role model. In doing so, he also asserts the significance of *De Oratore* as a document which models an intellectual and social ideal, just as individual expert orators do.

48 Hall (1994).

49 Dugan (2005: 75); cf. Achard (1987: 324); Baraz (2012: 78); Vasaly (2015: 129–132).

Using *De Oratore* to Supply the Orator's Education

A practicing orator like Antonius or Crassus, who is well trained as well as naturally talented, and who has adaptable skills as well as experience in the appropriate application of them, can master aspects of eloquence which defy systematization and even description. Seeing that kind of orator in practice has educational value which supplements a student's theoretical knowledge. In his 2001 study of key aesthetic terms used to describe social performance, Krostenko notes that Cicero constricts or limits the use of those terms in *De Oratore*. He takes this as a sign of "a kind of refusal to valorize aestheticism,"[50] especially over considerations of content and ethics—that is, over philosophical considerations, as Cicero (or Crassus) might say. "Cicero's solution to the problem of aestheticism was to push it into a different form in the past, as if to make the present turn out differently."[51] In composing a work on orators and oratory, Cicero was assiduous in addressing the technical aspects of speech composition as well as all the concomitant factors which distinguished the merely articulate from the truly eloquent. To represent the social, intellectual, and moral dimensions of his ideal orator, Cicero looks to his own teachers and models, who were all but lost to him, to say nothing of future generations. He takes on their voices and authority, and looks at the still mistrusted discipline of rhetoric through their eyes, retrojecting the kind of *disciplina* he saw as ideal into their conversation and their characters.

In *De Oratore*, the instigators of the conversation and the primary recipients of the combined wisdom of Crassus and Antonius are Cotta and Sulpicius, two promising up-and-comers. They are eager disciples of the great orators of the previous generation, apprenticed to the masters in the usual arrangement of the *tirocinium fori*. Sulpicius had chosen Crassus as his role model, and adopted Antonius as well on Crassus' recommendation (2.87). Their known historical relationship to the great orators as students and imitators made them ideal interlocutors for Cicero's purposes. In the dialogue, as in life, they are eager to learn the secrets of the art of oratory: having observed the orators at work in the forum before, in the dialogue they try to extort some theoretical advice from them while on vacation (1.96–98, 133–136, 205–206).[52] The speeches of Crassus and Antonius in the dialogue, as written by Cicero, thus perform the kind of

50 Krostenko (2001: 230); cf. Grilli (2002: 60–64).

51 Krostenko (2001: 232).

52 On the importance of *otium* in the dialogue, see especially Stroup (2010: 146–167).

didactic value which the orators would also have had in delivering orations live. Thus, Cicero does not only use the dialogue to advocate for and to describe the ideal orator's education, but also uses it to provide (or at least to supplement) that education itself.

The voice of each Roman orator echoed the voices he had learned from, and his voice provided the model for the next generation. Cicero's organization of his *Brutus*, his history of orators, in generational groups, each showing the influence of the set immediately preceding it, reflects the importance of imitation of exemplary orators in the history of oratory at Rome. In that sequence of generational groups, Cicero describes Cotta as a known imitator of Antonius, although he finds Cotta somewhat inferior to the model (203). Cicero himself modeled his own oratory on Cotta in turn, and on Cotta's contemporary Hortensius; when Cicero returned from his studies abroad in Athens and Rhodes, these were the only two first-rate orators who had survived the proscriptions and civil wars of the 80s BCE, as Sulpicius, Antonius, and Crassus had all died or been killed. The deaths of Crassus, Antonius, and Sulpicius during the civil conflicts were all the more tragic because their influence as models of truly exceptional eloquence was cut short—this, incidentally, is the view taken of Cicero himself later, by Seneca the Elder and others. Individual living orators themselves represented the tradition of Roman oratory; when they died, part of that tradition died with them.

The loss of an authoritative voice represented the end of its influence. It could continue to educate others indirectly, through the transmission of the tradition, but that required attentiveness, faithfulness, and talent on the part of disciples and apprentices, and so was not assured or inevitable. But the influence of an orator's voice could sometimes transcend his performances: a published speech could document that performance and reach a much wider audience of imitators for more careful study. In the *Brutus*, Cicero refers his readers to five orations partially published by Crassus and apparently still accessible in 46 BCE (158–162). These orations cover a time period from 113 BCE, seven years before Cicero was born, to 92 BCE, the year of Crassus' untimely death, when Cicero was 14 years old.[53] Cicero, therefore, could hardly be expected to have learned much, if anything, from observation of Crassus, and indeed he specifies that thirty-four years separated them in age in order to give a precise chronology for the "first blossoming or ripening of Latin oratory" (*dicendi Latine prima maturitas*). Nevertheless, because Crassus published selections of these

53 For a prosopographical study of the historical relationship between Crassus and Cicero, see Rawson (1991).

speeches, Cicero could say that Crassus' speech in praise of Caepio in 95 BCE had provided a useful model for his own orations (164).

In the *Brutus*, the textual or written legacy of Roman orators is often included in Cicero's discussion of the history of oratory, and Brutus expresses a wish that he had more of these written texts from which to learn his craft:

> Hoc loco Brutus: quando quidem tu istos oratores, inquit, tanto opere laudas, vellem aliquid Antonio praeter illum de ratione dicendi sane exilem libellum, plura Crasso libuisset scribere: cum enim omnibus memoriam sui tum etiam disciplinam dicendi nobis reliquissent ... Et ego: mihi quidem a pueritia quasi magistra fuit, inquam, illa in legem Caepionis oratio ...
>
> 163–164

> At this point Brutus said, "although you praise those orators so effusively, I could wish that it had pleased Antonius to write something besides that very thin volume about the art of speaking, or Crassus to write more, for they would have left behind not only a memory of themselves for all, but an education in speaking for us ..." And I said, "For me, ever since childhood, that oration against Caepio's law was a sort of teacher ..."

Here, Cicero seems to be invoking *De Oratore* in particular, which after all transmits (or purports to transmit) the voices of Crassus and Antonius, in some fashion. Moreover, Crassus, in *De Oratore*, had described the forum as his *magister* (see above); Cicero's use of the same metaphor to describe written text in the *Brutus* marks the transition occurring in Roman education in the first century BCE. Cicero had learned his own craft from *magistri* of various kinds: from actual human instructors, from role models, from experts in the related disciplines of philosophy and rhetoric, from written texts, and from personal experience. This last teacher, personal experience, was privileged by tradition, as Crassus' labeling of the forum as his *magister* suggests; texts, however, offered their instruction to a larger number of people over a longer period of time, and Cicero saw them as equally useful, if limited. While Dugan, in discussing the parallel between Crassus and Socrates, states that "the genius of Crassus, like that of Socrates, eludes textual representation,"[54] in fact the genius of Crassus was at least partially represented and transmitted to Cicero (and others) in written orations.

---

54 Dugan (2005: 84).

This potential for the written text to extend the orator's influence as a role model is essential to Cicero's designs in writing the *De Oratore*. His published speeches could be "teachers" to a new generation of students, as Crassus' speeches had been his own "teachers," even if their didactic value was less than the experience of seeing a real speech live, or of engaging an orator in conversation. The relationship in the dialogue between the expert orators, Crassus and Antonius, and the younger Cotta and Sulpicius also mirrors the relationship between Cicero and the young aspiring orators (like Lentulus Spinther's son) whom he hoped to aid and to influence with his published works, including *De Oratore*. In the dialogue, even the mature orators Caesar Strabo, Scaevola, and Catulus press Crassus and Antonius to reveal the secrets to their success and enjoy the discussion of the art, and Cicero no doubt expected his peers to read his dialogue as well;[55] but it is the young students who justify the didactic intent of the dialogue.[56] Again, Cicero seems to be engaging in direct conversation with Plato's *Phaedrus*: if, as the apocryphal tale of Theuth and Thamus describes, writing is destructive to wisdom and inhibits real learning by preventing conversation with the wise author himself (274c–278d), and if the dialogue form can (implicitly) therefore make a written text more intelligent and pedagogically useful by providing that sort of conversation,[57] Cicero's *De Oratore*, too, attempts to reconcile orality and literacy by looking to the same genre.[58] *De Oratore* thus offers a new way to capitalize on the best of both worlds, of the oral and the literary modes of education: it uses the permanence of literature to model the oral community of master orators whose influence in terms of style, practical wisdom, and *persona* would otherwise have been diminished or lost.

Conclusion

It is hard to say how developed Cicero's plans were for his corpus of written works at this early stage, although he was already working on his *De Republica*

55 Fantham expresses surprise that Cicero, in his 30s, was still (as he describes in *Brut.* 317) looking for a model to imitate, and chose Hortensius (2004: 100); but as the attitudes of the older orators in *De Oratore* suggests, emulation and imitation seem to have been a matter of continuing education.

56 Just as he was motivated to publish his consular orations by the "enthusiasm of young people" as well as Atticus' delight in them, in the letter with which I began this chapter.

57 Nehamas (1999: 344–347); Gill (2002: 147–153).

58 Cf. Dugan (2005: 84–86).

in 54, a year after the circulation of the finished *De Oratore*, if not earlier (*Q. fr.* 3.5).[59] *De Oratore* was clearly a first step toward that corpus, conscious or not: *De Oratore*, like Cicero's later written works, translates Greek philosophy and knowledge into a Roman context and provides a sort of curriculum in Latin for the intellectual elite, more accessible than teachers in Athens or Rhodes, and with the added authority of influential Romans' experience and success brought to bear. Those writings have been called a "counter-Rome," an idealized alternate universe in which authority was based on merit and effective service to the republic, in contrast to the corruption of reality.[60] In the 50s, Cicero's enemy Clodius and (arguably) his "friend" Caesar, not to mention Catiline and the Gracchi before them, had inspired popular support in the discontented and particularly the younger elements in the Roman *populus* by decrying the corruption and selfishness of the senatorial elite—and they had done so through remarkably successful uses of mass oratory. They were the sort of elite citizens who ought to have been providing positive examples of behavior, but they instead used oratory without civility or wisdom, in his view. They threatened Cicero personally and the identification of oratory as a tool of legitimate leadership, and also represented a greater trend of what Cicero saw as political miseducation. *De Oratore* is his answer, an attempt to reassert the value of eloquence and to provide a pedagogical model incorporating and preserving the best of the old and the new, pairing technical with ethical concerns. The mid-50s, like the 90s BCE when the dialogue is set, saw political threats to the orator's ability to exert exemplary influence over his community, by threatening individual orators' careers and very lives. Education through imitation had allowed Cicero's interlocutors to influence him in his formative years and to carry on the tradition of eloquence at Rome, and if his dialogue represents a nostalgic fantasy, it is a fantasy which he hopes to bring to life by providing the same kind of education for his readers in turn.

In composing a work on eloquence and education, Cicero thus turns to his own role models and invokes their authority, framing his dialogue as a sort of re-creation of part of his own education. In the act of paying homage to his own teachers and role models, he also leads his readers to feel as if they themselves are now apprenticed to those same teachers, benefiting from their wisdom and experience. If the handbook represents a new scientific, textual *magister*, and the forum or the orator represents the old, practical, oral *magister*, Cicero's dialogue offers a hybrid: partially oral and partially literary, conversa-

59 Cf. Zarecki (2014: 62–68) on the relevance of *De Oratore* to *De Republica*.

60 Bloomer (1997: 54–55); Achard (1987: 329); cf. Gildenhard (2011: 388); Hanchey (2014: 75).

tional but semi-permanent in form, and protreptic without being pedantic or narrowly prescriptive in content, combining what is useful from both practice and theory while rejecting misleading elements of both. The right answer is not simply presented; instead, the reader is led through a dialectical process, represented through conversation, which points toward plausible conclusions but ultimately allows the reader to choose her own path. The experience of the *tirocinium fori*, of listening to and emulating the voice of a role model, is mirrored in the reader's experience of the dialogue, a sort of *tirocinium litterarum*, in which the interlocutors model (and even theorize about) opinions, behaviors, and skills. The best elements of Cicero's own education are preserved and made accessible to future students, sanctioned by the master himself as the proper material for education. That education was transmitted by recognized masters of the art in dialogue with each other, rather than by single schoolmasters; it was personal and consciously subjective rather than universal; and practical rather than abstractly theoretical. It is sanctioned in the dialogue by the interlocutors' authority as public figures and recognized exemplars of eloquence, not by the title of *rhetor*. And it is contained as much in their mannerisms and style of discourse, even in relatively informal conversation, as in the content of what they said.

Bibliography

Achard, Guy. 1987. "Pourquoi Cicéron a-t-il écrit le *De oratore*?" *Latomus* 46 (2): 318–329.

———. 2000. "L'influence des jeunes lecteurs sur la rédaction des discours cicéroniens." In Guy Achard and Marie Ledentu eds. *Orateur, auditeurs, lecteurs: à propos de l'éloquence romaine à la fin de la République et au début du Principat*. Actes de la tables-ronde du 31 janvier 2000. Paris: De Boccard.

Asmis, Elizabeth. 2014. "Cicero *Mythologus*: The Myth of the Founders in *De Republica*." *Classical Journal* 110 (1): 23–42.

Baraz, Yelena. 2012. *A Written Republic: Cicero's Philosophical Politics*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Barnes, Jonathan. 1997. "Roman Aristotle." In Jonathan Barnes and Miriam Tamara Griffin, eds. *Philosophia Togata II: Plato and Aristotle at Rome*, 1–70. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Beriger, Andreas. 1989. *Die aristotelische Dialektik: Ihre Darstellung in der* Topik *und in den "Sophistischen Widerlegungen" und ihre Anwendung in der* Metaphysik *13*. Heidelberg: Carl Winter.

Bloomer, W. Martin. 1997. *Latinity and Literary Society at Rome*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Butler, Shane. 2002. *Hand of Cicero*. London and New York: Routledge.

Connolly, Joy. 2007. *The State of Speech: Rhetoric and Political Thought in Ancient Rome*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

———. 2015. *The Life of Roman Republicanism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

David, Jean-Michel. 2011. "L'éloquence judiciaire entre compétence aristocratique et spécialisation carriériste." In Wolfgang Blösel and Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp, eds. *Von der* militia equestris *zur* militia urbana. *Prominenzrollen und Karrierefelder im antiken Rom*, 157–173. Stuttgart.

Dirlmeier, Franz. 1962. *Merkwürdige Zitate in Der Eudemischen Ethik Des Aristoteles*. Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse 2. Heidelberg: Carl Winter.

Douglas, A.E. 1962. "*Platonis Aemulus*?" *Greece & Rome, Second Series* 9 (1): 41–51.

Dugan, John. 2005. *Making a New Man: Ciceronian Self-Fashioning in the Rhetorical Works*. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press.

Fantham, Elaine. 2004. *The Roman World of Cicero's* De Oratore. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Föllinger, Sabine. 2015. "Discursivity in Aristotle's Biological Writings." In Miira Tuominen, Sara Heinämaa, and Virpi Mäkinen, eds. *New Perspectives on Aristotelianism and Its Critics*, 50–65. Brill's Studies in Intellectual History 233. Leiden; Boston: Brill.

Gaillard, M. 1978. "*Auctoritas exempli*: pratique rhétorique et idéologie au Ier siècle avant J.-C." *Revue des études latines* 56: 30–34.

Gildenhard, Ingo. 2011. *Creative Eloquence: The Construction of Reality in Cicero's Speeches*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.

———. 2013. "Of Cicero's Plato: Fictions, Forms, Foundations." In Malcolm Schofield, ed. *Aristotle, Plato, and Pythagoreanism in the First Century BC: New Directions for Philosophy*, 225–275. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Gill, Christopher. 2002. "Dialectic and the Dialogue Form." In Julia Annas and Christopher Rowe, eds. *New Perspectives on Plato, Modern and Ancient*, 145–172. Center for Hellenic Studies Colloquia 6. Cambridge & London: Harvard University Press.

Görler, Woldemar. 1988. "From Athens to Tusculum: Gleaning the Background of Cicero's *De Oratore*." *Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of Rhetoric* 6 (3): 215–235.

Graff, Richard. 2001. "Reading and the 'Written Style' in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*." *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* 31 (4): 19–44.

Grilli, Alberto. 2002. "Cicerone tra retorica e filosofia." In Emanuele Narducci, ed. *Interpretare Cicerone: Percorsi della critica contemporanea: Atti del II Symposium Ciceronianum Arpinas*, 53–65. Florence: Felice le Monnier.

Hall, Jon. 1994. "Persuasive Design in Cicero's *De Oratore*." *Phoenix* 48 (3): 210–225.

———. 1996. "Social Evasion and Aristocratic Manners in Cicero's *De Oratore*." *American Journal of Philology* 117 (1): 95–120.

———. 2014. *Cicero's Use of Judicial Theater*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Hanchey, Dan. 2014. "Days of Future Passed: Fiction Forming Fact in Cicero's Dialogues." *The Classical Journal* 110 (1): 61–75.

Humbert, Jules. 1925. *Les plaidoyers écrits et les plaidoiries réelles de Cicéron*. Paris: Les Presses Universitaires de France.

Kennedy, George. 1972. *The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World, 300 B.C.–300 A.D.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Krostenko, Brian A. 2001. *Cicero, Catullus, and the Language of Social Performance*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Leeman, Anton Daniël, Harm Pinkster, and E. Rabbie. 1989. *M. Tullius Cicero, De oratore libri III*. Vol. III. III vols. Wissenschaftliche Kommentare zu griechischen und lateinischen Schriftstellern. Heidelberg: Carl Winter. Universitätsverlag.

Lévy, C. 1992. *Cicero Academicus: Recherches sur les* Acadèmiques *et sur la philosophie cicéronienne*. Collection de l' École Française de Rome, CLXII. Rome: École Française de Rome.

Lintott, Andrew. 2008. *Cicero as Evidence: A Historian's Companion*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.

Long, A.A. 2006. "Cicero's Plato and Aristotle." In *From Epicurus to Epictetus: Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy*, 285–306. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

May, James M. 1988. *Trials of Character: The Eloquence of Ciceronian Ethos*. Chapel Hill & London: University of North Carolina Press.

Narducci, Emanuele. 1997. *Cicerone e l'eloquenza romana: Retorica e progetto culturale*. Quadrante 86. Rome: Editori Laterza.

Nehamas, Alexander. 1999. *Virtues of Authenticity: Essays on Plato and Socrates*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Rawson, Elizabeth. 1972. "Cicero the Historian and Cicero the Antiquarian." *The Journal of Roman Studies* 62: 33–45.

———. 1991. "Lucius Crassus and Cicero: The Formation of a Statesman." In *Roman Culture and Society: The Collected Papers of Elizabeth Rawson.*, 16–33. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Rehn, Rudolf. 2000. *Sprache und Dialektik in der aristotelischen Philosophie*. Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie 31. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: B.R. Grüner.

Schofield, Malcolm. 2009. "Ciceronian Dialogue." In Simon Goldhill, ed. *The End of Dialogue in Antiquity*, 63–84. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Steel, Catherine E.W. 2005. *Reading Cicero*. London: Duckworth.

Stroh, Wilfried. 1975. *Taxis und Taktik: Ciceros Gerichtsreden*. Stuttgart: Teubner.

Stroup, Sarah Culpepper. 2010. *Catullus, Cicero, and a Society of Patrons: The Generation of the Text*. Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press.

Stull, William. 2011. "*Deus Ille Noster*: Platonic Precedent and the Construction of the Interlocutors in Cicero's *De Oratore*." *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 141: 247–263.

Usener, Sylvia. 1994. *Isokrates, Platon und ihr Publikum: Hörer und Leser von Literatur im 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr*. ScriptOralia 14. Tübingen: Gunter Narr Verlag.

van der Blom, Henriette. 2010. *Cicero's Role Models: The Political Strategy of a Newcomer*. Oxford Classical Monographs. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Vasaly, Ann. 1993. *Representations: Images of the World in Ciceronian Oratory*. University of California Press.

———. 2015. *Livy's Political Philosophy*. Cambridge University Press.

Walker, Jeffrey. 2011. *The Genuine Teachers of This Art: Rhetorical Education in Antiquity*. Studies in Rhetoric/Communication. Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press.

Zarecki, Jonathan. 2014. *Cicero's Ideal Statesman in Theory and Practice*. London: Bloomsbury Academic.

Zetzel, James E.G. 2003. "Plato with Pillows: Cicero on the Uses of Greek Culture." In David Braund and Christopher Gill, eds. *Myth, History and Culture in Republican Rome: Studies in Honour of T.P. Wiseman*, 119–138. University of Exeter Press.

CHAPTER 17

Becoming Gallic: Orality, Voice and Identity in Roman Gaul*

Jay Fisher

In 1897, near the commune of Coligny in eastern France, a certain Monsieur Roux discovered more than 150 fragments that comprise roughly half of what was once a single bronze tablet. Because the tablet, now known as the Coligny calendar, gives the months of a five-year cycle, including two intercalary months, rather than a single year, the missing parts of the inscription may be reconstructed with some confidence.[1] Nor is it surprising that the language of the document is Gaulish, given that it was discovered in what was once a part of Roman Gaul. That being said, it is somewhat unexpected that the calendar appears to have been engraved in the last quarter of the second century CE.[2]

Since its discovery in the late nineteenth century, the bronze fragments of the Coligny calendar have attracted the attention of Celticists, who have used this document to reconstruct the language and calendar of ancient Gaul,[3] or

* I would like to thank the audience of the eleventh Orality and Literacy in the Ancient World meeting for their feedback and Niall Slater and his colleagues at Emory for hosting the meeting. Finally, I would like to thank Michael Antoseiwicz for helping with the proofreading.

1 The lacunae in the calendar do, however, allow for the possibility of variable lengths for some months. MacNeil 1926: 28–30 suggests that the month of *EQUOS* had varying lengths throughout the five-year cycle in order to make the calendar reflect the length of five solar years more accurately.

2 In their discussion of the date of the calendar, Duval and Pinault 1986: 23–30 conclude (apparently in consultation with M. Richard Marichal) that its letter forms do not permit a date before the end of the second century CE. The fragments of a classicizing statue that were found with the calendar date between 50 and 150 CE.

3 Because the text of the calendar consists of abbreviations for the most part, interpreting the language of the calendar is especially hazardous. Duval and Pinault 1986: 335–395 provide an extensive month by month commentary on the text of the calendar and 1986: 421–427 a separate discussion of the meanings of individual lexemes, including a list of words that defy interpretation. Zavaroni 2007 makes suggestions for almost every single sequence of letters by means of the etymological method. Because, Zavaroni's discussion is part of a synoptic interpretation of the calendar, however, many of his interpretations are polemical and sometimes idiosyncratic. Lambert 2003: 111–117 discusses the calendar more briefly than

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2017 | DOI: 10.1163/9789004329737_018

even the calendar of the ancient Celtic ancestors of the Gauls.[4] More recently, however, Roman historians have noted that the form of the calendar is demonstrably Roman and therefore indicative of pervasive Romanization.

As different as the nature of these studies may be, the overwhelming majority of them share an implicit assumption that the content of the calendar is, on the one hand, Gaulish, including its use of lunar months in contrast to the Julian calendar, but that the material form of the calendar is "wholly Roman" as asserted by Greg Woolf.[5] For example, Sacha Stern, who understands the Coligny calendar as a form of local resistance to the official Roman calendar, recognizes that its material form appears to have been influenced by Roman *fasti*.[6] Conversely, Garrett Olmsted assumes the content of the calendar was passed down orally.[7] With the exception of Cathy Swift, who still argues that there is a relationship between the Coligny Calendar and Old Irish parallels,[8] these assumptions consistently inform all of the previous studies that I have been able to find.

Although these suggestions about the nature of the Coligny calendar are all correct on a superficial level, they mask a complex dialogue between Latin and the Gaulish language, literacy and orality, and Roman and provincial identity that cannot be easily separated into different and independent voices. Even on the most basic level of language, there are spellings that reflect the influence of Latin on Gaulish, a result, I suggest, of an imperfect knowledge of Gaulish in an era when Latin was the first language in the Gallic provinces. In other words, Gaulish is here serving as "an emblem of groupness" or a "psychosocial rallying

---

either Duval and Pinault or Zavaroni but less polemically than Zavoroni. Interpretations of some of the individual words may also be found in Delamarre's 2013 dictionary of the Gaulish language. Swift 2001 touches upon a number of theoretical issues that are often implicit in previous interpretations of the calendar.

4 MacNeil 1928: 4–7 argues that it is unlikely that a Gaulish calendar would have been inscribed and displayed after Augustus and the Romanization of Gaul, an argument that was still accepted by some authorities as late as the 1990's as Swift 2001: 84 has observed. MacNeil arrived at his conclusion, however, before anyone who was knowledgeable of Roman epigraphy appears to have examined the orthography of the calendar closely. Although Olmsted 1992: 71–74 is forced to acknowledge the inscription is a product of the late second century CE, he dates the calendar as it appears in the inscription to the first century BCE and then proceeds to argue that the Coligny calendar was derived from an earlier form that may be dated to the fourth century BCE or earlier.

5 Woolf 1996: 96.

6 Stern 2010: 311.

7 Olmsted 1992: 73.

8 Swift 2001: 88–92.

point" as opposed to an "instrumental tool."[9] Moreover, the use of lunar cycles in the calendar may be influenced by Roman ideas about Gallic culture as well as a genuine, orally transmitted means of marking time in ancient Gaul, since the use of a lunar calendar that is adjusted to closely reflect the solar year is complicit with Roman views of the Gaulish calendar. Finally, the elements of the physical form of the calendar may be wholly Roman, but the combination of elements in the Coligny calendar has no precedent in the extant *fasti*, as noted by Swift.[10] The calendar is therefore a hybrid of multiple voices, oral and written, that were used to express identity in Roman Gaul in the late second century BCE, whatever the origins of the various elements of the calendar may be.

To borrow a term from Marie Louise Pratt, the calendar is an inscribed autoethnography, an expression "in which colonized subjects undertake to represent themselves in ways that engage with the colonizer's terms."[11] Although the term implies a traditional text, these expressions include non-textual forms such as Peruvian fabric pictures known as *arpilleras*.[12] In a manner similar to the *arpilleras*, the Coligny calendar employs visual forms imported from the imperial center of power, in this case the Roman *fasti*, and combines features of them in unique ways to express the point of view that is at once resistant to and complicit with Roman ideas about Gallic culture.

Even if a neat structural opposition between lunar, Gaulish, resistant and oral to solar, Roman, complicit and literate, cannot be maintained under close scrutiny, the assumptions of such a structure are, nevertheless, based on demonstrable observations. The engraver employs Latin letter forms including -*Q*-, a letter that is absent from all but three of the more than eighty Gallo-Latin alphabets extrapolated by Stifter from inscriptions, not to mention Roman numerals.[13] As Swift has observed, the abbreviations in the calendar are also a particularly Roman practice.[14] What is more, the use of bronze as the medium of a public documents itself is "a recognizable Roman practice" that held symbolic meaning for the inhabitants of Rome as Callie Williamson has demonstrated.[15] The designation of months by means of the abbreviations *MAT* or *ANMAT* is further reminiscent of the abbreviations *F*, *N*, *C* and *NP* in Roman

9 Edwards 2009: 55–57.

10 Swift 2001: 89.

11 Pratt 2008: 9.

12 Pratt 2008: 136–140.

13 Stifter Old Celtic Languages. IV. Gaulish. https://www.univie.ac.at/indogermanistik/download/Stifter/oldcelt2008_6_gaulishA.pdf.

14 Swift 2001: 87. Meyer 2004: 63–66 identifies and discusses this feature of Roman culture.

15 Williamson 1987: 160–183.

fasti. Finally, the lack of evidence for calendars in Gaulish before at least the middle of the first century CE (if the fragments of the Villards D'Héria calendar can be dated that early)[16] suggests that the idea of an inscribed Gaulish calendar was conceived under the influence of Roman *fasti*. On the other hand, the language of the calendar must be Gaulish. The names of the months are not Roman and presumably native to the region of western Gaul, passed down through oral tradition as an alternative means of keeping time. Its luni-solar nature also stands in contrast to the solar Julian calendar adopted at Rome two hundred years before.

These observations may be illustrated in the following transcription for the more or less intact month of *EQVOS* in the Coligny Calendar:[17]

M EQVOS ^{ANM}

I	D	IVOS
II PRINI LACIVOS		
III M	D SIMI	IVOS
IIII	D	IVOS
V	D AMB	
VI M	D SIMIVISO	
VII	D ELEMBI	
VIII	D ELEMBI	
VIIII	D ELEMBI	
X	D	
XI	D AMB	
X]II	D	
XIII M	D SEMIVIS	
XIIII M	D SEMIVIS	

16 The calendar is extremely fragmentary and was at first thought to be written in Latin and published as *CIL* XIII 5345, but it is now recognized as a Gaulish calendar. The letter forms that survive, unfortunately, only allowed Duval and Pinault 1986: 259 (again in consultation with Marichal) to date the fragment between the second quarter of the first century CE and the third century.

17 The text is my own transcription of the drawing from Duval and Pinault 1986: 11 of the conjoined fragments 25–29 and 35–36. A photograph of the join may also be found in the unpaginated photographic plates. The form that I present on the printed page is modeled after Lehoux 2007: 197. I have altered Lehoux's use of † in the triple marks to ɪ, however, in order to more accurately represent the actual appearance of the calendar. I thank the anonymous reader for the suggestion.

VX M	D SEMI GANOR
ATENOUX	
I M	D SEMIVIS
II M	D SEMIVIS
III	D AMBSIMIV
IIII	D
V ƗIƗ	D AMB
VI IIƗ	D SIMISO
VII IƗI	D ELEM AMB
VIII IIƗ	D ELEMB
VIIII	D AMB ELEMB
X	D
XI ƗII	D AMB
XII IƗI	D
XIII IIƗ	D AMB
XIIII	D
XV	D AMB

Although the meanings of the abbreviations are not all secure, there is some agreement on the following aspects of the notation of the calendar. M is an abbreviation for MID "month" and is followed by the name of the month. The Roman numerals mark the days before and after the middle of the month. The abbreviation D stands for day and is sometimes followed by an abbreviation of another month name. The meaning of the abbreviations AMB and IVOS is not clear nor is there a consensus on the meaning of PRINI LACIVOS, ATENOUX and GANOR, though the second member of the putative compound ATENOUX appears to be cognate with Latin nox, hence the meaning of -NOUX is "night." I also remain agnostic about the meaning of the triple marks (e.g. ƗII) along with Duval and Pinault.[18]

Even though the form of the calendar is constructed of Roman elements, the particular combination of Roman elements in the Coligny calendar cannot be found among the extant *fasti* from Roman Italy. There are at present no examples of Roman *fasti* engraved on bronze. All of the surviving examples of *fasti* listed by Jörge Rüpke are either inscribed on stone or painted.[19] The extant

18 Duval and Pinault 1986: 295. Olmsted 1992: 28 claims the triple marks indicate "solar and lunar positions" over a seventy-five year cycle. Zavaroni 1999: 88 suggests that the triple marks indicate that the marked days characterize lunar days that are longer than a solar day in months marked *MAT*- and shorter than a lunar day in *ANMAT*- months.

19 Rüpke 2011: ix–xii.

fasti also never extend beyond a single cycle of twelve months, or thirteen in the republican calendar from Antium, the so-called Fasti Antiates Maiores that includes a single intercalary month (CIL I^2 *Fasti Antiates Maiores*).

In contrast to Roman practice, the Coligny calendar presents a cycle of five years with the intercalary months placed within the cycle of regular months rather than outside of it. Moreover, the form of the calendar gives no hint that the two intercalary months were placed within another month, as was done in the Roman calendar after the festival of the Terminalia on the 23rd of February. Nor did the intercalation in the Roman calendar occur in fixed intervals as it appears to have been in the Coligny calendar. Cicero in a letter to Atticus (Att. 5.9.2) debates with himself whether or not he should ask Atticus to try to block an intercalation so as not to delay his return to Rome from Cilicia any more than necessary. Intercalation occurred at Rome when the officials in charge decided that intercalation was necessary, whereas intercalation in the Coligny calendar was apparently not decided on a case by case basis. The Coligny calendar therefore differs from the Fasti Antiates Maiores not only with respect to the graphic representation of the placement of the intercalary month but also in its use of fixed intercalary months in order to calibrate the lunar months with the solar year.

Nor does the Coligny calendar mark the days of the month in the same manner as the Roman *fasti*, since all the days are given Roman numbers from one to fifteen rather than the letters A to H or numbers that are used to indicate the day's relative position to the Kalends, Nones and Ides that can be found in Roman *fasti*. Both of these Roman practices may observed from the following transcription of the month of March from the Fasti Praenestini (CIL I^2):[20]

D K MART NP
E VI F
F V C
G IIII C
H III C
A PR NP
B NON
C VII F
[D VI] C

20 I have not included the commentary by Verrius Flaccus printed in smaller letters around the abbreviations and I have been very conservative in my reconstruction for the missing days.

[E V] C
[F IV]
[G III]
[H PR]
[A EID]
[B XVIII
[C XVII]
[D XVI]
[E XV]
[F XIIII] Q
[G XIII]
[H XII]
A XI
B X
C VIIII C F
D VIII
E VII
[F]
G
H
A C
B PR C
XXXI

The month name is part of the abbreviated phrase K MART (*Kalendae Marti*) rather than given a separate lemma as it is in the Coligny calendar. The letters stand for the eight days of the Roman week and the Roman numerals count backwards to the Nones (NON), a date that was calculated by counting eight days inclusively to the Ides of the month (EID), a day that was either the thirteenth or the fifteenth day depending on the month. In this particular *fasti*, the abbreviation F is followed by an explanation of the nature of the *feriae* or holiday. The commentary added to the calendar explains that the abbreviation Q on the nineteenth of the month stands for *Quinquatrus*, a day sacred to artisans and the day when the Salii perform in the *comitium*.

Because the abbreviations *MAT* and *ANMAT* in the Coligny calendar bear a remarkable similarity to Middle Welsh *mat* and Old Irish *maith*, words that both mean "good," they could be parallel to the abbreviations *F* and *N* in the Latin *fasti*. There are, however, no obvious parallels for *C* and *NP* in the *fasti*.[21]

21 *F*, *N* and *C* in the *fasti* are understood to be abbreviations of *fastus* "courtday," *nefastus*

Even if MAT and ANMAT are parallel to the Latin abbreviations F and N,[22] moreover, the use of these abbreviations diverges even further from Roman practice because the Gaulish abbreviations MAT and ANMAT are used to characterize months. It would therefore follow that the Coligny calendar designated months of bad and good omen, whereas the Roman calendar gives these indications only to days.

On the other hand, given that declaring an entire month as unlucky would be exceedingly inconvenient for almost any public activity, it is also possible that MAT- indicates that a month is 'full' or rather consists of thirty days in opposition to incomplete months of twenty nine days characterized as ANMAT- as suggested by Duval and Pinault.[23] Whether or not this interpretation of the Gaulish abbreviations is correct, the form of the Coligny calendar still demonstrably diverges from the Roman *fasti* in its use of abbreviations. No matter what MAT- and ANMAT- abbreviated or meant, whoever composed the calendar was expressing his Gaulish identity by consciously or unconsciously rearranging the details in a manner that no inhabitant of Roman Italy would.

In light of the current evidence, an inscribed calendar is also out of step with Roman fashion at the end of the second century, since none of the extant *fasti* appear to have been produced after the early second century. There are no monumental *fasti* after the Fasti Sorrinenses Minores, an inscription that Rüpke dates not "much later" than Caligula, under whom the latest monumental *fasti* from Rome, the no longer extant Fasti Pighiani, were set up.[24] Because the much smaller and much less detailed Fasti Lanuvi and private, painted *fasti*, such as the Fasti Porticus, can be dated to the second century, however, it is important not to overemphasize the anachronistic character of the Coligny calendar in terms of simply setting up an inscribed calendar. What is significant here is the contrast between its monumental nature and the small, private character of the few surviving Roman *fasti* that are roughly contemporaneous with the Coligny calendar.

"non-court day," and *comitialis* "assembly day" based upon Macrobius (1.16. 4–5). I use Hannah's 2005: 101–102 English translations of the Latin terms. Although there is some controversy over the exact wording represented by NP, the consensus is that it is a subcategory of dates marked N. Rüpke 2010: 50–53 suggests NP stands for *Nefas Piaculum*. Hannah 2005: 104 provides an overview of other suggestions for NP.

22 Woolf 1996: 96, for example, assumes that the calendar marks days that are "of good and bad omen."

23 Duval and Pinault 1986: 425.

24 Rüpke 2010: 140.

A more significant divergence is the absence of the emperor and the imperial family in the form of birthdays and significant events celebrated at Rome and recorded in imperial *fasti*. Whether or not any of the abbreviations or enigmatic terms such as *ATENOUX* refer to native Gallic festivals, there is no recognition of the present emperor and his household or their predecessors. The extant monumental imperial *fasti*, on the other hand, are saturated with birthdays and other significant events in the life of the imperial family. There were so many of these events on imperial *fasti*, in fact, that Rüpke suggests that the sheer weight of numbers of these events led to the decline and disappearance of larger monumental calendars in imperial Italy by the end of the first century.[25] The Coligny is therefore out of step with contemporary Roman calendars not only because of its size but also because of the conspicuous absence of the emperor and his family.

The holes in the Coligny Calendar placed to the left of the *lemmata* for individual days add yet another complication to the relationship of the calendar to Roman *fasti*. The holes indicate that the Gaulish calendar was also a *parapegmata*, an inscription or text that records cycles of time by moving a peg, day by day, to indicate where the day takes place in a given cycle of time. The discovery of a fragment of a calendrical *parapegma* composed in Latin in the area of Nimes[26] does not necessarily mean, however, that the composer of the Coligny calendar was influenced by general Roman practice, as *parapegmata* do not consistently record calendrical cycles.[27] Because the practice was widespread across the Greek east, moreover, there remains the possibility that the parapegmatic feature of the Coligny calendar is not indicative of Roman influence so much as a general Mediterranean influence.

If characterizing the form of the calendar as wholly Roman is dubious, then it is equally difficult to maintain that the content of the calendar reflects a Gaulish oral tradition of a lunar calendar only superficially influenced by over two centuries of cultural contact. Although the language of the calendar must be Gaulish, there are subtle characteristics that suggest that the Gaulish of the calendar is subject to interference from Latin, a process whereby grammatical features of one's native language are unconsciously imported into one's second language. In other words, if the following analysis is correct, then Latin was the first language of at least the engraver, not Gaulish.

---

25 Rüpke 2010: 140–145.

26 *L'Année épigraphique* 2003: 1279.

27 Lehoux 2007: 138–142 and *passim*.

To begin with the orthography of the calendar, the month name *CUTIOS*, is sometimes spelled *QUTIOS* rather than *CUTIOS*. This fluctuation of spelling is indicative of someone schooled enough to have internalized the Latin spelling rule that requires the letter Q precede U at the beginning of most words. Such a vacillation is an example of orthographic interference at least. Nor does the calendar employ the distinctive Gaulish letter referred to as *Tau Gallicum*, either because the letter was unknown to the engraver or because it had fallen out of the Gaulish in that part of the province.[28] Because the engraver was inconsistent in his use of Q and C and did not use *Tau Gallicum*, it is a reasonable inference that he knew how to write in the Latin alphabet fairly well, but not as well in the Gallo-Latin alphabet seen in other inscriptions. Both of these circumstances may also indicate a phonological or phonetic interference from Latin. In other words, not only the engraver's spelling but also his pronunciation of Gaulish may have been unconsciously influenced by his pronunciation of Latin.

If the month name *EQVOS* means something like 'horse month', as the majority opinion appears to be, then the labiovelar (spelled -*QV*-) in *EQVOS* requires an explanation, since this phoneme universally surfaces as -*p*- elsewhere in Gaulish.[29] The equivalence of Latin -*qu*- to Gaulish -*p*- may be seen in its cognates of Latin *equus* elsewhere, such as Gaulish *epo*- the first element in proper names in a number of Gallo-Greek inscriptions in the sanctuary of Glanum in Gallia Narbonensis, and sometimes simply as *epo*-, presumably an abbreviation of a personal name with the *epo*- element, or perhaps of the attested divine name Epona.[30] Some have explained its presence as an archaism but there is a small number of words that begin with p- where some suggested Latin cognates begin with *qu* in the calendar-. Whether or not *PRI(N)NO/PRI(N)NI* is a

---

28 Although the exact articulation of Tau Gallicum is elusive, Eska's 1998: 120–121 observation that the same graphemes are also occasionally used to represent a lenited allophone of /t/ suggests that Tau Gallicum was at least similar to a lenited /t/ if not identical, as Eska 1998: 124 suggests.

29 In addition to *EQVOS*, the ethonym Sequani and the toponym Sequana are usually cited as evidence "dialectical variants" of Gaulish that may retain the labiovelar. There are good reasons, however, to suspect that these names do not contain an original labiovelar. In the first place, the sequence SEQUANI appears in only one Gaulish text of which I am aware, and that text also contains the Latin name *LOUCIO(N)* (Lucium) (cf Lambert 2003: 99). The root of both names also looks suspiciously similar to the common root *Sego*- 'victory', found in a number of Gaulish names. Moreover, Latin only has the segment -gu- after -n-, a constraint that may have influenced Latin speakers to interpret **Seguani* 'The Victorious Ones', as *Sequani*.

30 I take my evidence from the excellent *onomastica Glanicorum* of Mullen 2013: 328–383.

reflex of PIE *k^w*rin*-, "buy," no one disputes that its initial consonant is a reflex of the same Indo-European phoneme that yields *qu*- in Latin.[31] Whatever the meaning of *PETI* may be, it too must come from a labiovelar since the loss of the original initial p- is one of the fundamental characteristics of the Celtic languages.[32] The phenomenon may be seen in the place name *Mediolanum*, "middle of the plain" a name that would surface as **Medioplanum* in Latin and that yields the modern place name Milan.

If *EQVOS* is not an archaism, then there must be another explanation for the unexpected form. Zavaroni and DeLammare suggest that the word *EQVOS* is actually not related to Latin *equus* or Gallo-Greek *epo*- but rather from different roots that yield the outcome *EQVOS* in Gaulish.[33] Matasovic, suggests that *EQVOS* results from unconscious influence of Latin *equus* on Gaulish forms such as *epo*-.[34] Whether the word EQVOS actually meant 'Horse-month' in the native Gaulish calendar or 'possession-month' or 'live-stock-month,' the undeniable fact remains that the month name looks exactly like an early Latin spelling of *equus*. Given that the vast majority of inscriptions in the region are in the Latin language, it is extremely likely that at least some of those who could read the calendar would connect the Gaulish month name to the Latin word, especially since the roots of month names and proper nouns in general can be very opaque to native speakers.

Because the "certain mépris de la grammaire," as Duval and Pinault describe it,[35] suggests an imperfect knowledge of Gaulish morphology as well as orthog-

31 I find Stifter's interpretation of *PRINO* in Lambert and Stifter 2012: 160 on the lead tablet from Rezé very compelling, since the document does appear to be an account or receipt. Although Lambert in the very same article (Lambert and Stifter 2012: 112) hesitates between understanding *PRINO*, as Stifter does, and instead understanding it to be "le nom de l'arbre du sort," it seems very likely that it should be taken as a reflex of PIE *k^w*ri*n- and therefore cognate with Breton *prena* "to buy" and Old Irish *crenaid*, "he buys." If *PRI(N)NO/PRI(N)NI* is derived from a root that meant "to buy," then it is very likely analogous to the Roman *Nundinae*.

32 Eska 1998: 63–80 discusses the loss of the sound *p in all positions in the word in the Celtic languages.

33 Zavaroni 2007: 17 contends that this month name is a reflex of **Heyk^*-, a root that means "possession." Delamarre 2003 s.v. *equos* raises the possibility that the month name derives from the Gaulish cognate of Latin *pecu*, a suggestion that is 'indemonstrable,' as he himself admits.

34 Matasovic 2009 s.v. *ek^w*o*-.

35 Duval and Pinault 1986: 421 cite Koch 1981: 201–233 who argues that the loss of declensional ending in Welsh and the other Brittonic languages occurred "somewhat earlier than that of the drastic Brittonic phonological changes of the mid-fifth to later sixth centuries." As

raphy and phonology, the engraver may not have been a native speaker of Gaulish. Duval and Pinault tentatively suggest that a result of a partial loss of inflection may explain the hesitation between *PRI(N)NO* and *PRI(N)NI*,[36] a suggestion that is supported by the lack of nominative and accusative endings on the so-called Châteaubleau Tile. If this vacillation is the result of a partial loss of inflection, however, one would expect more alternations of the same nature to appear in the calendar that do not. The partial loss of inflection may have been 'corrected' by a speaker of Latin who reintroduced the nominative -s ending to the Gaulish nouns from Latin, a strong indicator of interference. On the other hand, the distinction between the genitive and nominative appears to be consistent elsewhere in the calendar. Because this distinction is so regular that Lambert can list eight genitives of eight o-stem month names, including *EQUOS*,[37] the alternation could be taken as evidence that the engraver had a good command of Gaulish but not a perfect one and therefore that the engraver was a native speaker of Latin. Whatever the origin of the inconsistency of endings, the simplest explanation is that the engraver did not have a perfect mastery of Gaulish morphology.

Although not one of these proposed instances of interference or grammatical errors may seem particularly impressive by itself, the weight of evidence points toward at least one native speaker of Latin writing Gaulish. However much it differs in its presentation from Roman *fasti*, the Coligny calendar is clearly based upon Roman practice down to the alphabet. Given the lack of other Gaulish inscriptions nearby combined with the presence of Latin inscriptions in the general area, not to mention the presence of the fragments of the classicizing statue that was mixed in with the fragments of the calendar at the

Shrijver 1998–2000: 136 observes, there is a lack of final -s and -m /-n, the expected nominative and accusative case endings, in spite of the presence of finite verbs on the Cháteaubleau Tile, dated between the end of the third and the beginning of the fourth century CE by Lambert 1998–2000: 61–62. The loss of -s and -m at the end of the words, though fundamentally a sound change, would be tantamount to a loss of the nominative ending of Gaulish o- stems and the accusative ending across declensions. Because the tile is not likely to be more than a century older than the calendar and its find spot is much closer geographically than modern Wales, there is a real possibility that loss of these final consonants may have already occurred in the Gaulish of Coligny in the late second/early third century.

36 Duval and Pinault 1986: 421. Although I find the suggestion of Swift 2001: 87 that the variants *PRI(N)NI* and *PRI(N)NO* are indicative of the interference of the confusion between u-stems and o-stems in Latin on Gaulish to be attractive, there are, unfortunately, too many complications of orthography and etymology to cite the suggestion as evidence.

37 Lambert 2003: 112.

find site,[38] it seems very likely that there were many other native speakers of Latin in the area who knew Gaulish as a second language.

What is more, the luni-solar structure of the calendar itself may be as related to Roman ideas about the Gaulish calendar as it is to native practice. Both Diodorus and Pliny refer to cycles of thirty and five years respectively in passing, a phenomenon that is consistent with the cyclical nature of the Coligny calendar. In addition, much of what is said about the Gaulish calendar in the extant sources suggests that Roman ideas about the Gaulish calendar come from Greek and Latin texts, not from first hand observations. The extant sources therefore only allow comparison between the Coligny Calendar and written sources that are certainly influenced by ancient ethnographic prejudices.

Two sources, one Greek and one Latin, allude to the use of cycles of multiple years among the Gauls. Pliny reports that the *sexta luna* is the beginning of Gaulish days, months and *saecula* in a comment on the process of gathering mistletoe by druids:

> … magna religione petitur et ante omnia sexta luna, quae principia mensum annorumque his facit et saeculi post tricesimum annum …
>
> *HN* 16.95

> It [mistletoe] is gathered with rites replete with religious awe. This is done more particularly on the fifth day of the moon, the day, which is the beginning of their months and years, as also of their ages, which, with them, are but thirty years.
>
> BOSTOCK and RILEY trans.

Pliny's remark that the *saecula* of druids were thirty years long could include the use of six five-year cycles of the type used in the Coligny calendar. The report of Diodorus that the Gauls performed a sacrifice of prisoners every five years (Diod 5.32.6) may be an indication not only that the five year cycle is a native Gallic practice, as suggested by McCluskey,[39] but also that such a cycle was noted in Greek ethnographic writing about Gauls.

The importance of night in Gaulish timekeeping observed by Caesar and hinted at by Pliny may be reflected in the terms *ATENOUX* and *TRINOUX*, terms that appear to be compounds that have the Gaulish cognate of Latin *nox* and English *night* as a second member. Moreover, the term *TRINOUX* is found in

38 Duval and Pinault 1986: 35–37 discuss the statue and its relationship to the calendar.

39 McCluskey 1998: 58.

the month of *SAMON-*, a name that has more than a passing resemblance to the festival name *Samhain* in Old Irish and to Old Welsh and Old Breton *Ham*, "summer."[40] Whether or not all three words are cognate, Old Irish and Welsh are closely related to Gaulish and the Irish festival seems to have lasted three nights whereas TRINOUX in the Coligny calendar is almost certainly to understood as "three-night."[41] Caesar reports that the druids also marked the beginnings of months and years by night (BG 6.18)), an observation that dovetails with a festival called "three-night." Pliny also implies the use of night as a means of marking time when he reports that the gathering of mistletoe occurred on the "fifth day of the moon" (*sexta luna*). Although Pliny and Caesar could be referring to actual Gaulish calendars, these ideas about Gallic time naturally reflect Roman beliefs as much as actual practices in Gaul.

Whether or not Caesar "went to conquer Gaul with [the Greek historian and ethnographer] Posidonius in his satchel," as Arnaldo Momigliano once colorfully remarked,[42] much of what Pomponius Mela says about druidic lore in Gaul is clearly taken from Caesar. Both Pomponius Mela and Caesar discuss the importance of astronomy among the druids:

> Hi terrae mundique magnitudinem et formam, motus caeli ac siderum et quid dii velint, scire profitentur.
>
> III.15

> These men [the druids] claim to know the size and shape of the earth and of the universe, the movements of the sky and of the stars, and what the gods intend.
>
> Trans. ROMER

> Multa praeterea de sideribus atque eorum motu, de mundi ac terrarum magnitudine, de rerum natura, de deorum immortalium vi ac potestate disputant et iuventuti tradunt.
>
> BG 16.4

---

40 Although Pokorny 1959 (IEW; 905) derives *ham* and *Samhain* from the same root, Matasović 2009 does not. He considers *Samon-* to be cognate with *Samhain* (s.v. samoni-) but not *ham* (s.v. *samo-). Delamarre 2003 s.v. samoni(o)s suspects that folk etymology or analogy led the speakers of Old Irish to understand a root that was originally derived from the same root as *ham* to be derived from a root cognate with Sanskrit *samānā́* 'assembly'.

41 Duval and Pinault 1986: 403 and 427.

42 Momigliano 1971: 71.

> They likewise discuss and impart to the youth many things respecting the stars and their motion, respecting the extent of the world and of our earth, respecting the nature of things, respecting the power and the majesty of the immortal gods.
>
> Trans. MCDEVITTE and BOHN

As may be seen in the passages above, there are multiple verbal echoes that suggest Pomponius derived at least some of what he knew of Gallic thought from Caesar rather than from direct inquiry, even though he himself was a provincial from the Western empire (he was born in Tringentera, a settlement that is likely the same as the Augustan foundation of Iulia Traducta on the Spanish side of the Strait of Gibraltar).

On the other hand, Pomponius Mela's report that such things were still being taught in secret in the middle of the first century CE may not be a rephrasing of Caesar, since the language of Pomponius does not echo Caesar's as transparently as in the previous passage. As Robert Wisniewski has observed, however, Pomponius' remark could be taken as an interpretation of Caesar's description of the education of druids:[43]

> Docent multa nobilissimos gentis clam et diu, vicenis annis, aut in specu aut in abditis saltibus.
>
> Mela III 18

> … in secret and for a long time (twenty years), they teach many things to the noblest males among their people, and do it in a cave or in a hidden mountain defile.
>
> Trans. ROMER

> … multi in disciplinam conveniunt et a parentibus propinquisque mittuntur. Magnum ibi numerum versuum ediscere dicuntur. Itaque annos nonnulli vicenos in disciplina permanent.
>
> BG 6.14

> … many embrace this profession of their own accord, and [many] are sent to it by their parents and relations. They are said there to learn by heart a great number of verses; accordingly some remain in the course of training twenty years.
>
> Trans. MCDEVITTE and BOHN

43 Wisniewski 2007: 148–149.

On the other hand, there are no definitive indications of an intertextual relationship with Caesar here besides the expression *vicenis annis* and the weak parallel of Pomponius' *multa* to Caesar's *multi*. This lack of verbal correspondence, moreover, stands in contrast to Pomponius' description of the content of druidic lore. Although the possibility remains that Pomponius Mela is drawing on another Greek or Latin source, it is also possible that astronomy was still believed to be an object of interest in imperial Gaul.

Because Pomponius had access to Caesar and considered him a reliable source for Gallic culture, it opens the possibility that other provincials in the western empire read Caesar and trusted him as a source for their own past. If one provincial in a nearby province could have used Caesar as an authority on Gaulish timekeeping, it is also possible that even the residents of the Gallic provinces could use Caesar as a source for the culture of pre-Roman Gaul, including the ancient residents of modern Coligny. Whether or not it was an actual practice in pre-Roman Gaul, the terms *ATENOUX* and *TRINOUX* could also be a response to Caesar and Pliny who remark upon the importance of night in druidic lore. What is more, the calendar's attempt to reconcile the lunar months with the solar year could be a response to Caesar's assertion that the druids studied astronomy enthusiastically, a report that was considered valid in the eyes of Pomponius Mela, who himself was a provincial from the western empire.

Although the Classical sources do not give much detail about the Gaulish calendar, a consistent set of Roman beliefs about how such a calendar would work can be extrapolated. Pliny and Diodorus imply that the use of cycles of a fixed number of years consonant with the five year cycle of the Coligny calendar was a "fact" known to educated Romans. Similarly, these Romans "knew" that the druids practiced astronomy and therefore would know the length of the solar year as opposed to that of a lunar year. A nighttime festival in ancient Gaul would also not surprise anyone who was also "aware" that nights were sacred and used to mark time rather than days. In sum, even if the Coligny calendar were not influenced by Roman ideas about its form or language, it would still meet Roman expectations of the Gaulish calendar.

Because the Coligny Calendar meets Roman expectations, employs elements of Roman *fasti* and contains some indications of interference from Latin into Gaulish, it is possible to make some educated guesses about its purpose. Because dates were recorded in the Julian calendar in Gaul elsewhere including Lugdunum and other places relatively nearby,[44] whoever composed it did not

44 For example, two inscriptions from ancient Lugdunum listed in Wuillheumier 1963: 89–90

do so out of ignorance of Roman timekeeping. Instead, the calendar makes a statement about the relationship between Gallic and Roman culture. Because the calendar is both resistant to Roman calendrical practice as Stern suggests[45] and complicit with the Roman ideas of the Gallic calendar, it is a nuanced and thoughtful expression of Gallic identity within the Roman empire.

In sociolinguistic terms, the obvious Roman influence on the form of the calendar and the evidence for the interference of Latin in the Gaulish of the calendar indicate that, at the time of its composition, the ethnolinguistic vitality of Gaulish and Latin was uneven, to borrow the terminology of Alex Mullen's study of multilingualism in southern Gaul.[46] The calendar does not have a bi-version but displays traces of interference from the language of the higher vitality group (i.e. speakers of Latin), whereas the use of the Latin calendar in the general vicinity of modern Coligny does not display any evidence of interference linguistically or culturally. Although such a conclusion is not likely to surprise anyone, it is helpful to know that Mullen's formulation can be applicable beyond southern Gaul.

The elements of Roman and Gaulish culture in the calendar have been, in fact, so thoroughly hybridized that it is not possible to reduce it to the sum of its parts. There does seem to be a native Gaulish voice in the calendar, but that voice is expressed in the Latin alphabet in a document that consists of a combination of Roman elements that are unique to ancient Gaul. Although there is no reason to assume that the lunar nature of the calendar was not native to the region, it fulfills Roman expectations of the Gallic calendar. On the one hand, Gaulish was valued enough to preserve the language for centuries under Roman rule presumably passed down orally. On the other hand, the deep engagement with the Roman calendar in the document is undeniable.

Instead of a combination of Roman and Gaulish elements I suggest that the calendar is best understood holistically, as an autoethnography, a document of a hybrid Gallic and Roman identity at the end of the second century CE that spoke to Romans and Gauls in ways they both could understand.[47] The reaction

---

and 92 have Roman dates in November and October respectively. Bertrandy et al. 2005: 114 include an inscription dated V k Apr⟨i⟩le[from Groslée.

45 Stern 2010: 311–313.

46 Mullen 2013: 66–73 discusses the phenomenon of ethnolinguistic vitality in the abstract and (2013: 303–306) applies the concept to the evidence that she has collected from southern Gaul.

47 I leave aside the question of whether eastern Gaul was a "contact zone" or a "middle ground" at the time the Coligny calendar was engraved. Whereas Pratt 2008: 6–7 describes a contact zone as a "social space where disparate cultures meet, clash, and grapple

to Roman rule no doubt evoked many different responses at different times and the calendar is one specific example of how complex the relationship between provincial and imperial culture could be even after more than two centuries of Roman occupation.

To return to the topic of voice, I have for the most part used voice as a metaphor for the expression of a cultural identity, but the calendar is also evidence for an actual human voice that lies behind the Coligny calendar. This voice could have expressed itself in the Gaulish language, a valuable preservation of a language. It is equally valuable, in my opinion, for us to recognize that this voice had at least a slight trace of a Latin accent.

Bibliography

Bertrandy, F., Kayser F., Rémy B. and Buisson A. (2005). *Inscriptions latines de l'Ain*. Chambéry: Université de Savoie.

Bohn, W.S. and McDevitte, W.A. (1869) *Caesar's Gallic War*. New York: Harper and Brothers.

Bostock, John and Riley, H.T. trans. (1855) *The Natural History. Pliny the Elder*. London: Taylor and Francis.

Delammare, Xavier. (2003). *Dictionnaire de la langue gauloise. Une approche linguistique du vieux-celtique continental. Préface de Pierre-Yves Lambert*. 2e *édition revue et augmentée*. Paris: Editiones Errance.

Duval, Paul-Marie and Pinault, Georges. (1986). *Recueil des inscriptions gauloises* (*R.I.G.*), *Volume* III: *Les Calendriers* (*Coligny, Villards d'Héria*). Paris: Éditions du CNRS.

with each other, often in highly assymetrical relations of domination and submission," a middle ground, as described by White 2010: xxvi, is a space where "diverse peoples adjust their differences through what amounts to a process of creative, and often expedient, misunderstandings." Although I agree with Woolf 2014: 17–19 in understanding Gaul as a middle ground, the presence of an autoethnography suggests that eastern Gaul may have been more of a "contact zone" in the late second century.

There are, however, theoretical and empirical difficulties that do not allow me to make a compelling argument for one definition or another. In the first place, Pratt does not say that an assymetrical relationship, the kind of relationship that produces the autoethnographies, is necessary in a contact zone. A middle ground may therefore be a contact zone with an assymterical relationship of power. Moreover, a single autoethnography would not allow a generalization about the power relationships in eastern Gaul.

Edwards, John (2009). *Language and Identity: An Introduction.* New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Eska, Joseph (1998a). "PIE *P ≯ ø in Proto-Celtic." *Münchener Studien zur Sprachwissenschaft* 58: 63–80.

——— (1998b) "Tau Gallicum." *Studia Celtica* 32: 115–127.

Hannah, Robert (2005). *Greek and Roman Calendars: Constructions of Time in the Classical World.* London: Duckworth.

Koch, John (1983) "The Loss of Final Syllables and Loss of Declension in Brittonic." *The Bulletin of the Board of Celtic Studies* 30: 201–233.

Lambert, Pierre-Yves. (1998–2000) "La tuile gauloise de Châteaubleau (Seine-et-Marne)." *Études Celtiques* 34: 57–115.

——— (2003). *La langue gauloise: Description linguistique, commentaire d'inscriptions choisies, 2e édition revue et augmentée.* Paris: Editions Errance.

Lambert, Pierre-Yves and Stifter, David (2012) "Le plombe gaulois de Rezé," *Études Celtiques* 38: 139–164.

Lehoux, Darren. (2007). *Astronomy, Weather, and Calendars in the Ancient World:* Parapegmata *and Related Texts in Classical and Near Eastern Societies.* New York/Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Matasovic, Ranko. (2009). *Etymological Dictionary of Proto-Celtic.* Boston/Leiden: Brill.

McCluskey Stephen. (1998) *Astronomies and Cultures in Early Medieval Europe.* New York/Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Meyer, Elizabeth. (2004). *Legitimacy and Law in the Roman World:* Tabulae *in Roman Belief and Practice.* New York/Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Momigliano, Arnaldo. (1975). *Alien Wisdom: The Limits of Hellenization.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Monard, Joseph. (1999). *Histoire du calendrier gaulois.* Vannes: Burillier.

Mullen, Alex (2013) *Southern Gaul and Mediterranean: Multilingualism and Multiple Identities in the Iron Age and Roman Periods.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Olmsted, G. (1992). *The Gaulish Calendar.* Bonn: Dr. Rudolf Habelt.

Pratt, Mary Louise. (2008). *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation.* 2nd edition. New York/London: Routledge.

Pokorny, Julius (1959). *Indogermanisches etymologisches Wörterbuch.* Bern: Francke.

Romer, F.E. trans. (1998). *Pomponius Mela*'s *Description of the World.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Rüpke, Jörge (2011). *The Roman Calendar from Numa to Constantine: Time, History and the Fasti.* David M.B. Richardson trans. Malden/Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Schrijver, Peter (1998–2000). "The Châteaubleau Tile as a Link between Latin and French and between Gaulish and Brittonic." *Études Celtiques* 34: 137–142.

Stern, Sacha, (2010). *Calendars in Antiquity: Empires, States and Societies*. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Stifter, David. (2008). Old Celtic Languages. IV. Gaulish. https://www.univie.ac.at/indogermanistik/download/Stifter/oldcelt2008_6_gaulishA.pdf.

Swift, Cathy. (2001). 'Celts, Romans and the Coligny Calendar'. In *Proceedings of the Eleventh Annual Theoretical Roman Archaeology Conference which took place at the University of Glasgow* 29–31 *March* 2001, Martin Carruthers, Carol van Driel-Murray, Andrew Gardner, Jason Lucas, Louise Revelle and Ellen Swift eds.: 83–95. Oxford: Oxbow Books.

Wallace, Rex (1988). 'Dialectal Latin Fundatid, Proiectatid, Parentatid'. *Glotta* 66 no. 3 and 4: 211–220.

White, Richard (2010). *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815. Twentieth Anniversary Edition with a New Preface by the Author*. New York/Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wisniewski, Robert (2007). 'Deep Woods and Vain Oracles: Druids, Pomponius Mela and Tacitus' *Palamedes* 2: 148–156.

Woolf, Greg. (1996). *Becoming Roman: The Origins of Provincial Civilization in Gaul*. New York/Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

——— (2014). *Tales of the Barbarians: Ethnography in the Roman West*. Malden/Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Wuilleumier, P. (1963). *Inscriptions latines des Trois Gaules* (Gallia supplement XVII) Paris: CNRS.

Zavaroni, Adolfo. (2007). *On the Structure and Terminology of the Gaulish Calendar*. British Archaeological Reports, International Series 1609. Oxford: Archaeopress.

CHAPTER 18

λόγος and φωνή in *Odyssey* 10 and Plutarch's *Gryllus**

Athena Kirk

This paper examines conceptions about animal speech as reflected in the Circe episode of *Odyssey* 10 and in Plutarch's moral essay *Gryllus*, a dialogue between Odysseus and one of his men-turned-pigs. It focuses particularly on how these two texts treat communicative versus non-communicative voice, a distinction that drives much of the action of *Odyssey* 10 and as a result figures prominently in the *Gryllus*. Both these texts, I will suggest, challenge norms of human and animal communication, confusing traditional divisions of λόγος and φωνή. While the *Gryllus* has been recently interpreted as a condemnation of sophistic pedantry among the Roman elite as symbolized by Gryllus, an intertextual reading reveals that Odysseus, not Gryllus, is under scrutiny. In critiquing Odysseus' approach, the dialogue upends the Aristotelian divide between speechless, irrational animals and speaking, rational humans, ultimately questioning the moral usefulness of human vocalism and perhaps dialectic altogether.

Ancient conceptions about animal speech in particular, and animal studies more generally, have received increased attention in the last few decades.[1] Amidst the great assortment of ancient reflections on animals and their vocalisms, perhaps the frankest, and certainly some of the best known, come from Aristotle. "Man is a political animal," he says, for the following reasons (*Pol.* 1253a):

> οὐθὲν γάρ, ὡς φαμέν, μάτην ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ· λόγον δὲ μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζῴων· ἡ μὲν οὖν φωνὴ τοῦ λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος ἐστὶ σημεῖον, διὸ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις

* I am grateful to Niall Slater, reviewer Robert Lamberton, and the participants at the Orality and Literacy XI conference in Atlanta for their useful comments, as well as to Kim Haines-Eitzen and Hayden Pelliccia. All have greatly expanded my thinking on this topic.

1 The trend in Classics follows upon increased attention to animals in many disciplines, beginning from the advent of the animal rights movement in the 1970s. On Greek animal speech and language in particular, see: Sorabji (1993: 80–86) and the work as a whole, which argues that reception of ancient beliefs about animal language shaped modern treatment of animals; Pelliccia (1995: 105–107); Newmyer (2005: 25–26, 44–46); Heath (2005: 39–51, 215–242); Labarrière (1993); Fögen (2014); Bettini (2008a and b).

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2017 | DOI: 10.1163/9789004329737_019

ὑπάρχει ζῴοις (μέχρι γὰρ τούτου ἡ φύσις αὐτῶν ἐλήλυθε, τοῦ ἔχειν αἴσθησιν λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος καὶ ταῦτα σημαίνειν ἀλλήλοις), ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐπὶ τῷ δηλοῦν ἐστι τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ βλαβερόν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον· τοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἴδιον, τὸ μόνον ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἴσθησιν ἔχειν· ἡ δὲ τούτων κοινωνία ποιεῖ οἰκίαν καὶ πόλιν.

> Because, as we claim, nature does not do things in vain, and man alone of animals possesses speech (λόγος). Voice (φωνή) may be indicative of pain and pleasure, and thus the other animals have it too (for their constitution has developed such that that they are able to perceive pain and pleasure and communicate those things to one another), but *speech* exists to show the helpful and the harmful, and as a result also the just and the unjust. For it is unique to man in relation to the other animals that he alone possesses perception of good and evil, just and unjust, and the other values, and man's sharing in these things forms household and city alike.

For many, this passage encapsulates Aristotelian notions of what it means to be human; for scholars of animal ethics, the kernel of an idea here ultimately leads to the erosion of any fair consideration of animals in the West.[2] As Sorabji argues, denying language to animals is one part of the greater scheme of denying them reason, and thus any ethical treatment.[3] In his chronology, this preoccupation with speech is taken up by the Stoics, who maintain that there are two kinds of λόγος—the externally uttered, λόγος προφορικός ("speech"), and the internal, λόγος ἐνδιάθετος ("reason").[4] Since animals observably lack λόγος προφορικός, they must as a result, lack reason too; as a result humans owe them no justice.[5]

Yet of course animals' roles in Greek literature differ vastly from how Aristotle describes them in the *Politics*: they so frequently think, judge, and especially speak. Indeed, debate persists as to when Greek thought first denied reason

2 This is not to say that Aristotle gives a clear sense of his own position across his works on animals: the statement in the *Politics* seems to contradict others he makes elsewhere (e.g. *Historia Animalium* 536B 11–23) that afford more communicative powers to certain birds in particular. For a detailed discussion of the problems see Labarrière (2003).

3 Sorabji (1993: 15, 81–84). Newmyer (1999: 101–103) follows suit, outlining in particular the Stoics' interpretation. Renehan's (1981) claims are perhaps more general but could be seen to tend toward similar conclusions.

4 See Newmyer (2006: 26–27 with n. 76); Sorabji (1993: 112–113) (also cited by Newmyer).

5 See Newmyer (1999) for an elaboration of this idea.

and communicative speech to animals. Most examples introduce further complexity rather than clarity to the issue, especially where speech is concerned. The Aesopic fables, for instance, are replete with conversations between and among species such as to make them seem almost normal, or at least anthropomorphized to the point of mundanity; however, they do not often address the imagined mechanics of such interactions.[6] They never reveal what it might sound like, for example, when a mouse asks a frog for help crossing a river, (384 Perry) nor how exactly a gnat makes its advice known to a camel (137 Perry). More often, they concern themselves with the message (in Aristotelian terms, the λόγος) rather than its delivery. And when we do hear about the actual voice (that is, the φωνή) of an animal in Aesop, it usually proves to be non-linguistic, non-symbolic, and, moreover, often detrimental to the animal's success or well-being. I cite just one example here, but there are many of a similar flavor (188 Perry):

> ὄνος ἐνδυσάμενος λέοντος δορὰν περιῄει ἐκφοβῶν τὰ ἄλογα ζῷα. καὶ δὴ θεασάμενος ἀλώπεκα ἐπειρᾶτο καὶ ταύτην δεδίττεσθαι. ἡ δέ, ἐτύγχανε γὰρ αὐτοῦ φθεγξαμένου προακηκουῖα, ἔφη πρὸς αὐτόν· "ἀλλ' εὖ ἴσθι, ὡς καὶ ἐγὼ ἄν σε ἐφοβήθην, εἰ μὴ ὀγκωμένου ἤκουσα." οὕτως ἔνιοι τῶν ἀπαιδεύτων τοῖς ἔξωθεν τύφοις δοκοῦντές τινες εἶναι ὑπὸ τῆς ἰδίας γλωσσαλγίας ἐλέγχονται.

> A donkey put on the skin of a lion and went around frightening all the animals. The donkey saw a fox and tried to frighten her too, but she had heard his voice first, so she said to the donkey, "You can be sure that I too would have been afraid, if I had not already heard the sound of your bray." Likewise, there are certain ignorant people whose outward affectations give them an air of importance, but their true identity comes out as soon as they open their big mouths.
>
> Trans. GIBBS

While the Aesopic donkey is presumably endowed with communicative Greek speech, λόγος,[7] the sounds it emits outside of that fantasy realm—its real-life

6 We do, however, read twice in the *Life of Aesop*, as preface to human-animal fables, of an era in which animals were "ὁμόφωνα" with humans, that is to say, "spoke the same language" or at least "made the same sounds" (Vita G 97.1 and 99.3). Kurke (2011:134) notes (1) the antiquity of these passages and (2) their similarity to Xen. *Mem.* 2.7.13, which refers to a time when animals were "φωνήεντα" (such that a pig could speak to his master). We also find the statement (Vita G 133.1) that all non-human animals too were once ὁμόφωνα, rather mysterious in its assumption that they obviously no longer are.

7 Λόγος is, of course, the Greek word for "fable," too; thus the λόγιος-animal is also himself

animal noise, braying—lands it in trouble. The audience must be willing to engage with a shifty fictional landscape, suspending disbelief when appropriate (the talking fox), but recognizing and interpreting nonfictional, commonplace behaviors (the braying donkey).[8] This ambiguity challenges the notion that the animals of fable perform essentially human thoughts and behaviors, retaining an animal nature only in their physical characteristics: in fact, the lines are much less clear, and much more conscious of species distinctions.[9] Can we simply characterize the donkey's lion-disguise as "human behavior"? It would seem that the fabulist demands more from an audience here than a simple allegorical reading. While this paper will not examine Aesopic fable in detail, I speculate that these same ambiguities of species-identity also underlie other mentions of animal sound and voice in the corpus. Cleverer characters in the fables seem aware of the dangers their vocalizations may bring, and they seek to avoid them. Elsewhere, a rooster refuses to pay heed to a dog who tries to flatter his crowing, and a caged bird now sings only at night, since making noise during the day once revealed her to bird-catchers.[10] Thus even if the wisdom of animals in fable resides in their words, these remain in conflict with the noises they emit. While the fable tradition contains more reported animal *speech* than any other, it presents animal vocal *sounds* as a potential liability and general source of harm or shame. This same tension, I shall suggest, pervades—and links—the texts of my focus, *Odyssey* 10 and *Gryllus*.

The Homeric poems in many ways give no clearer sense of Greek attitudes toward animal speech and cognition than do fables. They have been variously interpreted to reflect, on the one hand, "little significant distinction between the mental or emotional lives of human and non-human animals," or, on the other, a division closer to that of the *Politics*.[11] Regardless of how one inter-

perhaps a fabulist. For explication of this type of λόγος (contrasted with γνώμη) see Aesop Vita G, ch. 93 with Kurke (2011: 132–133).

8 Griffith (2006a) and (2006b) magisterially explores the ancient cultural associations of donkeys; for his general interpretation of donkeys in Aesop as "average Joe" characters, see 2006b: 344, along with specific references to other donkey fables throughout both articles.

9 For the idea that fable maintains a strict distinction between animal and human behaviors in animals, see e.g., Durán López (2005: 112), who cites also Jedrkiewicz (2002); see also Kurke (2011).

10 It should be noted that the birds enjoy a special status for Aristotle and others, with more articulate vocalizations than the rest of the animal kingdom. See Payne (2010: 86–88) for an explication of this idea, preceding a corresponding reading of Aristophanes' *Birds*, which for Payne forms a counterpoint to Aristotle and complicates the relationship between allegorical fantasy and observable data.

11 Heath (2005: 44).

prets the poems, however, it is certain that animals in epic do not as a rule speak unless they have been endowed with some extraordinary and temporary power to do so.[12] In contrast to fable, the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, if in relatively few moments, really do try to describe what it would be *like* if an animal could speak.[13] These poems thus perhaps reveal a greater interest than fable in imagining the mechanics of animal communication.[14] One of the most memorable such scenes occurs when Achilles' horse Xanthus prophesies the hero's death (*Il.* 19.404–420).[15] The poet reports in formulaic language that Xanthus speaks (404: … προσέφη πόδας αἰόλος ἵππος) and then appends, as if to dispel suspicion, an explanation (407): αὐδήεντα δ' ἔθηκε θεὰ λευκώλενος Ἥρη· "For Hera had given him a voice."[16] The Erinyes later take Xanthus' voice away (407): (Ὣς ἄρα φωνήσαντος Ἐρινύες ἔσχεθον αὐδήν). Aristophanes of Byzantium found this moment incongruous and athetized the line, but others have more recently interpreted it as a typical restoration of natural order in keeping with the Erinyes' archaic role.[17] Pertinent for this study, the framing of the prophecy and its relative mundanity (it does not contain new information unknown to Achilles or the audience) emphasizes instead Xanthus' αὐδή: under what circumstances might an animal acquire an ability to speak, and if he could, what would he say? It is studying what animals need speech *for*, I think, that will prove of interest to both Plutarch and Homer.[18]

12 For the idea that Homeric animals cannot speak without divine intervention and normally do not do so, see Heath (2005: 39), Whitman (1958: 271), and Pelliccia (1995: 105–107). Johnston (1992: 91) holds that speaking horses are a mythic commonplace and suggests this scene would thus not have seemed exceptional to a Homeric audience.

13 Admittedly perhaps an impossible task, akin to the thought-experiment presented by Nagel (1974: 438), who asks what it is like to be a bat: "… bat sonar, though clearly a form of perception, is not similar in its operation to any sense that we possess, and there is no reason to suppose that it is subjectively like anything we can experience or imagine."

14 I set aside here the animals of similes, which properly belong to a separate study. See, e.g., Ready (2011: 62–64); Lonsdale (1995: 133–135); Clarke (1995).

15 Other Homeric scenes involving animal comprehension (but not speech) include the dog Argos' recognition of Odysseus at *Od.* 17.301–304 and Achilles' weeping horses at *Il.* 17.426–428.

16 404 is formulaic, that is, save for the insertion of αἰόλος, here only with πόδας, where αἰόλος Χάνθος clearly follows in place of ὠκὺς Ἀκχιλλεύς. As for 407, Autenrieth (1891) s.v. αὐδήεις curiously clarifies: "'endowed him with voice' (i. e. human as contrasted with equine utterance)."

17 See e.g. Leaf (1900–1902 [1960]) ad loc.

18 Other studies have fruitfully taken up the Greeks' interpretation of actual animal sounds.

First, however, a word regarding the lexicon. A complete study of words for voice and speech organs is outside the scope of this paper and already exists for Homer and Pindar (= Pelliccia (1995)); nonetheless, I shall address briefly some of the vocabulary items pertinent to animal communication as a way of clarifying my argument about *Gryllus*, to follow below. As we have seen already, Aristotle distinguishes λόγος and φωνή in *Politics*, in other works complicating the binary with terms like διάλεκτος (used for some birds). In his detailed study, Labarrière (1993) concludes that Aristotelian λόγος, the kind of utterance unique to humans, denotes "symbolic" speech, "ce qui implique qu'il soit conventionnel, composé et articulé," (a "sign"), while φωνή denotes potentially meaningful, but not articulated, speech (a "signal").[19] διάλεκτος complicates this picture as a third possibility, available to certain animals: it too, however, according to Labarrière we may distinguish from λόγος because while διάλεκτος may use signs, they are not further divisible into meaningful units.[20] αὐδή, the term given to Xanthus' speech, does not figure into Aristotle's scheme but nonetheless bears some of its distinctions insofar as it always denotes a human or human-like voice. In addition to Achilles' horse, the modifier αὐδήεις is used only of Circe (whom we shall examine below) and Calypso, both goddesses with special relationships to humans. While in Xanthus' case αὐδή and αὐδήεις refer to the ability to make himself understood to Achilles, in the goddesses' case they also refer to their connection to and capacity for song and, perhaps in Circe's, an affinity for animals.

Xanthus' αὐδή in fact provides a point of departure from which to examine the encounter of Odysseus' men with Circe in *Odyssey* 10. This group could not find themselves in more different circumstances than the horse. The scene

---

As to the overall question of whether animals can in fact communicate vocally and to what extent they do, see the recent work of Slobodchikoff et al. (2009) on prairie dogs, who appear to perceive and have different sounds to describe specific details such as color, size, species.

19 Labarrière (1993: 238, 256–257). In refining the traditional understanding of Aristotle Labarrière maps λόγος and φωνή onto Martinet's theory of double articulation—the quality of human speech to be divisible into meaningful units (words) or meaningless ones (phonemes): this quality of λόγος is unique to humans, but animal φωνή can also have "significant sequences" that are just not articulated.

20 Labarrière (1993: 257): "*Phônê* et *dialektos* diffèrent alors radicalement. D'un autre côté, si l'on se réfère à cette capacité de la langue d'émettre et de moduler des sons qui ne soient pas simplement descries 'inarticulés,' mais qui peuvent être des chants variés, alors rien n'interdit d'y voir un 'langage' puisqu'il y a bien, de ce point de vue, 'articulation.'"

in which they arrive at Circe's house (*Od.* 10.221–250) prefigures their metamorphosis in its extended attention to vocal communications. When the men first arrive, they hear Circe making human vocal sounds (ἀειδούσης ὀπὶ καλῇ, "singing with a beautiful voice," 10. 221), and she does the same thing again (ἀοιδιάει) at 10.226. These verbs etymologically recall the earlier epithet αὐδήεσσα; moreover, they suggest that the poet aims to emphasize her special human vocal qualities in this passage.[21] Meanwhile, the men are described in terms not necessarily unique to humans. When they hear Circe's voice, for instance, Polites suggests not that he and his companions knock on the door or try to catch a glimpse of her, but rather that they make some ambiguous noise (φθεγγώμεθα, 228). The verb can be used of the human shout but equally well of animal sounds and even noises caused by inanimate objects (such as doors or instruments); its appearance here may not be problematic, but it is markedly ambivalent.[22] In the following line, the poet reiterates the men's sounds with two verbs of noise-making: τοὶ δ' ἐφθέγγοντο καλεῦντες ("calling out, they shouted," 229). While the participle may seem redundant, it in fact specifies the nature of vocalism and limits the scope of φθέγγομαι.[23] Moreover, the collocation may look common but in fact appears only twice more in Homer: the second time forms part of the men's report of the events to Odysseus, a repetition of this scene (255); the third occurs at *Od.* 12.249, where the companions cry out as Scylla snatches them. Immediately following the formulaic line, her victims are likened to fish that have been caught and are gasping (ἀσπαίροντα) on land (12.251–255). Thus in both the Circe and the Scylla episodes the same speech-focused formula introduces an animal-metamorphosis, whether real or in simile. Voice, the episodes suggests, may even encode species.

Once the men call out to her, Circe opens the doors to her house and calls to them in return (κάλει, 231). While this exchange may not seem immediately notable, both parties engage an unequivocal expression of speech: καλέω suggests at least some kind of "yoohoo," if not real words.[24] Moreover, the call-and-response scene's elaborated exposition and the men's subsequent recep-

21 For interpretations of the derivation of ἀείδω and relevant vocalisms see Wackernagel (1888: 151–152) and Chantraine (1968–1980: 138).

22 See e.g. (for animals with lungs) Arist. *Hist. an.* 535a30.

23 Autenrieth (1891), s.v. φθέγγομαι: "Since the verb merely designates the effect upon the ear, it may be joined with a more specific word." (Note that his reference to Φ192 should read φ192; I cannot identify his subsequent citation to a line 341).

24 καλέω often includes a summons to a place (εἰς ἀγορήν vel sim.) or by name, though this last seems unlikely here. Used absolutely it can imply "call to a banquet" (Montanari (2015) ad loc.), but it is not clear what nuance is intended here.

tion into the house, told in comparative detail, contrasts distinctly with Circe's transformation of them, which occurs with almost comical brevity in a single, deadpan line: ῥάβδῳ πεπληγυῖα κατὰ συφεοῖσιν ἐέργνυ ("having struck them with her rod she turned them into swine"). Once the men have begun to change, the poet specifies just four loci of their metamorphosis—their heads, voice, hair, and bodies: οἱ δὲ συῶν μὲν ἔχον κεφαλὰς φωνήν τε τρίχας τε | καὶ δέμας, αὐτὰρ νοῦς ἦν ἔμπεδος ὡς τὸ πάρος περ ("they had the heads and voices and hair and bodies of swine, but their minds remained the same as before," 239–240). The inclusion of the indistinct term φωνή in this short and otherwise physical list draws attention to the men's capacity for linguistic articulation, so suddenly unavailable; the poet implies that the speech organ itself has changed quality just as did the hair and skin. Moreover, we also learn that men retain their human minds. This detail emphasizes the severity of the spell and utter torture of retaining consciousness without the power to articulate, but it just as much underscores the crucial defining power of the capacity for speech: it, and not νοῦς, defines one as human.[25]

At this juncture the focus returns once more to the men's vocal utterances, and the scene foregrounds, more than any other sensory detail, the sounds of the action both before and after the transformation. As syntactic parallel to their previous action in τοὶ δ' ἐφθέγγοντο καλεῦντες ("and calling out they gave voice," 229) we encounter instead οἱ μὲν κλαίοντες ἐέρχατο ("they went in crying," 241). In pig-form, the men no longer perform καλέω, the human vocalism, but rather κλαίω, an expression of unintelligible distress. And, although he escapes physical transformation, even the one spared member of the party, Eurylochus, suffers this same consequence of becoming animal, for he experiences his own temporary aphasia. When he returns to Odysseus' camp, Eurylochus is unable to utter a single *word* (οὐδέ τι ἐκφάσθαι δύνατο ἔπος, 246) and in fact can but contemplate emitting a non-linguistic wail (γόον δ' ὠίετο θυμός, 248).[26] In this moment he undergoes perhaps just a predictable human reaction to trauma,

---

25 Apuleius' Lucius experiences a similar division. Note that modern science in some ways has no more precise an understanding of the conscious state than did Homer. Recent discoveries based on subjects undergoing anesthesia reveal how little is certain. Koerth-Baker (2014) speaks of a patient who suffers an experience much like Odysseus' men, of being aware of her state but unable to communicate; Lee et al. (2013), with Sleigh (2013) discuss the theory that information flux between and among parts of the brain (which various forms of anesthesia prevent) is responsible for (a version of) what we call consciousness.

26 Pelliccia (1995: 234–240) insightfully explains the agency of the θυμός as the "prospective" organ of thought, and the organ that approaches speech.

but his animal-companions' fate renders it all the more pointed, suggesting an intratextual interpretation for the puzzling sentence at line 248.[27] Whereas others have focused on the emotional aspect of γόος, more relevant here is its vocal, sonorous quality, as Pelliccia's explication notes with the rendering "uncontrollable sobs."[28] Thus the idea here is that Eurylochus' θυμός, temporarily colored animal, does not have the capacity for articulation. It cannot "think" of words but merely of unintelligible (if emotive) sounds.[29] In other words, in contrast to his inability to speak forth words, if he were to try to say anything, "his heart could (only) expect (to utter) a wail."

Of course Eurylochus soon regains his human speech capabilities—but how? Certainly the passage of time helps as the shock wears off, yet the narrative gives a more direct cause: his human companions' own words. It is only upon being questioned by them that he is able to tell the full tale. A strong adversative and correlative temporal clauses mark the moment (249–250):

> ἀλλ' ὅτε δή μιν πάντες ἀγαζόμεθ' ἐξερέοντες,
> καὶ τότε τῶν ἄλλων ἑτάρων κατέλεξεν ὄλεθρον·
>
> But when we all vexedly questioned him,
> then did he recount the ruin of our other companions.

Dialogue with other humans, then, is the catalyst that ultimately allows Eurylochus to find his voice again, and moreover to speak in an ordered narrative (κατέλεξεν, in response to ἐξερέοντες). These verbs suggest a lengthy and complex exchange, and one nothing like the infantile monosyllables and cries of the previous scene. Here, Eurylochus' return to humanity consists in the capacity to articulate in responsion.

The problems of speech resurface in one final scene, in which Odysseus himself visits Circe's house. Once he arrives, his behavior, too, is to stand outside and shout (ἔνθα στὰς ἐβόησα, 311), and again it is the exchange of his voice with the goddess's that drives the action: θεὰ δέ μευ ἔκλυεν αὐδῆς ("and the goddess heard my voice," 311, and again at 481). After they spend the evening together, his behavior too reprises his companions' silence. As Circe asks him, "τίφθ' οὕτως, Ὀδυσεῦ, κατ' ἄρ' ἕζαι ἶσος ἀναύδῳ …;" ("why are you sitting there that way, like

27 For an account and critique of previous interpretations see Pelliccia (1995: 237), with n. 233.
28 Pelliccia (1995: 237).
29 For the θυμός's "ability to formulate thoughts in sentences" in conjunction with the verb οἴομαι see Pelliccia (1995: 238–239).

a mute?" 378). While Odysseus alone thwarts Circe's designs, he nonetheless shares the fate of speechlessness with everyone who has come to this house, just as did Eurylochus before him. Recall, too, that only through pharmacology and brute force did he win over the goddess, not by his characteristic verbal cleverness. Circe's is thus an island on which vocal skills have no force—a dead zone, so to speak, where neither Odyssean rhetoric in particular nor human speech more generally can work in their accustomed ways. At the same time, however, frightening and disorienting as it seems to the human characters, this repeated inability to speak actually leads to discovery and advancement. Perhaps the underlying lesson for Odysseus, for his men, and for Eurylochus is that progress need not always involve the art of words: rather, silence may be what paves the road to success.

One could productively adduce here other famous episodes in which actions trump dialogue and hold the real persuasive power: Odysseus' shot through the axes, the spilling of blood before the ghosts in the Underworld, or (as a negative exemplum) his offshore taunts of Polyphemus. But this discussion will be limited to *Odyssey* 10, for its instance of the failure of λόγος pertains to our other focus text. Plutarch's dialogue *Gryllus* (=*Bruta animalia ratione uti, Mor.* 985d–992e) picks up the issue of human and non-human speech where it trails off in the *Odyssey*. While the Homeric poet has imagined animals who can think but not speak, Plutarch endows the pig Gryllus with human speech in addition to his still-sentient mind. The argument of the dialogue stems from Odysseus' erroneous assumption—of which Gryllus quickly disabuses him—that Gryllus wants to return to human form. The two then proceed to debate the merits of belonging to one species or the other. Like the Homeric narrative upon which it is based, I argue, the *Gryllus* thematizes the problem of animal speech and its relationship to morality. By viewing the two works together, we can observe that rather than being merely a satirical flight of fancy,[30] the dialogue functions in a number of unexpected ways: to reevaluate animal speech, to separate speech from reason, and, finally, to expose the inadequacies of rhetoric and dialogue in the face of moral decisions.

It will be useful to consider Plutarch's innovations to the scenario of *Odyssey* 10 alongside the Aristotelian scheme from the *Politics*. The following diagram lays out the distinctions:

30 As interpreted by Herchenroeder (2008), Bréchet (2005), and others.

FIGURE 18.1

While Aristotle implies that animals have φωνή but lack interior λόγος [A], the metamorphosed men of *Od.* 10 maintain a νοῦς ἔμπεδος, (in Aristotelian terms, an interior λόγος), even as they lose the ability to speak articulate words [B]. Plutarch's Gryllus, meanwhile, is endowed (at least temporarily) with both brands of λόγος [C]. Finally, revisiting the stupefied Odysseus and Eurylochus of *Od.* 10, we can observe that they pattern with type [B], even as they retain their human forms. In *Gryllus*, by contrast, Gryllus and Odysseus both fall into [C]. This relationship becomes explicit as soon as Circe endows Gryllus with an articulate voice, saying to the skeptical Odysseus (*Mor.* 986B):

> K. Θάρρει, φιλοτιμότατ' ἀνθρώπων· ἐγώ σοι παρέξω *καὶ συνιέντας αὐτοὺς καὶ διαλεγομένους* · μᾶλλον δ' εἷς ἱκανὸς ἔσται καὶ διδοὺς καὶ λαμβάνων ὑπὲρ πάντων λόγον· ἰδού, τούτῳ διαλέγου.

> C. Courage, courage, my ambitious friend. I'll see to it that you shall find them both receptive and responsive. Or rather, one of the number will be enough to thrust and parry for them all. Presto! You may talk with this one.[31]

The operative terms καὶ συνιέντας καὶ διαλεγομένους correspond with the two λόγος balloons of [C], implying both internal comprehension and external expression; what is more, διαλεγομένους suggests that Gryllus will not just talk; he will also be able to practice dialectic.[32] Circe's next comment, that he will be able both to give and receive words, amounts to a clarification of

31 All translations of Plutarch from Helmbold (1957).

32 The compound διαλέγω implies any of a spectrum of meanings ranging from the literal "pick out" to "converse with" to "come to a reasoned conclusion via conversation." While the word here could merely denote the capacity to converse, in this context (itself dialogic) the more technical-philosophical sense seems quite plausible.

διαλέγομαι, which in the philosophical sense consists in both these acts.[33] Her final command to Odysseus (διαλέγου), with the verb repeated, sets both parties on an equal footing and reasserts the definition she has just provided.

Once these mechanics are worked out, the philosophical portion of the dialogue should be able to proceed, yet in fact a series of false starts and continued logistical problems ensue instead. Throughout the piece, the fundamental question of speech-capability and the importance of λόγος is never far beneath the surface. Thus Odysseus, asking how to speak to the pig, continues his line of inquiry even after he should be reassured (*Mor.* 986B):

> O. Καὶ τίνα τοῦτον, ὦ Κίρκη, προσαγορεύσομεν; ἢ τίς ἦν οὗτος ἀνθρώπων;
> K. Τί γὰρ τοῦτο πρὸς τὸν λόγον; ἀλλὰ κάλει αὐτόν, εἰ βούλει, Γρύλλον.

> O. "And how am I to address him, Circe? Who in the world was he?"
> C. "What's that to do with the issue? Call him Gryllus, if you like."

Double entendre pervades the exchange, first in Odysseus' question (τίς ἦν οὗτος ἀνθρώπων;), which in addition to echoing epic formulaics of course is also to be understood quite literally as "which human did this pig used to be?"[34] Circe's response cleverly dismisses either option: "what does [either his name or his former identity] have to do with anything?" Yet at the same time, her words themselves pun, for with them she again undermines Odysseus' problem as one of speaking. Τί γὰρ τοῦτο πρὸς τὸν λόγον means generally "what does that have to do with the price of eggs," but also, quite literally: "how does this matter relate at all to reason?," or even, at its most absurd, "what does this issue [Gryllus' identity] have to do with speech?" In its own ambiguities, Circe's

33 The implication that this kind of argumentation has connotations of physical combat, as echoed in Helmbold's translation "parry and thrust," echoes the sentiment expressed at Pl. *Rep.* 454a: ὅτι, εἶπον, δοκοῦσί μοι εἰς αὐτὴν καὶ ἄκοντες πολλοὶ ἐμπίπτειν καὶ οἴεσθαι οὐκ ἐρίζειν ἀλλὰ διαλέγεσθαι, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι κατ' εἴδη διαιρούμενοι τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὄνομα διώκειν τοῦ λεχθέντος τὴν ἐναντίωσιν, ἔριδι, οὐ διαλέκτῳ πρὸς ἀλλήλους χρώμενοι. ("[The power of contradiction is a great thing] [b]ecause I think that many a man falls into the practice against his will. When he thinks that he is reasoning he is really disputing, just because he cannot define and divide, and so know that of which he is speaking; and he will pursue a merely verbal opposition in the spirit of contention and not of fair discussion") (trans. Jowett).

34 Herchenroeder (2008: 359, with n. 28) notes the Homeric punning, with comparanda. He highlights the overall significance of this exchange but interprets λόγος here as "the subject under investigation" (353); I contend there is yet another layer.

question thus presages the broad queries that the dialogue will address. What does naming have to do with communication? What does being human ("of men") really have to do with reason? What, ultimately, does speaking have to do with thinking?

Even though Circe has worked out the logistics of interspecies communication, Odysseus revisits them; in fact, he seems so preoccupied with the very fact of Gryllus's speaking that the two cannot get to the heart of their alleged subject. Frustrated, Gryllus finally interjects (*Mor.* 986 E–F):

> Γ. ἂν δὲ διαλέγεσθαι μᾶλλον ἐθέλῃς ἢ λοιδορεῖσθαι, ταχύ σε μεταπείσομεν, ἑκατέρου τῶν βίων ἐμπείρως ἔχοντες, ὅτι ταῦτα πρὸ ἐκείνων εἰκότως ἀγαπῶμεν.
> Ο. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐγὼ πρόθυμος ἀκροᾶσθαι.
> Γ. Καὶ ἡμεῖς τοίνυν λέγειν.

> G: But if it is your pleasure to discuss the matter instead of hurling abuse, I shall quickly make you see that we are right to prefer our present life in place of the former one, now that we have tried both.
> O: Go on. I should like to hear you.
> G: And I, in that case, will instruct you.

Here the reader thinks that surely the dialogue will finally progress. Gryllus will speak, Odysseus will listen, and these unlikely interlocutors will actually address the issue at hand. Yet even after this overt redeployment, the false starts persist, and Odysseus cannot abandon his preoccupations with animal speech. He continues to make programmatic interruptions, derailing the topic, and punningly comments after a long discursive speech by Gryllus on the valor of animals and cowardice of humans (*Mor.* 988F):

> Παπαί, ὦ Γρύλλε, δεινός μοι δοκεῖς γεγονέναι σοφιστής, ὅς γε καὶ νῦν ἐκ τῆς συηνίας φθεγγόμενος οὕτω νεανικῶς πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἐπικεχείρηκας.

> Bless me, Gryllus, you must have once been a very clever sophist, one may judge, since even as things are, and speaking from your swinishness, you can attack the subject with such fervent ardor.

Instead of responding with any substance to Gryllus' assertions (that animals exceed humans in valor), Odysseus raises the issue of Gryllus' vocal abilities (ἐκ τῆς συηνίας φθεγγόμενος). His joke turns on the ambiguity of συηνίας, usually

"stupidity," but here literal "piggishness." The phrase ἐκ τῆς συηνίας φθεγγόμενος, which should for a human mean "speaking from a position of ignorance" here also could connote "vocalizing like a pig."[35] The double entendre, then, corresponds precisely to the dichotomy of λόγος and φωνή—the intellectual versus the vocal or, as realized in Stoic terms, λόγος ἐνδιάθετος versus λόγος προφορικός. In his thought-provoking study of this dialogue, Herchenroeder has interpreted Odysseus' comment here as a not-so-veiled critique of contemporary elite culture, where Gryllus in his piggery will ultimately stand for the so-called Roman *pepaideumenoi*:

> Plutarch has depicted his talking pig in the persona of a careful, textbook speaker. Yet Gryllus is a parodic representative of sophistry on the whole in this respect, for … contradictions in his argumentation and expression within his speech weaken his claims … [I]t is not to be taken as an entirely serious investigation on the part of its external author, that is, on the part of Plutarch.[36]

I read the comment, however, as an admission of shock on Odysseus' part that someone who vocalizes so poorly can yet reason adeptly: for Plutarch's Odysseus, language is a fundamental prerequisite for reason—he too submits to the fallacious Aristotelian and Stoic equation of the two forms of λόγος. I contend that a critique of this perception, not Gryllus' intellectual weakness, emerges in this exchange, and in the dialogue as a whole. Moreover, if we view Odysseus' obsessive attention to Gryllus' speech in conjunction with the repeated failings of human speech in *Odyssey* 10, it becomes difficult—problematic, even—to see Plutarch's characters as "a lowly brute [Gryllus] rivaling the heroic speaker, Odysseus, in a sophistic contest."[37] Doing so all but disregards the model upon which the dialogue depends and comments. The Odysseus of the Homeric episode, as we have seen, learns only that his rhetoric skills (not to mention his crew's λόγοι) do not function on

35 The verb φθέγγομαι here is a marked departure from λέγειν. As opposed to denoting speech it is often used of the peculiar sounds made by animals, infants, and inanimate objects (cf. Arist. *Hist. an.* 535a30).

36 Herchenroeder (2008: 361–362). See also his general conclusion on 373: "In representing the sophist as an animal, Plutarch parodies elite claims to authority that lack real substance."

37 Herchenroeder (2008: 352–359). He adduces other evidence in support of his conclusion, including an extended explication of the etymology Gryllus' name, which he views in its many connotations as a marker of a coarse performer.

Aeaea; so too, Plutarch's Odysseus comes to question the relationship between reason and speech.

This exchange with Gryllus and those that follow it gesture instead toward a broader caveat: that spoken dialogue may not be the only or even the best means of grappling with complex problems. In referring to animal vocalisms so persistently, the *Gryllus* upsets the notion that λόγος signifies rational understanding—that is, the view expressed by Aristotle in the *Politics* and expressed here by Odysseus. In a passage about why animals make better spouses than humans, Gryllus says (*Mor.* 989A–B):

> τὴν δὲ Πηνελόπης σωφροσύνην *μυρίαι κορῶναι κρώζουσαι γέλωτα θήσονται καὶ καταφρονήσουσιν*, ὧν ἑκάστη, ἂν ἀποθάνῃ ὁ ἄρρην, οὐκ ὀλίγον χρόνον ἀλλ' ἐννέα χηρεύει γενεὰς ἀνθρώπων·
>
> As for the chastity of Penelope, the cawing of countless crows will pour laughter and contempt upon it; for every crow, if her mate dies, remains a widow, not merely for a short time, but for nine generations of men.

Here the exemplum again points to the animal voice as communicative rather than just noise-making: it is crucial to the argument that the crows' manner of vocalizing (κρώζω) specifically comes into play.[38] Thus in continuing to reiterate the sonic differences between human and animal utterances, Gryllus challenges the idea that human-style speech is a prerequisite for intelligent and ethical thought. Moreover, one of Gryllus' final points would seem to refute even more directly Aristotle's more specific statement that animals can vocally communicate pain and pleasure, but nothing more (ἡ μὲν οὖν *φωνὴ* τοῦ λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος ἐστὶ σημεῖον). He says of animals' temperance as opposed to human hedonism (*Mor.* 989 F):

> ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πλεῖστα ταῖς ἀναγκαίαις ὁ βίος ἡμῶν ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ἡδοναῖς διοικεῖται, ταῖς δ' οὐκ ἀναγκαίαις ἀλλὰ φυσικαῖς μόνον οὔτ' ἀτάκτως οὔτ' ἀπλήστως ὁμιλοῦμεν.

38 For the opposite poetics cf. Ar. *Lys.* 506, in which the magistrate demands of Lysistrata, τοῦτο μέν, ὦ γραῦ, σαυτῇ κρώξαις. σὺ δέ μοι λέγε ("You can croak that to yourself, you old crow! Now tell me (why you women are meddling in civic affairs)!"). The magistrate's implication is that croaking is a noncommunicative, nonintelligent, female medium of complaint; to express anything of substance one must *speak*, λέγειν.

> [O]ur life for the most part is controlled by the essential desires and pleasures. As for those that are non-essential, but merely natural, we resort to them without either irregularity or excess.

Here the connection of voice to virtue receives its final reformulation. True, animals' φωνή communicates pain and pleasure, and Gryllus would hardly disagree. But according to his schema, this is not a limitation. Rather, unlike humans, animals' sense of natural pleasure accords with their moral sense in a pure, unconflicted way. Whereas the quest for unnatural and unnecessary pleasures (οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι and φυσικαὶ ἡδοναί) leads men to depravity, for animals, pleasure and desire lead to good behavior. The animal φωνή, then, actually emerges as a manifestation of moral virtue. Thus if we return to Aristotle's λόγος, defined as the unique tool humans possess whereby they lead ethical lives, it turns out to be a liability rather than an asset. As Gryllus would see it, Aristotle is right: humans *do* use λόγος to work out right and wrong, but this only is because they are morally bankrupt without it. Λόγος is not a skill for the wise, but a crutch for the weak. As we know from the intertext of the *Odyssey* episode, Gryllus has achieved this deep understanding of λόγος only by the very condition of being *deprived* of it. This irony emerges in the Greek title given to the work, "Περὶ τὰ ἄλογα λόγῳ χρῆσθαι" which, as others have variously interpreted, clearly involves etymological play. Based on this reading, we might render it: "On the use of reason by those who don't have speech."

As Gryllus argues it, then, animals draw their sense of moral and rational behavior from within, rather than via spoken dialogue with others. While I hesitate to ascribe this particular viewpoint to Plutarch himself, the underlying message of the *Gryllus* merits some final consideration. Reading the dialogue as a mere *jeu d'esprit* on the one hand, or as a sustained critique of the *pepaideumenoi* on the other, with Gryllus as the butt of the joke, does not fully account for the resonances between the dialogue and its Homeric model, nor does it accord with the thrust of Plutarch's other animal treatises, which are ever defensive of the virtues of the pig. It is true, as others have noted, that Plutarch does not explicitly argue for animal intellect in the *Moralia*; yet still, why equate an object of ridicule to a pig (a rather banal turn), when one has elsewhere so clearly presented a sympathetic portrait? More to the point, it is not intellect so much as moral superiority that is at stake in the *Gryllus*. Intellect, or the performance of it, matters comparatively little. And if animals indeed have an internal moral sense, then what good to them, we might ask, is dialectic at all? Certainly quite little, as it is a peculiarly human practice, a point Plutarch observes at the incomplete end of his treatise on meat-eating (*Mor.* 999B):

> Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτ' ἤδη σκεψώμεθα, τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι πρὸς τὰ ζῷα δίκαιον ἡμῖν, μήτε τεχνικῶς μήτε σοφιστικῶς, ἀλλὰ τοῖς πάθεσιν ἐμβλέψαντες τοῖς ἑαυτῶν καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς ἀνθρωπικῶς λαλήσαντες καὶ ἀνακρίναντες …
>
> Let us, however, now examine the point whether we really have no compact of justice with animals; and let us do so in no artificial or sophistical manner, but fixing our attention on our own emotions and conversing like human beings with ourselves and weighing …

Where the treatise trails off, one can recognize a shade of the same intractable problem of *Gryllus*—that humans can resort only to speech to come to moral understanding, even, ironically, in the very case of their ethical obligations toward animals. Indeed, the ultimate query to which the dialogue leads may be: what good is dialectic to humans? At best it is an artificial, rather than an innate, asset, and an aid rather than a skill.

Circe subjects Gryllus to a Turing test of sorts, endowing him with communicative capabilities such that Odysseus might examine his internal intellect. Ultimately, however, the *Gryllus* causes the reader to question the validity of the experiment altogether, leading us instead to consider that we ought to believe in animal internal λόγος without the "proof" of hearing it, as it were, from the horse's mouth. Speech becomes a faulty and imprecise marker of internal λόγος, and the very process of hashing out animal mental capacity via dialogue may be fundamentally flawed.

The *Politics* claims that humans uniquely arrive at the ethically sound via language, and Gryllus would agree: in fact, humans *require* dialectic to secure virtue. Animals, by contrast, have no need for this secondary conduit of language, an imperfect (and often unreliable) communicative device. True virtue may not be tied to speech and is perhaps more likely to be found in silence.

Bibliography

Bettini, M.S. 2008. "Laughing Weasels: Animal Voices from Myth to Natural History," *I Quaderni del Ramo d'Oro on-line* 1: 209–216.

Boulogne, J., ed. 2005. *Les Grecs de l'antiquité et les animaux: Le Cas remarquable de Plutarque*. Lille: Université Charles-de-Gaulle—Lille 3.

Bréchet, C. 2005. "La philosophie de Gryllos" in Boulogne, ed. *Les Grecs de l'antiquité et les animaux: Le Cas remarquable de Plutarque*, 43–61. Lille: Université Charles-de-Gaulle—Lille 3.

Campbell, G.L., ed. 2014. *The Oxford Handbook of Animals in Classical Thought and Life*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cherniss, H. and W.C. Helmbold. 1957. *Plutarch Moralia*, Volume XII. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Clarke, M. 1995. "Between Lions and Men: Images of the Hero in the *Iliad*," *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies* 36: 137–159.

Fögen, T. 2014. "Animal Communication" in Campbell, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Animals in Classical Thought and Life*, 216–232 Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Griffith, M. 2006a. "Horsepower and Donkeywork: Equids and the Ancient Greek Imagination," *Classical Philology* 101: 185–246.

———. 2006b. "Horsepower and Donkeywork: Equids and the Ancient Greek Imagination. Part Two," *Classical Philology* 101: 307–358.

Heath, J. 2005. *The Talking Greeks: Speech, Animals, and the Other in Homer, Aeschylus, and Plato*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Herchenroeder, L. 2008. "Τί γὰρ τοῦτο πρὸς τὸν λόγον; Plutarch's 'Gryllus' and So-Called 'Grylloi,'" *American Journal of Philology* 129: 347–379.

Hubert, C. 1954. *Plutarchi moralia*, vol. 6.1. Leipzig: Teubner.

Johnston, S. 1992. "Xanthus, Hera and the Erinyes (*Iliad* 19.400–418)," *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 122: 85–98.

Koerth-Baker, M. 2013. "What Anesthesia Can Teach Us About Consciousness," *The New York Times*, December 10.

Kurke, L. 2011. *Aesopic Conversations: Popular Tradition, Cultural Dialogue, and the Invention of Greek Prose*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Labarrière, J.-L. 1993. "Aristote et la question du langage animal," *Métis* 8: 247–260.

Leaf, W., ed. 1960 [1900–1902], ed. *The Iliad*. Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert.

Lonsdale, S. 1979. "Attitudes towards Animals in Ancient Greece," *Greece & Rome* 26: 146–159.

Montanari, F. 2015. *The Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek*. Leiden: Brill.

Mossman, J. 2005. "Plutarch on Animals: Rhetorical Strategies in 'de Sollertia Animalium,'" *Hermathena* 179: 141–163.

Newmyer, S. 2005. *Animals, Rights and Reason in Plutarch and Modern Ethics*. New York and London: Routledge.

———. 1999 "Speaking of Beasts: The Stoics and Plutarch on Animal Reason and the Modern Case against Animals," *Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica* NS 63: 99–110.

Payne, M. 2010. *The Animal Part: Human and Other Animals in the Poetic Imagination*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Pelliccia, H. 1995. *Mind, Body, and Speech in Homer and Pindar* [Hypomnemata 107]. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

Ready, J.L. 2011. *Character, Narrator, and Simile in the Iliad*. Cambridge.

Renehan, R. 1981. "The Greek Anthropocentric View of Man," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 85: 239–259.

Sorabji, R. 1993. *Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Wackernagel, J. 1888. "Miszellen zur griechischen Grammatik." *Zeitschrift für vergleichende Sprachforschung* 29: 124–52.

CHAPTER 19

The Fragrance of the Rose: An Image of the Voice in Achilles Tatius*

Amy Koenig

Of the complete Greek novels we have, Achilles Tatius' *Leucippe and Clitophon* may be the strangest to modern sensibilities: it includes lovingly described scenes of torture and cannibalism, mostly perpetrated on the heroine, and it is visually obsessed to the point of scopophilia, as Helen Morales has detailed.[1] It is also, perhaps oddly for a novel so preoccupied with vision, the most "oral" in its conceit. It begins as a first-person narrative (1.1–2): an anonymous narrator describes his encounter with a painting of the rape of Europa in a temple in Sidon. While looking at the painting, the narrator runs into a young man who is moved to tell him of his troubles with *eros*, and he invites him to sit down in a pleasant place shaded by plane trees and to tell his story at length. The young man, we learn, is our hero Clitophon, and his ensuing narration (1.3.1ff.) forms the bulk of the novel; the frame story never appears again.

Clitophon's narration, as scholars have noted, is problematic in a number of ways. He can be a less than reliable narrator; he veers between strict ego-narrative, withholding information that he does not yet know in-story for the sake of increasing his audience's horror or suspense, and pseudo-omniscient narration, describing scenes he could never have witnessed.[2] The text also seems at points to undercut his narrative in ways that some scholars, applying Conte's "hidden author" model to this text, see as indicating the author's own ironic stance toward the character and ultimately alienating him from the reader.[3] No less problematic is his relationship with the heroine Leucippe, which is decidedly the most asymmetric of any Greek novel: Leucippe is the

* I am grateful to the organizers and the other attendees of Orality and Literacy XI for their kind and generous feedback on the orally delivered version of this paper; to David Elmer for his advice in the early stages of the talk; and to Stephen Nimis for his thoughtful comments and suggestions, which were very helpful in the process of revising.

1 Morales (2004).

2 See e.g. Reardon (1994: 85); Hägg (1971).

3 Conte (1997); for its application to Clitophon see Morgan (2004, 2007) and de Temmerman (2007), among others.

© KONINKLIJKE BRILL NV, LEIDEN, 2017 | DOI: 10.1163/9789004329737_020

passive recipient of his courtship and his voyeuristic gaze, and in the course of the novel she is repeatedly silent or silenced at crucial moments.[4] Once dismissed as evidence of the author's lack of skill, care or taste, later scholarship has tended to regard many of the seeming problems of the novel as deliberate features. The issues of the narration, Clitophon's character and his relationship with Leucippe can be seen as playfully exploring the elusive, ambiguous nature of reported speech and the insufficiency of attempts to interpret or convey meaning through a different medium from the original, whether an ecphrasis of a painting[5] or a written account of an oral narrative. The tension between orality and textuality is distinctly foregrounded for the reader from the start, as Ní Mheallaigh and Marinčič convincingly argue, by the way the frame narrative puts the interlocutors into a setting that recalls Plato's *Phaedrus*; one of the many ways in which Plato informs the novel is in the problematizing of written texts themselves.[6]

My argument focuses on one subtle but forceful way in which the novel seems to highlight the tension between different media in indirect transmission and emphasize the fragility of the voice, through the analysis of a striking set of passages featuring the image of a rose. I will then extrapolate from this motif to present a reading of one of the more baffling of the digressions that characterize *Leucippe and Clitophon* more than any other novel—the story of the elephant and the "black rose" in book 4—and end with some speculation as to its broader significance. In giving my interpretation, I do not wish to be too reductive: one of the richest aspects of this novel is its playful multivalence, the refusal of any of its elements to be reduced to one "key" interpretation. My intent is not to contradict prior interpretations of these passages, but to suggest new possibilities.

Achilles Tatius' novel, as one might expect of a text devoted to the theme of *eros*, is filled with depictions of flowers. The picture of the rape of Europa in the frame narrative features a meadow of roses, narcissus and myrtle, flowers that then reappear in sensuous detail in the lovers' courtship in the garden of Clitophon's house and in the description of Leucippe herself, whose face is described as a "meadow" (1.19.2).[7] Flowers and especially the rose are a

4 See Morales (2004), Konstan (1994: 62–64).

5 Here, as elsewhere, I am using the term in the more restrictive sense of a verbal description of a work of (usually visual) art.

6 Marinčič (2007), Ní Mheallaigh (2007); see e.g. Morales (2004: 50–60) and Repath (2001) for fuller discussions of Achilles Tatius's engagement with Plato.

7 Bartsch (1989: 52); see also Littlewood (1979) and Hindermann (2013) on the significance of gardens in ancient novels. De Temmerman (2009) offers a fuller discussion of this metalepsis.

commonplace of erotic literature with a wide range of romantic and sexual significance, and that is true of this text as well: walled gardens are figures for a woman's virginity, and the beauty of women and boys' faces and bodies is compared to that of flowers, a comparison that emphasizes not only their beauty but the short duration of that beauty.[8] But there are several places in the text where the image of a flower—the rose in particular—appears connected with a mouth or voice at a curious moment: a place where the reader is made aware of a disjunction between different focalizations or narrative layers in the text.

When Clitophon describes the moment of his first sight of Leucippe, he dwells lavishly on the features of her face, beginning with her eyes and ending with her mouth:

> τοιαύτην εἶδον ἐγώ ποτε ἐπὶ ταύρῳ γεγραμμένην Σελήνην· ὄμμα γοργὸν ἐν ἡδονῇ· κόμη ξανθή, τὸ ξανθὸν οὖλον· ὀφρὺς μέλαινα, τὸ μέλαν ἄκρατον· λευκὴ παρειά, τὸ λευκὸν εἰς μέσον ἐφοινίσσετο καὶ ἐμιμεῖτο πορφύραν, οἵαν εἰς τὸν ἐλέφαντα Λυδία βάπτει γυνή· τὸ στόμα ῥόδων ἄνθος ἦν, ὅταν ἄρχηται τὸ ῥόδον ἀνοίγειν τῶν φύλλων τὰ χείλη.
>
> 1.4.3
>
> I saw such a Selene once depicted on a bull: a pleasingly spirited eye; blonde hair, curly blonde; a black brow, pure black; a white cheek whose whiteness reddened in the middle and resembled purple dye into which a Lydian woman dips ivory. Her mouth was a rose-bloom, when the rose begins to open the lips of its petals.[9]

The initial comparison recalls the Europa painting from the frame narrative, a metaleptic moment that takes the reader a mental step back from the immediacy of Clitophon's narration. The most marked features of the subsequent description are the dyed ivory of her cheek, an image borrowed from the wounding of Menelaus in *Iliad* 4.141,[10] and the description of her mouth as an opening rose.

---

8 For the rose as particularly ephemeral, see *Leucippe and Clitophon* 2.36.2: καὶ τὸ ῥόδον διὰ τοῦτο τῶν ἄλλων εὐμορφότερόν ἐστι φυτῶν, ὅτι τὸ κάλλος αὐτοῦ φεύγει ταχύ. All quotations of the Greek follow the Budé edition of Garnaud (1991).

9 Translations are my own unless otherwise noted.

10 This image is also used in an erotic context of the blushing Lavinia in *Aeneid* 12.67–69; in fact, coupled with the image of "lilies mixed with roses."

Comparisons of mouths to roses are of course not uncommon in erotic contexts (such a comparison also appears, for example, in *Daphnis and Chloe* 1.18), and the sexual associations and *double entendre* of the flower/mouth imagery in this novel, "richly suggestive of labial pleasures,"[11] are obvious throughout. I hope, however, to bring out another nuance of the motif as I trace it through the text. For the moment, I note that the comparison here is strikingly vivid: Leucippe's mouth *is* a rose, as the narrator phrases it, and the words "mouth" and "lips" (τὸ στόμα, τὰ χείλη) surround the words describing the rose as though it is unfurling between her lips. What began as a static image, a comparison to a painting, ends with a tantalizing glimpse of motion: the opening of the lips of the rose, and by extension Leucippe's lips, just beginning to part as if to speak.

But the motion is never completed, and the image remains purely visual. For the remainder of the first book, Leucippe is not heard to speak directly. It is Clitophon who verbally displays himself for her benefit in his garden in a dialogue with his slave Satyros (1.16–18), and who almost literally feasts his eyes on her at a dinner party (1.5.3) as she remains the passive object of his gaze. Leucippe's voice then finally appears—or seems to—in the narrative at the beginning of the second book. It is in the context of a musical performance, in which the rose makes a second very prominent appearance. After her encounter with her would-be lover in the garden, Leucippe returns to her chamber to play on the *kithara*, and Clitophon and Satyros join her: ostensibly to hear her sing, but in fact because Clitophon does not want to let her out of his sight.[12] Both Clitophon's motives and his faithfulness as a listener are thus dubious from the beginning: he is again concentrating on the visual spectacle at the possible expense of the oral performance.

The first music Leucippe performs is a Homeric text, but one that seems—at least in the text as we have it—strangely represented, even misrepresented: she sings of "Homer's fight of the boar against the lion."[13] A fight between a boar and lion appears in the *Iliad*, but only as a simile of some four lines (16.823–826) describing Hector's slaying of Patroclus. Either Leucippe in her performance or Clitophon in his narration is modifying the simile by taking it out of context in a way that must be obvious to a Homer-educated reader; the uncertainty about the source of this modification is heightened by the fact that the lines themselves are not reproduced. This seems to create a disconnect between

---

11 Morales (2004: 192).

12 … ἐπὶ τὸ δωμάτιον ἐβαδίζομεν τῆς κόρης, ἀκροασόμενοι δῆθεν τῶν κιθαρισμάτων· οὐ γὰρ ἐδυνάμην ἐμαυτοῦ κἂν ἐπ' ὀλίγον κρατεῖν τοῦ μὴ ὁρᾶν τὴν κόρην (2.1.1).

13 ἡ δε πρῶτον μὲν ᾖσεν Ὁμήρου τὴν πρὸς τὸν λέοντα τοῦ συὸς μάχην (2.1.1).

the epic lines, their performance as an excerpt in an erotic lyric context (a woman singing in a private room, accompanied by the *kithara*), and the allusive recounting of that performance.

Leucippe's second song, and the first representation of her "voice" in direct speech, is an unattributed piece in praise of the rose, describing its beauty and erotic sweetness (2.1.2–3). Before reproducing the song, however, Clitophon introduces it as follows:

> εἴ τις τὰς καμπὰς τῆς ᾠδῆς περιελὼν ψιλὸν ἔλεγεν ἁρμονίας τὸν λόγον, οὕτως ἂν εἶχεν ὅ λόγος.
>
> 2.1.2

> If one removed the modulations of the music and spoke the bare sense of the composition, the sense of it would run in this way.

ψιλὸς is used in a technical sense of words (λόγος/λόγοι) "bare" of meter, i.e. prose (e.g. Plato, *Laws* 669d; Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1404b14, 33 contrasted with τὰ μέτρα), and of poetry (ποίησις) "bare" of musical accompaniment (e.g. Plato, *Phaedrus* 278c, of epic as opposed to lyric, ἡ ἐν ᾠδῇ). Here it seems to be used in both these senses, indicating a prose paraphrase without music: the closest parallel is in Plato's *Symposium*, in which Socrates is said to charm his listeners, unlike the satyr-musician Marsyas, ἄνευ ὀργάνων ψιλοῖς λόγοις, "by means of bare words without instruments."[14] But how does this statement actually function here?

On one level, it strips away any pretense of unfiltered access to Leucippe's song, casting doubt on what would otherwise appear to be her first "direct" speech of any kind in the novel and emphasizing that something is lost in translation. But to go further, this clarification is ultimately unnecessary in a *written* prose text, which by the very nature of the medium reproduces only the text of the song. Instead, it indicates how Clitophon plans to reperform it *orally* in his narration: he is not singing the song, but speaking a paraphrase as part of the story he is telling in prose. This distances the reader of the novel from the song twice over: from the original oral performance of the song, in Leucippe's voice, and from the oral retelling of its lyrics, in Clitophon's.

The symbol of the rose thus reappears at a point in the novel at which oral performance and written transmission sit especially uneasily together, and where the voice of the heroine is both transmitted and silenced by the indirect

---

14 215c7. All quotations from the *Symposium* are from Burnet's OCT; translations are my own.

nature of its representation. Furthermore, its use in this context brings to mind not only its erotic but its metapoetic resonances. Roses are everywhere in erotic lyric, but they are also used as symbols of that poetry, and are especially associated with the work of Sappho.[15] The image of a woman singing about roses to the music of a *kithara* could not help but bring these associations to mind, underscoring the link between the image of the rose and the representation of a female voice in oral performance.

Following the song, Clitophon has a vivid fantasy that recalls his first sight of Leucippe:

> ἡ μὲν ταῦτα ᾖδεν· ἐγὼ δὲ ἐδόκουν τὸ ῥόδον ἐπὶ τῶν χειλέων αὐτῆς ⟨ἰδεῖν⟩, ὡς εἴ τις τῆς κάλυκος τὸ περιφερὲς εἰς τὴν τοῦ στόματος ἔκλεισε μορφήν.
>
> 2.1.3

> She sang this, and I seemed [to see] the rose upon her lips, as if someone closed the rim of its calyx into the shape of her mouth.

The sequence of Leucippe's songs has already recalled his initial description of her cheeks and mouth—a Homeric allusion leading into a rose—and this ensuing image is clearly reminiscent of the first rose fantasy. While the rose in the first passage is opening, however, this rose is being closed; the agency as well as the direction of movement have been switched. We have "heard" Leucippe speak, and now Clitophon is metaphorically silencing her.

Again the image is only visual, which emphasizes by contrast one other aspect of Leucippe's song: while it does dwell on the visual beauty of the rose, unlike Clitophon's rose fantasies, it is one of the rare places in the text that also mention the *fragrance* of the rose:

> **Ἔρωτος πνέει**, Ἀφροδίτην προξενεῖ, **εὐώδεσι** φύλλοις κομᾷ, εὐκινήτοις πετάλοις τρυφᾷ, τὸ πέταλον τῷ Ζεφύρῳ γελᾷ.
>
> 2.1.3; emphases mine

15 To name a few examples, one of the fragmentary poems attributed to her uses the "roses of Pieria" as a symbol for poetry and poetic fame (fr. 55 Voigt, l. 2–3: βρόδων / τῶν ἐκ Πιερίας), and the preface to Meleager's *Garland*, which associates the work of different poets in his anthology with different flowers, mentions Sappho's poems as "few indeed, but roses" (l. 6: βαιὰ μὲν ἀλλὰ ῥόδα). Leucippe's song here has in fact been attributed to Sappho by nineteenth-century translators and anthologizers, seemingly on no other basis than its lyric context, female performer, and mention of roses.

> *It breathes of Love*, it is Aphrodite's ambassador, it is arrayed in *fragrant* petals, it glories in graceful leaves, its leaves laugh in the West Wind.[16]

Especially coming at the moment at which Leucippe herself is singing erotic lyric and "breathing of Love," it adds a brief glimpse of the missing piece of the rose image: the fragrance that would correspond to her breath, and by extension to her voice.

Finally, perhaps the most explicit and grotesque link between flower imagery and the voice comes in one of the most prominent of the ecphrases that pepper the narrative: the story of Procne and Philomela. Leucippe and Clitophon arrive in Alexandria; Clitophon happens to catch sight of a painting depicting the story; Leucippe then asks its meaning, and Clitophon relates the story to her in detail. The result is that the story is effectively told twice, with a narrative structure like that of the novel itself in miniature: once in Clitophon-the-narrator's ecphrasis, a condensed description of the picture (5.3.4); and once as Clitophon-the-character's story, in which he dwells particularly on the silencing of Philomela (5.5). Shadi Bartsch and others have provided wonderfully detailed analyses of the ecphrasis and its relation to the larger narrative,[17] but I would like to highlight a small part of each "version" as especially relevant to this argument.

In the first passage, from the initial description of the painting, Philomela's mutilation is bluntly described as "the cutting out of her tongue" (τῆς γλώττης τὴν τομήν, 5.3.4). But Clitophon's retelling introduces a floral image, in metaphorical language that is made more marked by the contrast with the way it is expressed earlier:

> τὴν γλῶτταν τῆς Φιλομήλας φοβεῖται, καὶ ἕδνα τῶν γάμων αὐτῇ δίδωσι μηκέτι λαλεῖν καὶ κείρει τῆς φωνῆς τὸ ἄνθος.
>
> 5.5.4

> [Tereus] fears Philomela's tongue, and he gives her the bride-gift of no longer speaking and shears away the flower of her voice.[18]

16 Some manuscripts have εὐειδέσι φύλλοις, though that seems not to be the preferred reading of most editors.

17 Bartsch (1989: 65–76); see also Nimis (1998 and 2009).

18 ἄνθος here need not literally mean "flower"—it can also be used more broadly, as "glory" or "beauty"—but I would argue that the use of κείρει concretizes the image, and that it is hard not to think of this moment in the context of Clitophon's visions of Leucippe's mouth as a flower.

This gruesome metaphor, which practically parodies the earlier image of Leucippe with a rose for a mouth, is immediately followed by a discussion of the way Philomela found to bypass her silence:

> ἀλλὰ πλέον ἤνυσεν οὐδέν· ἡ γὰρ Φιλομήλας τέχνη σιωπῶσαν εὕρηκε φωνήν. ὑφαίνει γὰρ πέπλον ἄγγελον καὶ τὸ δρᾶμα πλέκει ταῖς κρόκαις, καὶ μιμεῖται τὴν γλῶτταν ἡ χείρ, καὶ Πρόκνης τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς τὰ τῶν ὤτων μηνύει καὶ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἃ πέπονθε τῇ κερκίδι λαλεῖ.
>
> 5.5.4–5

> But he accomplished nothing more: for Philomela's art discovered a silent voice. For she weaves a *peplos* as a messenger and works the act into the threads, and her hand imitates a tongue and reveals to Procne's eyes the things [meant] for her ears and with the shuttle tells her what she has suffered.

This discussion strikingly describes what is effectively writing as a kind of indirect oral delivery: Philomela's hand imitates a tongue, the *peplos* is a "messenger," and a little later Procne will "hear" (ἀκούει, 5.5.6) the news from the *peplos*. In fact, the telltale tapestry prefigures a crucial *letter* Leucippe will write to Clitophon a little later in the novel, informing him in absentia of what *she* has suffered (5.13.2–6).[19] The coy avoidance of describing the peplos as "writing" only points up the message: that writing is, in Clitophon's telling, portrayed as a makeshift, indirect analogue of speech.

The contrast between Clitophon's version as told to Leucippe and the earlier depiction of the revelation to Procne in the painting (5.3.5) is also striking. In the painting, Philomela is actually standing beside (παρειστήκει) the *peplos* as Procne looks on, and pointing out the woven pictures with her finger (ἐπετίθει τῷ πέπλῳ τὸν δάκτυλον καὶ ἐδείκνυε τῶν ὑφασμάτων τὰς γραφάς) almost as though reading from it to her sister; this emphasizes her presence and her status as not only "author," but in-person interpreter of her work.[20] Procne, in turn, responds specifically to her sister's "display" or "demonstration" (δεῖξιν, 5.3.5), picking up on ἐδείκνυε from a sentence earlier to affirm the importance of Philomela's gestures to Procne's comprehension and reaction. In Clitophon's account, however, Philomela does not interpret to Procne in per-

19 This parallel is noted in e.g. Repath (2013).

20 I am indebted to the insightful discussions of the "painting" passage in Nimis (1998: 115–117) and (2009: 88–89) for this observation.

son; it is the *peplos*—functioning metaphorically as a messenger rather than a text or picture—that carries the tale to Procne and in whose voice she "hears" the message. Philomela's agency in the "telling" of her sad tale is thus transferred entirely to the go-between she has created.

Looking at the development of the flower-voice motif in these contexts, where it seems clearly linked to instances where a voice is in some sense "lost in translation," may shed additional light on one of the most unusual of the novel's apparent digressions. Midway through the novel, the lovers encounter the general Charmides, who is smitten with Leucippe and begins to tell her a series of anecdotes as an excuse to keep looking at her. The sight of a hippopotamus provokes a digression on the animal that leads to a discussion of the habits of the Indian elephant, which Clitophon et al. have only seen "in a picture" (4.4.2). Charmides tells of a "novel spectacle" he once saw:

> εἶδον δέ ποτε καὶ θέαμα καινόν. ἀνὴρ Ἕλλην ἐνέθηκε τὴν κεφαλὴν κατὰ μέσην τοῦ θηρίου τὴν κεφαλήν· ὁ δὲ ἐλέφας ἐκεχήνει καὶ περιῄσθμαινε τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐγκείμενον. ἀμφότερα οὖν ἐθαύμαζον, καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῆς εὐτολμίας καὶ τὸν ἐλέφαντα τῆς φιλανθρωπίας. ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἔλεγεν ὅτι καὶ μισθὸν εἴη δεδωκὼς τῷ θηρίῳ· προσπνεῖν γὰρ αὐτῷ καὶ μόνον οὐκ ἀρωμάτων Ἰνδικῶν· εἶναι δὲ κεφαλῆς νοσούσης φάρμακον.
>
> 4.4.7–8

> And I once saw a novel spectacle. A Greek man put his head into the middle of the beast's maw: and the elephant had its mouth open and breathed on the man as he lay there. I marveled at both, at the man for his boldness and at the elephant for its beneficence. But the man said that he had actually given payment to the beast, for (he said) its breath was all but equal to that of the spices of India, and was a remedy for an aching head.

The name Charmides, evoking the title character and interlocutor of a Platonic dialogue, has already encouraged the reader to be alert for literary play.[21] Like

21 My thanks to Mathilde Cambron-Goulet and others at the conference for bringing this parallel to my attention, and to Pauline LeVen, who shared with me her own close reading of Charmides' story with an eye to the *Charmides*. Achilles Tatius' engagement with Platonic texts merits and is receiving increasing attention. A close reading of this section of the novel with the *Charmides* in mind deserves a more detailed treatment than the focus of this paper allows; I mention it mainly as support for an "oral" and possibly metatextual reading of the following passage. See Repath (2001) for a broader discussion of meaningful Platonic names in the novel.

Charmides' elephant, which is compared to a "quack doctor" (ἰατρὸς ἀλαζών, 4.4.8), Socrates in the *Charmides* pretends to offer a headache cure to the beautiful youth of that name as an excuse to converse with him (155b3–7). Socrates himself, as Alcibiades famously notes in the *Symposium* (215a–b) in a passage perhaps already recalled by Clitophon's earlier reference to ψιλὸς λόγος, presents a contrast between exterior ugliness and inward beauty and charm, like a satyr statue concealing an image of a god—and like the elephant here, whose monstrous exterior belies its fragrant and therapeutic breath. While other writers mention the elephant as having medicinal powers, the idea of its *breath* being curative of headache is not recorded in surviving antecedent or contemporary texts, strengthening the case that this innovation is a playful nod to Plato and that the fragrance of the elephant's breath stands on some level for the power of the voice.[22]

Clitophon next asks Charmides how such an ugly animal comes to have such sweet breath, and Charmides replies with the story of the "black rose of the Indians," the elephant's fragrant food:

> γίνεται δὲ παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἄνθος Αἰθίοπος χρόας· ἔστι δὲ παρ᾽ Ἰνδοῖς οὐκ ἄνθος ἀλλὰ πέταλον, οἷα παρ᾽ ἡμῖν τὰ πέταλα τῶν φυτῶν· ὃ μὲν κλέπτον τὴν πνοὴν καὶ τὴν ὀδμὴν οὐκ ἐπιδείκνυται· ἢ γὰρ ἀλαζονεύεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς εἰδότας ὀκνεῖ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἢ τοῖς πολίταις φθονεῖ· ἂν δὲ τῆς γῆς μικρὸν ἐξοικήσῃ καὶ ὑπερβῇ τοὺς ὅρους, ἀνοίγει τῆς κλοπῆς τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ ἄνθος ἀντὶ φύλλου γίνεται καὶ τὴν ὀδμὴν ἐνδύεται. μέλαν τοῦτο ῥόδον Ἰνδῶν· ἔστι δὲ τοῖς ἐλέφασι σιτίον, ὡς τοῖς βουσὶ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν ἡ πόα. ἅτε οὖν ἐκ πρώτης γονῆς αὐτῷ τραφείς, ὄδωδέ τε πᾶς κατὰ τὴν τροφὴν καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα πέμπει κάτωθεν εὐωδέστατον, ὃ τῆς πνοῆς αὐτῷ γέγονε πηγή.
>
> 4.5.2–3

> Among the Greeks there is a flower of Ethiopian complexion; but among the Indians it is not a flower but a leaf, like the leaves of the plants among us. There it conceals its breath and does not display its odor; for either it hesitates to boast about its delights to those that know them already, or

22 The image of a man with his head in an elephant's jaws has a parallel in Philostratus' *Life of Apollonius of Tyana* (2.11), but there is no mention there of medicinal breath—Philostratus uses it only as an example of the elephant's docility. Pliny the Elder's *Natural History* mentions the elephant as being able to cure headaches with a touch of its trunk, sometimes accompanied by a sneeze (28.88). Cassiodorus' *Variae* (10.30) mentions the curative power of elephant breath, but far postdates this novel and may itself be drawing on this passage.

> it begrudges them to its countrymen. But if it emigrates a short distance from its own country and crosses its boundaries, it opens up its delights from their concealment and becomes a flower instead of a leaf and clothes itself in scent. This is the black rose of the Indians: and it is fodder for the elephants, as grass is fodder for oxen among us. Since it has been nourished in this way from its birth, the whole animal smells like its food and sends forth most fragrant vapor from below, which is the source of its breath.

The story of the black rose is striking in itself for a few reasons. One is the anthropomorphic agency attributed to the rose. Its blooming or not blooming, its concealment of its "breath" (τὴν πνοὴν), is described as a matter of choice rather than natural imperative—the only question is the motivation for this choice. Even its transplantation is described as an *exoikesis*, as though the plant makes a decision to emigrate and "steps over" the boundaries of its land. Following on from this is the curious fact that in a narrative reveling in exhibitionism, the rose is practically unique in choosing *not* to show off its bloom and scent. Even when it blooms, its color is black, as if deliberately refusing to engage in visual display.

Several readings of the rose might suggest themselves, but the passages listed above, along with the Platonic/philosophical resonances suggested by Charmides' name and the elephant story, offer a strong possibility for interpretation. Consider the rose's fragrance as a symbol of the voice and Leucippe's voice in particular, especially as its scent is uniquely emphasized here. The association with Leucippe might also be suggested by a pun on "black" (μέλαν) and the "white" (λεύκος) part of her name. More crucially, the paradoxical image of a flower that refuses to bloom except at a distance also bears a certain resemblance to the apparent selectiveness of Leucippe's silence. The places in the narrative where Leucippe seems to speak most forcefully—for example, her defiant speech to the villainous Thersander, who seeks to take her virginity (6.22)—are precisely those moments at which Clitophon is distant from her and has no real way to hear her, or moments where she is speaking indirectly, as through the letter mentioned earlier. Conversely, the places in which she is most definitively silenced are often those in which she is nearest to Clitophon, beginning with their first kiss.[23] In these passages, it seems as though

23 Perhaps the most light-hearted of these examples is the first (2.7): Clitophon pretends that he has been stung by a bee on the lips, and Leucippe comes close to sing a charm over them; Clitophon puts his lips to hers so her charm turns into kisses; finally Clitophon

Clitophon's narratorial voice is usurping hers—just as the scent of the black rose that does not bloom in India can be known there only indirectly, through the mouth of the elephant.

One striking feature of the passage, considered in this light, is that the trigger for the description of the "black rose" is, effectively, a mismatch between voice and speaker. The initial elephant anecdote seems self-contained, but the contrast between the animal's ugly appearance and sweet breath prompts Clitophon to ask where the creature comes by it: surely it is not original to the beast. Another is that considering the scent of the flower as a kind of "voice" adds even more complexity to an already very complex narrative structure. The scent of the flower is transmitted through the elephant's breath to the man being treated for headache; Charmides then learns about the scent through visual observation and the man's subsequent oral report (in indirect statement), and eventually tells the story to Clitophon and company. As with the Philomela passage, this could be the novel in microcosm: Leucippe's voice is transmitted by Clitophon's voice to the frame narrator, who shares the story first as a visual spectacle and then as an oral narrative. Perhaps this is too elaborate a parallel, but it is a thought-provoking one, and the novel never shies away from narrative convolutions. If anything, it might serve as a reminder that Leucippe's is not the only voice in danger of being usurped: Clitophon's account is also being indirectly transmitted through the frame narrative, and is in a sense equally vulnerable.

The elephant anecdote, in fact, encapsulates a number of issues central to the novel in general. The elephant literally consumes the flower, usurping its fragrance for its own benefit and acclaim. The scent it produces is only an approximation of the true "spices of India," and the original flower is lost in the process: something of the original is sacrificed when committed to another voice or when written down. On the other hand, the famously long-lived elephant (Charmides reports in 4.4.3 that it lives "longer than Hesiod's crow") may provide a means of preserving the scent and its benefits far beyond the lifespan of the most ephemeral of flowers, as written texts or repeated retellings can preserve stories generations after the speakers have passed away.

---

embraces and kisses her, silencing her entirely. Later, Clitophon and Leucippe have been captured by pirates; after a lengthy description of his own feelings on the subject, Clitophon turns to Leucippe and asks why she has said nothing to him; she replies that her "voice has died before her soul" (3.11.2). Finally, Leucippe's mad scene (4.9) features Clitophon physically restraining and lamenting over her as she is bereft of both reason and speech.

Interestingly, taking over the fragrance also seems to grant the elephant's transmission greater authority at the expense of its actual source. Charmides specifies that the man being treated for headache is a Greek; but Greece, as it happens, is a country where the black rose *will* bloom. If the man could have access to its scent directly, why should he go to the trouble of finding an elephant and paying it to put his head in its mouth? Either there is some genuine medical benefit to indirect transmission, or the exotic appeal of having one's headache cured in the mouth of a beast has trumped logic and convenience.

Conceiving indirect transmission of voices in this light may also point to and challenge the words of Alcibiades in the *Symposium* (215c–d), which have already been shown to lurk behind some of the passages discussed. As he compares Socrates and Marsyas, Alcibiades underlines the idea that both musician and philosopher create content with great power—content that remains the property of its original creator and derives its power from that creator, even if performed or spoken by others. Of Marsyas, Alcibiades says that the charm of his music is effective even for "the man who can pipe *his* [*Marsyas'*] music—for the things that Olympus played, I say they were *Marsyas', the one who taught him*" (215c2–3, emphasis mine: καὶ ἔτι νυνὶ ὃς ἂν τὰ **ἐκείνου** αὐλῇ—ἃ γὰρ Ὄλυμπος ηὔλει, **Μαρσύου** λέγω, **τούτου διδάξαντος**), and that the power of the music manifests no matter how inept the performer who serves as its vessel, effective "because it is divine" (διὰ τὸ θεῖα εἶναι, 215c6). In the case of Socrates, while any other orator speaking "other words" (ἄλλους λόγους, 215d2) has no effect, "whenever anyone hears you, or *another man speaking your words* … we are astonished and spellbound" (215d3–6, emphasis mine: ἐπειδὰν δὲ σοῦ τις ἀκούῃ ἢ τῶν σῶν **λόγων ἄλλου λέγοντος** … ἐκπεπληγμένοι ἐσμὲν καὶ κατεχόμεθα).

On the one hand, the situation of the elephant and the rose seems not too dissimilar to this: the scent of the rose is the source of the power the elephant's breath holds over those who experience it. On the other hand, the rose is destroyed in the process of transmitting its scent, and the medicinal power of the elephant's breath need not be credited to or associated with the flower's fragrance—there is no mention of anyone using the rose for the same purpose. In Alcibiades' account, transmission is a didactic or even divinely inspired process traceable to its ultimate immortal creator; in Charmides' story, it is an act of usurpation and consumption, the original source gone without a trace. Switching from one medium to another, however—an issue absent in Alcibiades' account—is here presented as the most drastic change of all: some aspect of what came before is irretrievably lost, no matter how otherwise faithful the reproduction might be. It is no accident that the voice maps onto the aspect of the rose that is the most transient and most difficult to reproduce. An image of a rose has no scent; an oral account of an olfactory remedy has no

curative power; a prose rendition of a song loses the charm of its music; and written words do not preserve the original speaker's voice.

Why would a love novel be so concerned with the elusiveness and fragility of the voice? On one level, it can be seen as a playfully parodic response to Plato, who presents discussions of the nature of love, the soul, orality and textuality in the medium of elaborately nested oral narratives; such games may themselves be an aid in drawing the portrait of the sophistic and sophisticated Clitophon, who is constantly inquiring into the origins and properties of things (it is no accident that he is the one to ask Charmides about the source of the elephant's breath).[24] On another level, it reflects the idea that this is ultimately a narrative of frustrated desire, à la Peter Brooks.[25] Not only is the reader left inconclusively at the end of the novel with no end to the frame narrative in sight; the author renders problematic the very fabric of the tale. Morales concludes that the novel's repeated empty promises of fulfillment belie the idea that *eros* could be "learned" without experiencing it for oneself:[26] like the Greek man with his head in the elephant's mouth, the reader of exotic novels about love would perhaps do better to go home and smell the rose himself. On still another level, given that the transmission of prose fiction in the Roman period seems to admit a greater degree of variance than that of other types of literature, it could even be a sly nod to the anticipated instability of the written text once out of the author's hands.[27]

One might speculate that there is another point at work as well: the counterproductivity of seeking out another's "true meaning" by interpretive dissection of their self-presentation as Clitophon tries to do. A feminist reading takes Leucippe's silence as a mark of Clitophon's dominance, but the most prominent common characteristic of her silences, besides the fact that they often happen when the two lovers should be closest, is Clitophon's frustration with them and his inability to correctly "read" her motivations.[28] When she is heard, as

24 See e.g. de Temmerman (2007) for an analysis of some of the narrative's features—here, *gnomai* or "wisdom sayings"—as devices that characterize Clitophon.

25 For the idea of "narrative desire," see Brooks (1992: 37–61).

26 Morales (2004: 143–151).

27 See e.g. Vilborg (1962) on issues with the text of Achilles Tatius, particularly with regard to the papyrological evidence; evidently there was great variation in its transmission in antiquity, not only at the level of words and sentences, but in the large-scale arrangement of whole sections of text.

28 For instance, after Clitophon first silences Leucippe with a kiss in 2.7, they are forced to part. Clitophon grieves (ἐγὼ μὲν ἄκων καὶ λυπούμενος), but as for Leucippe—"I do not know how she felt" (οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως εἶχεν, 2.8.1).

the analysis of the passages above hints, her speech (and speech in the novel in general) is often accompanied by the language of artifice and craft rather than artless authenticity—the lyric performance of the rose song, the τέχνη of Philomela—which serves as a further reminder that it is filtered through the creative lens of multiple narrators, Clitophon first and foremost, before reaching us not as voice but as text.

Clitophon the lover-intellectual ardently seeks to get at the soul behind the words as well as the body behind the clothes, no less concerned in love than elsewhere with finding inner truths, but often (however inadvertently) ends up doing violence to the original in superimposing his own interpretation.[29] The fact that the rose song and Philomela episode are both places where Clitophon comes to the fore as narrator and interpreter, and where his involvement comes at the expense of preserving the full beauty or agency of the female artistic "voice" represented, seems to associate him in particular with the brutality inherent in this sort of analytical or ecphrastic attempt. His metaphorical, pseudo-philosophical stripping down of Leucippe's rose song and laying "bare" of its ψιλὸς λόγος robs the performance of its original effect;[30] his efforts to analyze his love and beloved lead only to fruitlessly abstract musings, grotesque images of mutilation and death, and a lover who remains physically and mentally unavailable.[31] In retrospect, it makes perfect sense that Clitophon is alone when he first meets the frame narrator: Leucippe has ultimately eluded him.

Clitophon, then, is frustrated by his own analytic tendencies; but are the readers of the novel left unsatisfied as well? By repeatedly drawing attention to the gap between voice and text and issues of indirect transmission, and constructing microcosms of its narrative structure within itself, the novel draws the attentive reader's gaze to its own sophisticated artificiality—unreal and unnatural, perhaps, but clever and intricate nonetheless. For those seeking

29 One might see in all this a reflection of the Clitophon in his namesake Platonic dialogue, who accuses a silent Socrates of provoking a desire for virtue without being able to show how to achieve it, leaving the would-be disciple in a state of frustrated unfulfillment. In the process he puts words in Socrates' mouth, providing (questionably accurate) quotations from speeches he says Socrates has made in the past. See e.g. Moore (2012) for a discussion of Clitophon's possible misrepresentation and/or misinterpretation of Socrates' speeches.

30 The idea that his treatment of the performance might be generically inappropriate could also pose a tongue-in-cheek caution to the reader: anyone who approaches a romance novel like a technical treatise or philosophical dialogue is as doomed as Clitophon.

31 By contrast, his spontaneous sexual encounter with the matron Melite succeeds and brings pleasure *because*, as he comments, it was artless (ἀπερίεργον) and not overthought or overcurious (πολυπράγμονος) (5.27.4).

an "authentic" erotic or philosophical experience, this would be frustrating indeed; but for those reading a work of fiction as fiction, knowing that no true person or voice exists behind the text, it is all part of the game. The violence done to the voice in retelling or transcribing it is, then, of a piece with the many kinds of violence present in the novel: the conflict and the suffering or sense of loss that it causes are not only emphasized but eroticized, and the tension between "reality" and art, foregrounded by the conceit of problematic narrative authenticity, is made into a source of pleasure for the reader/voyeur. An image of a rose may have no scent, but a well-crafted one fools the viewer into half expecting that it will, and that apparent failure emphasizes both the illusion of reality and the consciousness of artifice in the eyes of the beholder.[32] At one point in the narrative, Clitophon declares that "the voice is a shadow of the soul" (φωνὴ δὲ ψυχῆς σκιά, 2.8.2). One might add that "the text is a shadow of the voice;" but in that case, *Leucippe and Clitophon* is a shadow creating the illusion of an object behind it, and the reader is meant to revel in the shadow-play.

Bibliography

Bartsch, S. 1989. *Decoding the Ancient Novel: The Reader and the Role of Description in Heliodorus and Achilles Tatius*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Burnet, J. 1901, 1903. *Platonis opera*. Vols. 2 and 3. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Brooks, P. 1992. *Reading for the Plot: Design and Intention in Narrative*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Conte, G.B. 1997. *The Hidden Author: An Interpretation of Petronius'* Satyricon. Trans. E. Fantham. Berkeley: University of California Press.

de Temmerman, K. 2007. "A narrator of wisdom: characterization through gnomai in Achilles Tatius." Princeton-Stanford Working Papers in Classics. Online.

———. 2009. "A flowery meadow and a hidden metalepsis in Achilles Tatius." *The Classical Quarterly* 59: 667–670.

Garnaud, J.-P., ed. and trans. 1991. *Achille Tatius d'Alexandrie: le roman de Leucippé et Clitophon*. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.

Hägg, T. 1971. *Narrative Technique in Ancient Greek Romances: Studies of Chariton, Xenophon Ephesius, and Achilles Tatius*. Stockholm: Svenska institutet i Athen.

32 A common trope of ecphrastic description: compare, for instance, the many epigrams on Myron's almost-alive sculpture of a cow. See e.g. Squire (2010) for a fuller discussion of the poems along those lines.

Hindermann, J. 2013. "Eros und Wissensvermittlung im Garten." *Gymnasium* 120: 343–360.

Konstan, D. 1994. *Sexual Symmetry: Love in the Ancient Novel and Related Genres*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Littlewood, A.R. 1979. "Romantic paradises: the role of the garden in the Byzantine romance." *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 5: 95–114.

Marinčič, M. 2007. "Advertising one's own story: text and speech in Achilles Tatius' *Leucippe and Clitophon*." In V. Rimell, ed., *Seeing Tongues, Hearing Scripts: Orality and Representation in the Ancient Novel, Ancient Narrative* Suppl. 7, 168–200. Groningen: Barkhuis.

Moore, C. 2012. "Socrates and Clitophon in the Platonic *Clitophon*." *Ancient Philosophy* 32: 1–22.

Morales, H. 2004. *Vision and Narrative in Achilles Tatius'* Leucippe and Clitophon. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Morgan, J.R. 2004. "Achilles Tatius." In I. De Jong, R. Nünlist, A.M. Bowie, eds., *Narrators, Narratees and Narratives in Ancient Greek Literature*, 493–506. Leiden: Brill.

————. 2007. "Kleitophon and Encolpius." In M. Paschalis, S. Frangoulidis, S. Harrison & M. Zimmerman, eds., *The Greek and the Roman Novel: Parallel Readings, Ancient Narrative* Suppl. 8, 105–120. Groningen: Barkhuis.

Ní Mheallaigh, K. 2007. "Philosophical framing: the Phaedran setting of *Leucippe and Cleitophon*." In J.R. Morgan and M. Jones, eds., *Philosophical Presences in the Ancient Novel, Ancient Narrative* Suppl. 10, 231–244. Groningen: Barkhuis.

Nimis, S. 1998. "Memory and description in the ancient novel." *Arethusa* 31: 99–122.

————. 2009. "Cite and sound: the prosaics of quotation in the ancient novel." In M. Paschalis, S. Panayotakis and G. Schmeling, eds., *Readers and Writers in the Ancient Novel, Ancient Narrative* Suppl. 12, 79–90. Groningen: Barkhuis.

Reardon, B.P. 1994. "Achilles Tatius and ego-narrative." In J.R. Morgan and R. Stoneman, eds., *Greek Fiction: The Greek Novel in Context*, 80–96. London and New York: Routledge.

Repath, I. 2001. *Some Uses of Plato in Achilles Tatius'* Leucippe and Cleitophon. PhD thesis, University of Warwick.

————. 2013. "Yours truly? Letters in Achilles Tatius." In O. Hodkinson, P.A. Rosenmeyer and E. Bracke, eds., *Epistolary Narratives in Ancient Greek Literature*, 237–262. Leiden: Brill.

Squire, M. 2010. "Making Myron's cow moo? Ecphrastic epigram and the poetics of simulation." *American Journal of Philology* 131: 589–634.

Vilborg, E. 1962. *Achilles Tatius*, Leucippe and Clitophon*: A Commentary*. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell.

Index

2 Chronicles 34–35 288
2 Kings
22–23 288
22:2 289
22:20 289

abacus 323–324
Achilles 11, 13, 19–20, 31n2, 33n7, 34n12, 34n13, 41–43, 46–47, 51, 56–59, 61, 62, 64, 66–68, 69, 70, 155–159, 162–163
see also storytellers, Homeric
Achilles Tatius
Leucippe and Clitophon
1.1–2 416
1.3.1 ff. 416
1.4.3 418
1.5.3 419
1.16–18 419
1.19.2 417
2.1.1 419n12, 419n13
2.1.2–3 420
2.1.3 421–422
2.7 426n, 429n28
2.8.1 429n28
2.8.2 431
2.36.2 418n8
3.11.2 427n
4.4.2 424
4.4.3 427
4.4.7–8 424–425
4.5.2–3 425–426
4.9 427n
5.3.4 422
5.3.5 423
5.5.4 422
5.5.4–5 423
5.5.6 423
5.13.2–6 423
5.27.4 430n31
6.22 426
acoustics 200
Acts
8:26–40 285
16:10–17 285
20:5–15 285
21:1–18 285
27:1–29 285
28:1–16 285
Adeimantus 264–265, 268–271, 274
Aedon 189
Aelian, *Varia Historia*
6.10 307n
13.24 307n
Aeschines
1 (*Against Timarchus*)
1.40 334n49
1.77–78 310n, 312–313
1.86 310n
1.114 310n
2 (*On the Embassy*)
2.118 334n59
2.177 310n
2.182 310n
Aeschylus
Agamemnon 167–198, esp. 170–197
40–257 (parodos) 173–179
104–106 175
121 176
139 176
159 176
160–183 (hymn to Zeus) 177
177 169, 177, 179
681–782 182
975–1034 183–184
988–993 183
1140–1145 188
1186–1192 192
1468–1474 196
Choephoroi 198
306–478 198–199
Eumenides 199–200
307–396 (*hymnos desmios*) 199
Oresteia 166–201
Niobe 261, 264–267, 271
Seven Against Thebes 261, 263–264, 268, 271–273
Wool-Carders 261, 266, 271
fragments of
F154 Radt 264
F162 Radt 267
F168 Radt 266
F350 Radt 267

fragments of (*cont.*)
F351 Radt 268
tragedian par excellence 260
Aesop 399
aesthetic/s 169–170, 174, 190–191, 193, 197, 200–201
Agamemnon 32n5, 37, 46, 48, 56, 58–61, 62, 63, 64, 69, 70, 178–188
see also storytellers, Homeric
ἀκρίβεια 332–341
Demosthenes' self-presentation and 332–341
imprecision vs 341–346
numeral qualifiers and 346
τέχνη and 334, 334n57
writing and 334–335
see also writing
Alcibiades 425, 428
Alcidamas, *On the Sophists* 13 335, 335n65
Alexander the Great 102–104
Alexandria 208–213, 218–219, 227, 422
see also Hellenistic
Alexandrian 208, 210n9 and n11, 211–213, 215, 217–219
see also Hellenistic
Alexandrian aesthetics 128, 130
Alexis 105–106
Allen, T.W. 278n5
Amphiareus 263, 268
Anakalypteria 191
ancient classification of literature 128–129
animals 399, 400
cognition 400, 406
crows 411
elephant 424–429
fish 403
hippopotamus 424
speech 400, 406, 409, 412
Anteia 47
Antilochos 33n7, 34n13, 43n21, 101
Antiphon, *Second Tetralogy* 3.2.1–2 335n65
Antisthenes (sophist) 98
Apelles 102–104
Aphrodite 219, 221–226
Apollo 39, 179, 185–186, 191, 193–196, 201
Aristophanes 234n4
Acharnians 260n5
Birds 772 196
Frogs 260n5, 265n24, 271n52
Wasps 655–722 325
Aristotle 353–354, 357, 363, 366n46, 397–398, 406–407, 410
Athenaion Politeia 305–306
5.1 305
6 305
9 305
13.5 309
21.2 306
26.4 306
42.1–2 308, 311
42.1 308
Nicomachean Ethics
I.2 (1094b12–14) 334n62
Poetics
1448a19–24 128–129n15
Politics 397–398, 406–407
1275b19–21 316
1275b34–39 306
Rhetoric 1404b14, 33 420
I.4.5–13 (1359b–1360a) 325
1404b14, 33 420
III.12 (1413b3–1414a28) 334n63
Artemis 176–177
Asclepiades of Myrlaea 100, 102–106, 108–109
aspect (verbal) 236
atechnoi pisteis 333
Athenaeus
x.434c 103–104
xi.461 102–107
xi.466 102–107
xi.487–494 102–107
xi.501 102–107
xi.781 93, 102–107
Athene 31, 33n7, 34n14, 35–37, 38n18
Athenian Tribute Lists 325n21
auditory theater 200
augmentation 245–246, 249–252
authoritative voice 172–176, 178, 180
autoethnography 379, 393

Bakker, Egbert 245
bard 49
Barrett, James 52
Bartsch, S. 417n7, 422
beautification 189
Beck, Deborah 46n32, 47, 278n4, 292
Bellerophon 47

Ben Zvi, E. 291–292, 291n25, 292, 292n26, 293
Benveniste, Émile 244
Bible
  see under 2 Chronicles, 2 Kings, Acts, Ezra, Judges, Joshua, Leviticus, Luke, Nehemiah, etc.
bird-metaphor 173–175, 188, 195–197
body language 178
breath 422, 424–426, 427
bride 178, 182, 191–192
Brooks, P. 429
Burnet, J. 420n14
Byrskog, S. 285n15, 293

Caesar 389–392
Calchas 48, 56–61, 62, 66, 69, 70, 175–177
calculation
  cognition and 321–322
  common sense and 330
  communicative function of 325, 329–332
  emotions and 329–332
  expertise and 332, 333, 333n55, 341
  inappropriateness of 331
  interactive 336, 339–340, 345
  live 336, 337–338, 345–346
  memory and 321, 321n5, 321n6
  money and 326–328
  necessity and 340–341
  oral 322, 326–328, 345, 346
  procedure and 336
  repeatability of 336–337
  transparency of 336, 340–341
Cantilena, Mario 49
Cassandra 173, 178, 184–195
Cassiodorus, *Variae* 10.30 425n22
Cephalus 268–269, 273
Chafe, Wallace 241
charm 174, 177, 179–180
Charmides 424–428
choral projection 173
choral self-referentiality 167–171, 173, 183–184, 190, 197, 199–200
chorality 166, 192
choreia 166–201
chorus 166–201
  see also Epinician Odes, chorus
Cicero
  Brutus 369–371
  De Oratore 353–372
  Epistulae ad Atticum 2.1 352–353
  Epistulae ad Familiares 1.9 353
  Epistulae ad Quintum fratrem 3.5 361–362
  Orator 359, 364–365
  Pro Caelio 358–360
Circe 402–406, 408
circle dance 194
citizenship 297–298, 305–316
city lament 272
Civil Wars (Roman) 161–163
Cleisthenes 305–306, 308n, 315
Clitophon 416–431
Clytemnestra 170–188, 194–196
Coligny calendar 377–395, 388–390, 392–394
Conte, G.B. 416
cricket(s) 215–216
  see also euphonist(s); euphony, euphonism
crow 195–196
curse 178–179, 195, 197

Daphnis 210n13, 219–227
de Jong, Irene 49–52
de Temmerman, K. 416n3, 417n7, 429n24
Deborah 280–282
deceptive speech 47
decorum 364–367
Delphic Theoxeny 150–152
deme registry 305–315
Demetrius of Phalerum 213, 214n28 and n29, 216, 220–223, 224n67, 227
Demodokos 278–279
Demosthenes
  6 (*Philippic* 2)
    6.35 334n59
  8 (*On the Chersonese*)
    8.38 334n59
  10 (*Philippic* 4)
    10.75 334n59
  12 (*Philip*)
    12.13 334n59
  14 (*On the Navy*) 326n26
  18 (*On the Crown*)
    18.21 326n59
  20 (*Against Leptines*) 326n26, n29

Demosthenes (*cont.*)
23 (*Against Aristocrates*)
23.148 334n59
27 (*Against Aphobus* 1) 326n29
27.1 332n46
27.3 332n47
27.5 344
27.7 332n48, 332n49, 332n50, 347
27.9 332n50, 336–337
27.10 326n30, 336–337, 343
27.11 338n83, 343n100
27.17 339
27.34 339n86
27.35 338, 344
27.36 340, 340n76, 345
27.37 338n83, 340n76
27.40 332n50
28 (*Against Aphobus* 2)
28.4 332n48
29 (*Against Aphobus*)
29.57 334n59
30 (*Against Onetor*)
30.27 334n59
34 (*Against Phormio*) 326n29
34.23–24 327n35, 337
34.40–41 327n32
36 (*For Phormio*)
36.14 334n59
41 (*Against Spudias*)
41.17 334n59
44 (*Against Leochares*)
44.35 308n
44.37 308n
44.41 313
45 (*Against Stephanus* 1)
45.3 334n59
52 (*Against Callippus*)
52.3 332n59
55 (*Against Callicles*)
55.3 334n59
57 (*Against Eubulides*)
57 310n 311
57.10 311
57.13 311
57.26 308n
57.28 313n
57.40 313n
57.46–56 311
57.46–48 301n
57.46 308n
57.47 312
57.55 308n
57.56 312n
57.58–59 311
57.60–62 308n, 314
57.60 312
58 (*Against Theocrines*)
58.45 334n59
[Dem.] 59 (*Against Neaira*)
59.17 334n59
59.38 313n
59.60 308n
59.105 315
59.121 334n59
61 (*Erotic Essay*)
61.10 334n59
Deuteronomy
1:1 286
1:38 287
3:28 287
6:4–5 285
31:1–23 287
31:24 286
31:26 286
31:9 286
32:1–43 280
32:45 286
33:1–29 280
34:9 287
dialectic 407–408, 413
dialogue genre and orality 354–355, 356–357, 372–373
Dinarchus
2.2 (*Against Aristogeiton*) 334n59
2.11 334n59
Diodorus 389, 392
Diogenes Laertius
2.26 270n39
3.5 307
Dionysius of Halicarnassus 212–213, 216, 224
Dionysius of Thrace 105, 227
Dionysus 182, 185, 186, 193n91, 196, 201
displaced mode (of discourse) 241–244
divination 300–302
documents, use of 298–305, 310–316
dokimasia 308n, 309, 312–314
Dream (or dream, in *Iliad*) 31, 32n5, 32n6, 37, 46–48

dreams, in Aeschylus 175, 179–180, 183
Duris of Samos 254n32
dysphemia 169, 173–174, 179, 182, 186

ecphrasis 239, 417, 422, 430, 431n
Edelman, D.V. 292, 293
education in oratory through apprenticeship 354–355, 360–363, 368–371, 372–373
ego-narrative 416
elephant 424–429
Eleusinian mysteries 269
embassy
  to Achilles 31n2
  vs. messenger scene 33n7
embedded speeches
  direct embedded speeches 46–49
  indirect embedded speeches 46, 49–50
embellishment 175, 197
enchantment 174
  see also incantation and *parathelxis*
encomia 261, 274
enigmatic 173–175, 180, 191, 197
ephebeia 271n51
Epicurean 209–210, 214, 217n46, 218
epigram 421n15, 431n32
Epinician Odes
  as processional songs 134–135
  as part of a ritual 134–135
  autobiographical fictions 127–128, 130, 141–143
  chorus 129, 138–140
  historical author 138–140
  historical performance situation 125–127, 134–135
  intratextual pragmatic situation 131–134
  oral subterfuge 140–141
  place of performance 134–135
  poetology 140–141
  re-performances 131n26
  Sitz im Leben 131
  speaker 127–130, 136–139
eponymous archon 270
Erinys/Erinyes 168, 174 with n35, 176, 180–184, 187–188, 192, 194, 196, 198–199
Eros (*eros*) 225, 416, 417, 429
eroticism 178
Eteocles 268, 272–274
etêtumos 43
ethnolinguistic vitality 393
euphemia 168–169, 172–173, 175, 177, 180, 184, 187–188, 191–195, 199
euphonist(s) 209–225, 227
  critics 209–210, 214, 217n46, 223
  see also cricket; Demetrius of Phalerum; Dionysius of Halicarnassus; Dionysius of Thrace; euphony; Longinus; Pausimachus; Philodemus; song culture
euphony, euphonism 216n43, 217, 224, 227
  literary, literate 208–210, 211–215, 216n39, 217–218, 220, 228
  lyricism 214n33, 218, 223, 225
  musicality 214, 215n33, 216, 224–225
  sonority 214n33, 222–223, 225n71, 227
  sound 209–210, 212, 214–215, 216n41, 217, 220–221, 222n62, 223–225, 226n74, 227
  textual performance 209, 217, 220, 227
  see also cricket; euphonist(s); song culture
Euripides, *Antiope* 266, 270
Europa 416–418
Eurylochus 404–407
Eurymachus 59n12, 61, 62–65, 68, 69
Exodus
  15:1–18 279
  15:21 280
exoikesis 426
Ezra 289–290, 297–305, 310, 314–316
  2 299, 301–303
  2:3–58 302n
  2:59–63 299
  2:59–60 300
  2:60 302n
  2:62 300–301, 304
  7:1–5 301
  7:6 289
  7:11 289, 301
  7:12 289
  7:21 289
  8 302n
  8:1 300n, 301, 302
  8:3 300
  10 299–301, 304
  10:3 304

10:16 302, 304
10:18–44 304

fable 399
Fasti 378–385
Fasti Antiates Maiores 382
Fasti Praenestini 382–383
FD III 3:124, lines 2–7 283
focalization (in narration)
De Jong 49–52
degrees of 49–52
focalizer 49–52
narrator 49–52
Foley, J.M. 277n1, 277n2, 291n24, 293
folksong(s) *see song culture*
foreigners 265, 301n15, 306
formal education (*paideia, doctrina*) 355, 359–363
formulae 64n20, 75–76, 78–79, 85, 88–89, 246, 401, 403, 408
frame narrative 416–418, 427, 429

gardens 417–418
Garnaud, J.-P. 418n8
Gaulish month names
EQVOS 381n, 385–388
SAMON- 390
gaze 178–179, 417, 419, 430
genealogies 299–304, 316
Glaucon (Glaukon) 98, 263–265, 269, 271, 274
Glaucus 47
gnomic aorist 245
goatherd 215, 217
goos 169–170, 174, 182, 184, 186, 190–191, 193, 195, 198, 200
see also lament
Greek silver from Macedonia 103
Greek vases
Attic "Prachtschalen" 99–100
Eretria painter 100–101
Epigenes potter 100–101
inscribed black glaze 105–107
Pithecussae skyphos 93–98
Warrior vase 94

Hadrian's Villa
Doves mosaic 108
Hägg, T. 416n2
Halitherses 59n12, 61, 62–63, 65, 66n24, 68, 70
healing 170n14, 179–183, 185, 193–194; *see also* remedy
Hector (Hektor) 21n44, 26n62, 31, 35–39, 41–42, 44–46, 47n38, 84n24, 419
Hekabe 35–37, 45
Helenos 35–37
Hellenistic 208–209, 211–212, 214n28, 215–218, 223, 227
see also Alexandria; Alexandrian
herald *see* messenger
Herchenroeder, Lucas 410
herdsman, herdsmen 219, 224, 226n75, 227
see also pastoral; Theocritus
hermeneus 185
Herodotus 238, 252, 262n12
1.10.1–2 237n8, 238
1.30.2–3 247
1.34–43 247–249
Hesiod 234n4, 427
Days 85–89
handwashing 84
instructions about urination 84–85
mules 85–87
Nautilia 76, 81
oxen 85–88
plowman 78–79
woodcutting 80
Hindermann, J. 417n7
Hippocrates, *Ancient Medicine* (VM) 1.588.13–15 334n62
historical present 233–240, 243–244, 246–247, 249–254
Homer 33–34, 260, 264, 271
Iliad 31–52
2. 8–71 32n5, 37, 46–48
2.100–108 249–250
4.141 418
6.86–98 35–36
6.269–310 36–37
6.823–826 419
7.354–397 33n7
8.423–424 33n7
9.631–636 92–120
10.30 425n222
11.361–363 245
11.558–562 244
11.612, 650 31n2, 34n12, 34n13

13.730–734 245
15.158–217 38–41
16.839–841 46–47
22.438–439 43
24.74–140 41–43, 50–51
24.143–199 37
Odyssey 189
7.104–107 234n3
8.62–64 278
8.83–110 278
8.201–233 278
8.235–255 279
8.256–265 279
8.266–366 279
8.469–498 279
8.479–481 279
8.499–520 279
8.521–532 279
8.533–545 279
8.546–563 279
8.564–585 279
9–12 279
19.518–523 189n80, 196
22.346–347 183n62
Homeric language 234–237, 244–246, 249–252
Horace
and Achilles 155–159
and Apollo 159–161
Odes
4.6.13–24 156–157
4.6.25–30 159–160
4.6.31–40 157
4.6.41–44 154–155
hymnody 261, 274

Idaios 31, 33n7, 34n13, 43n21
IG I³ 52A 324n17
IG I³ 369 338n82
illness 182
immediate mode (of discourse) 241–244, 252
incantation see also enchantment and *parathelxis* 184
India 425–427
intermarriage 297–298, 304
Iphigenia 173, 176, 178, 191n85
Iris (messenger of gods) 31, 32n6, 32n7, 34n12, 34n14, 37–44, 48, 51
irony (dramatic) 265
Isaeus
7 (*Apollodorus*) 308n
7.27 308n
11 (*Against Hagnias*) 326, 333n51
11.3 333n51
11.15 333n51
11.34 327n31
11.38 333n51, 334n58
12 310n
Isocrates
4.53 (*Panegyricus*) 334n59
5.29 (*To Philip*) 334n59
6.24 (*Archidamus*) 334n59
6.65 313
8.80 (*On the Peace*) 334n59
8.88–89 310
9.73 (*Evagoras*) 334n59
12.36 (*Panathenaicus*) 334n59
12.85 334n59
14.50 (*Plataicus*) 334n59
15.173 (*Antidosis*) 334n59
16.22 (*On the Team of Horses*) 334n59

Jakobson, Roman 186, 197
Janzen, J.G. 280n7, 293
Joshua 287–288
1:7–8 287
8:32, 34–35 288
Josiah 288–289
Judges
4 282
5:2–7 281

Kallias Decree 1 (IG I³ 52A) 324n17
Kallipolis
guardians of 264, 266, 270, 271, 274
'noble lie' 269
practicality of 265
katabasis 271
katastasis 187
see also stasis
kithara 419–421
komos 132–134, 136n36
Konstan, D. 293, 417n4
Kurke, Leslie 151–152

Labarrière, Jean-Louis 402
Lacan, Jacques 178n48

lament 169–170, 173, 175–176, 179, 181–182, 184–186, 188–191, 195–198, 200
see also city lament
Lattimore, R. 278n5, 293
Lavinia 418n10
learning 169, 179, 197
Létoublon, Françoise 43–44
Leuchter, M. 280n8, 293
Leucippe 416–431
Leviticus
19:18 285
lists 299–304, 308n, 310, 311–314, 316
Littlewood, A.R. 417n7
Longinus 222
Longus, *Daphnis and Chloe*
1.18 419
love 210, 219n51, 220–222; *see also* pastoral
lover, doomed 219–220, 224
Lucian, *Hermotimus* 12 98
Luke
4:16–30 284, 290
10:25–28 284
Lycurgus
1.31 334n59
76 308n
lyric 419–422, 430
Lysias
19 (*On the Property of Aristophanes*) 326n29
21 (*Defence against a Charge of Taking Bribes*) 326n29
21.1 308n
21.1–5 342n92
32 (*Against Diogeiton*) 326n29, 328–332, 342, 345
32.4–8 342n92
32.9 327–328
32.15 328n37
32.19 332
32.20 329–330
32.21 330
32.22 331
32.25 339n84
32.26–27 329n41, 330, 346

mant- stem 54, 55, 58, 60, 61, 62, 63, 69, 70, 71, 72
mantis 54, 56, 58, 59, 60, 62, 71
manteuomai 54, 59, 60, 62, 63, 66n24, 71
mantosunē 54, 56, 71
mantēion 54
Marinčič, M. 417
Marmor Parium 237n8, 240
239A49 Jacoby 241
marriage 167, 191
Marsyas 420, 428
Martial 8.6 107–108
mathematics 322n10
McLuhan, Marshall 197
medicine 424–425
medium 177, 189–190, 196–197, 200
Meleager of Gadara 421n15
Melite 430n31
memory
and the 'distinctiveness heuristic' 25–26
and spatial location 26
and management 22–25
and 'mental moulds' 18–19
and retrieval of stories 14–18
and 'thematic packages' 18–19
see also calculation, memory and
Menander, *Kolax* 103–104
Menelaus 418
messenger
Ángelos 31n1, 31–52
herald 31n1
reliability (of the) 41, 43–45, 51–52
scenes 31–43, 50–52
speeches 31–43, 45–50
metabole 182
metalepsis 417, 418
metapoetic weaving 189n80, 198n108
metatheatricality 167–168, 178, 182, 184
metatragedy 167, 169, 201
metics 265
Meyers, C. 280, 280n7, 280n9, 293
Miller, John 161–163
mimesis 262, 266, 268
Minchin, E. 292
mise en abyme 178, 201
mixing 176–177, 181n58, 182, 187
Moore, C. 430n29
Morales, H. 416, 417, 419n11, 429
Morgan, J.R. 416n3
Moses 279–280, 286–287, 291–292
multiple relay 35, 37–43, 50–52
murder 171, 181, 184, 186–188, 192, 194–195
Muse 49, 52, 143

music 166–170, 177, 179, 184, 189–191, 193, 195, 197–201, 419–422, 428, 430
musicality 166, 184, 198, 200
Mycenae, Shaft Grave IV
  Gold kantharos 108–109
Myron (sculptor) 431n

narrative desire 429
narrative, Homeric
  secondary narrative (*Iliad*) 11–22
  secondary narrative (*Odyssey*) 22–26
narrator 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 68, 69n29, 72
  see also unreliable narrator
Nehemiah 297–305, 310, 314–316
  2:20 297
  7 299, 302–303
  7:5 300n, 302
  7:7–60 302n
  7:62 302n
  7:64 300n, 304
  8:5, 7–8 289
  10:1 303
  11 299, 304
  12:12–23 301n
  13 303
Nestor 31n2, 67
  see also storytellers, Homeric
New Testament 253
Ní Mheallaigh, K. 417
Niditch, S. 281n10, 293
nightingale 188–189, 195
  see also Aedon
Nimis, S. 422n17, 423n20
"noble lie" 269
  see also Kallipolis
nomos 188–189, 190n82, 194, 199
numbers
  lists and 326n
  manipulation of *see* calculation
  origin of writing and 322, 322n9
  recording of 322–324
  rounded 339, 341–346
  writing and 322
numeral qualifier 341–346
  approximating
    ἐς/εἰς 337n76, 343
    μάλιστα 338
  comparative
    μικροῦ δέοντα 344–345
    πλέον ἤ 342, 343–344n100
  imprecision and 342–343
  uncertainty and 343, 343n97
numerals
  acrophonic 323, 323n12
  alphabetic 323, 323n11
  Hindu-Arabic 323, 323n13

Odysseus 58n10, 62, 64, 66n23, 68, 69, 70, 406–410
ololygmos 170–171, 181, 187–188, 194, 199–200
oral poetry 234
orations published as texts 351–354, 369–373
oratory & orators 353–372
Orientalizing cauldrons 110–113
oxymoron 186, 189–191, 201

paean 167, 179, 181–182, 185, 193–194, 198, 200, 272
πάθει μάθος 169, 177
palinode 261, 273–274
palintonos harmonia 190
  see also oxymoron
paradox 169, 176, 181–182, 187–188, 190–191, 197, 201
parapegmata 385
parathelxis 172, 174
pastoral 210, 219n51, 221, 226–227
  see also herdsman; love; Theocritus
pathos 167, 169–170, 173–174, 177–179, 184, 186, 189, 191, 195, 197, 200
Patroclus (Patroklos) 31n2, 33n7, 34n12, 46, 67–68, 419
Pausimachus 209, 213, 216, 222, 223n64
peitho 175, 180–181, 199
Pelliccia, Hayden 404, 405
Penner, T. 293
pepaideumenoi 412
performance, textual 209, 217, 220, 227
performativity 166
Pericles 305–309
Person, R.F. 277n2, 286n17, 287n19, 288nn20–21, 290n22, 291n24, 293
persona loquens
  and Horace 159–163
  and Pindar 123–130, 136–144, 150–152
Pherecydes of Syros 234–236, 252

7B1 D.–K. 234–235
7B2 D.–K. 235
Philodemus 209, 214, 216n40 and n41, 222n62
Philomela 189n80, 195n96, 422–424, 430
Philostratus
Imagines 1.1.1–2 239–240
Life of Apollonius of Tyana 2.11 425n22
phroimion 194, 198
see also prelude
Phrynichus 262n12
Phylarchus 253–254
Phylarchus 81F24 Jacoby 254–255
Pindar 123–144, 236, 251
Olympian Odes
1 127, 140
1.17–23 133n30
6.84–87 128, 141–142
9.1–8 132–133
Pythian Odes
5.72–76 128
8.56–60 137–138n38
8.98 128
8.100 137–138n38
9.89–92 138n38
10.51–54 123
Nemean Odes
1.19–24 133–134
7.61 137n38
7.65–66 137n38
7.84–86 137n38
9.1–3 133
Isthmian Odes
2 130n21
Paeans
6.7–14 157–158
Piraeus 265, 269, 273
Plato
as tragedian 270
Charmides 424–425
155b3–7 425
Clitophon 430n29
Gorgias 270, 362–363
Hippias Maior 285d–e 283
Laws 669d 420
Meno 83E 334n62
Phaedo 196
84e3–85b4 196
85b2 196
Phaedrus 269n37, 273–274, 363, 365n42, 371, 417
278c 420
Philebus 56B–61D 334n62
Republic
city/soul analogy 268
date of composition 263n16
narrative form of 265
Symposium
215a–b 425
215c–d 428
Pliny the Elder, *Natural History* 28.88 425n22
Pliny the Younger 389–390, 392
Plutarch 406, 410
Demosthenes 8.1–7 335, 335n71
8.4 335, 335n70
8.6 335, 335n72, 335n73
8.6–7 335n74
Pericles 37.2–5 307n, 309
37.4 309n
Solon 5 305n
15 305n
Moralia: de esu carnium 412–413
poetic *ego* *see persona loquens*
poetic function 186, 197
poetic performance 49, 52
poeticity 166, 200
poetics 190
poetry
'ancient quarrel' of with philosophy 260–261, 270
as traditional education 260, 264
banned from Kallipolis 260
meters of 262, 265–266, 272
problematic content of 262, 266
Polemarchus 265n23, 273
Polybius 253–254
Histories 2.56.10 253
Porphyry, *Homeric Questions* 98
Poseidon 38–41, 62n17
power 55, 56, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65–66, 69–70, 71
praesens annalisticum/tabulare 240
prelude 167, 170–171, 194–195, 200
see also phroimion
Priam 20, 21n44, 32, 36, 41
priests 299–302, 304
Procne 189, 195n96, 422–424
see also Aedon

Promathidas of Herakleia 105, 108
prophecy 47–48, 54, 55, 57n8, 58, 61, 63, 64–66, 67, 68, 70, 71–72, 173, 183, 186–187, 193–194, 197, 401
prosopopoeia 358
pseudángelos 44–45
psiloi logoi 420, 430
Ptolemies 211, 212n18
  see also Alexandria; Alexandrian
Ptolemy II Philadelphus 211–212, 218, 228
Ptolemaic 211, 212, 218, 227–228

Ready, Jonathan 22n48, 43–44
Reardon, B.P. 416n2
regimenting 169
remedy 170, 181–182, 185, 198, 424, 428
Repath, I. 417n6, 423n19, 424n21
reported speech 31–45, 417, 420–421, 423, 426–431
  see also embedded speeches, indirect narration, indirect speech
Republic *see* Plato, *Republic*
risk-aversion 75, 79–80
rite de passage 191
rituality 166
Rollston, C. 287n18, 293
Römer, T. 279n6, 293
rose 417–419, 420–422, 425–428

sacrifice 68, 167–168, 171n20, 172, 174, 176–179, 181, 188, 194–195, 199, 389
sacrificial ritual 171
Salamis Tablet 324
Sappho, fr. 55 (Voigt) 421n15
satisficing 83
Satyros 419
Scodel, Ruth 49–50
scribes 301–302
Selene 105, 418
self-referentiality 140–141, 167–171, 173, 183–184, 189n80, 190, 197, 200
shepherd 210n13, 219n50, 227n79
Shiell, W.D. 286n16, 293
Sidon 416
silence 168–169, 172, 178–181, 184–185, 405–406, 413, 417, 420, 423, 426, 429
similes (in Homer) 244–245, 401n14, 403, 419
Socrates 260–261, 264–268, 270–271, 273–274, 283, 362–363, 370, 420, 425, 428, 430n29
Solon 247, 305–306
song culture 167n5, 169–170
  folksong(s) 210–211, 217–221, 227
  oral 208, 210–212, 214, 216–218, 220–221, 223–225, 228
  song(s) 208, 210–215, 216n38, 217–221, 223, 224n67, 225–228
  see also euphonist(s); euphony
Sorabji, Richard 398
sound 169–170, 173, 177, 181–192, 195–197, 199–201
  see also euphony, sound
speech reporting 32n4, 31–52
speech-act 179, 184, 199n114
sphragis 141–143, 154–155
Squire, M. 431n
stasis 187, 198n109
Stesimbrotos (sophist) 98
Stoics 209, 398, 410
stories in Homer
  binding of Zeus 19–20, 21
  Heracles 17–18
  Lapiths and Centaurs 13, 16–17, 21
  Niobe 20–21
  'nostoi'-tales 22–26
  Tydeus 14
storytellers, Homeric
  Achilles 19–20
  Agamemnon 14, 17, 19
  Antinous 16–17
  Nestor 13, 19
  and their 'voices' 18–20
storytelling
  and adaptation 20–22
  and interleaved tales 22–26
  and rehearsal 20–21
stylometrics 75
suffering 169–171, 173–174, 177, 179, 181, 190–191, 195, 262, 264, 431
  see also pathos
swallow 195
swan 195–196

tableau 178
Talthybios 31, 43n21
Taplin, Oliver 168
Teiresias 70

Telemachus 23–24, 61, 64–66, 68, 69, 70, 85
Tereus 189n80, 422
Theano 37, 45
Theoclymenus 58n12, 66n24, 70n29, 71
Theocritus 208n2, 209n3, 210–211, 214–222, 223n65, 224–225, 226n74, 227–228
  Idylls 210, 214, 216n39, 217–219, 222n62, 223, 225, 228
    1 215–227
    3 219
    5 224
    6 219
    7 215n37, 219, 226, 227n77
    10 210n11
    15 210n11, 219
    29 208n2
  see also pastoral; herdsmen
theoprop- stem 54, 55, 56n5, 58–59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 66, 69–72
  theopropiē 54, 58, 63–65, 67–68, 71n30
  theopropeō 54, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64, 71
  theopropos 54, 62n17, 71
  theopropion 54, 58, 65
Thersander 426
Thetis 19–21, 32, 34n14, 41–43, 45, 51, 62, 261, 266, 271, 274
Thiessen, M. 280n8, 293
Thoötes 31, 43n21
Thucydides 1.22 334n64
Thyrsis 210–211, 218–221, 223–227
tis speeches 47
torsion 194
tragedy 166–171, 174, 176–177, 179, 182, 184, 189–192, 197–198, 200–201, 261–262
Tydeus 14, 268

unreliable narrator 416–417, 419, 430–431

vases *see* Greek vases
veil 178, 191, 193
verbal adjective 340–341, 345
verbatim repetition 31n2, 32–33, 34–43
Vergil, *Aeneid* 12.67–69 418n10
Vilborg, E. 429n27

Warburg, Aby 197
Weaver, J.B. 284n14, 294
web 172–173, 175, 198
writing
  democracy and 335
  overpreparedness and 335

Xanthus (horse) 401
Xenophon 238, 244
  Anabasis
    1.1.1 238
    1.2.5 237n8, 239

Zelnick-Abramovitz, R. 282–283, 282nn11–12, 282n13, 290n23, 294
Zeus 32n5, 32n6, 34n14, 37–45, 46n34, 47–48, 50–51, 174, 176–177, 179–180, 182, 184, 187